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LATIN AMERICA

LATIN AMERICA



CLARK UNIVERSITY ADDRESSES

NOVEMBER, 1913

EDITED BY
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CONTENTS

INTRODUCTION. DR. George H. Blakeslee.....	vii
I. CONTRASTS IN THE DEVELOPMENT OF NATIONALITY IN THE ANGLO- AND LATIN-AMERICAN. Señor Don Federico A. Pezet, Envoy Extraordinary and Minister Plenipoten- tiary from Peru.....	1
II. PAN-AMERICAN POSSIBILITIES. John Barrett, Director- General of the Pan-American Union, formerly United States Minister to Siam, Argentina, Panama and Colombia.....	20
III. A GLANCE AT LATIN-AMERICAN CIVILIZATION. Francisco J. Yanes, Asst. Director, and Secretary of the Govern- ing Board, of the Pan-American Union.....	30
IV. THE MEXICAN SITUATION FROM A MEXICAN POINT OF VIEW. Lic. Luis Cabrera, recently Speaker of the House of Representatives in the Mexican Congress...	47
V. THE FUNDAMENTAL CAUSES OF THE PRESENT SITUATION IN MEXICO. Nevin O. Winter, Author of "Mexico and Her People Today".....	64
VI. THE MEXICAN SITUATION. S. W. Reynolds, formerly President of the Mexican Central Railway Company, Limited.....	82
VII. DEMOCRACY ON TRIAL. John Howland, D.D., President of Colegio Internacional, Guadalajara, Mexico.....	95
VIII. THE PRESENT SITUATION IN MEXICO AS SHAPED BY PAST EVENTS. Leslie C. Wells, Professor of French and Spanish at Clark College.....	104
IX. THE PRESENT DAY PHASE OF THE MONROE DOCTRINE. F. E. Chadwick, Rear Admiral, United States Navy, Formerly President of the Naval War College; Chief of Staff to Admiral Sampson in the Spanish War.....	108
X. THE MONROE DOCTRINE FROM A SOUTH AMERICAN VIEW- POINT. Honorable Charles H. Sherrill, Envoy Extra- ordinary and Minister Plenipotentiary to Argentina, 1909-1911.....	121
XI. SHOULD WE ABANDON THE MONROE DOCTRINE? Hiram Bingham, Ph.D., Assistant Professor of Latin-American History, Yale University.....	126
XII. THE MONROE DOCTRINE. Honorable George F. Tucker...	151
XIII. THE MODERN MEANING OF THE MONROE DOCTRINE. J. M. Callahan, Ph.D., Professor of History and Political Science, West Virginia University.....	161
XIV. THE MONROE DOCTRINE. Albert Bushnell Hart, LL.D., Professor of Government, Harvard University.....	172
XV. THE DEVELOPMENT OF OUR LATIN-AMERICAN TRADE. Hon. John Hays Hammond, LL.D.....	176

XVI.	ADVANTAGES OF MAKING THE CANAL ZONE A FREE CITY AND FREE PORT. W. D. Boyce, Publisher, The Saturday Blade and Chicago Ledger.....	181
XVII.	SOME ECONOMIC FACTS AND CONCLUSIONS ABOUT SOUTH AMERICA. Selden O. Martin, Ph.D., Graduate School of Business Administration, Harvard University.....	197
XVIII.	THE PROBABLE EFFECT OF THE OPENING OF THE PANAMA CANAL ON OUR ECONOMIC RELATIONS WITH THE PEOPLE OF THE WEST COAST OF SOUTH AMERICA. Hiram Bingham, Ph.D., Assistant Professor of Latin-American History, Yale University.....	216
XIX.	SOME OF THE OBSTACLES TO NORTH AMERICAN TRADE IN BRAZIL. John C. Branner, LL.D., President of Stanford University.....	235
XX.	AMERICAN INTERVENTION IN CENTRAL AMERICA. Philip Marshall Brown, Assistant-Professor of International Law and Diplomacy, Princeton University; formerly American Minister to Honduras.....	245
XXI.	THE DOMINICAN CONVENTION AND ITS LESSONS. Jacob H. Hollander, Ph.D., Professor of Political Economy, Johns Hopkins University, Formerly Special Commissioner Plenipotentiary to Santo Domingo, and Financial Adviser of the Dominican Republic.....	263
XXII.	IN JUSTICE TO THE UNITED STATES—A SETTLEMENT WITH COLOMBIA. Earl Harding.....	274
XXIII.	THE RELATIONS OF THE UNITED STATES WITH THE LATIN-AMERICAN REPUBLICS. Leopold Grahame, formerly editor of "The Buenos Aires Herald" and of "The Argentine Year Book".....	290
XXIV.	THE MIND OF THE LATIN-AMERICAN NATIONS. David Montt, General Correspondent of "El Diario Ilustrado," Santiago, Chile.....	299
XXV.	HIGHER EDUCATION IN LATIN AMERICA. Edgar Ewing Brandon, Ph.D., Vice-President of Miami University..	307
XXVI.	THE UNIVERSITIES AND AMERICAN INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS. George W. Nasmyth, Ph.D., President of the Eighth International Congress of Students; Director of the International Bureau of Students.....	321
XXVII.	PATAGONIA AND TIERRA DEL FUEGO. José Moneta, Captain, Argentine Navy, Commanding Battleship "Rivadavia," formerly member of the Argentine Boundary Commissions with Chile and Brazil.....	328
XXVIII.	THE PHYSICAL BASIS OF THE ARGENTINE NATION. Bailey Willis, Ph.D., Consulting Geologist to the Minister of Public Works, Argentina, 1911-1913; Member of the United States Geological Survey.....	342
XXIX.	THE ADAPTABILITY OF THE WHITE MAN TO TROPICAL AMERICA. Fillsworth Huntington, Ph.D., Assistant Professor of Geography, Yale University.....	360

INTRODUCTION

Increasingly intimate relations between the United States and the countries of Latin America will be one of the striking features of the next few decades. Since the days when these sister republics began their independent existence a century ago, their people and our own have been neighbors to Europe, but strangers to each other. Happily this period of mutual isolation has now come to an end.

The reasons for this separation of a hundred years are not hard to find. The United States was absorbed in its own internal development and gave little thought to other countries, least of all to those with whom it had no necessary association. As an agricultural land it exported surplus raw materials—wheat, corn, meat and cotton—to England, France and Germany, and received in return the best grades of manufactured goods. A rapidly swelling stream of immigration maintained some connection with these older nations across the Atlantic. The diplomacy of the United States was largely limited to problems concerning either Europe or the lands immediately beyond our borders. The large tourist class of today did not exist during most of this period; even the relatively few who went abroad for sightseeing had no desire to visit countries which they regarded as primitive, sparsely settled and racked by constant revolutions. In fact there was nothing which tended to bring the United States and South America into close contact.

Latin America, also, found no common ties during the past century to bind it to this country. Although it was strongly influenced by North American precedents in its revolt against Spain and in the form of its national constitutions the connection between the two sections went no further. Like the United States the rapidly developing republics of the South sent their raw materials to Europe and bought manufactured goods in return. They received hundreds of thousands of immigrants from the Latin countries of the old world and borrowed from European bankers the vast sums

which built their railroads, harbors, and attractive capitals. The intellectual life, the school and university systems, social customs, fashions and styles all came from France, Spain or Portugal.

The cords which stretched from this country and from Latin America to the outside world all led to Europe; there were none which bound the two sections together.

This situation is rapidly passing away, for the underlying conditions which caused it are changing. The United States now needs foreign markets in which to sell its surplus manufactures and is entering upon a systematic campaign to take the commercial leadership in Latin America. At the same time it is ceasing to export and coming to import agricultural produce; the past few months shiploads of Argentine beef and corn have been sold in the cities of our Atlantic states. Thus the basis of a new trade relationship is coming into existence—the exchange of North American manufactured goods for the raw products of the lands to the South. A similar change has taken place in international finance; the United States has recently become a creditor nation, ready to loan large sums in foreign countries; the billion of dollars invested by our citizens in Mexico during the past two or three decades is an evidence that similar help may be given in the near future to other American republics. The diplomatic policy of the United States, also, is changing as noticeably as its foreign trade and finance. The Monroe Doctrine, which sums up our traditional attitude towards the outside world, has in the past concerned itself chiefly with the behavior of Europe towards the Republics of Latin America; we are now attempting, practically for the first time, to define our own relations with these republics. This Doctrine in its present form, so far as it relates to the Latin American states, is very generally regarded as unsatisfactory; and a redefinition is widely demanded which shall bring about a greater coöperation with the strong, stable states to the south of us. The most immediate single cause, however, which is bringing Latin and Anglo America closer together is the building of the Panama Canal. The seizure of the Canal

Zone advanced the coast line of the United States hundreds of miles towards the center of the Latin American world; while the Canal itself is giving to North and South an object of common and general interest. It is the Canal probably, and the discussion regarding it, which have aroused the people of this country to a dawning consciousness that there exist in South America strong nations with cultured people, stable governments and attractive cities.

There are many signs of this awakening interest. The magazines are writing of the resources and the charm of South America as if it were a newly discovered land. A rapidly increasing number of books dealing with one or more of these Latin countries are issuing from the press; while one of them, in many ways the best, that by the recent British Ambassador to the United States, James Bryce, has been read by a large proportion of the thoughtful people of this country. The professional stereopticon lecturers have found that the Panama Canal and South America are the most popular subjects to present to the average well-informed audience. The teaching of Spanish, the tongue of every country to the South of us except Brazil, is being rapidly introduced in our high schools and colleges, while a knowledge of this language is being accepted by some of our higher institutions as an equivalent for French or German. Courses also are now being given in the foremost universities upon the history, the civilization and the economic conditions of South America. The diplomatic policy of the United States towards Latin America is being widely discussed. The problem whether the Monroe Doctrine should be continued unchanged, or be modified, or be abandoned, has been a live issue in our newspapers and periodicals; it has been debated in schools, colleges and universities in every part of the country; it has frequently been the topic of city economic clubs; and has been studied from nearly every aspect at three recent conferences of experts. Still another evidence of the increasing interest in Latin America is shown by the large number of tourists who have visited the Panama Canal and South America. So popular is the trip through the cities

of Brazil, Uruguay, Argentina, Chile and Peru, that the travel agencies are making reduced rates and arranging special parties for this route. A succession of Chamber of Commerce delegations also has passed south through Panama the last couple of years—so many of them that they have brought consternation to their hospitable hosts in the thriving South American cities. Finally a number of our foremost public men have recently visited our sister republics, among them being Ex-President Roosevelt and three Secretaries of State, Root, Knox, and Bryan.

Latin America also is coming into closer touch with the United States, as is shown most strikingly by the fact that 436 students from its various republics have spent the past year in our higher institutions of learning.

In matters of commerce and business the United States and Latin America are even now more closely bound together than we generally realize. It is hardly too much to say that the typical well-to-do South American business man, when he rises in the morning, puts on a pair of North American shoes, at the breakfast table reads his daily paper fresh from a North American printing press, in his office sits at a North American desk, dictates to a stenographer who uses a North American typewriter, signs his letters with a North American fountain pen, files his correspondence in North American filing-cases, weighs his goods upon North American scales, keeps his cash account by North American cash registers, and if all this should give him the toothache rushes to a North American dentist.

On the other hand, the coffee which makes our delectable breakfast cup comes from Santos, Brazil. We have just begun to eat Argentine beef, so much of it that by the end of the present year arrangements will have been perfected by which steamers will leave Buenos Aires each week for New York loaded with chilled and frozen beef and mutton. The tires of our automobiles came originally, for the most part, from the forests of the Amazon; while much of the copper used in the electric light wires in our homes and our streets was dug from the exhaustless mines of the Peruvian and Chilean Andes.

But we of North and South America are nearer to one another commercially than we are intellectually or sympathetically; we have greater mutual trade than mutual understanding of each other. The mass of our people have little comprehension of conditions in the most advanced of the Latin American countries; and are incredulous when told that the most beautiful city of the American hemisphere is not in the United States, but in South America; that two South American cities have opera houses which in elegance and luxury surpass any in our own country; and that the most imposing public avenues of the new world are in Rio de Janeiro and Buenos Aires. From a business view it may be stated that the capital of Argentina has a more extended and magnificent system of stone docks than any North American port: it has a larger number of public taxicabs than New York and Chicago combined, and, no wonder, a higher cost of living. As for other matters, the leading South American countries take far better care of their immigrants than do we, while Argentina has a more liberal system of pensions for public school teachers than any in force in this country. It might be added that the largest and most powerful Dreadnaught in the world flies neither the Stars and Stripes, nor the Union Jack, but the flag of a South American Republic.

Many stories which illustrate the mutual lack of understanding are grotesque and amusing. Only a short time ago a New York millionaire remarked to a business man from Brazil that the Panama Canal would greatly shorten the distance between New York and Rio. This is exactly the same kind of a mistake, and just as bad, as placing San Francisco on the Atlantic Coast. On the other hand, not long ago the members of the reception committee of a South American capital, while preparing a most elaborate entertainment for a Chamber of Commerce delegation, were yet tortured by the fear that after all these business men from a leading North American city would not be acquainted with the usages of polite society.

We need to become acquainted with each other, we of the North and of the South. It is notable that the Latin Ameri-

cans who have lived or studied in this country, have, for the most part, a warm-hearted admiration for our people and our institutions; while those who have been permitted to travel or reside in such progressive South American republics as Argentina, Brazil and Chile are never tired of telling of their culture, their charm and their open-handed hospitality.

To discuss conditions in Latin America and the mutual interests of its countries and our own, there met together at Clark University last November, for a four days Conference, some forty men, from both North and South America, each of whom could speak with authority upon some aspect of Latin American affairs. The carefully prepared papers which they read during these sessions are published in the present volume. The University presents this to the public in the hope that it may help to create a more sympathetic appreciation of the history, the civilization and the problems of our sister American Republics, and may aid in determining the ideal diplomatic relations which should exist between them and our own land, a problem whose solution is our nation's most pressing diplomatic task.

G. H. BLAKESLEE.

Clark University
June 10, 1914

CONTRASTS IN THE DEVELOPMENT OF NATIONALITY IN THE ANGLO- AND LATIN-AMERICAN

By Señor Don Federico A. Pezet, Envoy Extraordinary and Minister Plenipotentiary from Peru

I have chosen as my subject, a question that is most important at this time, when there is a growing tendency to know better and understand the peoples of the Latin-American nations; to get closer to them by establishing bonds of friendship through commercial relations based on mutual respect and confidence, as is evidenced by this conference, and by the recent utterances of the President of the United States in his memorable declarations at Mobile.

In order to determine properly the relative positions and conditions of the two great groups of individuals that people this American world, north and south of the Rio Grande and Gulf of Mexico, we must first study the contrasts in the development of nationality in these two groups that, for expediency, I shall denominate or class as "Anglo-American" and "Latin-American."

No man can truly appreciate another, if he does not know him. No nation can feel friendship towards another if it does not know it. But to know, should imply understanding, without which there can be nothing in common, and understanding is an essential to draw individuals together, and so it is with nations.

International relations are necessary, they are cultivated for many reasons, but they do not necessarily mean friendship. Nations, like individuals, live on good terms with their neighbors because it behooves them to do so, but this does not imply that they are friends, that there is any closer relation between them, other than one of courteous deference towards each other.

Such neighbors, whether they be individuals or nations, do not know each other, much less do they understand each other. There is consequently, no true friendship between them; no bond of union. Therefore, if such people wish to become friendly they must begin by knowing each other, becoming acquainted through intercourse and thus, discover their respective traits and characteristics, so that, in course of time, a sentiment of understanding is born, which, being reciprocal, eventually gives way to friendship, and in like manner to amity between nations.

Therefore, as a first essential to the study of the subject matter of these remarks, we must place ourselves in a position to perfectly understand the very peculiar conditions of settlement and growth of Latin America, before we can hope to obtain any fair estimate of present day Latin America.

These conditions were very different to those that have been found in Anglo America. This is a most important point and one that should be made clear to all who in this nation and elsewhere are trying to know and understand Latin America and its people.

When this point becomes apparent to all, then I shall expect to see another attitude towards our people. I contend, that the average Anglo-American does not appreciate us because he invariably wants to measure us by his own standards, regardless of the fact that those standards do not happen to fit our special type of humanity.

Physically, we are more or less similar, but in a moral sense, each has special traits of character that mark the peculiar idiosyncrasies in each. Therefore, if we reverse the process and we Latin-Americans measure you Anglo-Americans by our standards, we likewise would find you as below par, according to our estimate, which proves my premises, that, firstly, secondly and lastly, we have to thoroughly understand each other, if there is to be any reciprocal appreciation, and it behooves us to be forbearing, generous and accepting the other's idiosyncrasies as absolutely exact traits of character, born with the individual or developed in

him through environment. In order to make this point clear I must ask you to consider two things: firstly, the relative conditions at the time of the discovery of America by Christopher Columbus: both of the territories that constitute what is known today as the United States of North America, and of those that constitute what is considered as Latin America; secondly, the class and type of white men who became the first settlers in either section of America, (for expediency and clearness, I shall refer to each section, as yours and ours). Well, then, your territory, at the time of the advent of the white man from Europe, was more or less of a virgin territory, inhabited by savage and semi-savage nomadic tribes, thinly scattered all over a very vast area. While our territory was to a very great extent organized into states in a measure barbaric but nevertheless semi-civilized, densely populated, and concentrated in a manner to make for cohesion. Mayas, Aztecs and Toltecs, Caras, Chimus, Incas, Aymaras, and Quichuas, and other tribes, less known, over-ran our territory and presented marked contrast with conditions in yours.

According as the news of the discovery of the New World invaded the European countries, two types, that were to mold the destinies of the wonderlands beyond the seas, were brought into play; the one formed of the oppressed and persecuted by religious intolerance, the other of the adventurous, soldiers of fortune, in quest of gold and adventures.

Both of these started out with set purposes, the oppressed and persecuted came to the New World to build up new homes, free from all the troubles left behind. While the adventurous came, bent on destroying and carrying away everything they could lay their hands on. So here we have the true genesis of the formation of nationality in Anglo- and Latin-America. In the two great classes, the permanent and the temporary, the one to build up, the other to tear down and destroy. The one came with reverence, the other with defiance. Both with an equally set purpose, but the one with humility in his heart, the other proud and

overbearing; the one full of tenderness born of his religious zeal, the other cruel and despotic.

Thus we find that whereas Anglo America was settled by austere men, seeking religious freedom, men who were fleeing from states with laws prejudicial to their beliefs and practices, men dissatisfied with the political conditions in their own countries, who did not wish to go so far as to sever their connection entirely with the fatherland, but who sought in the new colonies ameliorated conditions under their own flag; men who came to build homes in a new land, eager to remain because full of energy, they saw in the very newness of the land the great opportunities it offered them to build a greater commercial and political future for themselves. Besides these good elements, there came, as a matter of course, a few adventurous outlaws, and others attracted to the new land by the prevalent "Wanderlust" of the times. The latter, a decided minority.

Let us now turn to Latin America. To her went the soldiers of fortune, valiant but ignorant, adventurous and daring yet unscrupulous, they came principally from a country where religious bigotry was rampant. They were an admixture of virtues and vices. They came to conquer, to fight if necessary; their one aim was to better themselves financially regardless of by what means and as to consequences. The companions of Pizarro, Hernando Cortez, de Soto, Almagro, Pedrarias, Vasco Nuñez de Balboa, were in marked contrast to the men who came to the shores of New England with the Pilgrim Fathers.

To us came the militarists seeking a field for new exploits, in their wake came adventurous outlaws seeking gold and riches. Of course, there also came some good men, some who would have been willing to preserve what they found, but these were a minority, and besides, the existing conditions throughout our territories prevented this. Because while in your territory there were nothing but nomadic, savage and semi-savage tribes, without fixed settlements, in our territory the Spaniards came upon organized states, having a certain civilization of their own.

So we have, that, whereas in Anglo America the whites arrived and settled peacefully, acquiring the ownership of the land from the native Indians, either by right of purchase, by peaceful treaty negotiations, and in some instances by forceful occupation, after actual warfare with the aborigines, which ended with the conquest of the land but not of its inhabitants, who in each case, were driven westward. In Latin America, the whites came as a military organized force, overran the countries that they discovered, fighting their way from the very outset, right into the heart of the unknown territories that they seized upon, destroying everything, plundering wholesale and making a display of force and rare indomitable courage so as to cower the astonished natives. In Latin America, the white man overthrew the native governments and established themselves as the governing class reducing the Indian to a state bordering on actual slavery, that, in many instances, was slavery. Every cruelty was resorted to by the conquerors. No pity nor mercy was ever shown unto the defenseless tribes. From the very first, it was a question of asserting his superiority as a master, and making the Indian feel that he was but a mere tool in his master's hands.

From the foregoing, it can readily be seen that while your territory was being colonized, in the strictest sense of the word, by your forefathers, ours was being conquered by the white man in such a manner as to be most detrimental to posterity.

Now, let us glance at the types of men who came to your and to our sections of the Continent. The colonists of Anglo America came from those countries of northwestern Europe, where there was the greatest freedom, the nearest approach to republican institutions and government of the people, and by the people, existent at the time. England, Scotland and Wales, The Netherlands, French Huguenots, Scandinavians, and Germans, were the stock from which were evolved the American colonies.

The conquerors of Latin America were militarists from the most absolute monarchy in western Europe, and with these soldiers came the adventurers. And after the first

news of their wonderful exploits reached the mother country, and the first fruits of the conquest were shown in Spain, Their Most Catholic Majesties, Ferdinand and Isabella, felt it their duty to send to the new kingdoms beyond the seas, learned and holy monks and friars. With these, came many scions of noble families, men of means and of great power at home, who brought a very large clerical force, composed mainly of younger sons of the upper classes. Each one eager to obtain a sinecure, trusting to his relations and powerful sponsors to better his condition, and in time, get his promotion to more important and more lucrative positions.

It was a veritable army of bureaucrats, of office-seekers of penniless and spendthrift young men that over-ran our territory, men who had never done any work at home, men, who by reason of birth, or by reason of the conditions existing in the mother country at the time, had never had to do any work, men whose one and only ambition was a high salary, because they had never had any occasion to learn a profession nor to earn a livelihood through industry and toil.

From sources so widely different in their components sprang the Anglo-American and the Latin-American. Your men formed an unmixed mass, because, although being of diverse nationalities and coming from diverse social classes, they were of pure race and maintained this condition with very rare exception. Besides, as they came with intent of bettering themselves, by becoming independent in a measure, if not of the governments, at least of the laws that had oppressed them at home. They came determined to settle down and so they brought their families with them and a great many of their belongings, and thus, from the very beginning, they established homes and organized properly constituted communities of workers.

Our men did not bring their women and families until many years after the Conquest, and, in consequence, the Spaniards from the very commencement took to themselves Indian women and the offspring became the "Mestizos," a mixed race that the haughty pure Castilians in Spain never countenanced, although they were of their own flesh

and blood. Later on, when conditions became more settled, the Spaniards brought their families, and after a time the "Creoles," came into existence, these were the offspring of European parents born in the New World.) It is a well-known fact that many of the Conquistadores took unto themselves women of the Indian race, of the governing class, especially did this occur in Mexico and in Peru (which included at the time, what is today Ecuador and Bolivia), there being in Mexico and Peru a semi-civilized native race organized into castes. One of the best known of the early chroniclers of Peru, and who has been considered as an authority on the history of the Inca Empire was Inca Garcilaso, the son of a Spanish nobleman, Garcilaso de la Vega, who came to Peru in 1535, and who married dona Isabel Palla Huailas Ñusta, daughter of Palla Mama Oello and of Huallpa Tupac Inca Yupanqui, fourth son of the Inca Tupac Yupanqui, brother of Huaina Capac, one of the reigning Incas.

This mixing of the races—white and Indian—after a time, was not frowned upon by the haughty Spanish monarchy, but on the contrary, it was encouraged, it being considered the best possible means of establishing a uniform race. The idea being to create a great middle class, that would in time make useful and loyal subjects of the Crown.

Many of the Conquistadores thus married or entangled themselves with princesses of the existing dynasties, and with the daughters and relatives of the curacas or chieftains. And following this example, the soldiery and the retainers of these leaders, were allowed a very large amount of liberty, so promiscuous, that by the end of the eighteenth century, the mestizo population of Peru had exceeded a quarter of a million.

Some of these mestizos, by the right of their parentage, were given the best education and, in many instances, they were brought up with the creole children; but, by far the vast majority were kept in ignorance, and made to do menial work or, at most, allowed to apprentice themselves to some trade.

The Anglo-American colonist, when he established himself on the shores of America, was already somewhat schooled

in self-government. He was a man of discipline, of order and above all else, he was a worker. He emigrated because he sought to improve his condition, because he saw in the new land beyond the seas a new life, and at the very first opportunity he proved himself able to take care of himself. With such men, it is not to be wondered at, that the new colonies should have been more or less successful from the start, and that the science of self-government should have been so readily acquired.

Your forefathers came over, bringing in their hearts the desire to accomplish great things. As they found everything in an undeveloped state, they were obliged to take the initiative and try to help themselves. From the first, it was a great coöperative effort, everyone working for himself, but at the same time, lending a helping hand to his neighbor.

With us it was otherwise. The sight of such great wealth as the Conquistadores found in some of our countries, the existence of organized states, where the ceremonies were carried on with pomp and splendor, dazzled the more or less ignorant adventurers who were the first comers and completely demoralized them.

I firmly believe, that had those brave men, for brave they certainly were, found in our countries the conditions that the Anglo-Saxon found in this, they would surely have developed qualities that might have been on a par with some of the ones exhibited by your pioneers. There is no telling what would have resulted from altered conditions in our respective territories.

The news of the riches to be found in the New World attracted to it men from all over Europe. To our countries came a very large number of the riff-raff-soldiers, who had been warring all over Europe, men, courageous, but unscrupulous. From the beginning, these men quarreled among themselves, over the spoils; their leaders distrusted each other, they organized themselves into separate camps and from the moment the Conquest was consummated, an actual state of anarchy prevailed throughout the new dominions of the Spanish monarch. A seed that unquestionably bore

fruit to judge from the history of our countries with their perennial upheavals and continued discontent and unrest.

During the first fifty years after the Conquest by the Spaniards, many attempts were made by the Crown to establish good government in the newly-acquired possessions, but it was to no avail. The fact is that the men who came to us were untutored in the science of government. They knew how to rule, but they did not know how to govern. So for two centuries and more, the European and the creole exploited and ruled the land, and the mestizos and the Indians for the benefit of the mother country.

The Indian was kept in a state of abject servitude, he was turned into a beast of burden. The mestizo, physiologically, is nearer to the Caucasian than to the Indian. Physically and morally he is superior to the Indian, and although of less active intelligence than the European or the creole, he is more strong-willed and more persevering and painstaking in all of his undertakings.

In the early days after the Conquest, the mestizo who happened to have one parent of lineage or rank, was given every facility to improve and was placed on an equal footing with the creoles, but as the years advanced, and the mestizos became more and more numerous, the Spaniards began to look on them with distrust and fearing that too much education would give them certain power in the administration, they forbade them to occupy certain positions and prevented them from acquiring too much knowledge. But many of them, notwithstanding these drawbacks, opened a way for themselves, through well regulated homes and families, and placed themselves on a level with their acknowledged masters.

During these years, the Indians were continually oppressed by the European, the creole and even by the mestizo. But, at times, some of the latter would join in the rebellions against their cruel masters, only to be crushed the more, and made to feel the distance that separated each race. And so it was, for more than two hundred years, these two people, the conquerors and the conquered subsisted side by side, living in hatred and distrust of each other, until even-

tually out of sheer exhaustion they became apparently reconciled to their respective conditions, when gradually a sort of colonial nationality was evolved.

This nationality formed of creoles and mestizos might have been beneficial to our countries, if it had had time to develop. But unfortunately, just about the time when the Spanish-American was beginning to find himself and to make himself understood, a wave of freedom swept over the northern portion of the American continent, and Spain, fearing that the example would be followed in her dominions, tightened her hold on her unfortunate subjects.

The splendid results of the independence of Anglo America; the advent of new ideas through the French Revolution; the invasion of Spain by Napoleon, all tended to engender in the Latin-American countries the desire of independence.

No longer was it the rebellion of the Indians. These unfortunates had been thoroughly crushed into submission. It was the creoles and the mestizos, who conspired against the authority of the mother country. The people demanded freedom. They sought to have liberties, to be allowed to have a direct voice in the government and the administration of the affairs of their countries.

Spain, notwithstanding her gradual loss of power in Europe, stubbornly refused to listen to the cry of her subjects. The men, who in her own parliament voiced an opinion in favor of the Americans were denounced as traitors to their country and as friends of the French invader.

From 1804, the unrest in Latin America was most evident, it broke out into revolution, first in one section, then in another until in 1810, several of the countries established their independence, organizing a republican form of government. But there was no preparation for self-government, such as the Anglo-American commonwealths had had. They decided on this form of government, because a wave of republicanism had swept over them. The ideas and principles that they adopted were taken from you, from the French, a little from each, and they simply adopted them without studying their own condition, without having any

real instinct for self-government, without having any fitness or being ready for such a state.

The Anglo-American passed from the condition of a good colonial subject to that of a citizen of an independent commonwealth. It was a gradual development. He took with him from one state into the other the experience of years, and a thorough study of the needs of his country and of its people.

On the contrary, our people were totally unprepared for self-government. The number of our people who had risen to positions of distinction while not unappreciable, was scattered over a very large area from Mexico to the confines of South America.

In each of our countries there were racial divisions. Their populations were made up of creoles, who together with the born Spaniard formed the governing class, the mestizos, striving to be on an equal footing with these, and a long way down in the scale, the Indians, considered inferior, even to the imported African slave.

The three centuries of Spanish domination had been, with but few intervals, years of exploitation, of misrule, of neglect. I do not blame Spain, absolutely. I think that this condition was the natural outcome of the manner in which the Conquest was effected. Many unfortunate circumstances militated to bring about in Latin America conditions that did not occur in Anglo America. Summing these up as shown in the foregoing I can but say that you were more fortunate than we in the beginning, at the very foundation, and that, consequently, when each of us set out in life for himself, all the advantages were with you.

Geographically and climatically you have been in better condition to prosper than we, and, to develop your natural resources. Situated, the original thirteen states, on the east coast of the northern hemisphere of the continent, nearer to Europe, they were in a position to receive an ever increasing influx of the most desirable immigrants from western Europe. In this way, you could offer them climatic conditions more or less similar to theirs; institutions in ad-

vance of theirs, but with which they were familiar, if only in principle; a language that was the surest vehicle for the development of trade relations; religious and political freedom, and a virgin country rich in natural resources, a land of opportunities, holding out every possible kind of incentive to those who came to its shores, and inviting them to remain to better their condition and satisfy their ambitions.

Latin America, situated in great part in the southern hemisphere, with many of its centers of population within the tropics, on the Pacific slope, or on the high table lands of the Andes Mountains, has been more or less inaccessible to European immigration.

So while you have had a constant flow of immigrants to your shores, immigrants who have helped to develop your country and its resources, we have been dragging out our existence, trying to free ourselves from the effects of inherent conditions that were drawbacks to our development. Whereas republican institutions and a knowledge of true self-government were the direct inheritance of the Anglo-American colonies at their birth, as a nation; Latin America, at the time of its inception into the family of nations, was a group of disassociated military nations, utterly unschooled in self-government, and inhabited in greater part by unfused races.

With these conditions, at the time of our political emancipation; it is not to be wondered at that our first steps in the path of freedom and our first attempts at self-government should have been disastrous in every respect. Our educated men, and we had throughout Latin America, many men of mark and distinction—were mostly scholars, theorists and thinkers, but unpracticed in the science of government, and moreover they were idealists and unpractical.

Fine orators, with great versatility, our parliaments, congresses and assemblies vied with each other in scholarly and cultured debate.

All of the great principles that had taken centuries to ripen, in the nations of the Old World, were adopted by us, at a stroke of the pen, and by acclamation. Without having inborn in us any of the principles of true democracy,

we became over night, as it were, democratic and representative republics. From despotism and servitude we jumped into the most advanced form of government.

Of course, there were many men who would have been great men in this or in any other country. There were men who under other conditions and with different environments would have risen to great heights, but I am dealing with facts, and not with suppositions, consequently, the lack of proper training, owing to the conditions under which our countries had lived since the Conquest, and the class of men who had been responsible for the government and administration of them, as also the nature of their inhabitants, were all conducive to the state that followed immediately the political emancipation of Latin America.

Your thirteen original States had already a growing trade with Europe, and even with the Orient, at the time of your independence.

Latin America, for three centuries, had been supplying to ever needy Spain the precious metals obtained from its mines, by the enforced hard labor of the poor natives. The mother country did not permit her American possessions to trade with other countries. The products of our soil were sent to Spain, or were consumed at home, or exported to the other dominions of our master. The trade was in the hands of Spaniards, and Spanish ships carried it.

England always far seeing, always alert to improving her commercial supremacy, saw a great future for her commerce and trade in Spanish America, and while she was the ally of Spain, assisting her to overthrow the Napoleonic invasion of the Peninsula, she was, at the same time, urging upon Spain to grant to her restless and discontented possessions certain freedom and autonomy. England knew that Spain had no longer the financial power to develop those countries; she foresaw the day when they would become independent and she decided to get for herself a trade that would be of very great consequence at some future date.

During the time that our countries were fighting the mother country, we received great moral and material assistance from Great Britain. It is often said that nations

are wont to be ungrateful, and that they seldom remember the services rendered by other nations or by foreigners who embrace their cause. I trust that this will never be said of Spanish America, because we do remember the assistance that Great Britain gave us, in quite the same manner as you remember what France did for you during your own great war, and moreover, we have not forgotten that in the days of our struggle, we had the sympathy and the aid of many noble soldiers and sailors from the cradle of American liberty—your own country.

So you see, that while you, in Anglo America, had everything conducive to national welfare, we were laboring under the stress of great difficulties.

We had no money. We had no foreign trade, to speak of. We had no internal developments. Slavery had been introduced into many of our countries and the same laxity that had allowed a promiscuous intercourse between creole, white man and Indian, permitted the mixing of the African with the other races.

Certainly no worse conditions for the formation of a nationality could exist. From the very outset, we followed in the footsteps of our late masters, in fact, many of these became our first and foremost citizens. They applied the democratic republican theories and practices to a people who were unprepared for them, and, as was natural, the result was license, misrule, and finally chaos.

As things went wrong under one man, another was tried, and as he could not improve the condition, the reason for which did not depend on the man, but was the natural sequence to all that had gone before, the consequence was continual unrest, dissatisfaction and perpetual changes of political leaders, with the result, that the nations became impoverished, the inhabitants instead of improving, degenerated, and became, in many instances, next to worthless as a national asset.

The general state of national bankruptcy, that was prevalent in Latin America, a few years after the final overthrow of Spanish rule in 1821, served as an incentive to European money lenders and financiers of a more or less

obscure class, who came forward to offer their services for all and every conceivable object, from a mere money loan to the building of public works and the development of the mineral and agricultural resources of the land. Many men of shady reputations, with pasts that would not bear a very close scrutiny and investigation, flocked to the newly constituted states, offering their services, and ready to take up anything in the shape of a concession, which they immediately took to Europe to finance there. In this manner Latin America was duped and swindled. Loans were raised, the proceeds of which were used up in paying commissions and expenses, but the unfortunate state had to meet the obligation or default. It is a very long story, this history of the financial struggles of many of the young Latin-American republics, and it is a very pitiful story.

In like manner and as we had started out with the wrong foot at the time of the Conquest, the same misfortune befell us when we launched out into independent statehood. In other words, we ran before we walked, we talked before we learned our A, B, C; we assumed a developed state with out first having had the preliminaries. How different this was in your case! Yet how very few people are there, who think of this when discussing and criticising us. How many are there among you, who think of this and stop to consider to what extent the Latin-American countries and their people have been handicapped.

We have been misjudged. We have been misrepresented at all times. And all because our critics have failed to look into our early histories and ascertain the why and wherefore of the present state of affairs. They have sought in our countries for practically the same conditions as exist in other more fortunate lands, where the evolution of nationality was gradual and logical, because there had been a foundation for it.

It is impossible to build where the foundation is not solid. Where the ground has not first been well broken and prepared. As I stand here before you and think that I come from the country that is proud to possess the oldest trace of prehistoric civilization on the continent, the nation that

boasts the most ancient seat of learning in the Americas, it grieves me to consider that, notwithstanding the age of my country and the venerableness of that seat of learning, the University of San Marcos, we still are, as a nation, in our infancy. And it is so, because only now are we developing our true nationality. And we know now that the formative period may be considered as well as over and we feel ready to face the future with full confidence in ourselves, and in our country.

Some of the countries of Latin America have already made wonderful strides along the path of progress, material and intellectual. Some have already crossed their Rubicon and are forging ahead at a rapid pace. Argentina, in which conditions are more analogous to those of the United States, has already attained a greater material growth than any other Latin-American nation. The tide of immigration from the European countries has been for some years steadily flowing towards the southern part of our Continent. Brazil and more specially Argentina have been receiving in increased numbers European settlers. In Argentina, the blending of the races is taking place, and a condition similar to that which occurred in the United States is developing there. Southern Brazil and Uruguay, on the Atlantic, and Chile, on the Pacific, are developing strong nationalities. In the latter country climatic conditions and a more or less homogeneity of race have been favorable.

The Panama Canal will open the west coast of Latin America to European immigration. It will help to open to trade the countries on the Pacific slope. Through the new water-way, Peru will be in a direct line of communication with Europe and the Gulf and Atlantic ports of the United States. The Canal will be the great gate-way through which will flow to our shores a stream of progress, carrying along with it men with capital, men with energy and activity, men who will come to us in the spirit that the pioneers from these New England States, went into the West of this great country and founded there a greater empire of wealth than even the Pilgrim Fathers founded in this section of your country.

There is a happy faculty that is common to the whole of America of being able to readily assimilate diverse foreign immigrants and turn them into good citizens. The "melting pot" does not exist only in your country. In each of the Latin-American nations it is doing the work of fusing into one great nationality the stray elements from all over Europe.

Any one who takes up a directory of any of the Latin-American countries, will be astonished to read the numbers of names of English, Scotch, French, Irish, German, Dutch, Scandinavian, Italian and Slav origin that are to be found, and he will be even more astonished when he learns that the Edwards, the McKennas, the Gallaghers, the Washbournes, the Evans, the Müller, the Cawthorns, the O'Donnells, the Elmores, the Lynch, the Lefevre, the Dubois, the Mulanviolet, the Godinskis, the Canevaro, the Figari, the Hemmerde, the Schaffers, the Von der Heyde, the Jacobys, the Solomons, the Dreyfous, the Bergman, the Bryce, Smith, the Black, the White, the Greene, the Brown, the Jones, the Walkers, the Schreit-Muller, the Scribebens, the Hahns, etc., are Latin-Americans of two or more generations.

At present in Peru, our president is Señor Billinghamurst; two members of the Supreme Court are Justice Elmore and Justice Washbourne, the president of the Lima Chamber of Commerce is Señor Gallagher, the assistant secretary of state is Señor Althous, the consul general in New York, is Señor Higginson, the chargé d'affaires in Great Britain is Señor Lembecke, one of our most distinguished generals is Señor Canevaro; one of the leaders in congress, is Señor Solomon—all of these are Peruvian citizens by right of birth. South America by reason of its great territorial vastness, is a world in itself—furthermore, it is self-supporting; without dispute it is the richest section of the entire world, having more natural resources and greater potential power for development than any portion of the world, that is still undeveloped. From our colleges men of intellect and of learning are taking their place in the world of knowledge alongside with the scholars and thinkers in other countries. I believe that we have reached in Latin America a stage of development that is molding a true and distinct nationality, and

that from now on we will occupy a position in the world's councils.

The native Indian population, so long neglected, is now a matter of deep concern to many of our countries, and in Peru, where we have a very large percentage of pure Indian and of mestizos, we are doing everything that is possible in order to undo the evil and the many injustices that have been done unto them since their country was rested from them at the Conquest.

This is a problem of the greatest importance and one that is receiving the greatest attention in my country from the men who have at heart the welfare, prosperity and the future of the nation.

In the foregoing, I have attempted to present the many drawbacks that the Latin-American nations have had in the development of nationality.

I would beg you to consider this question when you are judging the Latin-American. Bear in mind what I have tried to make clear to you, and if you do this, you will better be able to understand his idiosyncrasy and, in time, you will perhaps look upon him as a companion and a fellow-worker in the great cause of human uplift. We are all striving for a common goal, our methods may differ, but our aspirations are the same, and the earnest endeavor of each is worthy of the respect of the other.

PAN-AMERICAN POSSIBILITIES

By John Barrett, Director-General of the Pan-American Union, formerly United States Minister to Siam, Argentina, Panama and Colombia

We are at the beginning of a great Pan-American era. The next ten years are going to be Pan-American years. As during the past fifteen years Asia has been very much to the front, causing our eyes to be constantly on Japan, China, and the Philippines, so now during the next decade we shall be looking largely at the countries of Central and South America.

You will pardon me for speaking with both earnestness and enthusiasm. For fourteen years I have been studying Latin-American potentialities and progress. During the first seven of these years it was my privilege, as United States minister in Argentina, Panama and Colombia, to study that part of the world intimately from the standpoint of a United States minister. During the last seven years, as the executive officer of the Pan-American Union, it has been my duty to study every republic of the western hemisphere from its own standpoint as well as from the standpoint of other countries and peoples. At first I found it extremely difficult to awaken the interest and draw the attention of universities like this one, of public schools, of newspapers, of magazines, of lecturers, of writers, of travelers, and of business men. They did not seem to care for Latin America. They did not appreciate what these twenty countries south of us meant to the United States.

But a great change has now come. The Pan-American Union is almost reaping the whirlwind of its pioneer efforts and all the world seems anxious to know more of the Latin-American countries and peoples. The demand for information about all of them, their commerce and trade, their institutions, their agricultural, mineral and timber resources,

their material and economic possibilities, their industrial development, and their educational advancement is almost beyond the capacity of the Pan-American Union to meet. Where there was one article in a newspaper a few years ago about Latin-American countries, their politics and possibilities, there are now a score of articles. Where then on magazine had a stray paper on Latin America, nearly every magazine is now describing that field. In contrast to only a few universities, colleges, academies and high schools taking up the study of Spanish six or seven years ago, there is a multitude of them all over the country teaching this language. Where one traveler seeking entertainment and amusement went to Central and South America ten years ago, a dozen are now going. Where one exporter or importer went personally to investigate the Latin-American field a decade ago, a score are now going. It is remarkable, moreover, that during the last ten or twelve years the value of the exchange of products between the United States and Latin America has increased nearly 100 per cent, until it has reached a surprising total of approximately \$850,000,000.

Remembering that commerce is often called the life blood of nations, it is well to note that the twenty countries of Latin America last year bought and sold in the markets of the world products valued in excess of \$2,500,000,000. This in turn represents an increase of nearly \$1,000,000,000 in the last decade. These figures are all the more remarkable when we remember that all of these countries lie south of the great eastern and western routes of trade and travel—that it is only within the last five years that there has really been a world appreciation of Latin America—and that the Panama Canal with its great future effect on trade is not yet opened. Surely the most skeptical person must give Latin America credit for these facts and figures.

While considering some data concerning commerce, let us remember that these twenty countries which reach from northern Mexico and Cuba south to Argentina and Chile cover a combined area of nearly 9,000,000 of square miles which is equal to an area nearly three times that of the United States proper. They support a population of 70,000,-

000 which is growing faster by reproduction than is the 100,000,000 population of the United States.

If, on the other hand, we are influenced by sentiment—and we should be—it is well to bear in mind that the majority of these countries secured their independence under the leadership of generals and patriots who, in their own biographies, state that they were inspired to make their fight by the example of the immortal George Washington of the United States. It should also be borne in mind that the majority of these countries have written their constitutions upon the constitution of the United States. While these sentimental facts may make the people of the United States proud, they should also cause them to look appreciatingly and without a patronizing attitude towards the Latin-American countries, their peoples and their institutions. The latter should be given credit for the astonishing progress they have made despite many adverse conditions of location, climate and population. They must be given credit for the high class civilization that is developed in many of them. It must not be forgotten that Lima, Peru, had a university, that of San Carlos, which was nearly a hundred years old before John Harvard or Eli Yale founded the universities which carry their illustrious names. While our average professors and students may not be familiar with the literature of Latin America, that part of the world has in reality a list of historians, essayists, poets, novelists, writers on international law and scientific subjects which would surprise the average North American if he were to investigate the roll of honor and achievement of Latin America.

There are some bogies about the countries, the peoples and the commerce of Central and South America which should be destroyed. One is that there is an overwhelming sentiment in Latin America against the United States. While it is true that certain newspaper writers and public speakers never lose an opportunity to arouse sentiment against the United States, they correspond exactly to a certain class of newspaper writers and public speakers in the United States who are always attacking foreign countries and pursuing jingo tactics but who do not necessarily repre-

sent the sober public sentiment of the land. The big, strong, able and influential statesmen in the Latin-American republics have no bitter feeling against similar men in the United States, and are only too glad to coöperate with the corresponding men in the United States for the good of the western hemisphere. There is, it is true, a great deal of misinformation and prejudice throughout Latin America as far as the United States is concerned, but it can be removed by the pursuance of the right policy on the part of the government and people of the United States towards the peoples and governments of Latin America.

Another bogie is that the countries of Latin America are lands of revolution. There is a tendency to hold the six-pence of prejudice too near the eye in looking at the troubles in a few countries and thus not to see the prevailing peace in other lands. Two-thirds of the territory and area of Latin America have known no serious revolution in the last twenty-five years. Revolutions, moreover, are often grossly exaggerated in the reports which reach the United States.

Still another bogie is that there are no good mail and passenger steamship connections between the United States and the Latin-American countries. The answer to this is that the mail, passenger and freight facilities between the principal ports of the United States and all of the ten or eleven countries bordering on the Gulf of Mexico and the Caribbean Sea are excellent and far better than the average person even dreams that they can be. While the service down the west coast of South America can be considerably improved, it is far better now than it was formerly and will probably be excellent soon after the canal is opened. As for the vessels plying, for example, between New York and the east coast ports of Rio de Janeiro, Montevideo and Buenos Aires, it can be said that there has been a hundred per cent improvement in the last few years, until almost every week vessels of first-class passenger accommodations are sailing with ample accommodations for passengers as well as freight. The steamships are not as large or as numerous as those which ply between Europe and the east coast of

South America because the conditions do not require it, but they are far better than is generally supposed.

There is also a bogie, prevailing in the minds of a majority of the people who have not studied carefully the geography of Latin America, that they are all hot or tropical countries. It is overlooked that the great southern end of South America, including southern Brazil, all of Uruguay, practically all of Argentina, and nearly all of Paraguay and Chile, are in the south temperate zone. It is also overlooked that in the countries right under the equator, or near it, there are remarkable plateaus in the Andes and other mountain ranges where the temperature remains the year around at about the temperature which prevails in Massachusetts in June and September. It is an interesting fact that if a man is on the seashore of Ecuador where the equator crosses South America, he can experience a greater change of climate by traveling inland and upland for five hours on the back of a mule than he can in traveling north or south for six days on the deck of a steamer! When I made a journey of nearly 2000 miles through the Andes of Colombia and Ecuador in the summer of 1906, during my incumbency of the post of minister of the United States at Bogota, the capital of Colombia, I had the unique experience of sleeping on the equator under three heavy blankets and being obliged to build a good fire in order to get warm in the morning! That was at an elevation of nearly 12,000 feet. In Bogota and Quito, which, are within a short distance of the equator as one looks at the map, I never say the thermometer in the offices of the United States legations in those capitals go above 78°, while frequently at night it would go down to 60°, and yet both of these cities are located on plateaus, either of which could support a million or more population.

Now let me drive home one or two remarkable facts about each one of the Latin-American countries, so that the new student of Latin America who may hear or read what I am saying tonight will understand to some extent my interest in these republics.

Glancing at South America and first noting Brazil, we are impressed by the fact that it covers an area greater than

the connected area of the United States; that in the Amazon it has a river which empties into the ocean daily four times the volume of water which the Mississippi pours into the Gulf of Mexico, and that Rio de Janeiro, its capital, has already reached a population of 1,000,000 and is regarded as one of the show cities of the world.

Uruguay, lying between Brazil and Argentina, occupies a position in South America similar to that of Holland and Belgium in Europe. It is a land of remarkable progress, and its capital city, Montevideo, has a population of nearly 500,000.

Argentina covers an area larger than the entire section of the United States east of the Mississippi River. Its capital city, Buenos Aires, often called the "Paris of America," has a population of nearly 1,600,000. It is the largest city in the world south of the equator, the second Latin city, ranking after Paris, and the fourth city of the western hemisphere, following after New York, Chicago and Philadelphia. Argentina last year, with a population of approximately 9,000,000, conducted a foreign trade of \$900,000,000, which is greater than the foreign trade of Japan or China.

Chile extends for 2600 miles along the southern Pacific temperate coast of South America. Its capital, Santiago, is often called the "Paris of the Andes," and has a population of 500,000. The principal port of Chile, Valparaiso, is spending \$15,000,000 in preparing for the opening of the Panama Canal.

Paraguay, lying also between Brazil and Argentina, is a land of remarkable potentialities just starting upon a new era of agricultural development. Asunción, its capital, is one of the interesting cities of South America.

North of Argentina and northeast of Chile is Bolivia, covering an area twice that of the state of Texas and enjoying a period of remarkable mining and railroad development. La Paz, its capital, is the highest capital city in the world, but is connected by railroads with the ports of Chile and Peru on the Pacific Ocean.

Peru, lying northwest of Chile, has a reach on the Pacific Ocean equal to that of the whole Atlantic Coast of the

United States from Maine to Georgia, with a corresponding variety of products. Lima, its capital city, is famous for its culture and possesses the ancient University of San Carlos, to which I have already referred.

North of Peru is Ecuador, into which Massachusetts could be placed nearly ten times over. Its port, Guayaquil, will be one of the principal harbors on the Pacific south of the Panama Canal when it is made sanitary. Quito, its capital, is one of the old but attractive mountain cities of South America, and is connected with Guayaquil by a railroad which is a remarkable engineering achievement.

North of Ecuador, and the only country which has an extensive coast line on both the Atlantic and Pacific, is Colombia, with an area nearly equal to that of France and Spain combined. Bogota, its capital, located about 600 miles in the interior, is situated on a plateau nearly as large as the state of Connecticut. This city is noted for the culture of its people and the high quality of its civilization.

Venezuela, the most northern of the countries of the South American continent, is nearly as large as Colombia in area, and possesses within its limits the mighty valley of the Orinoco. Caracas, its capital, is one of the attractive cities of the so-called "Spanish Main" visited by the American traveler.

Turning now to the countries of Latin America which are in North America, we find that Panama has much to her credit aside from the Panama Canal, and is now entering upon a period of material and economic development which will be an influence other than the Panama Canal to advance its prosperity.

Costa Rica, northwest of Panama, is famous for its stability of government, having known no serious revolution since it was established as a republic. San José, its capital, is readily accessible by rail from the port of Limon on the Caribbean and is becoming more and more a point of visit by American travelers.

Nicaragua, north of Costa Rica, is a country of extraordinary natural possibilities, and, when once permanent peace is established, it will surely go ahead with rapid strides.

Managua, its capital, on the lake of similar name, is only awaiting the touch of a new material era to become a progressive city.

Honduras, lying north of Nicaragua, is another land of vast potentialities which only requires the construction of railways and investment of capital for opening up its interior to enter upon an era of prosperity. Tegucigalpa, its capital, when connected by railway with the Caribbean on the one side and the Pacific on the other is sure to evolve into a city of modern progress.

Salvador, the only Central American country bordering solely upon the Pacific Ocean, has the largest per capita population of any American country, and has enjoyed comparative peace and prosperity for a number of years. Its capital, San Salvador, is a prosperous city.

Guatemala, the most northern and western of the Central American Republics, has enjoyed a long period of peace which has been characterized by the construction of railways and the development of the interior, and has brought a large amount of capital into that country. Its capital, Guatemala City, is the largest of the Central American capitals and easily reached by railway from the Caribbean or Pacific sides.

Of Cuba, let it be said that it is justifying the confidence that has been placed in it as an independent republic and it is now going ahead with strides which are surprising to those who have not kept track of its onward movement. Havana, its capital, can not be classed as one of the great capitals of the western hemisphere, having passed the mark of two hundred and fifty thousand in population.

Of the Dominican Republic and Haiti, it can be said that they form one of the richest islands in the world, and, when once permanent peace and stability are established, they are sure to progress in a way that will astonish their critics. Port-au-Prince, the capital of Haiti, and Santo Domingo, the capital of the Dominican Republic, are now in a process of evolution from the old to the new style of city and both are ports of importance upon the Caribbean. To Mexico I refer later on.

In making this survey I have only touched upon, as it

were, a few of the high points. The student will be expected to study each country carefully, and, if he does, he will discover facts and figures which will not only awaken his interest but cause him to become an advocate of more general appreciation in the United States of these countries, their peoples and their possibilities.

In discussing this great subject, it is in order to make a few observations in regard to the meaning of the Panama Canal. In studying the effect of that mighty waterway, it is a mistake to think only of the countries and the commerce which will be reached through and beyond the canal. We must also think of the countries and the commerce on the road to the canal from the Gulf and Atlantic seaboard of the United States. It is not generally appreciated in the hasty judgment of the passing observer that eleven Latin-American countries are tributary to either the Gulf of Mexico or the Caribbean Sea which form the great basin approaches to the canal. The ports of these countries have heretofore been, to a considerable degree, in a commercial pocket or cul-de-sac, but they are all beginning to feel a new life as a result of being taken from this pocket or cul-de-sac and placed upon a great avenue of international trade and travel. The student who has watched the history of the Gulf and Caribbean coast line is profoundly impressed with the changes which have come in the last few years as a result of the building of the canal and of the expectations of what will follow its opening.

Looking beyond the canal, with reference to Latin America and without considering the commerce of the entire Pacific Ocean, valued at \$4,000,000,000, and having tributary to it nearly 1,000,000,000 of the world's population, we note that twelve of the countries of Central and South America either have a coast line upon the Pacific Ocean or are tributary to it. There is a reach of 8000 miles from northwest to southeast or from the California-Mexico line to the Straits of Magellan. While many differ with me as to the future growth and possibilities of this western coast, I am convinced that the opening of the Panama Canal will have the same influence on it that the building of the trans-continental railways had upon California, Oregon and

Washington. It was not long ago that these three states of the United States were regarded as almost barren and impossible of supporting large populations. There is a corresponding opinion among some critics of the western shore countries of Central and South America, but I can not understand how a man, who has intimately studied them as I have, can come to any other conclusion than that they have extraordinary possibilities of material, economic, industrial and agricultural development. The change will not come at once, and may not come for some years, but eventually it will come to such an extent as to confound the skeptical persons of the present.

You ask me before I close to say a word in regard to Mexico. While I can not discuss the political situation or the pros and cons of the attitude of the present administration, I can, as an international officer having in mind the peace and welfare of the whole western continent, raise my voice against war with Mexico. "Lest we forget" should be constantly our motto in considering this problem. We must bear in mind that this struggle of Mexico is not a war against the United States but is a civil struggle. We must not forget that the United States, from 1861 to 1865 carried on the greatest civil war in the history of the western hemisphere and that was followed by ten years of awful reconstruction. In our civil war more lives were lost and more property destroyed than in all the revolutions of Latin America put together for the last twenty-five years. We must remember that where one American has lost his life in Mexico hundreds of Mexicans have lost their lives; that where one American family has suffered, hundreds of Mexican families have suffered, and where one dollar of American money has been lost, hundreds of dollars of Mexican money and property have been lost or destroyed. We must not overlook the fact, moreover, that a war with Mexico might mean a bloody struggle in which thousands of our best men would be killed and as a result of which an enormous pension list would be established that would go on for the next fifty years. It might also develop a feeling of hostility not only in Mexico but throughout all Latin America against us which would counteract all the work of the past ten years for Pan-Ameri-

can accord and defeat corresponding efforts in the future. Let us go slow and with sincere piety pray that peace may come in Mexico without war between it and the United States. If the Mexican question can be settled as a result of a kindly and sympathetic attitude on the part of the United States, there is no limit to the degree of Pan-American commerce and comity which will be developed not only between the United States and Mexico but between the United States and all the other republics of the western hemisphere.

In conclusion, permit me to observe that, if what I have said here, arouses greater and further interest, among my hearers or readers, in the countries of Latin America, I hope they will not hesitate to get in touch with the Pan-American Union, of which I have the honor to be the executive officer. As many of you have been so busy with your various activities that you have not followed with detail the work and scope of this organization, I will define it to you in a single sentence. The Pan-American Union is the international organization, with its central office in Washington, of all the twenty-one American republics, devoted to the development and advancement of friendship, good understanding, mutual acquaintance and commerce among them all, supported by their joint contributions based upon population, controlled by a governing board consisting of the diplomatic representatives in Washington of the Latin-American countries and the secretary of state of the United States, administered by a director-general chosen by this board and therefore performing the functions of an international officer rather than those of an officer of any particular country, and who, in turn, is assisted by a large staff of international experts, statisticians, commercial specialists, editors, translators, compilers, librarians, et al. Having its home in a building erected through the generosity of Mr. Carnegie and described by the greatest living French architect as "possessing beauty of architecture and nobility of purpose more than any other public building of its cost in the world," it invites every man of this wide world who may be interested in Pan-American development or Pan-American history to come within its doors and make use of its facilities.

A GLANCE AT LATIN-AMERICAN CIVILIZATION

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The civilization of peoples cannot always be gauged by set standards. There are varying factors to be taken into consideration and discrepancies to be accounted for in measuring the degree of cultural and industrial progress of a nation. Conditions growing out of racial characteristics, historical necessities, geographical position, custom and habit, on the one hand, and on the other the basic principles upon which different societies have been built, must not be lost sight of in dealing with, or rather, in endeavoring to understand the factors that have led to the progress of a given nation, or aggregate of nations of the same or similar origin.

Latin-American civilization from an Anglo-Saxon point of view may be found wanting in many respects, but the life and happiness of nations, the ideals and hopes of their peoples, their legislation and institutions, are not to be found ready made, but have to be worked out to meet peculiar wants, and in accordance with the racial, mental, moral and material resources and necessities of each.

We must deal with Latin America as a whole if we wish to cast a rapid glance at its civilization. Some of the twenty free and independent states which in their aggregate make up Latin America have developed more than others, and a few marvelously so, but whether north or south of the Panama Canal, east or west, on the Atlantic or the Pacific, on the Caribbean or the Gulf of Mexico, the countries of Latin America sprang from the same race—the brave, hardy, adventurous, romantic and warlike Spanish and Portuguese conquerors, who fought their way through unknown territories, whether in quest of “El Dorado” or in warfare against

whole nations of Indians, as in the case of Mexico and Peru, where the native Indians had a marvelous civilization of their own.

On the other hand, the men who founded these United States, the Pilgrims who first set foot on this new land of promise, and those who followed in the wake of the first settlers, came to this country already prepared, through years of training, to govern themselves. They came to the friendly shores of the New World in quest of freedom. They wanted a home in a new land not yet contaminated with the spirit of the Old World. They brought with them their creed, their habits of order and discipline, their love of freedom, their respect for the established principles of law. Hence from its inception Anglo-American civilization was built upon solid ground. Its subsequent development—the marvel of the last half of the nineteenth and this our twentieth century—is due to the solidity of their institutions, their steadfastness of purpose, their practical sense of life, and a territorial expanse where all the soils, all the wealth, all the climatic conditions of the cold, the temperate and the tropical zone can be found.

The discussion of Latin-American civilization is of vast importance, since it deals with the history and development of twenty republics lying beyond the Mexican border, and covering an aggregate area of about 9,000,000 square miles, with a total population of over 70,000,000, of which 48,000,000 speak the Spanish language, 20,000,000 Portuguese in Brazil, and 2,000,000 French in Haiti. This general division brings us at once to deal, under the same classification, with peoples and civilization springing from different sources—Spanish, Portuguese and French. Even among the Spanish-speaking countries there are conditions, depending on the province of origin of the first Spanish colonizers and settlers, who came mainly from Biscay, Andalusia, Castile, Aragon, and Extremadura, which further tend to establish other slight differences, just as the various states of this country show differences due to the sources of their population.

For our purpose, a general survey of the twenty countries

called Latin America is not amiss. Geographically, Latin America begins beyond the Rio Grande, with Mexico, at the southern boundary of which extends what is called Central America, consisting of Guatemala, Honduras, Salvador, Nicaragua, and Costa Rica, the historic five Central American states; Panama, the gateway to the Pacific on the west and to the Caribbean and the Atlantic on the east; South America proper, embracing Venezuela on the Caribbean, Colombia on that sea and partly on the Pacific; Ecuador, Peru and Chile, bordering on the Pacific; Bolivia and Paraguay, inland states in the heart of South America; Argentina, Uruguay and Brazil on the Atlantic; and, lastly, Cuba, Haiti and the Dominican Republic, islands in the Caribbean Sea. So we see that Latin America extends from the north temperate zone to Cape Horn, near the Antarctic Ocean, which means that all climatic conditions are found in that enormous area over which the pole star, the Southern Cross, and the constellations brightening the South Pole keep nightly watch, from the cool regions of northern Mexico to the tropical heat of the torrid zone and again to the cold lands of Patagonia. This is indeed a world of wealth where all the products of the entire globe can be successfully cultivated, where all races of mankind can live and thrive, because the Mexican and Central American cordilleras, and further south the mighty Andean range, offer an unbroken chain of lofty peaks, wide valleys, and extensive tablelands, affording all climates and zones, all kinds of soils and minerals, the only limitations to the development of these lands being human endurance. The water supply is plentiful in most parts of Mexico and the Central American republics, and there is nothing in the world which can be compared to the hydrographic areas of northern and central South America, consisting of the Orinoco basin with its 400 affluents, offering a total navigable length of about 4000 miles; the mighty Amazon having three times the volume of the Mississippi and navigable for over 2000 miles, and the network of great rivers emptying into it; the Paraná and the River Plata, with twice the volume of the Mississippi, and a thou-

sand other streams too numerous to mention in detail, but which can be found on any fairly good map, showing a feasible water route from the mouth of the Orinoco in Venezuela to the Amazon and the very heart of South America, and thence to the Paraná and finally to the River Plata.

We all know how Columbus discovered this New World which today bears the name of America (although the application of that name is quite restricted in this country to the United States)—we have all heard of the hardships Columbus and his followers had to endure, their sufferings, their hopes, and their faith in some supernatural fate, a trait begotten by the influence of Moorish ancestors in Spain through the mingling of both races during the occupation wars which lasted over eight centuries. The discovery of America has a tinge of romance, such as inspires the soul of the adventurer and the buccaneer. It was a romance that began at the Rábida, grew in the presence and with the help of good Queen Isabella, developed into a mad desire for adventure at Palos, and ended with the planting of the Spanish standard on the shores of Guanahani, now called Watling's Island. From here Columbus went to what is today called Cuba, thence to Hispaniola—now divided into Haiti and the Dominican Republic, where his remains now rest in the Cathedral at Santo Domingo—and in this latter island founded the first white settlement in the New World. We cannot follow Columbus' voyages or his adventures step by step, but we must feel that the discovery of America is an epic poem worthy of the mettle of the great discoverer and his men.

And so the civilization of what is called Latin America began with the first Spanish settlement, the first Indian blood shed by the greed of the white conqueror, and the first attempt to Christianize the inhabitants of the new-found land. The inevitable features of conquest—war, treachery, destruction, fire, sword, deeds of valor but little known, and endurance almost superhuman—marked along the trail of the discoverers the birth and first steps of the New World. And in the midst of this turmoil, bravely battling against unknown odds, the Spanish missionary fathers worked un-

ceasingly, founding hamlets and towns, thus planting in the wilderness the seeds of many a large city today, building their temples of worship, going from place to place struggling with disease and hunger, teaching the Indians the Spanish language and with it their religious faith, and laying the foundation of what is known today as Latin America.

The second stage of Latin-American civilization began when the crown of Spain finally took an active interest in its new possessions and men of a better class than the soldiery which landed with the discoverers and conquerors began to come to the New World, bringing their wives and daughters, and surrounding themselves with whatever comforts could be had in their new home. They were in many cases scions of noble families, who came either as viceroys, governors, or in some other administrative capacity, or as "oidores," judges and men of letters in general. There also came learned monks, and among these, philosophers, poets, musicians, painters, etc. Hence some of the oldest descriptions and chronicles of Latin America are in verse or in choice prose, either in Spanish or in Latin, and we find in some of the oldest cities in Spanish America wonderful examples of wood carving, either in churches or in old houses, beautiful specimens of the gold and silversmiths' art in ware of the precious metals, some fine paintings, and unexcelled samples of the art of illuminating books, particularly missals.

The scholars, either members of the religious orders or laymen, began to gather books imported from Europe, and so our libraries were started, mainly in the convents. With this feature of civilization the necessity of educating the children of the Spaniards and the Indians became more pressing, and private schools and seminaries were established, as a first step to the foundation of universities. I think it is due to the Spaniards to state right here that both in Mexico and in Peru schools were founded for the education of the Indians, to teach them not only reading and writing, but the manual arts as well.

We Latin Americans record with natural pride the fact that the first university founded in the New World was that

of Santo Tomás de Aquino at Santo Domingo, in 1538. This University is no longer in existence, but we still have that of San Marcos at Lima, Peru, founded in 1551; the University of Mexico, established in 1553 and refounded in 1910; the University of Cordoba, in Argentina, dating from 1613; that of Sucre in Bolivia, founded in 1623, or thirteen years before Harvard, which dates from 1636, and that of Cuzco, in Peru, established in 1692, or eight years earlier than Yale, which was founded in 1701. The University of Caracas, in Venezuela, dates from 1721, and that of Habana, Cuba, from 1728, the other universities founded before the nineteenth century being that of Santiago, Chile, in 1743, and the University of Quito, Ecuador, in 1787.

The great agent of civilization and progress, the printing press, has been known in Latin America since 1536, when the first printing outfit was introduced into Mexico and the first book printed in the New World, a plea of Father Las Casas for a better life. Cartagena, Colombia, is said to have been the second city of America to have a printing press, in 1560 or 1562, but Peru seems to hold the record for the first book printed in South America, about 1584, and La Paz, Bolivia, had a printing establishment about 1610. There were also a press and other printing paraphernalia at the Jesuit missions of Paraguay about the first decade of the seventeenth century. The first work in Bogotá was printed about 1739; Ecuador printed its first book in 1760, and Venezuela in 1764, while the earliest production of the Chilean press bears the date of 1776, and there was a printing outfit in Cordoba, Argentina, in 1767. With the foundation of universities and schools and more frequent communication with Spain and other European countries of Latin origin, and the printing of books and newspapers in the New World, the desire for learning was developed and a new field was open to intellectual culture.

Dissatisfaction of the colonies with the exactions and abuses of the viceroys, captains-general and other officials representing the crown of Spain, jealousies between the creoles, or children of Spanish parents born in America, and the "peninsulars," or native Spaniards, commercial prefer-

ence and social distinctions, and other petty annoyances born of the arrogance of the Spaniards, on the one hand, and the proud nature of the creoles on the other, were the smouldering embers that, fanned by the success of the American Revolution and the storm of the French Revolution, set on fire the Spanish colonies at the end of the eighteenth and the beginning of the nineteenth century. The majority of the Spanish-American countries attained their independence between 1804 and 1825, and their struggles for freedom, while encouraged by the example of the United States, were inspired in French ideals. The heroes of the bloody but romantic French Revolution, their fiery speeches and undaunted bravery, their proclamation of the republic and the rights of man; the echoes of the Boston Tea-party, the exploits of the spirit of '76, the commanding and serene figure of Washington, the birth of the American Constitution, the utterances of the grave thinkers and inspired orators of the revolutionary period—all these dazzling examples of patriotism appealed to the Spanish-American colonists, and one by one the colonies began their fight for independence. The executions and ignominy heaped upon the first patriots who forfeited their lives for the cause of independence, instead of discouraging the leaders, made them more aggressive, and they resolved to gain the day at all hazards.

We come now to the most brilliant pages of the history of Latin America, and upon these pages are written the names of Miranda of Venezuela, the precursor of South American independence; Bolivar, who has been called the Washington of South America, a brilliant soldier and born leader, the liberator and father of Venezuela, his native country, and of Colombia, Ecuador, Peru, and Bolivia; Sucre, also a Venezuelan, more like Washington than Bolivar, the very soul of honor, a gallant knight and an accomplished diplomat; San Martin, the brave and heroic liberator of the southern half of South America; Artigas, a man of sterling qualities; O'Higgins, the great Chilean hero; Tiradentes, the forerunner of Brazilian independence; Morelos and Hidalgo in Mexico, both Catholic priests, and both martyrs to the cause of inde-

pendence; and hundreds of others from each country whose names would be meaningless except to those well acquainted with the history of South America.

But, once free from colonial bondage, the new republics, whose political constitutions in the main are based on that of the United States, had to deal with fresh problems arising from changed conditions. The new political entities commenced their independent life heavily handicapped, on the one hand by their economic condition after a period of protracted wars, and on the other hand by a scarcity of population, and—though paradoxical, nevertheless true—the fertility of the soil and extremely favorable climatic conditions. The unbounded productiveness of Latin America, coupled with the modest wants of the masses, has been the main cause of the slow development of most of these countries as manufacturing centers, their chief means of support being agricultural and allied industries, and mining. The evolution out of all this chaos has been more rapid in some countries than in others, due to special conditions, among which the principal ones are in general terms geographic and topographic position, and predominance of the white man.

The leading classes, owners of black slaves and landlords to the Indian tenantry, lived for the most part in relative ease after the war of independence. Those who did not seek in the army a field for their activities or inclinations, devoted themselves to intellectual and scientific pursuits, either in civil life or in the service of the church. Some went abroad, to France or Spain preferably, to acquire a general education or to perfect that received at home and to see the world, on their return bringing new ideas which were eventually adopted and more or less modified as necessity demanded. With the progress of the nineteenth century Latin America also advanced.

Intellectually, the Latin-Americans are anything but the inferiors of the Anglo-Americans. The literature of Latin America is as rich and valuable as that of any country, yet it is hardly known—not to say entirely unknown—in the United States except by a handful of men who have devoted their time to the study of the Spanish language. It is only

now, during the last few years, that a desire to know Spanish has made itself felt in the United States, and it is astonishing to note the number of persons now able to read and understand the language. On the other hand, the study of modern languages is compulsory in all of the universities and colleges of Latin America, and absolutely necessary to obtain certain academic degrees. French was for a long time the language chosen by the majority of the students, hence the influence of French literature and French thought in Latin America. German was taken up by many, more as a commercial tongue than otherwise, but even so German literature, particularly the works of Goethe, Schiller and Heine, and most of the writers of today, are well known in Latin America. English was preferred by others, rather as an accomplishment than as a language of immediate practical use, until now it has taken, in many cases, the place of German. These two languages have followed the trend of trade, but English is becoming more useful every day in view of the increased relations of Latin America with the United States, in all spheres of human activity.

The problem of education has always commanded the earnest attention of all the Latin-American governments, to the extent of having made primary education, in most of these countries, not only free but compulsory. So far as higher education is concerned—that is, all grades above primary—there are institutions, either public or private, or both, for secondary and superior education, normal schools, schools of mines, agricultural and manual training, technological institutes, colleges, universities, conservatories of music, academies of painting and sculpture, national or public libraries, museums, etc.—in short, all kinds of institutions devoted to the moral and intellectual uplift of the people.

In all the Latin-American countries there is a system of scholarships which serves as a practical means of promoting interest in education. This system provides for supporting abroad for a certain length of time such of the students and graduates as have won honors, who are sent to Europe and in some cases to the United States, to perfect their edu-

cation and bring home new methods and the latest and most approved systems. We frequently hear at the Pan-American Union of Latin Americans who have come to the United States or are coming here to take a post-graduate course in some science or profession, and others who are in this country studying and investigating school methods and appliances. At present there are over 1350 such students in the United States.

I think this is the proper occasion to urge upon American scholars and professors the necessity of encouraging the preparation in the English language of popular monographs for school use, written by responsible and unprejudiced men, on the history and geography of the Latin-American countries. So far as I know, there is not a single well-known school book in English giving in a concise, impartial manner the history of any one of the countries of Latin America. The history of the United States, on the other hand, is studied in Latin-American colleges and universities along with the modern history of France and England, Spain, Italy and Germany. Another point that deserves passing mention is the scarcity of good American books in Latin America, in the Spanish language, due to their enormous cost. France, Italy, Germany, and Spain especially, publish in Spanish hundreds of useful books on history, science, geography, literature, etc., at prices so low that no one can give excessive cost as an excuse for not having what is termed in Spanish "an economical library," that is, small volumes of several pages, well edited, bound in paper, which are worth from 20 cents up to 50 or 75 cents. An American work cannot be obtained at such prices. I can remember in my childhood days having learned to read from a series of books, edited in Spanish by a New York publishing firm, called "Libros de Lectura de Mandeville" (Mandeville's Readers). The school geography was also edited in Spanish by the same publishing house, if I am not mistaken, and was called "Primer Libro de Geografia de Smith" (Smith's (Asa) *First book of Geography*). If the sale of American printed books fails of success in Latin America, it is due mainly to the almost prohibitive prices.

With better means of communication and a desire to expand their trade with Latin America, United States merchants and travelers are visiting intelligently the Latin-American countries, and men of science and learning have, during the last few years, turned their eyes toward that continent, bringing to light the wonders of past ages buried by the sands of Time, and doing justice to a civilization until then little known, and only by a few. No better proof of the fact that Latin-American civilization is worthy of note could be had than the desire to exchange professors and students between certain universities of the United States and those of the leading South American countries.

Latin Americans have done much towards the progress of the world both intellectually and materially. Civilization may be divided into two great branches from which others spring: development of the intellectual forces of mankind, and development of the material resources for the benefit of all. Under the first head—as I have endeavored to show in the brief review of Latin-American history just made—we have educational institutions to train and perfect the mind, which have existed in Latin America for centuries, and the result of this training has been great jurists, historians, orators, physicians, painters, sculptors, poets, musicians, playwrights, and others too numerous to mention, as we are dealing with twenty countries, but whose works might fill a good sized library. We have painters and sculptors of renown whose works have been admired, rewarded and commended in the leading art centers of the world, and in all the countries there are art schools from which the students go preferably to Italy or France, most frequently pensioned by the government, to perfect themselves and do honor to their motherland. We have musicians wedded to their art and a credit to the country and themselves; and composers, singers and players educated in our own conservatories or schools. We have theatres and opera houses not surpassed by any others in America or Europe, and the governments of many, if not all of the Latin-American countries, contribute to the musical education of the people by subsidizing opera troupes every season

or so, paying heavy sums to obtain the best singers. Many a celebrity who has come to New York has commenced his career in Latin America.

There is another phase of Latin-American civilization showing in an unquestionable manner a natural tendency towards the establishment of higher ideals—those ideals that are today being proclaimed by men of good will of all nations. I refer to arbitration, the recourse to which is the highest form of culture among peoples. Arbitration is not new with us. It is one of the basic principles of the foundation of our social structure, since it rests on the civil law of Rome, which provides for arbitration as one of the ordinary and usual means of settling differences between man and man. The principle of arbitration was first proclaimed on our continent by General Bolivar, the Liberator of South America—as far-sighted and keen a statesman as he was a military genius. Bolivar was the originator of the idea of holding the first Congress of Nations of America in Panama in 1826, for the purpose, among others, of adopting arbitration as a principle of American—that is to say, Pan-American—policy.

In recent years we have had recourse to arbitration and direct negotiations partaking often of the nature of arbitration, more frequently than in all the rest of the world. Our Latin-American wars have been civil wars for a political principle, and these mainly in countries where the military element predominates. We have never engaged in wars of conquest. In our international difficulties, arbitration has always been the keynote of our negotiations. It is a remarkable fact that in the history of our Latin-American republics, since they became independent from the mother country over one hundred years ago, we have had among ourselves only two wars which, if international in a sense, could be classed as national, since they were fought among members of our own family of republics. But these wars were not fought for territorial expansion nor in the spirit of conquest, although territory may have been gained as an indemnity. I refer to the Paraguayan war against Brazil, Uruguay and Argentina, and the war of Chile and Bolivia against Peru.

On the other hand, who, looking at the map of Europe to-day, would recognize it as the same Europe of half a century ago? With one or two exceptions,—the Iberian and the Scandinavian peninsulas and the British Isles—there is not a single country that has not been remade at the cost of numberless lives and enormous bloodshed.

All our boundary disputes—and they have been many—have been or are being settled by arbitration. Now, could any better proof be offered of the advancement of peoples who, while springing directly from a race of warriors, do not fear to work towards the ends of peace?

Another proof of this spirit of progress is the maintenance in the city of Washington, by all the countries of our American hemisphere, of a unique organization called the Pan-American Union, the living embodiment of the idea which created the International Union of American Republics as a result of the first Pan-American Conference held in Washington over twenty years ago at the invitation of that great American statesman, James G. Blaine. The Pan-American Union represents the spirit of progress, the desire for a better understanding, the necessity for stronger ties of friendship, felt among the republics of the three Americas, by making them known to one another, by bringing to the attention of the American people the opportunities offered by the Latin-American countries, their civilization, their onward march towards prosperity, united in a single purpose of material and moral advancement.

There is another aspect of Latin-American civilization which deserves more than passing attention. It is their political life as members of the Pan-American fraternity of independent nations. Their first step towards higher ideals was their declaration of independence and their assuming the duties and exercising the rights of sovereign states. The transition from colonial dependencies to self-governing nations was fraught with difficulties unknown to the citizens of the original thirteen states of the North American Union, resulting from different conditions, due in the main to the spirit that inspired their complete emancipation. The original thirteen states separated from England

principally for practical reasons, while the Spanish American countries had to contend with an economic as well as a political problem.

After a period of evolution—or, if you prefer it, revolutions—during which the several antagonistic interests were undergoing a process of amalgamation, or better still, clarification, there now exists, in the majority of Latin-American countries, stable governments whose sole aim is to maintain above reproach the moral as well as the economic credit of their respective nations, so as to attract foreign capital and energy, which will stimulate the development of home industries, and insure peace, prosperity and happiness to its citizens. Some Latin-American countries have been less fortunate, but every disturbance, every civil strife, has been a misdirected effort towards the attainment of a goal dreamed of by all and by all desired. Public education, foreign commerce, improved means of communication, greater development of the natural wealth of those countries are factors which have contributed and are constantly contributing to the establishment of a peaceful era which will eventually become normal and stable.

As to the material phase of Latin-American civilization, all I have to say is that communication with the other countries of the world is represented by over fifty steamship lines plying between European ports and those of Latin America, and about twenty-five lines running from the United States to the Atlantic, Caribbean and west coast ports of Latin America. The combined railway mileage from Mexico down to Chile and Argentina, including the island countries of Cuba, Haiti and the Dominican Republic, is estimated at 65,330 miles, Argentina leading with over 20,300 miles; next comes Mexico with over 16,000 miles; Brazil follows with about 14,000 miles; Chile, over 5,000; Cuba, nearly 2,200, and the other republics in lesser proportion. There is not one single country, however, that is not included in this total mileage. It may seem strange that in an area of about 9,000,000 square miles there should be only 65,000 miles of railway, but if you stop a moment to consider the enormous barrier extending along the west coast of South

America, formed by the mighty range of mountains which is but a continuation through Mexico, Central and western South America of the Rocky Mountains, and the scarcity of population which creates demands and makes traffic profitable, you will understand why the railways of Latin America have not advanced faster. But even under these circumstances, not a day passes but some work is done towards the extension of that railway mileage.

Another phase of civilization and progress is the foreign commerce of a country. Latin America in this respect has a good record, and the figures representing its foreign trade in 1912 are, in round numbers, as follows: total Latin-American commerce, \$2,811,000,000, the exports being represented by \$1,571,000,000 and the imports by \$1,240,000,000. The total trade with the United States amounted to about \$825,832,000, of which \$519,025,000 was exports and \$306,807,000 imports. The progress made by Latin America in its commercial relations with the world at large and the United States especially shows that there is a great consumption of all such articles as are considered necessary to civilization. Latin America is not a manufacturing continent; it mainly produces for export agricultural products such as sugar, coffee, rubber, tobacco, cacao or cocoa, cotton, etc., hides and other raw materials, mining products such as silver, gold, tin, copper, iron, bismuth, saltpeter, etc., and a few gems. Its main imports are machinery of all kinds, hardware, cotton and other fabrics, foodstuffs, carriages and automobiles, railway material, electrical appliances, and other similar products of industry necessary to the cultivation of the land, the improvement of roads and cities, and the comfort of the inhabitants. There is not a city of any importance in Latin-America where either artificial illuminating gas or electric light is unknown. Telegraph and telephone wires stretch all over Latin America, uniting cities and towns, over the wilds and across the mountains, bridging powerful rivers, connecting neighboring countries and linking our shores with the rest of the civilized world. Not an event of any importance takes place in Europe, Asia, or Africa, or the

United States which the submarine cable does not bring to the Latin-American press, to be made public either in the form of bulletins or in "extras," according to the importance of the event, while nearly every Latin-American country has its wireless telegraph system. Electric cars are fast replacing the older and slower methods of transportation within the cities and extending their usefulness to carrying passengers to suburban villas, small towns or country places of amusement, and Buenos Aires, the largest Latin-American capital, has a subway in operation.

In conclusion, I may say that a charge frequently made against us Latin-Americans, and in a sense true, is that we are a race of dreamers. Perhaps it is so. We inherited from our forefathers the love of the beautiful and the grand; the facility for expression and the vivid imagination of our race; from them we inherited the sonorous, majestic Spanish, the flexible, musical Portuguese, and the French, language of art, and a responsive chord to all that thrills, be it color, harmony, or mental imagery; we inherited their varying moods, their noble traits and their shortcomings, both of which we have preserved, and in certain cases improved, under the influence of our environment, our majestic mountains, our primeval forests, the ever blooming tropical flowers, the birds of sweetest wild songs and wonderful plumage; under magnificent skies and the inspiration taken from other poets and writers, be they foreign or native, who have gone through life like the minstrels of old with a song on their lips and an unsatisfied yearning in their hearts.

Much more might be said to show the constant endeavor of Latin America to coöperate with its best efforts to the civilization of the world. It has contributed readily according to its Latin standards, and from the day of its independence and the establishment of republican institutions, Latin America has recognized the rights of man, abolished slavery, fostered education, developed its commerce and increased traveling facilities and means of communication with the outer world. It has contributed to the best of its ability to the sum total of human betterment, and the day cannot be far off when full justice will be done to the

efforts of the countries south of the United States, where live a people intelligent, progressive, proud of their history and their own efforts, and ready to extend a friendly hand and a sincere welcome to those who are willing to understand them, and aid them on their road to progress.

The interest shown by the leading universities and educational institutions of the United States in fostering better acquaintance with intellectual Latin America, in giving special courses in the history of those nations, in endeavoring to establish with them an exchange of professors and students, deserves the sincere appreciation of every Latin American, and as a Latin-American myself, I desire to express here my deep gratitude. To Clark University, in particular, and its executive officers, I wish to extend my most cordial congratulations for the friendly—I may say fraternal—thought of dedicating this conference to the discussion of Latin-American topics. It is indeed a noble thought. I also wish to thank the executive officers of Clark University for their courtesy in allowing me to present before you the views of a Latin-American as to what we are and what we have done towards the general progress of the world.

THE MEXICAN SITUATION FROM A MEXICAN POINT OF VIEW

By Lic. Luis Cabrera, recently Speaker of the House of Representatives in the Mexican Congress

Much has been said in the United States about the Mexican situation, but actual conditions in Mexico have never been fully understood, because they have always been studied from an American point of view.

The sources from which Americans draw their information about Mexico are chiefly foreign residents and investors, who are very apt to consider the Mexican situation only from the standpoint of their own interests. All that foreigners seek in Mexico is the reestablishment of a state of things favoring the continuation and promotion of business. They generally believe that the conditions of Mexicans themselves, and of those issues which are of a purely national character, do not concern them, and consequently they do not regard them as necessary factors in the problem, such as they understand it. Hence, the proposing of solutions which, although beneficial perhaps to foreign interests, do not tend to solve the Mexican problem itself.

To fully understand the Mexican situation and to find satisfactory solutions both to Mexican and foreign interests, it is necessary to study the question from a Mexican point of view.

Such is the purpose of this paper.

Foreigners in Mexico believe that the only political problem which interests them is peace. But misled by superficial judgment or pushed by impatience, they have believed that the establishment of peace in Mexico depends only on the energy with which the country is governed.

All foreigners in Mexico look for a strong government, an iron hand or iron fist, and the only thing they discuss is whether a certain man is sufficiently strong or energetic to govern the country. And when they find a man with such qualities, foreigners always have believed that it was their duty to help that man to come into power and to support him.

These were the reasons for the foreign sympathy in favor of General Reyes first, General Félix Díaz afterwards, and General Huerta, and these are the reasons why President Madero did not get the full support of foreigners. He was considered a weak man, and consequently unable to establish peace.

It is necessary to rectify foreign opinion about strong governments in Mexico.

A strong government is not the one able to maintain peace by the mere force of arms, but the one which can obtain the support of the majority of the country. Any peace obtained by the system of the iron fist is only a temporary peace. Permanent peace in Mexico must be based on certain economic, political and social conditions which would produce a stable equilibrium between the higher and the lower classes of the nation.

Foreigners ought to be persuaded that to have real guarantees for their interests it is necessary that such interests be based on the welfare of the people of Mexico.

It is then to the interest of foreign capitalists to help Mexicans to obtain such conditions as will produce permanent peace in Mexico.

The troubles in Mexico during the last three years are attributable to mal-administration covering a period of thirty years. The internal upheaval in Mexico could not have grown to the importance that it has reached, had it only had the object of satisfying personal ambitions. The revolution in Mexico could not be so strong as it is, were robbery the only purpose of the soldiers or was personal ambition the only motive of the leaders.

The truth is that the Mexican disturbances are a real revolution of apparently political aspect, but at the very

bottom of economic and social tendencies. The present revolution in Mexico is only the continuation of a revolution begun in 1910.

The present revolution's main purposes are to free the lower classes from the condition of slavery in which they have been for a long time and to seek for an improvement in their economic and social conditions.

In Mexico there is no real middle class. The purpose of the present revolution is the creation of such a class which may help the country to have a social equilibrium. There is no real social equilibrium and there is no peace, and there is no democratic form of government without a middle class.

The causes of the Mexican revolution and its aims, are of a social, economic and political character. Consequently the Mexican question presents three different aspects, intimately related to each other, that can be called the social, economic and political aspects of the Mexican question.

SOCIAL ASPECT

Mexico has a population of about 15,000,000 inhabitants, 15 per cent of which are Indians, 75 per cent mixed or "mestizos" and 10 per cent of European descent. Each one of these groups presents different characteristics and even the "mestizos" cannot be said to be homogeneous, since there are various racial types among them.

Mexico, however, has *no real race problem*. Properly speaking, there are no insoluble conflicts between the various elements of the nation, because the Indians are easily assimilated by the "mestizos," and as a matter of fact, when the Indians receive education or mix with the "mestizos," they immediately become identified with them. A full blooded Indian who has received a certain amount of education, is always sure to keep it, and he never shows any retrogressive tendencies, so that we can say that *the effects of education upon the native Indians of Mexico are of a permanent character*.

On the other hand, the mestizo element of the population of Mexico intermarry very easily with the Europeans,

particularly with the Spaniards and French, and as soon as they have received a proper education or have acquired some economic welfare, they can be considered on practically the same level as any of the European residents.

But true as it is that this variety of races cannot be regarded as a social problem for Mexico, the large diversity of types of civilization found among those races, on the other hand, do give rise to grave difficulties, from the point of view of the government of the country.

The problem that every administration has to face in Mexico, that is to say, the social problem in its broadest sense, is to find a rule or a formula of government which shall be suitable to all the dissimilar elements of the population, or to find the various co-existing formulæ of government suitable to each one of the various groups of population. It is very difficult indeed to find a formula of government suitable at the same time to a fifteenth century type of civilization (Indians); to an eighteenth century type (largest part of the mixed races); to a nineteenth century type of civilization (educated mestizos) and to a twentieth century type (foreigners and Mexicans of high culture).

The systems used up to the present to govern these dissimilar groups have failed, that of General Diaz pretending to rule the country with sixteenth century proceedings, as well as that of Madero pretending to rule on a nineteenth century system. This social problem is intimately related to the political problem of the unfitness of the laws of Mexico.

The political problem of ruling over the different races in Mexico could have more or less adequate solutions, but the social problem has but one solution, namely: education.

Fortunately, the characteristics of the Indian and mixed races, and their facility to assimilate into the white race, give sufficient grounds to believe that the problem can easily be solved simply by means of an educational policy wisely matured and persistently applied.

It can be safely said that in fifty years from now, if the education of the Indians is kept up, all local dialects will die away and the whole Indian population will be assimilated by the mixed race.

ECONOMIC ASPECT

The principal causes of the revolution in Mexico are undoubtedly of an economic, and chiefly of an agrarian character.

The colonial policies followed by Spaniards, when they conquered Mexico, consisted in taking possession of the greatest part of the lands of New Spain to grant them to the Spanish conquerors. Extensive land concessions were granted now in favor of the church, now in favor of the Spanish soldiers, leaders, chieftains, or mere settlers.

Together with each one of those large concessions granted in favor of Spaniards, a large number of Indians were also assigned to them with the apparent object of educating and Christianizing them, but with the real purpose of obtaining slaves, or land serfs, to cultivate and develop the lands granted.

With regard to the Indian towns already existing at the time of the conquest, they were theoretically respected together with their lands. New towns were also laid out as Indian reservations, providing them with sufficient lands which were called "egidos" and "propios," for the common use of all the inhabitants.

The colonial policies of Spain resulted therefore in the formation of a wealthy class of landholders as against the Indian population, which found itself either assigned to the estates as land serfs or concentrated in Indian towns.

In 1810 the freedom of slaves and Indians was officially decreed by Hidalgo, but the independence of Mexico having been accomplished by the wealthy landholders, the situation of the Indians was not materially changed, and the lower classes still remained in a state of actual servitude, although, theoretically, slavery had been already abolished.

We can safely say that up to 1856 the only real-estate property of any importance, which was not in the hands of the Spanish great landholders, was the property of the church and the "commons" of the Indian towns.

The church had been acquiring large territorial property

obtained either by direct concessions from the Government or by donations and foundations from private sources.

The towns still were owning their communal lands granted to them, as stated above, for the purpose of grazing, timbering, farming and watering, and which were called "egidos." The characteristic aspect of the agrarian questions in Mexico was for nearly two centuries, the obstinate defense made by the towns against the great landholders who always tried to invade the communal lands.

From 1856 to 1859 certain laws were enacted in order to do away with the mainmort. About the middle of 1859, the liberal administration of Juarez, for political reasons, was compelled to deprive the church of its properties and to begin to appropriate them to private individuals, who wished to acquire them at low prices.

Towards 1859 also, and as a consequence of the laws enacted to do away with the mainmort, the "egidos" of the towns began to be divided up and apportioned in small parcels among the inhabitants, for the purpose of creating small agricultural properties, but through ignorance and lack of means, those lands were almost immediately resold to the great landholders whose properties were adjacent to the "egidos."

About 1876, at the beginning of the "porfirista" regime, (the administration of General Porfirio Diaz) the real property of the church had already passed into the hands of private individuals, and the communal property of the towns was beginning to be divided among the masses.

There still remain, however, *large estates owned by old wealthy families of Spanish origin*, which could be considered as real mainmort, and which are now responsible for the present agrarian conflict.

The "porfirista" regime can be defined by saying that it consisted in putting the power in the hands of the large landholders, thus creating a feudal system.

The local governments of the different states in Mexico and nearly all the important public offices, were almost always in the hands of, or controlled by, wealthy families owning large tracts of land, which of course were inclined to

extend protection to all properties such as theirs. Torres and Izábal in Sonora, Terrazas in Chihuahua, Garza Galán in Coahuila, Redo in Sinaloa, Obregons in Guanajuato, the Escandons in Morelos, etc., are instances of great landholders who always had an absolute control over the government of their respective states.

The political, social and economic influence exerted by landholders during General Diaz's administration, was so considerable and so advantageous to them, that it hampered the development of the small agricultural property, which could have otherwise been formed from the division of ecclesiastical and communal lands.

The large estates called haciendas, pay only about 10 per cent of the taxes levied by law as result of misrepresenting the value of the property, while the small landholder is obliged to pay the whole tax imposed as he is unable to successfully misrepresent the value of his small holdings and as he lacks the political influence to obtain reductions.

The result of this system of inequitable taxation has been the gradual disappearance of small holdings which were absorbed by the large estates. This system was continued all through General Diaz's administration, thus increasing the power of the great landholders, and accentuating the contrast between the higher and the lower classes.

The communal lands or "egidos," used to be a means to ease to a certain extent the conditions in which the small agriculturalists found themselves, by affording them the opportunity of increasing their income out of what they could get from the use of the "commons."

But the condition of actual servitude in which the peon had always been, was accentuated and aggravated when the "egidos" disappeared, because, on the one hand, he was no more in a position to resort to the products of those communal lands, and on the other hand the great influence of the landholders was used as a political means to make peons work on the haciendas and keep them in an actual state of slavery.

The largest part of the inhabitants of towns where "egidos" have disappeared, being necessarily compelled to live on

the wages they get from working on the farms, and these wages being not enough to cover their expenses, it has become a common practice to advance money to the peons as a loan on account of future wages.

This system of lending the peons small amounts of money has resulted in accumulating huge debts on their shoulders. These debts were used as a pretext to keep the peons always at the service of the landowners, and the peon himself has been under the impression that he was legally bound to remain on the farm as long as he had not paid up his debts. These debts, as a rule, were transferred from father to son, thus creating in the rural population of the farm not only an actual condition of slavery, but the moral conviction among the peons themselves, that peonage was a necessary evil which the laws authorized.

This belief persisted through the ignorance of the peons themselves, and through the fact that the clergy has morally contributed to keep up the system.

During the first fifteen years of the administration of General Diaz, and when he was still strong enough to maintain his dictatorial rule, there was no apparent dissatisfaction among the rural classes, but later it became necessary to use drastic measures to keep the peons on the farms.

The large number of men who were deported from the more thickly populated regions, such as Mexico, Puebla, Toluca, etc., to the southern states, as well as the transportation by force of a large number of Yaqui Indian families from the state of Sonora to work as peons in Yucatan, are good examples of the use of public force to provide laborers for the "hacienda" and to maintain the condition of servitude of the rural classes in Mexico.

Since 1880 conditions in Mexico began to be complicated by reason of the policies of General Porfirio Diaz for the development of the country. General Diaz thought that the best way to develop the resources of Mexico was to favor the establishment of large business enterprises and the formation of large corporations to which special advantages were offered.

General Porfirio Diaz granted large concessions in lands,

mines, railroads, industrial and banking institutions to foreign investors, thus creating enormous monopolies and making more accentuated the contrast between the rich and the laboring classes of the nation. The cost of living was raised by the increasing of capital. The wages of miners, railroad men and those of the industrial classes were somewhat increased, although not in proportion to the increased high cost of living. The wages of the rural laborer did not enjoy this increase, the salary of the peon still remaining at a ridiculously low average. Notwithstanding the low rate of agricultural wages, the great land owners were still able to obtain labor thanks to their political influence which allowed them to keep the peons anyhow.

During General Diaz's administration, therefore, efforts were never made for the formation of a middle class. On the contrary, the power of the wealthy classes increased considerably, and a new privileged class arose from the great railroad, mining, banking and industrial concessionaires. The condition of the lower classes, on the other hand, was excessively precarious, and lately it became so grave, that during the last days of General Diaz's régime it is safe to say that the slavery of the peons was the principal cause of the unrest spreading throughout the country, and General Diaz had to resort very frequently to the use of force to maintain peace.

POLITICAL ASPECT

The economic unrest felt in Mexico during the last years of General Diaz's administration, had for its principal causes those which have already been enumerated, but this economic unrest was aggravated by political conditions.

The political problem is very complex, but it can be outlined or summed up as follows.

No constitutional system, properly speaking, can be said to have existed in Mexico prior to 1857. Towards 1857 the Constitution was adopted, but it was patterned largely on the French and American Constitutions, without taking into consideration the special conditions of Mexico.

The Constitution adopted in 1857 has been theoretically

in force ever since, but as a matter of fact it has never been applied on account of the Reform War, the French intervention, and the very abnormal conditions in which the country found itself during the administration of Juarez and Lerdo.

General Diaz entirely abandoned the Constitution of 1857 to follow a dictatorial regime.

In its political provisions the Constitution was never applied during General Diaz's administration. Elections of governors, local legislatures, congress, supreme court, etc., never took place, General Diaz himself making all the appointments.

Mexicans never had, therefore, the opportunity to test their Constitution, nor to see how it worked, and to find out whether it was suitable for the conditions of the country or not.

As regards justice, liberties and constitutional guarantees, the Constitution was never enforced for Mexicans, except in the cases where General Diaz thought it convenient. Only the wealthier classes could enjoy those liberties, they having sufficient influence to exact them from the President or from the supreme court.

Foreigners, also, by reason of their influence or through diplomatic pressure, have always been granted those liberties and guarantees recognized by the Constitution. These discretionary and unequal applications of the Constitution as regards individual guarantees, largely contributed to accentuate the difference already existing between the privileged classes and the masses.

The Constitution of 1857 undoubtedly presents a great number of points which make it absolutely unfit for the country.

The lack of municipal government, the unreasonable and arbitrary division of the country into so many states, the system of election of judges, the universal suffrage and even the system adopted for the substitution of the chief executive, and many other inadequate provisions, lead to the necessity of a general and fundamental revision of the Mexican Constitution.

The administration of General Diaz can then be summed up by saying that *it was a dictatorial regime with exceptions in favor of the wealthy classes and foreigners*. As a matter of fact, these exceptions were practically privileges, since 90 per cent of the population of the country did not enjoy either justice, or liberties, or guarantees.

From the political point of view, the administration of General Diaz, produced the same results as was produced from an economic point of view. *It deepened the division already existing between the higher and the lower classes*.

Any party wishing to establish peace in Mexico must take in consideration these three aspects of the Mexican situation. The Constitutionalist party wishes to solve the social problem of Mexico by fostering education so as to level the barriers between the upper and lower classes, as soon as possible. The Constitutionalist party wishes to improve the condition of the lower classes, so as to begin the creation of a middle class. In political matters the Constitutionalist party wishes the government of Mexico to abide by the Constitution, but at the same time wishes it to be so reformed as to meet the needs of the country.

Since 1895 there has been a feeling of unrest in Mexico which made itself more apparent during the last years of General Diaz's government. This feeling of restlessness was not well defined, and even when it led to several armed movements after 1905, it was generally thought that they were only insurrections of a local character or mere riots. When in 1908 General Diaz announced in the famous Creelman interview that he was ready to retire, public opinion in Mexico was profoundly stirred. Opposite tendencies appeared; one instigated by the friends of General Diaz, which demanded his reëlection or the election of a man who would continue his policies, and the other which wished a change in the government and in the system.

It was at that time that don Francisco I. Madero organized the anti-reëlection party, and that he began his electoral campaign under the motto "effective voting and no-re-election." It was supposed that the best remedy for the Mexican situation would be a free election of a president,

and the establishment in the political laws of the principle of one term. The political problem seemed to be the most important of all questions, and it absorbed entirely the public's attention so that the economic and social problems were lost sight of.

General Diaz accepted very easily his last reëlection, and permitted to be named with him, as vice-president, Ramón Corral, who represented the perpetuation of the Diaz régime. No other candidates than Diaz and Corral were admitted. Madero was arrested before the elections, and the triumph of the Diaz-Corral ticket made it apparent that it was impossible to obtain a political change by ballot.

On his escape from prison, Francisco I. Madero started the revolution. The plan of San Luis Potosi, which was the basis of the movement, made it clear that the leaders still considered as the chief problem of Mexico a political change, and the purpose of that plan was chiefly a change of government.

The rural classes, however, followed Madero, and supported him in the revolution initiated by him, under the tacit belief that his revolution would bring some agrarian reforms which were needed to improve the condition of the masses, but which were not yet enunciated in any concrete form.

General Diaz believed that he would stop the revolution by his retiring from power. The negotiations at Juarez, by which General Diaz agreed to retire and to deliver the government to a provisional president, checked the revolution precisely when it began to acquire its actual strength and real form.

De la Barra, a vacillating and Jesuitic character, had no formative policy during his administration. As a creature of General Diaz, intimately connected with the conservative element of the old régime, he merely limited himself to muster out the revolutionary army, as the way in which he understood peace ought to be reëstablished.

By this negative action he minimized the effect of the revolution and he prepared a reaction in favor of the old régime. The same men who surrounded General Diaz and who had urged the continuation of his policies, returned to

the country when they saw that they were not persecuted, and started a political campaign against Madero and against the revolution. It was during this period that efforts were made to concentrate the public opinion in favor of General Reyes and De la Barra himself as presidential candidates against Madero.

It was at this same time that the clerical party which since 1867 had shown no signs of life, was revived under the name of the Catholic party, and clearly showed that it favored the reactionary principles of the Diaz régime.

De la Barra's ad-interim administration can be summed up by saying that while he received the government in trust to be turned over to the revolution, he did everything in his power to keep it for himself and to avoid the advent of the new régime, thus showing disloyalty both to Madero personally, and to the revolution itself.

When Madero came into power in November, 1911, he found the government in such condition that he was unable to change its direction, and was forced to accept existing conditions and even the same cabinet appointed by De la Barra, in which the most influential part was played by Ministers Calero, Hernández and Ernesto Madero.

Surrounded by nearly all Diaz followers, Madero could not establish a reform policy. During all the time of his government, he was constantly called by two opposite tendencies: on one side the reactionary in favor of the Diaz régime, and on the other side the revolutionary.

Madero tried to make friends of the Diaz partisans but unsuccessfully. At the same time he lost the support of the greater part of the men who had helped him during the revolution.

At the very beginning of Madero's administration a protesting movement started, which was backed by some of the old régime. The insurrections of Pascual Orozco and of General Bernardo Reyes were no more than attempts of reaction against the 1910 revolution. The insurrection of Félix Diaz in the month of September, 1912, demonstrated that the reactionary sentiment had acquired a great importance, and that the army, which was the same army left by

General Porfirio Diaz, was not in sympathy with the revolution nor with Madero personally.

The uprising of the arsenal at Mexico City in the month of February, 1913, was the most vigorous reactionary movement of any started against Madero, and it gave General Huerta a chance to place himself at the head of the reaction.

General Huerta, who had been in the army since the time of General Diaz's administration, remained in it during the ad-interim administration of De la Barra, and later was under the orders of President Madero.

In the spring of 1912, Huerta had rendered President Madero very important services in overcoming the revolutionary movement started by Pascual Orozco in Chihuahua.

The prestige acquired by General Huerta after his campaign against Orozco, made him appear as one of the rising political figures in Mexico, in spite of his deficient culture, and his not very commendable personal habits. The enemies of Madero soon began to drop words of personal ambition in his ear, and finally succeeded in convincing him that he was the most prominent of the military officers and Madero's chief support in maintaining power.

When in the month of February General Félix Diaz captured the arsenal, Huerta, who was then the commander-in-chief of President Madero's troops, did not make, as a matter of fact, any serious effort to recapture the arsenal and overcome Félix Diaz. He had already realized that the fate of the government was in his hands, and during the tragic ten days of the bombardment of the city he kept a dubious attitude.

The fight, or rather the firing sustained by either side, was used by Félix Diaz's supporters as a moral pressure to bear on Madero to obtain his resignation. Various influences were resorted to for that purpose. Finally, the pressure brought to bear by the foreign residents and the diplomatic representatives, gave Huerta an excuse to attempt his coup, seemingly with the purpose of reëstablishing peace through the arrest and deposition of Madero and Pino Suarez.

The principal rôle in this coup d'état, as regards the help

given by foreign residents and diplomats to the uprising of Félix Díaz and the subsequent overthrow of Madero by Huerta, was played by Mr. Henry Lane Wilson, American ambassador. He can be considered as the chief adviser of Huerta and Díaz, during the bombardment and, indeed, as the one really responsible for that coup d'état.

After Madero and Pino Suarez had been arrested, they were compelled to hand in their resignations. As provided by the Mexican Constitution, the secretary of foreign relations, Mr. Pedro Lascuráin, took charge of the executive power, but only for a few minutes, just long enough to appoint Huerta as secretary of the interior and to hand in his own resignation himself. By virtue of this resignation, Huerta was to assume the presidency at once.

The Mexican congress, acting under duress, and believing that the lives of the president and the vice-president would thus be spared, accepted their resignations, and endorsed the appointment of Huerta as president of the Republic.

The assassination of Madero and Pino Suarez was an act of a purely political character; it was discussed and approved by General Huerta and his cabinet¹ as the most expeditious way of removing all possible obstacles to the political success of the new administration. Huerta thought that by putting Madero and Pino Suarez out of the way he would remain practically without enemies. He was mistaken in thinking that Madero and Pino Suarez were the only obstacles that the new administration would have to overcome.

General Huerta's administration, both on account of its acts and of its men, was a thorough restoration of the dictatorial régime of General Díaz, with the only difference that the dictator was now Huerta, and that dictatorial measures and rigorous methods were carried to an extreme they had never reached before, not even in the most hazardous times of General Díaz's administration.

¹ The cabinet of General Huerta, which was appointed in accord with Félix Díaz, was: Francisco L. de la Barra, Alberto García Granados, Toribio Esquivel Obregón, Rodolfo Reyes, Manuel Mondragón, Alberto Robles Gil y Jorge Vera Estañol.

During Madero's government, the position of the revolutionary element was uncertain and awkward, because while they were supposed to be exercising a great political influence through Madero, practically they had no influence whatever since the Madero government was almost controlled by the conservative cabinet.

After the death of President Madero, the position of the revolutionary elements became clear. During his life, for reasons of loyalty and hope of a change, they had never taken an aggressive attitude, but once the president was dead and nothing to be hoped for from Huerta, there was no difficulty in renewing the struggle.

Huerta represented the reaction and his government was no more than the restoration of the government of General Diaz, with its same proceedings and the same men, under the orders of another chief.

The revolution against Huerta is nothing more than the revolution started in 1910 by Madero, and which having been checked in 1911 by virtue of the negotiations of Juarez and the election of Madero, now continued and entered into full activity, augmented because of the revolting circumstances under which the fall of Madero had taken place. The death of Madero has been one of the most powerful sentimental factors to increase the revolutionary movement against Huerta.

It has been very widely stated that the Carranza movement has only the purpose of avenging the death of Madero and reinstating the office-holders appointed by him. This is not the case. The purposes of the Constitutionalist are higher and better defined than were the motives of the 1910 movement. The Constitutionalist propose the reestablishment of a Constitutional government in Mexico, but as they realize the unfitness of the Mexican Constitution and other laws, they intend to reform them in order to have a system fitted to the country.

There is no doubt that peace in Mexico cannot be established unless a complete change takes place in the government's personnel and in the systems and laws. This is the

reason that the Constitutionalists appear too radical to those who would like to find a way of pacifying Mexico at once.

The Constitutionalists mean to begin immediately such economic reforms and specially such agrarian reforms as are necessary to offer to the lower classes an opportunity of improving their conditions: division of large estates, equalization of taxation, and in places where it would be necessary, the reëstablishment of the "egidos" or communal land system.

THE FUNDAMENTAL CAUSES OF THE PRESENT SITUATION IN MEXICO

*By Nevin O. Winter, Author of "Mexico and Her People of
To-day"*

The life insurance company, before passing upon an application for insurance, requires the applicant to give not only the facts concerning himself, but also certain information regarding his progenitors. If it is necessary to look to the ancestors of the individual, in order to be able to judge him and his possible ills correctly, how much more important it is when attempting to treat of the conditions existing in a nation to go back and see from whom the nation have descended, what traditions may have been inherited, and what environment has surrounded it.

In an attempt to analyze the troubles of Mexico, it is not enough to say that the land question, or labor for debt, or even social evolution is at the bottom of it all. Some great injustice or inequality might explain the spontaneous uprising of a people in revolution, but it does not satisfactorily account for a series of detached revolutions under leaders who would be just as ready to fight each other as the central government against which the efforts of each and all are aimed. There are other underlying causes which must not be overlooked, for they help to elucidate a situation that is almost inexplicable to the average North American.

The apparently dormant condition of some of the countries to the south of us in the New World for so long a period, was undoubtedly due to the different conditions under which they were colonized. Unlike the Cavaliers who settled in Virginia and sought political freedom, the Puritans who took possession of the New England coast for both political and religious freedom, and the broad-minded, tolerant Roman Catholics who settled in Maryland under the concession granted to Lord Baltimore, the early colonists

of South and Central America sought those shores to secure wealth and the means of an easy existence. They brought with them the spirit of the Middle Ages; instead of seeking religious freedom, they transferred the narrowness of creed that characterized Spain in the time of Ferdinand and Isabella to the New World. The natives were enslaved, as the Conquistadores did not look upon labor with favor. Looking upon the natives as an inferior race, it soon became unpopular among the Spaniards to perform any labor which might be considered menial. The Inquisition was established with all its bigotry and disregard of the God-given human rights.

With the union of the crowns of Castile and Aragon, by the marriage of Ferdinand and Isabella, and by the overwhelming defeat of the dark-complexioned Moors, Spain had become a nation filled with soldiers and adventurers. The long wars with the alien invaders had bred a race inured to and in love with the profession of arms. With the discovery of the New World Spain had suddenly leaped to the front and had become for a time, at least, the greatest nation of the day. Ships were constructed in great numbers and sent out filled with voyagers "toward that part of the horizon where the sun set." In the sixteenth century Spain had practically become the mistress of the seas and the most powerful nation in the world. Her soldiers were brave and the acknowledged leaders of chivalry. One is lost in admiration of the undaunted courage of such men as Cortez and Pizarro, and of the lesser-known heroes Pedro de Alvarado, who made a successful expedition against the powerful Quiché tribes in Guatemala, and Pedro de Valdivia, who resolutely marched across the great nitrate deserts of Tarapacá and Atacama, and added Chile to the Spanish crown.

When Cortez and his band of adventurers came to the court of Montezuma, and saw the lavish display of vessels and ornaments made of the precious metal, they thought that they had discovered the land of gold for which they were searching. Attracted by the glowing reports of untold wealth, thousands of Spaniards soon followed the first

band of Conquistadores, and they rapidly spread over the entire country occupied by the Aztecs, ever searching for the mines from whence this golden harvest came. A little later Pizarro made his wonderful find of the Inca civilization in Peru, and his reports were confirmatory of the almost unbelievable wealth told by Cortez and his followers of the wonders of the New World. Then the leaders began their policy of imprisoning and torturing the Aztec and Inca chieftains to force them to give up the hiding places of their treasures. New bands of adventurers were attracted to the New World, and ship after ship set sail toward the setting sun loaded with adventurers and their followers, and ever ringing in the ears of all was the refrain:

Gold! Gold! Gold! Gold!
Bright and yellow, hard and cold.

Shortly after the Conquest all the desirable lands were parcelled out among the invaders, and the few Indian caciques who had helped, with their powerful influence, in their subjugation. The Spaniards rapidly pacified the country, for the Aztec masses, however warlike they may have been before the coming of the Spaniards, were subdued by one blow. There were soon convinced that opposition to the power of Spain was useless. The priests, also, through their quickly acquired influence, taught submission to those whom God, in His infinite wisdom, had placed over them. Chiefs who would not yield otherwise were bribed to use their power over their vassals in favor of the Spaniards. Thus by force, bribery, intrigue, diplomacy, treachery and even religion, the Indians were reconciled and the spirit of opposition to the Spaniards broken. The result was a new and upstart nobility who ruled the country with an iron hand in the course of a few decades; and the natives, with the exception of the chiefs, were made vassals of these newly-made nobles.

The Church is a delicate subject upon which to touch, but the ecclesiastical authorities worked hand in hand with the civil authorities. Pope Alexander VI issued the following bull:

We give, concede, and assign them (lands in the New World) in perpetuity to you and the Kings of Castile and of Leon, your heirs and successors; and we make, constitute and depute you and your heirs and successors, the aforesaid, lords of these lands, with free, full and absolute power, authority and jurisdiction.

This absolute power and union of the church with civil authorities worked great harm in the colonies, and Mexico had more than her full share. It is simply another illustration of the fact that special privileges are difficult to eradicate when established by long usage, and those enjoying them yield only to force. The Church, which had imposed on the people such a vast number of priests, friars and nuns, and had acquired most of the wealth of the country, clung with the grip of death to its privileges and property. Brazil is the only country of South America where the two forces have been separated, and Mexico is the most conspicuous of the North American Latin republics.

If we, as citizens of the United States, in reading our early colonial history, think that our forefathers had reason to feel aggrieved against the mother country, and if we believe that the events of the Boston Tea Party and other disturbances which antedated the Revolutionary War were justified, how much more reason the colonists of the Spanish American colonies had to be indignant toward their mother country. Our forefathers had not one-tenth of the grievances to complain of that could be found in the treatment of Mexico, Peru, Chile and the other Spanish provinces because of their misrule by Spain. The entire colonial system of Spain in South and Central America was one of selfishness, cruelty and tyranny.

The policy actuating Spain and dictating her treatment of her New World provinces was well expressed by one of the Mexican viceroys as follows:

Let the people of these dominions learn once for all that they were born to be silent and to obey, and not to discuss or to have opinions in political affairs.

As a consequence of its narrow and almost inhuman policy, local human rights were not recognized by the

government of Spain. It was treason for a man to assert his freedom, or to seek a free field for his labor. He could not enter into business without the consent of an official. The natives were compelled to labor for the conquerors without profit. Imposing buildings were constructed, cities were encircled with massive walls, great monasteries, churches and convents rose on the hills, all by the unrequited toil of generations of these impressed natives. Education was denied, and the local governors, including in many instances the ecclesiastical officials, united in this system of repression and disregard of human rights.

Trade with foreign countries was wholly prohibited, and all mineral wealth was heavily taxed. The sole purpose of the colonial policy of Spain in the matter of trade seemed to be to protect the trading monopoly, which had been farmed out to the merchants of Cadiz, and to keep a record of the production of silver and gold in order to insure the collection of the royal one-fifth. This policy is shown in its greatest absurdity in the treatment of Argentina. Every Atlantic port of South America was closed to traffic except Nombre de Dios on the coast of Panama. Everything destined for that continent, even for the mouth of the Rio de la Plata, had to be landed there, transported across the Isthmus, reloaded to vessels on the Pacific bound for Callao, and from there again transported overland across the mighty heights of the Andes. The governors of Buenos Aires were instructed to forbid all importation and exportation from that port under penalty of death and forfeiture of property to those engaged in it.

Spain continued to send all of her viceroys, captains-general, archbishops, etc., from the mother country. Of the one hundred and seventy viceroys who ruled in the Americas, only four were of American birth, and those were reared, as well as educated, in Spain. The same would hold true of the archbishops, captains-general, and other chief officials. Some of these officials were good, but most of them were either bad or indifferent. Of the governors of Argentina, all were Spaniards with one exception—Saavedra—and this man is one of the brightest names dur-

ing the seventeenth century. He retained the confidence of both natives and Spaniards by his reputation for giving a square deal to all sides.

It is not to be wondered at, and in fact no other result could be expected by the intelligent and unprejudiced student of history, than that three centuries of such rule should have an important effect upon the character of the colonies over which it was exercised. It has long been a disputed question, and a favorite subject for debate in literary societies, as to which force, whether that of heredity or environment, exercises the greatest influence in the development of character; but the partisans of each side recognize and will readily admit that both heredity and environment are dominant forces in the development of the character of the individual and the nation as well. Therefore we can not do otherwise in trying to decide the underlying causes of the unrest existing in Mexico, and which at times breaks forth in some of the other republics to the south of us, than consider this element and placing upon it considerable stress. Someone may say that a hundred years has passed since the Spanish rule was practically broken in the New World, but a hundred years is too short a time in the life of a nation to overcome fully the evil effects of such an environment superimposed upon the hereditary feature that has already been mentioned.

Hence it is that in studying the history of Mexico and the other Latin-American republics, that although we find Mexico's Hidalgo, Venezuela's Bolivar, Argentina's San Martin, and other patriots whom we may well place by the side of our beloved Washington, at the same time we find Santa Ana of Mexico, Carrera of Guatemala, Rosas of Argentina, Lopez of Paraguay, and many others who might be mentioned, for whom we can find no counterpart in the history of the United States, unless someone might suggest the name of Aaron Burr. Burr was undoubtedly willing to plunge his native land into war to further his selfish ambitions, but he could not find enough followers. These men had inherited to the full the mediaeval idea of feudalism that might always makes right, that and one is justified

in pushing his power to the uttermost by the force of arms in gaining his own selfish ends. These men had no more regard for the rights of the individual, or for the inherent claims of human liberty, than had Spain or the viceroys whom she sent to govern the colonies in the New World. We can appreciate the sentiment that led to the self abnegation of San Martin, who sacrificed home, friends and honors after assisting in the establishment of three republics, and even submitted to cruel charges of ingratitude and cowardice rather than take part in the divisions of the factions fighting among themselves for place in his beloved fatherland. Few finer examples of unselfishness are recorded in the world's history. We can realize the truth contained in the political document left by General Bolivar, which concludes with these words: "I have ploughed in the seas."

In only a few of the republics of the New World to the south of us has there been any great amount of new blood introduced by way of immigration. Spain forbade immigrants to come into her colonies, and the natural resources of most of the others have not attracted those seeking new homes in any great numbers since the ban was removed. The exceptions to this general statement are Argentina and Brazil. To both of those republics thousands upon thousands of immigrants have come each year for a considerable period, and the good results of this influx are shown in the increased steadiness of the republican form of government.

These immigrants have been mostly Italians and Spaniards, although in Brazil a very large colony of Germans have made their home. But the Spaniards who have come in this recent immigration are different from those early adventurers who first sought these shores. They are men who do not seek gold or any easy road to wealth; they are not men who toil not, neither do they spin, but they come to their new homes with the purpose and expectation of earning their bread by the actual sweat of their brow, and asking only that a fair remuneration be given them in return for this expenditure of energy. They are the same type of people as the Germans and the English and the

Irish who sought new homes within the borders of the United States, and who have formed the real backbone of the Republic, as it exists today.

Since the establishment of the republic in Brazil in 1889 by a bloodless revolution, there has been a continuous succession of constitutional occupants of the presidential chair down to the present time. The same statement might be made for Argentina, covering a period since the election of that noble man, President Bartolomé Mitre, in 1862. Among his successors have been some most excellent statesmen, such as Sarmiento, and to offset the good report there has only been the one unfortunate case of the grasping Celman. In my opinion these countries have one advantage over our own in that a president is forbidden by the constitution to succeed himself, and therefore is not under the temptation to use his first term of office to build up a machine or organization in order to secure for himself a second term. In both Argentina and Brazil this requirement is faithfully respected, and President Roca of Argentina is the only man who was called for the second time to the high office of president, and in this instance two terms of six years each intervened between the first and second terms of President Roca.

Let us take a look for a moment at the early history of the Republic of Mexico, and see how the principles herein enunciated have worked out. The beginning of the nineteenth century opened with a feeling of unrest in all European nations and their colonies. When Napoleon began to overturn monarchies with a ruthless hand, the idea of the divine right of kings received a shock. Among the countries thus affected was Spain, which had fallen from the high pedestal it had formerly occupied. The success of the English colonists in overthrowing the foreign yoke no doubt acted as a leaven in spreading dissatisfaction throughout the Spanish colonies, but an influence of even greater moment was the placing upon the throne of Spain of Joseph Napoleon by his brother, the Emperor. Hitherto a sort of religious reverence had been felt toward the Spanish ruler, but no such sentiment was held toward the Napoleons.

The spirit of revolution and liberty was in the air, and restraint became more and more galling upon the colonists in Mexico.

It was on the morning of the 16th of September, 1810, that a struggle for independence was inaugurated by Miguel Hidalgo in the little village of Dolores, which lasted for eleven years, and during which much of the soil of Mexico was crimsoned with the blood of those slain in battle or executed by the authorities as traitors. At the outset the people were much less prepared for a contest at arms than were the American revolutionists, most of whom had been accustomed to firearms in their effort to conquer the wilderness. The Mexicans knew nothing of weapons or military tactics, and their early leaders were even without military training. Hidalgo and Morelas were priests of the established church. The followers of Hidalgo were made up of a motley crowd armed with stones, lances, *machetes*, arrows, clubs and swords. But enthusiasm made up for the lack of weapons and military training, so that terror struck the hearts of the Spaniards, and every town for a time yielded to this new leader.

Spanish rule formally ended in Mexico in 1821, but peace did not follow at once as it did in the United States, for in the fifty years succeeding the securing of independence, the form of government changed ten times, and there were fifty-four different rulers, including two emperors and a number of dictators. There were five different presidents in each of the years 1846 and 1847, and there were four in the year 1855. These facts are not an evidence of tranquillity, to say the least. The "progresistas" and "retrogrados," or, as we would say in English, the conservatives and the liberals, were constantly at war with each other. Frequently it was the contest between the clericals and anti-clericals, a struggle over the sequestration of church property. The anti-clericals were probably just as good Christians as the others, but they thought that the church had too much wealth. I would not be surprised if some of the same influences were at work in the present situation. From the end of the administration of the first president,

Guadalupe Victoria, which ended in 1828, until after the death of Maximilian, in 1867, there was not a year of peace in Mexico. Revolutions, *promunciamientos*, "plans" and restorations followed each other in quick succession. "Plans" of one faction were bombarded by "pronunciamientos" by its opponents. Generals, presidents and dictators sprang up like mushrooms and their career was as evanescent. Revolutions were an every day affair. A man in position of authority did not know when his time to be shot might come. A sudden turn of fortune might send him either to the National Palace or before a squad of men with guns aimed at his heart. An illustration of the latter statement is shown in the treatment of that grim old patriot, Guerrero. By a turn of fortune he became the third president in 1829; only a few months later he was compelled to flee and, after a farcical trial, was condemned to death as "morally incapable" and was shot on the 15th of February, 1831.

Elections eventually became a farce. The unfortunate habit was required of appealing to arms instead of submitting to the result of the ballot. The trouble was that the people had copied the letter and not the spirit of the American Constitution. It is an exemplification of the fact that self-government can not be thrust upon nations from without. It must be developed from within. A constitution with high sounding words means little to a people unless to the distinguishing characteristics of self-reliance and self-confidence are also added that important quality of self-control.

Had it not been for the elements of heredity and environment, of which I have already made mention, such conditions as these just related would not have been possible; a Santa Ana could never have been evolved. Many of the so-called revolutionary leaders were little more than freebooters. They may have secured their followers through high-sounding speeches, which were punctuated with choice rhetoric and seductive promises, but the fact remains that they deserve no more respect than the highway robber who would rob you of your all. They would violate a church with as little compunction of conscience as an avowed enemy. Had conditions been different, it would not have been possi-

ble for a foreign government to send a Maximilian and set him up on the throne. Had there been self-abnegation and self-control, which are so necessary in a republican form of government, the leaders would have swallowed their petty jealousies and united against the invasion of their soil by foreign troupes, who came to support an alien emperor upon a throne in a country which for almost half a century had held itself out to the world as a republic.

The United States has something to be ashamed of during this period, for the Mexican War is not a subject upon which we can pride ourselves. Mr. Bancroft, the historian, does not mince words in his treatment of the subject, for he says:

It [the Mexican War] was a premeditated and predetermined affair; it was the result of a deliberately calculated scheme of robbery on the part of the superior force.

The result was a foregone conclusion, for Mexico, torn by internal dissensions, impoverished by the expense of revolutions, and official robberies, and with a government changing with every change of the seasons, had neither arms, money nor supplies for such a conflict. And yet this war might have been avoided by Mexico, had there been a government in power long enough to negotiate a treaty. A special envoy sent from Washington at the request of one president was refused an audience by a new one who had usurped the office before the envoy arrived. The brightest light that shines throughout this period is that of the grim old warrior, Juarez, who was the Lincoln of Mexico. This man had even greater trials than our martyred president, at least, they continued much longer, but he kept a true heart and retained his courage throughout all the trials and tribulations of many years of public life. He prepared the way for the man who did bring about both external and internal peace and material prosperity for almost a generation.

Opinions differ very much as to the merits of the long rule of Porfirio Diaz, and I say rule advisedly. It is not to be wondered at that the man who governs with a strong arm will make bitter enemies as well as warm partisans. Likewise such a policy will always have its defamers, as well as

its supporters. The judgment of the world is still divided about Napoleon, and whether his high-handed methods wrought more of good than of evil. Hence it is that some can see nothing in Diaz but a tyrant, an enslaver of his people, and a man unfit for even life himself. They forget that neither peonage nor the land monopoly was originated by Diaz, but that both were inherited from the Spaniards and supported by the voters of the country. They do not look into the conditions faced by Diaz when he first became president, nor the bloody history of the republic before that time.

Those were indeed troublous times in Mexico while we were celebrating the centennial of our independence in 1876. The strong spirit of Juarez had been broken by the long strain from 1857 to 1872, during which time he was nominally president. His successor, Lerda, was a weak, ambitious man who accomplished little. There was disorder, everywhere; the country was overrun with bandits, and a worse than empty treasury were the conditions when Diaz grasped the reins. A huge foreign debt that had on several occasions brought about foreign intervention was also one of the conditions. There were only three hundred and fifty miles of railroad in the entire country. This was the condition of affairs in Mexico when Porfirio Diaz made his memorable march into the City of Mexico at the head of an army of several thousand armed men on the 24th of November, 1876.

Judging this man at a distance, we, who live in a country where even a third term is a "bogey," are inclined to dismiss the subject of Diaz with the charge of "dictator" and "republican despot" with all the odium that these terms imply. President Diaz was undoubtedly both a dictator and a despot. He had gone into office with the slogan of one term, and he respected this principle of his platform by retiring at the end of his first term of four years and gracefully yielding the office to his successor, Gonzales. This was the first time in Mexican history where the spectacle was seen of one president voluntarily relinquishing the scepter to his successor and returning to private life without an effort to retain himself in power. Gonzales entered the office

one of the most popular men of Mexico, having been elected by an almost unanimous vote. Four years later he left it under a cloud of almost universal execration and contempt. Then it was that Diaz was reëlected. Then it was that he undoubtedly changed his views, and had the law of succession changed so that he could succeed himself in a constitutional manner. He occupied that high office thirty-one years, lacking a few months, or almost a generation.

My personal opinion is that the motives actuating President Diaz were of the highest type of patriotism; he, more than ourselves, knew the needs of this people and what was best for them. In suppressing brigandage and restoring internal peace, even though he retained his position by arbitrary methods, he gave the people a needed opportunity to develop the resources of the country, to increase the education among the masses, and to devote themselves to those peaceful pursuits which are so necessary to develop the national character essential in a republican form of government. It is quite likely that in his later years, through the natural weakening of bodily and mental powers, although he was a remarkably preserved man for his age, that he may have come under the influence of unfortunate advisers, who were farming out the resources of the country for their own individual benefit. If this is so, it is an unfortunate fact and bitterly has he paid for it. Whether his retention of the office for so long a period was a really good or bad thing for the country the historian of the future will be a better judge, for we are too close to the events of his time to weigh them correctly and impassionately.

When I first visited Mexico, Diaz was at the height of his power. Railroad development was going ahead rapidly; the telegraph and the telephone were spreading over the country; new mines were being opened up, and the old ones were being worked industriously; plantations were being developed by outside capital in the tropical regions, and every indication seemed to augur well. Although I was familiar with the turmoil that had preceded this administration, it seemed to me that so many years had passed by in comparative peace and quiet, a new generation had grown up

into manhood who were not familiar with the revolutionary disturbances of the previous years, and who could not do otherwise than see the good effects of peace, that all possibility of a recurrence of such conditions had passed away. It did not seem possible that the country could again be torn by internal dissensions, with revolutionary leaders inciting the people to arms all over the republic.

The culmination of Mexico's greatness seemed to have been reached on the 15th of September, 1910, during the centennial celebration to which most foreign countries had sent special representatives. On the night of that date, President Diaz appeared on the balcony in front of the National Palace where the old bell with which Hidalgo first sounded the call to liberty is preserved. The President waved a flag, rang the bell, and shouted "Viva Mexico!" The cry of "Viva Mexico" was taken up by the crowd nearest to the President, and then by those farther away, until the great shout might have been heard all over the capital. The bells of the grand old cathedral pealed forth their loudest tones, the factory whistles shrieked, skyrockets were sent up in the air, and every noise-making device was turned loose. In the light of later events, this wonderful celebration seems to have been a sham, or at least only on the surface. At that time a political volcano was simmering all over the republic, and was just ready to break forth into violent eruption. Less than two months from that time the first outbreak against the civil authorities occurred. A new leader came to the front with "no reëlection" and "effective suffrage" as the two catch words. It was practically the same battle cry as that of Diaz in his original campaign.

No sooner was Madero installed in the high office to which he was elevated, than the very forces which he had himself brought into existence were arrayed against him. Extravagant promises, such as free land, lower taxes, higher wages and a decreased cost of living, had been made. It was the old story of revolutions in Mexico, and some of the other Latin American countries, for the revolution had bred a race of *caudillos* for whom the victorious party had to pro-

vide, and who rated their own deserts high. The atavistic appetite for a life of adventure had again been whetted. It was an absolute impossibility for Madero, however well meaning and conscientious he may have been, to immediately carry into effect the reforms promised by him, and to provide offices for these followers which would be satisfactory to themselves. It would have required years to work out such a program. But the *caudillos* could not wait. The spirit of impatience overcame all self-restraint, all patriotic impulse. It would be a misuse of and slander upon the term patriot to call all of these revolutionary leaders, who have sprung up in nearly every section of Mexico, by the name of patriot. Some of them are little better than freebooters, who prefer a life of adventure and notoriety to peaceful avocations. Some of them may be honest in their views, but sadly mistaken. I would not attempt to classify the revolutionary leaders and say which of them belong to the first class, which to the second class, or which of them may be real patriots, but I feel safe in saying that more of them belong to the first class than either of the others. They are not willing to curb their personal ambitions and lust for power for the general good of the country.

From this paper, it will appear that, in my opinion, the troubles in Mexico are of long standing. Nearly everything complained of by the Mexicans themselves, and that are criticised by people of other nations, can be traced either to the effect of heredity or environment. The land question, of which complaint is made so frequently, was inherited. The greater part of Mexico was parceled out by Cortez to his followers, and that which was not given by him was donated by the Spanish Crown to favorites. Many of the descendants of those original settlers still occupy these lands. The estate of General Terrazas in Chihuahua would make a commonwealth as large as the states of Massachusetts and Rhode Island combined, with a small farm of a million acres besides. The Zuloaga family own a *hacienda* which is thirty-five miles wide, nearly a hundred miles long, and includes about two million acres. On these great *haciendas* the proprietors still live a patriarchal existence

with thousands of peons attached to the estates. One *hacienda* controls twenty thousand peons, an army in themselves.

The owners of these great estates, like all owners of special privileges, cling to their inheritance with the grip of death, and they will do anything rather than yield one jot or one tittle of the prerogatives which have been in their families for generations. Some seven thousand families, out of a population of fifteen million, own the entire landed surface of Mexico, according to the best reports that I am able to find. This shows that it has never been a land of homesteaders, such as we have in the United States, for had the land been parceled out as it has been with us, with tens of thousands of families who have an actual interest in the soil, the political conditions in Mexico would never have reached or remained in the state that they have.

Mexico has never had the advantage of foreign immigration, and there are very few non-Spanish speaking whites in Mexico, with the exception of English, Americans, and Germans, who have gone there not for the purpose of making homes for themselves and their families, but for the purpose of exploiting some one or another of the natural resources of the country, and doing it frequently at the expense of the Mexicans themselves. This condition can be blamed upon Spain, for she forbade people of other nations to come to the country. The official corruption which has been criticised a great deal, and for which there is undoubtedly considerable reason, was the result of Spanish misrule, for it was the Spanish overlords who introduced and developed this system of government. When you know that there are districts in Spain today where scarcely 10 per cent of the inhabitants have mastered the art of reading and writing, it is not surprising to learn that after three centuries of the rule of Spanish governors and viceroys, 95 per cent of the people in Mexico still remained in profound ignorance. Learning for the masses was regarded as prejudicial by those representatives and misrepresentatives of the home government. Although conditions are not ideal yet, the percentage of ignorance has been greatly reduced.

Mexico likewise had the good fortune, as well as misfor-

tune, to have a large indigenous population. This native population furnished the labor necessary to develop the country which the Conquistadores were unwilling to do themselves. They were reduced to a condition of practical slavery. When slavery was abolished, peonage was established. The nature of these peons, who constitute almost 80 per cent of the entire population of Mexico, is such that they have formed a compact and inert mass. They have been non-resisting as a rule, and are content when their simple bodily wants are supplied. It has been an easier matter for the *hacendados* to get up a body of followers who would fight for them from the ranks of their peons. The peon is one of the greatest problems of Mexico, and it will take a long time to develop the best that is in him.

For the future of Mexico, I have great hopes. Conditions are better today than they were a half century ago. Just when the turn of the balance will come, I would not venture to predict, but I do feel safe in saying that it will come eventually. The inherited misfortunes of the Mexico of today will sooner or later pass away. Europe at one time went through similar conditions. Out of the troublous times of the fifteenth and sixteenth centuries, nations emerged which had been strengthened by the lessons of adversity learned in the internecine struggles of that period. This is probably the final transition—the dawn of a new era. The paroxysms now shaking the country in rebellions and treacheries, which have so shocked the world, mean the recovery of Mexico ultimately to peace and prosperity. Unrest and change are conditions in every country today, and with both sexes. These conditions have but added to those elements of unrest peculiar to our neighbor across the Rio Grande. A strong man must arise, perhaps another Diaz, at least a leader of enough force of character to draw the people to him and awe any opposing chieftains who may wish to create trouble for his own personal aggrandisement. Intervention should not even be thought of by the United States. From a standpoint of dollars and cents it would be cheaper for Uncle Sam to reimburse all losses sustained

by Americans and American interests than to incur the expense that intervention would involve.

I like the Mexican people, and I am a great admirer of the Spanish-American and Portuguese-American races. They are not inferior to the Anglo-American. They have many inherent good qualities; they possess some splendid traits of character, which are difficult to find in the North Americans. Instead of brusqueness they have courtesy; in financial honor they are the equal of our own people. They are perhaps bound more to the influence of tradition than we are, and this has been, I believe, one of their misfortunes. Were they less influenced by tradition, these inherited traits which I have mentioned in this paper, which are not found in nearly all, or not even in a majority of the Mexicans, but which are found in enough to cause the troubles that we find in making a historical study of the country, would have disappeared ere this.

I have great faith even in the peon who constitutes such an important element in Mexico. Some people think of the peon of Mexico, the coolie of China, and the peasant of Russia as inferior beings, but I do not believe that there is such a thing as inferior humanity. There is, however, a great deal of undeveloped humanity, and it is in this class that we must place the Mexican peon. He is almost wholly an undeveloped creature. There are a few isolated examples which show that he is on a par with others of a fairer skin. Juarez was a full blooded Mexican Indio, and he is one of the greatest men that Mexico has produced. Diaz himself had one-eighth of the peon blood in his veins. Many other examples might be given. I only hope that the time will come, and come soon, when turmoil and revolution will cease, and Mexico will take her place by the side of the great nations not only of the New World, but the Old World as well.

THE MEXICAN SITUATION

*By S. W. Reynolds, formerly President of the Mexican
Central Railway Company, Limited*

It is with a great deal of diffidence that I appear before you today to address you on a subject which, at the present time, is of such world-wide importance, and which seems likely at any moment to involve our country in a contest with our neighboring republic of Mexico; a contest which, if ever entered into, would no doubt in the end prove successful, but which would cost a great number of lives and a vast amount of treasure. This success will come in part from the fact that Mexico has not the men or the money to spend in such a conflict that we have, and, consequently, will not have the endurance to carry through a defensive contest.

In considering the present situation, it is well to look at the past and see what Mexico has been in the more recent years of her history, and what has been accomplished in the development of the country. You are all too familiar with the early history of Mexico to make it necessary for me to go into that part of her national life. You will be more interested in taking up her course since what might be termed the beginning of a peaceful and progressive term of government in that country.

Her greatest and most material advance began when Gen. Porfirio Diaz became her President. General Diaz was born September 15, 1830, in Oaxaca. He was the son of an inn-keeper, and of mixed Indian and Spanish descent, his mother having belonged to the Mixteca tribe. He was one of six children. His father died when he was three years old. He was originally intended for the church, but his temperament not tending in that direction, he afterward studied law in the office of Benito Juarez, who afterward became President of the Republic. Later on, he entered

the army and took a very active and important part in military life.

General Diaz's first wife died in 1880, leaving a son and two daughters. Three years later he married Carmen Romero Rubio, the daughter of Romero Rubio, who was a member of the cabinet for many years, and until his death. She was a woman of great beauty and refinement, and was affectionately called "Carmelita" by the people and was much loved by them. She was of great assistance to General Diaz in his work.

I will not go into the detail of his life up to the time he became President. He assumed the executive power on November 24, 1876. At that time the constitution of the Republic provided that a man could not succeed himself as President, therefore, at the end of his term he was succeeded by Gen. Manuel Gonzalez, who served his term, and in turn was succeeded by General Diaz. In 1884, the provision in the Constitution was altered so that a man might succeed himself, and thereafter General Diaz continued as constitutional President.

With the advent of General Diaz began the important development of the country. In 1876, the Republic was bankrupt, a prey to civil war, brigandage, etc. In 1886, the credit of Mexico abroad was firmly established through a proper and satisfactory adjustment of the foreign debt, and this condition continued until the latter part of the Madero government. When General Diaz became President the treasury was bankrupt, when he left it he left \$62,000,000 in it.

One of General Diaz's early methods of restoring peace was to organize the bandits, who had previously preyed upon the country and made travel through it dangerous, into what is known as the "Corps of Rurales," which afterwards became one of the most reliable and efficient arms of the government's service. He also made it much more to the advantage of his enemies to become his friends, and in that way pacified the contending elements.

General Diaz's greatest move toward development came through the promotion of railroad construction in the

country. Then took place what might be termed the peaceful American invasion of Mexico. It was his policy to invite anyone to come there with their money and enter into the country's development, and the first to accept this invitation were the Americans.

The first enterprise of any importance was taken up by Boston capitalists, and what was known as the Sonora Railroad was begun. This line of road ran from Guaymas on the Gulf of California, to Nogales on the American frontier. It was begun in 1879. In later years it became a part of the Atchison, Topeka and Sante Fe Railroad system, and is now a part of the Southern Pacific system, and has been extended nearly to Guadalajara in the central part of the Republic.

The next railroad taken up was also by Boston capitalists, who began in 1880 the building of the Mexican Central Railway between El Paso and the City of Mexico, and completed its whole length of 1224 miles to the City of Mexico in 1884, and it was opened for through traffic March 22 of that year. Since then additional lines have been built, until the system covered something over 3200 miles of road.

The corporations which built both these roads were organized under the laws of the State of Massachusetts, which had been changed so as to permit the organization of corporations here to build railroads in foreign countries. Other railroads were undertaken by Massachusetts capital, but they were not generally successful. One, however, formed the nucleus of what has since become an important system; that is the line across the Isthmus of Tehauntapec, which has now become a national highway of traffic between the Atlantic and Pacific. Other important railway lines were built with American capital, in fact, by far the larger part of the railway construction in Mexico has been done by Americans.

As showing the methods of the government in handling this great development and the wisdom of the course pursued in aiding and subsidizing the roads, the experience of the Mexican Central Road will serve as an illustration. To aid in the construction of this road the government granted

a subsidy of \$9,500 for each kilometer built. In order to make it easy to pay this subsidy, certificates of indebtedness were issued by the government on completion of defined sections of the road, and these certificates were redeemable with a certain percentage, which varied from time to time, of the gross customs receipts of the country. These certificates were placed on sale at every place where duties were collected, and importers were obliged to buy the percentage of their duties of these certificates, and pay them in to the government as a part of the duties which they had to pay. By this method the road was assured of its proper proportion of the country's revenues, and the government not having received it did not have to pay it out.

Subsidies were given to other roads on this and other bases, until quite an important part of the revenues of the country had been pledged for this purpose. The government wished to make a loan abroad, but found itself handicapped on account of these obligations. They finally, however, arranged a loan for an amount sufficient in addition to their other wants to take care of the obligations to the railroads.

Under the original conditions, the collections by the railroads would have extended over a number of years, so in order to meet the equitable result of anticipating payment, negotiations were entered into with the various roads for an equitable adjustment of this anticipation; a discount of 25 per cent was finally agreed upon in the case of the Mexican Central. The amount due the Company at that time was \$19,820,793.01. After deducting the 25 per cent and some other items entering into the settlement, the sum of \$14,335,732.06 was paid to them in cash.

In 1876, Mexico had but 578 kilometers of railroad. She has now upwards of 10,000 kilometers. Up to June 30, 1896, she had paid in subsidies on 9196 kilometers of road the sum of \$107,743,660.25.

I tell you this as an illustration of the credit that the country had attained, and the justice with which they treated their obligations to the railroads.

General Diaz had as an ally and assistant in working out

his financial policies and the results attained, Jose Yves Limantour, who was his secretary of the treasury. Limantour was of mixed Mexican and French descent, and was one of the ablest financiers of the age and commanded the respect and admiration of the people of his own country and of all other nations with whom he dealt.

General Diaz's policy in opening his country in the way he did for development was not shared by many of his advisers, but his theory was that the country could afford to offer the opportunity to anyone freely to go there and invest their money on the promise of liberal aid from the government for whatever they might do, as, if the railroads were not built, the government would incur no obligation, and if they were built, the benefit to the country would amply compensate for any aid that might be given them. The value of this policy is shown by the immense results which came, for probably nowhere in any country has there been so great a development in so short a time.

Practically, the whole of this wonderful development has come as a result of the opening up of the country by the railroads, so that natural and latent resources might be made productive.

Another important advantage obtained was the power it gave the government in establishing and maintaining peace throughout the country. Formerly when disturbances arose, it took so long for troops to reach the scene, there was time for a powerful organization to form, and it took a longer time for it to be subdued. Later when trouble occurred, the government was able to reach the scene and subdue it before it assumed formidable proportions. In other words, the railroads opened up the country to practically immediate control from the capital.

The methods of government followed by General Diaz were in every respect those of a dictator. He had absolute control of all the details of government, appointed his own cabinet and officials, even directing who should be governors of the various states of the Republic. He also had complete control of congress, whose duties for a long time were merely nominal. He and his cabinet arranged the various matters

which came up for consideration, and when they required the approval of congress, they were sent to it and approval was given in due course. As an illustration of this, my associates and myself wished a concession for building a railroad near the capital; through our attorneys we arranged all the details with the President and cabinet and then left the matter in their hands. The concession required the approval of congress which was then in session; there was only just time to have it take its regular course before congress adjourned. We paid no further attention to it, but it was put before congress and approved at the last effective moment.

Had he been other than the man he was, of course, one can readily see what this condition would have led the country into, but, being as he was, a patriotic man, devoting his life to his country, and working in every way for its development, he handled this great power with so much wisdom and discretion as to bring about the results which were achieved.

Of course, many things were done by him and under his administration that did not meet with the approval of some of his people. The church influence in the government, which formerly had been paramount, was entirely subdued by him and was in no way recognized, and for many years no one dare to oppose him with any hope of success. In fact, the people believed in him so strongly and his power and influence were so great that no effort at opposition was made. However, there was always an element, which though latent and quiet was powerful, and which was constantly on the lookout for a chance to assert itself. There was also an undercurrent of feeling of discontent and unrest on the part of other factions, which will always prevail in a country like Mexico, and under conditions existing there, and in fact in any country, which wished to get control of the government for purposes for their own good or bad as the case might be. These various elements worked quietly over their object and waited a time when they could assert themselves.

General Diaz was probably fully aware of what was going

on, but having exercised his power and control so long, he probably felt himself amply able to control and subdue whatever opposition might arise, but he was getting on in years, he was more anxious to maintain peace and give the country a chance to develop into a position where the full conditions and development of a republican form of government could be maintained and so let up on that tense hold which he had had, with the consequence that the various opposing factions had a chance to gain strength and prepare to assert their opposition to him.

For a long time he was anxious to resign from the Presidency and take a rest which he felt he so richly had earned, but he was always afraid that conditions were not ripe for his retirement, and he was doubtful of what might follow.

The constitution of the country made no provision for a vice-President, but in 1904 the constitution was altered, providing for one. Some time before he had brought from the State of Sonora, Ramon Coral, formerly governor of that state, and made him governor of the Federal District (corresponding to our District of Columbia), later a member of his cabinet, and finally vice-President. This was with the ultimate object of having him become President, but as conditions developed Coral did not seem to be the man for the place, and General Diaz did not dare to have him succeed him. Other men in the cabinet and outside were also considered, but none seemed to come up to the full requirements. Consequently, General Diaz held on, but as often happens in such cases, he held on too long. Had he given up several years before, and before the elements opposing him had become so strong, and been succeeded by someone whom there is no doubt he could have placed in power, who while probably not fully satisfactory to all elements, would have continued the Diaz policies, backed up by the aid General Diaz could have given him, the overturn which took place would not have occurred.

In the meantime the different opposing elements had been gaining strength and later became united under Madero. Had General Diaz recognized Madero's strength and treated with him, probably on a show of strength between the two,

Diaz would have prevailed, but instead Diaz attempted to suppress Madero in a way that finally became persecution, which resulted in increasing Madero's strength so that he was able finally to force Diaz to resign, which he did on May 25, 1911.

Madero's claim to leadership came from his opposition to the previous policies and administration of the government, and his promises if in power to reform the evils which he claimed existed and to give his country a government filling all the requirements and advantages of a republic. His promises were liberal and naturally the people felt that the change meant what they might term reformation. Madero claimed that he did not wish to become President, unless by a regular constitutional election. Consequently Francisco Leon de la Barra was appointed provisional President May 25, 1911, and held the office until the constitutional election took place which made Madero President.

It was my good fortune to know General Diaz personally, as well as every member of his earlier cabinets. After he had weeded out from time to time from the members of his cabinet, the last being Romero Rubio, his father-in-law, the men who had not entirely broken away from the old conditions of graft, etc., which formerly prevailed there, I believe its members to have been men of honesty, integrity, of high character, and devoted to their country, men who had the best interests of their country at heart and who worked to attain the greatest good. Of course, some will disagree with me in this, but I am looking at the whole subject in its broadest sense and based on my personal knowledge of the men, and while many mistakes were made as there always will by whoever may be in power, still considering everything it is doubtful if any set of men could have been in power in such a country who would have brought about such satisfactory results.

The administration of government as carried on by and under General Diaz was that which I believe was best adapted to secure the development which he was carrying on, in the most simple and effective way. If one had dealings with the government, he could go directly to the proper

official and secure immediate and direct consideration for what he had to offer. This meant that the way was easy and simple to do business with the government and did away with the great amount of red tape which is usually so prominent in connection with government affairs. And in this connection one must consider that the people in Mexico are no more like ourselves, naturally, than the people of France, Germany, Spain, China, Japan, or any other foreign nation, and we must consider their temperament, methods of life, and of business, their past history, and their personal characteristics in thinking of and in dealing with them. We would not think of going to Japan or Germany or Spain and finding conditions or people as we do in the United States, nor would we expect to reform or change their life and habits to conform to our own.

In our early experience in Mexico, we found many things different and we thought much inferior to our own, and we set about trying to reform them, but we soon found that their life, customs and ways were based upon a longer experience of their peculiar natural conditions than our own, and we soon concluded that it was much better to graft the best of ours with the best of theirs with the result that we both secured a lasting good.

It was my pleasure and privilege to know Mr. de la Barra personally, and no one can be found of higher character, more gentlemanly characteristics, and I think more honest and faithful than he. He is not, however, a forceful man, and probably could not handle a government passing through a condition of conflict such as at present exists, but as an administrator and executive he was highly efficient and successful.

I was also personally acquainted with some of the members of President de la Barra's cabinet, and have a very high opinion of them.

President Madero, I did not know personally, but from what I have heard about him, he appears to have been a man of high ideals and a certain amount of patriotism, but without the other qualities necessary to make a successful ruler.

He made many promises before he came into power, he proclaimed all the deficiencies of the previous administration and promised reforms in them all, but he was weak in many ways, and was unable to command the support necessary to carry through his reforms. In fact, he showed many of the common defects of men of his calibre, nepotism being one of the most prominent. He soon learned what the temperament and disposition of his people were and what General Diaz had to contend with in holding them in subjection, for elements which were disturbing, when he was fomenting rebellion, continued to be disturbing and he had them to contend with as Diaz previously had with him, and they finally compassed his overthrow.

He took the government under generally peaceful conditions and with a full treasury, he left it in unrest and in poverty. He deposed Diaz, and was in turn deposed by Huerta and Felix Diaz.

Some time in the future Mexico may attain a position where such methods as Madero followed may be successful but the time for that is not now. His career is a forceful illustration of the result of promises made when power is sought for, which are not carried out when one has the power to perform.

The success of General Diaz and his methods indicate strongly that the kind of a government which he gave is what Mexico must have for some time to come. It has been my own personal opinion since General Diaz was deposed that the country must be returned to his kind of a government before peace and progress will be resumed. The fact is not only is there a rebellion against the central government, but the rebels are divided into many bands under separate leaders, bandits in reality, none of which have any standing as a separate government; one only having a center or head of sufficient importance to be recognized as a power, and if ever an attempt was made to recognize a belligerent power, the recognition of one or more would not include all, nor would it bring them all under one control, it would simply mean a faction with other factions still to deal with.

Realizing all this, does it not seem as if the Diaz policy must be revived and an element control the government which shall be in a great manner dictatorial and coercive until the different elements can all be brought under control?

General Diaz went a long way in bringing his people up to a proper standard, they ought to see that they have not yet attained the position where popular government can be maintained, but with another such period of progress under control they may reach the point where full constitutional republican self-government can be maintained.

The great question today is whether Huerta is the man to reëstablish that method of government. He has had no chance to show what he can do, for he has been handicapped for the most of the time since he came into power by the attitude of our own government toward him, which, while seeking to have him attain certain results, seems to throw every impediment it can in the way of his attaining them.

The difficulty in considering the present question of the relations between our government and that of Mexico, is that we know practically nothing of what is going on. Our daily press contain voluminous articles which today make assertions of almost positive definiteness, which are tomorrow contradicted, leaving us with no distinct, actual knowledge, but sifting what we hear as best we may, the conclusion seems to be that our administration has taken a positive position of suppression of the Huerta administration and that nothing that Huerta can do, or anything that can be done there short of his annihilation, will have President Wilson's support or approval. Of the wisdom of this position there are varied opinions, and it may be fair to withhold open condemnation or approval or even open discussion, until we know just what his policy and position is to be.

The situation is very grave, for we will be held responsible for the protection of the lives and property of foreign subjects, as well as our own, and the considerations involved are too important to be trifled with. Our own people have a right to the protection of their interests in that country,

and they are entitled to know if they will have such protection.

General Huerta seems to have some of the qualifications which I believe necessary to bring peace to Mexico, but he cannot accomplish much with the decided opposition of the United States. There are many objections to be made to the methods which Huerta has followed, but the people of this country should recognize what Mexico and its people are. They are not like ourselves, their temperament and conditions, their previous government, the revolutions through which they have passed, and many of their ideals are entirely different from our own.

In an attempt to rehabilitate that country, I do not think we can safely assert what we would like to have them be, but we must start with a condition and not with a theory. If instead of trying to force them into a condition such as we would like, we take them as they are and endeavor to have them follow along lines which we believe to be in accordance with our ideas of the relationship of the United States to the Latin-American republics, we can hope for a very marked success and probably an adjustment of the whole existing condition, but if we try to assume that they must be as we want at the start, and then expect them to follow along lines which we may lay down, I think we will have great difficulty in bringing this about.

It seems rather a strong position for our government to take that they shall dictate to the head of another government who is in power and is the present provisional President of that country, what he shall do and what he shall not do, without giving better reasons than have yet been given. We are not taken into the confidence of our government, and, consequently, are unable to judge of its policy, if it has one, and what it is aiming to do.

We are quite aware that the government must of necessity keep much of its negotiations to itself, but it does seem as if more might be said to our people, who have vast sums of money invested in Mexico, and who are anxiously waiting to see what policy our government is to pursue, if it has a policy, in order to adjust their own affairs.

The people of our country have, I think, an entirely erroneous and unjust opinion of the people of Mexico. While they are unlike us in many ways, my own experience has found them to be in the main, that is, among the business people, of high character and integrity, fair and just in their dealings, and without those barbarous and inhuman proclivities that so many are apt to attribute to them.

The situation can be settled, and settled with reasonable promptness, but it must be done with full consideration for Mexico, and with a full understanding of its people.

DEMOCRACY ON TRIAL

By John Howland, D.D., President of Colegio Internacional, Guadalajara, Mexico

In the opinion of some students of history, democracy is but one stage in the invariable and inescapable cycle of political growth: autocracy, constitutional monarchy, oligarchy, democracy, and anarchy leading back to absolutism; the only possible variation being the length of the different periods, which will be dependent on special local conditions. Others, while not attempting to elude or minimize the historical testimony, would affirm that the lapse from democracy to an anarchy which finds its remedy only by a return to absolutism is by no means a necessity, but simply an accident, owing to defective conditions in previous stages; and that, at the worst, the movement is not a cycle but an ascending spiral in which the former stage is simply approached but at a much higher level, having eliminated much that held it down and back, carrying with it much of the good it has won out of the past and ever approaching more and more the straight tangent which will be the perfect and permanent democracy. Under every system since men first congregated, the strong have ruled the weak; but side by side with the rude fact of power have grown the ideals of fellowship and justice, and these have helped to correct the inequality and injustice which condition human life.

The struggle has been two-fold: to limit more and more the power of the ruler, and to introduce a larger and more effective participation of the people in public affairs. Hence we find two conceptions of democracy, not mutually exclusive but still fundamentally distinct: the one based on social equality, and the other the simple vesting of power in the people. The former is undoubtedly the most frequently entertained: and the cry of "Liberty, Fraternity, Equality," is the one which finds the quickest and most ardent response

in the sympathies of the people. Not only is it the more popular, but doubtless it must be conceded to occupy a higher moral plane, for the latter tends to lead to the former; that is, the vesting of power in all should result in the minimizing, if not in the obliteration, of all degrading or oppressive inequalities. No country can attain real and permanent progress as long as any class, be it high or low, fails through ignorance or indifference to respond to the call of patriotism, whether that call be to the field of battle or to the quieter but more strenuous struggle for the attainment of individual perfection and the fulfilment of personal obligations.

In the republics of ancient times and in most of those of the present, the adoption of democracy was a transition from a previous condition, so that the republican form had to be superimposed on elements that were more or less refractory. The United States has the unique position of being a republic in which the general character of its government was prepared before the nation came into being. The determinative element in the formation of the new race was a group of the descendants of those who had already fought valiantly for liberty and wrested successive concessions from the reluctant crown. When independence was secured for the English colonies, they had only to formulate and publish the principles that had already actuated them from the first. So, naturally, the new republic moved forward with scarcely a jar or tremor in its course.

This difference of origin is often overlooked in judging the progress and attainment of other republics. Because they do not correspond in every detail to the form that the United States has elaborated, they are considered defective or abnormal. It is easy to forget that a republican form of government furnishes no guarantee against tyranny and that a monarchy is not inconsistent with a high degree of political freedom. The writer of the article on democracy in the *Encyclopædia Britannica* does not hesitate to claim that Great Britain is the best type extant of a true democracy and that from her have come the ideals that have led to the establishment of republics, though none of them have attained to the height of the parent country. He calls the French

Republic "bureaucratic," and those in Latin America "despotic." Cavour in Piedmont, working for the freedom and unity of Italy, deliberately rejected the republican form and labored for a constitutional monarchy, established by the coöperation of France. He did this at the cost of losing the coöperation and even of encountering the fanatical opposition of Mazzini and other Italian patriots, but the result would seem to have fully justified his views.

With nations as with individuals there must be a reckoning with inherited tendencies and characteristics. Latin American republics were originally colonial dependencies. They were not colonies founded, as was the great republic of the north, by men who fled from oppression to seek greater freedom in a wilderness: but by those who were sent out to exploit new lands for the benefit of the crown. The only examples they had of government were, in most cases, marked by greed, graft, favoritism, and an utter disregard for the welfare of the colonies themselves. The democratic idea of rulers chosen by the people, responsible to the people, and administering the government with disinterested devotion to the welfare of the people, was practically unknown among them. What wonder, then, that office should have been sought not for the opportunity for service, for the honor, nor even for the salary, but mainly for the openings it offered for personal enrichment. It is always hard to break with hoary traditions; and even when they have been cast off, their influence often persists for an indefinite time.

It would not be easy to find a greater contrast than that which exists between a feudal system and a true democracy; and the existence of greatly concentrated wealth or extreme poverty, of privileges of birth or of ecclesiastical position, must always be a menace to republican institutions. But these conditions had been brought from Europe and firmly implanted on American soil and had to be taken into account by the new-born republic which sprang up under the influence of that wave of sentiment which, during the first half of the last century, threatened all thrones, even the most firmly established ones of Europe. Where these things exist, even as a memory or as a wish, they are sure sooner or later to

come into conflict with a democratic form of government and some way of adjustment must be found or the government will be overthrown.

Racial prejudice wields a mighty influence in the opinion peoples form of each other. It has been well said that "The portrait that one nation paints of another is likely to appear a libel or a caricature to the sitter." It is not, however, mere prejudice; for each race has its own peculiarities. The Saxon is phlegmatic, reflective, patient of delay, willing to wait for the slow processes of human experience. The Latin blood is fervid, and quickly boils at meeting opposition. The Saxon patriot wages his warfare and bides his time, confident that he is aligned on the side of truth and justice, and that these are destined to triumph at the last, however much they may be sidetracked, misrepresented or perverted for a time. If the party of opposition wins an election, he watches those thus chosen to arrest every false or devious step with the machinery of the law, and even when this fails, he sets himself to use the legal remedy—the election of cleaner executives and a more upright judiciary. He realizes that a people has only the government that it chooses, or at least consents to have; so that, to reform abuses or correct errors, it is necessary to educate public opinion or awaken public sentiment. He knows that victory obtained otherwise will be specious, momentary, and finally delusive. The Latin-American, with his more vivid imagination, sees only final ruin in everything that delays, diverts or defeats that for which he is laboring. He expects all to see things from his point of view and with the same enthusiasm. He is impatient of the process of slowly, methodically and persistently shaping the opinions of his compatriots. As in his personal difficulties he is quick to have recourse to the poniard, so in his political disappointments he trusts more naturally to an appeal to arms than to a prolonged campaign for subsequent elections. Instead of the joy that his impassive Saxon neighbor feels in carrying on a prolonged struggle for some principle, he enters the contest with boundless enthusiasm, but if not immediately successful, easily relapses into complete discouragement or lets his disappointment degenerate into a

personal feud against his political opponent. The Saxon, from his boyhood, is trained even in his play, in "team work," the spirit of coöperation which seeks union on common principles and purposes and with ease passes over personal preferences and slights in pursuance of the greater good. The Latin is more personal; everyone for himself. If he can not carry his point, he may yield with more or less of grace to another; but finds it difficult to combine or coöperate with that other. The difference is seen very markedly in commercial enterprises. Among Saxons combination has reached such limits and attained such colossal success as to seriously menace the stability of governments and the well-being of the common people. Commercial combinations among the Latins are apt to be of short duration. Their traditions and tastes point rather to the building up of a "house," where there shall be one dominant name and interest, and all the rest subservient to that.

History shows that political greatness and permanence must ever depend on well distributed economic and industrial development. The granting of great concessions and subsidies to powerful companies is beneficial in a way, because it develops resources hitherto unproductive: but it easily becomes a menace to the real prosperity of a nation in more ways than one. Frequently, if not usually, such concessions are given to foreigners, so that most of the gain is taken out of the country in which it is produced and then, too, international complications are liable to come up at any time. Such concessions also discourage competition and the wider development of national resources. Life comes from the ground, and only as agriculture is extended, improved and put into the hands of the greatest possible number can a nation hope for lasting prosperity. Ways must be found for the avoidance of or the breaking up of excessively large estates, but this is worse than useless unless the small owner is educated and protected, so that he will not lose through lack of thrift, wisdom, or legal security what he may have acquired. Every citizen who owns no taxable property is a menace to the state. Usually, his impecunious situation reveals a lack of intelligence, sobriety, or willingness to work,

which in themselves make him a source of danger; and his poverty makes him an easy prey to the demagogue, the politician or the revolutionist. In the colonization of the northern republic the character of the country and the traditions of the greater part of the colonists favored small holdings of land and the development of rural communities. To the south, conditions were different: large grants of land were made to individuals, and wealthy investors bought extensive tracts, thus making competition by a small proprietor difficult if not impossible. Climatic and territorial conditions make it necessary to undertake expensive projects of irrigation, far beyond the possibilities of the man of moderate means. Lack of transportation also puts the small producer at the mercy of the wholesale dealer who can afford to wait for months or years to realize his profits. The traditional method of holding land by Latin peoples of limited resources was the community system. This trained the indigenous population in an easy-going lack of anxiety for the future, and checked all their ambition. The family could not lose its right to tillage, pasture, and wood; nor could anyone acquire a largely greater wealth than others because all had equal rights. Experience has shown that the result of the breaking up of these ancient communities is that land sharks secure the titles to the larger part of them, as the former holders have had no training in that jealous protection of their real estate from all encumbrance or danger of loss, which is the secret of the existence of an extensive and intelligent rural population.

The security of a democracy will always be proportional to the extent of the intelligent participation of all of its citizens. There may be a stage of transition, more or less prolonged, in which the intelligent few may govern the acquiescing but ignorant masses, or as it has been expressed "a majority of brains ruling a majority as counted by noses," but such a condition is always fraught with danger and must be finally disastrous unless steady progress is made towards the education of all the people. Extreme poverty that results in practical serfdom and lack of aspiration that leaves the masses of the people illiterate, furnish a serious problem

for any progressive government, but especially for those that aim toward the democratic form. There is always the danger that the high ideal of democracy become a simple fetich, that the ideal degenerate into the idol. Academic education is not sufficient. In a race that is gifted with a vivid imagination and which never lacks for words in which to voice its thoughts, there is always the danger that the appeal will be to the passions and that the thrill it produces will be a kind of intoxication that is irrevocably followed by a depressing and degrading reaction, instead of leading to more intelligent and resolute action. Popular education, to be sane, must "speak directly to the reason, enlighten, kindle, free and teach how strength of soul may show itself in sane acts." It has been said that the individual that ceases to react to the facts of life is to be judged insane. Measured by such a standard, many republics have to reckon with a large insane element which constitutes a grave danger. Centuries ago, Plato affirmed that rational discussion was the only protection against errors and untested ideas; but the ability to calmly define terms, analyze and clearly state one's own opinions and those that differ from ours, see and show the logical coherence of the one and the real defects of the other, comes only by study and experience. Till it is acquired, there will always be dissension and turmoil instead of union and progress.

Having noted some of the more important points of difference in the conditions under which the Anglo-Saxon and the Latin-American races have attempted to carry out democratic principles, it remains only to be affirmed that, variant as the results may seem, they all point in the same direction. Divergencies and discrepancies are not necessarily failures nor defects, they may be simple stages in a conflict with diverse conditions.

In South America, the three largest republics have attained a good degree of stability, combined with a steady increase of true democracy. They seem to be at least approaching the final solution of their most serious problems.

In Mexico, a country that holds the attention of the world today, even during the first half century of her independence

which was marked with strife and confusion, many problems were worked out and an excellent constitution and code of reform laws adopted. The thirty-four years of absolutism under Diaz was not, by any means, a complete relapse. By covering the country with a network of railroads and telegraph the land was unified and preparation was made for a greater development of its many natural resources; the national credit was restored and carried forward to an enviable position; considerable advance was made in the line of economic and industrial enlargement; illiteracy was sensibly diminished; and the people were made familiar with at least the forms of law. It is to be deplored that, during that time, office was made a matter of official favoritism rather than of popular choice; graft was unchecked; the poor were taught little of either letters or morals; confidence in legal processes for the righting of wrongs was well nigh destroyed, and loyalty to the existing government as an essential element of true patriotism was almost unknown. When to all this is added the fact that by the revolution the worst instincts of the most vicious elements of society were awakened and battered by the looting of cities and farms, the only cause for wonder is that the confusion was not greater when the iron hand was suddenly relaxed and withdrawn. Unfortunately, the man who had the faith and the courage to initiate the revolution and who came into power on the crest of an immense wave of popular enthusiasm was pitifully lacking in the qualities that were necessary for meeting the situation, and was carried down in the vortex whose destructiveness his efforts only seemed to increase. The tragedy of his removal increased the disturbance. To the already numerous groups of bandits were added new bands, some of whom are doubtless moved by the instinct of patriotism to resist the government. To an empty treasury; to the depredation of lawless bands that avail themselves of mountain fastnesses and great stretches of nearly impassable desert and not merely take for themselves money, food, arms and horses, but who kill, rob and ruthlessly destroy the property of individuals, of the nation, and sometimes of foreigners; to private and political plots; to the difficulty of placing confidence in anyone in the

general slump of fidelity; to all this have been added the insidious influence of great combinations of capital, mostly of foreigners, interested in valuable concessions; and the shameless intrigue of individuals who have so far lost all that made man the image of his Creator that, just for private gain, they would deliberately embroil two friendly nations in a war that would be disastrous and unfruitful for both.

In spite of all this, democracy still lives in Mexico, not merely enshrined in the hearts of its people, but as a vital force. When present conditions have been worked out, the great body of sane, thoughtful Mexican patriots will bring their idolized country back to her rightful position of respect and confidence. If others will give Mexico intelligent and sympathetic coöperation instead of misunderstanding, misinterpretation and suspicion, or if they will even let her alone, she will successfully work out her own salvation. In doing so she will give to the world a new proof of the tremendous power of democratic principles, not merely to survive under the most untoward conditions, but ultimately to triumph over every obstacle.

THE PRESENT SITUATION IN MEXICO AS SHAPED BY PAST EVENTS

*By Leslie C. Wells, Professor of French and Spanish
at Clark College*

Porfirio Díaz, great and wonderful as certain of his accomplishments were, gave Mexico a very lop-sided administration. Her development under him was almost entirely economic in character. He paid little attention to the social uplift of his people, his widely advertised solicitude for education having been strangely exaggerated; he made almost no attempt to reform the structure of society, which for a large part of the people is that of feudalism; he denied them even the slightest opportunity for political training; and promoted injustice rather than justice.

His methods may have proceeded from good motives, but the statement well made by someone that he "mistook the wealth of the country for its well-being" is at best a charitable judgment of his rule. To his all-consuming desire of setting the wheels of industry in motion and giving his treasury a favorable standing in foreign money markets, he subordinated everything else. He sought to get the natural resources of the country used, but cared little who used them. The quickest way to accomplish this was, or appeared to be, to give all encouragement to capitalists, native and foreign, and to promote the concentration of wealth. The national blessings to be derived from a fair distribution of the rewards of labor, he seems hardly to have dreamed of. In some cases, even, willing employers were officially discouraged from raising the wages of their help. The land was more monopolized at the end of his rule than at its beginning. His administration made for the exploitation of the Mexican nation rather than for its development.

No country can enjoy true progress under such one-sided government, and injustice patiently endured never made a

nation great. Sufficient proof that the methods of Díaz were not those which Mexico needed, at least in the last decade of his rule, is furnished by the deplorable condition to which they have brought her.

When the reaction came in 1910 it was natural that the pendulum should swing too far. Madero was extravagant in his promises, and the people were too impatient in their demand for immediate reforms. But Madero had prepared his downfall in the very moment of his victory over Díaz. He then, to stop bloodshed and perhaps for other reasons, made a compromise with the old régime that delayed and made difficult the consummation of his reforms. If, as may be true, he himself, when President, became somewhat shaken also in his plans, the purpose of the Mexican people remained steady. The earlier revolts against Madero, as well as those of Félix Díaz, were perhaps led by selfish men; but they were largely supported by peons who, however vague their understanding of their own desires, were insistent that the revolution should not be abortive in its results.

It was this division of the great progressive element that gave the reactionary party under Félix Díaz and General Huerta its chance to overthrow the government. Their victory was at bottom more significant of the intense desire of the nation for a new era of justice than it was of dissatisfaction with the experiment in democracy, which was far too short to afford any real test whatsoever.

At this point mention may well be made of an erroneous statement which of late has appeared in American newspapers, and which should be corrected; the statement that when Madero was elected President he polled only 20,000 votes. Presidential elections in Mexico are indirect, and the mistake has arisen through a confusion of the popular vote with the electoral vote. For the purpose of national elections, under the electoral law in force until December, 1911, the country was divided into "sections" of 500 inhabitants each, one member of the electoral college being chosen from each section.¹ As there is a Mexican population of

¹In this particular the new law is virtually the same.

15,000,000 people, there existed theoretically about 30,000 electoral sections. Actually there were only about 20,000 in which polls were held at the time of Madero's election. Approximately 95 per cent of the presidential electors from these 20,000 sections cast their votes for Madero.

Of the 500 inhabitants of a section, the normal number of voters is from 80 to 100. On the average, probably from 20 to 25 per cent of these went to the polls. It might be impossible to obtain authentic figures, but it seems safe to say that the 19,000 electors who cast their votes for Madero were chosen by the ballots of 350,000 Mexicans. Even this number is a small portion of those entitled to the suffrage; but, under the circumstances, it is reasonable to consider their choice as fairly representative of the will of the Mexican people.

The purpose of bringing Mexico into a new era, which they failed to accomplish through that election, they will seek new agencies to fulfill. Its chief exponents at present are the Constitutionals. The leaders may be expected to profit from Madero's mistakes, and to accept no compromises that are likely to defeat their ends. The results of past compromises will explain General Carranza's unwillingness for mediation. If he treats with Huerta, it will probably be when Huerta's control is so far gone that Carranza will be able practically to dictate the terms. He must feel sure that the man who may be selected for provisional President is one in whose democracy the people will have entire confidence. They have been so accustomed to elections determined by official power that otherwise they would not vote freely in the polling for a permanent president. The result might be a choice not at all representative of the will of the nation, and the revolution would remain to be fought over again.

Foreign governments, therefore, desiring to end the disorder, should beware of forcing a compromise. They should give little heed to capitalists who are more interested in securing present returns from their Mexican investments, even through an iron-handed and cruelly oppressive

peace for a number of years, than they are in bringing permanent happiness to Mexico. If the people do not get justice now, they will surely demand it later, for "The smallest worm will turn, being trodden on."

THE PRESENT DAY PHASE OF THE MONROE DOCTRINE

*By F. E. Chadwick, Rear Admiral, United States Navy,
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of Staff to Admiral Sampson in the Spanish War*

I think it well that there should from time to time be discussions of our public policies so that their true meaning be kept before the country. Any policy which cannot stand discussion is of course a bad policy, for in a free discussion of any question of policy or politics is our safety. It is the basis of the freedom of which we boast. I thus hope, whatever the views of those concerned, that we shall have a full and frank discussion of the subject in hand.

Before entering on the question itself, I would like to say that we are using an erroneous nomenclature in applying the term "Latin" to those parts of the Americas settled by the Spanish and Portuguese. There is no Latin America in a true sense: but there is an Iberic America settled by the people of the Iberic peninsula, the races in which are still mainly of the old Iberic blood and in no large sense "Latin." I shall have something to say of this later.

I have heard no mention of the actual Doctrine under discussion as it originally stood. I thus venture to say a few words on this.

It was in reality due mainly to John Quincy Adams, Monroe's secretary of state. He first gave it concrete form and was thus its true author. It was by his insistence despite tremblings of the President and the rest of the Cabinet that it appeared in a note read on November 21, 1823, to Baron Tuvill, the Russian Minister, in form as follows:

That the United States of America, and their government could not see with indifference, the forcible interposition of any European power, other than Spain, either to restore the dominion of Spain over her emancipated colonies in America, or to estab-

lish monarchical governments in those countries, or to transfer any of the possessions heretofore or yet subject to Spain in the American hemisphere to any other European power.

As the responsibility of the acceptance of the principle and of its appearance later in fuller form was the President's it very properly took his name.

So early as July 17 of that year Adams had announced this policy to Byron Tuyll in an official conversation, saying that "we should assume distinctly the principle that the American continents are no longer subjects for any new colonial establishments." These expressions, those of Adams as well as that fathered by Monroe, were the outcome of the alliance known as Holy, consisting first of Russia, Austria and Prussia. England shortly became a signatory and France became a party in 1818. The alliance in this year stated the "respose of the world" as "constantly their motive and end." To assist Spain in reducing to obedience her revolted American provinces was one of the means proposed. England under the guidance of George Canning, one of the greatest of her statesmen at any period, withdrew from the alliance. Canning's attitude and the pronouncement in Monroe's message on the meeting of congress December 21, 1823, gave a quietus to any proposed interference with the Spanish provinces, which one by one became independent except Cuba and Puerto Rico. Brazil declared independence of Portugal with a scion of Portuguese royalty as emperor.

We thus very materially assisted Mexico and the South American republics in establishing their nationality. That we had none but the vaguest ideas regarding the conditions of these various countries, the character and temperament of the populations, goes without saying. We know all too little of them now, and, particularly, we know, or at least take to heart, but little of the race characteristics of the governing class small in numbers and which, in all but Brazil where it is Portuguese, is of Spanish blood. The Anglo-Saxon is proverbially slow and weak in the acquirement or at least in the application of such race knowledge. The great mass of our people are apt to assign to all races their own qualities; to believe

that what we wish to do is a sign of what they must wish. That the South American states had the wish to follow our experiment in government is undoubtedly true. But to wish and to do are different things. They all, except Brazil, sat at our feet so to speak; formed their constitutions upon ours and started upon the road to freedom which only led them, in their case, into the slough of almost incessant revolution and political convulsion. Back of their wish was the great dominant power of race temperament which governs and ever will govern in great degree all effort. The fateful inheritance was the oriental temperament of the Spaniards, for the Spaniard in the main is not a European, but a child of the orient. Basically he is a Berber, for such was the ancient Iberian, which probably has its root in the word Berber, and his near relatives are the Berbers today of the Atlas, and the Moors of Morocco; and farther back the Arab and the latter's kindred races. These races have never got rid of their tribal tendencies and it is this tendency which accounts for the subjugation of Spain by the Atlas Berbers and Moors in 700, for the downfall of their power 800 years later; for the constant regionalism of Spain which exists even today and prevents a real solidarity of the various kingdoms of Spain, and for the frequent revolutions and upheavals of the Mexican and South American republics. It is in the nature of the Spanish (and governing) part of their population. This tendency will be modified as the native races and their mixture with the whites increase in comparison with the pure white. It is estimated that already in Mexico the population is nineteen-twentieths Indian. It is only the phlegmatic character of the race and their want of assertiveness which prevents their having a greater influence. Thus the Mexican revolutions are the outcome of the exploitation of the weaker and milder race by but about a million of people of the restless Spanish or nearly Spanish blood, the character of the dominancy of which is shown by the casting sometimes of less than 18,000 votes in a presidential election in a population of about 18,000,000. Notwithstanding, and though very few can be said to be republics in any but

name, certain of these countries by reason of race mixture and pressure of commercial interests, have already grown out of their chaotic conditions. Argentina is today a well ordered prosperous country, rich beyond even North American ideas and with a capital city, Buenos Aires, of a population of over a million, a rival in construction, well-being, appearance and wealth of any city in the world. The country, mainly temperate in climate and well nigh half the size of the United States, has a great destiny. It is undoubtedly one of the seats of empire. It is beyond the stage when it can be patronized. The same may be said of Chile and Brazil though the last (never revolutionary in an extremesense) is immensely handicapped by its non-homogeneous population, so largely negro and Indian and of a mixture of both these with the white. In all the other states, except Uruguay which is still perhaps the most truly Spanish in blood, the mixture is chiefly Indian, as in Mexico. We have thus in our dealings with the regions to the south of us, to consider powers racially so different from ourselves that our understanding of one another is extremely difficult. The polite and ceremonious South American of Spanish descent cannot understand our rudeness of manner, our overbearingness, our want of that courtesy in general on which the Spaniard lays a stress which the North American mind fails wholly to comprehend. And, too, for generations, we sent to South America many diplomatic and consular representatives who misrepresented sadly their country. I could tell some very queer stories of such. Our government in later years has come to understand the necessity of sending a higher class of representatives, but it will take long to dispel the old impressions.

Naturally with such impressions immensely accentuated by racial and lingual differences, the southern republics have turned to Europe rather than to us for trade, travel and amusements. Brazil and the countries south are also much nearer Europe than to us, so that everything has worked against an actual drawing together of these regions and ourselves.

It has seemed necessary to say so much of conditions,

as they are closely related to any discussion of the meaning of the Monroe Doctrine today.

That there is any danger to Brazil, Argentina or Chile, such as was existent in 1823, it is impossible to believe. Undoubtedly these now comparatively powerful countries would stand together were either attacked with a view to subjugation, by a European power. Such an alliance is in itself an all sufficient Monroe Doctrine in so far as the establishment of a European hegemony in the southern and south-eastern part of South America is concerned. I thus am of the opinion that we need not concern ourselves about such a danger more than to declare a readiness to join with these three principal powers in case such emergency should arise. But I am convinced that no such emergency will arise through any European power, though there is a volume of immigration which is sure to change the predominance in importance of the Portuguese blood in southern Brazil and that of the Spanish in Uruguay, Argentina and more slowly in Chile. For more than ninety years there has been emigration from Germany to South Brazil, and the 110,000 who have come to southern Brazil between 1820 and 1911 amount today to more than 300,000 by far the greater number of whom know of course no other fatherland. There are also today hundreds of thousands of Italians chiefly of the better north Italian stock and who, in Brazil are chiefly a little to the north of the Germanic region. But these people whatever may come (and it must be kept in mind that migration to South America is Latin in enormous proportion, the German, to Brazil being not more than 4000 a year), will never put themselves under the government of a European power. Should Brazil, which be it remembered is considerably larger than the United States, leaving aside Alaska, ever separate into a north and a south through racial differences, the south would either set up its own government or attach itself to Argentina which in time may control the whole of the river Plate region. I would say however that I regard any danger of separation, by reason of race, extremely unlikely in that

the northern states are destined to be peopled by those of a blood whose special characteristic is subordination. In any case even were there a fear of European difficulty it would seem the part of wisdom to encourage the filling up of these vast spaces where possible by a better sort of man than the negro or Indian. It would be better far, for Brazil and the world, if the Germans in Brazil numbered millions where they are now only a few hundreds of thousands. If in time Germanic blood became the chief element, the state would still be Brazil, but a Brazil of a higher type intellectually and economically. We must not lose sight of race values, and this question is thus to Brazil of the most momentous character. Of its population of about 19,000,000, much the largest population is negro, mixed negro and white and Indian. The whites predominate in numbers in the further south only.

While this south is largely a high table land, the northern interior is chiefly a vast low-lying region all well within the tropics and with the tepid climate in which the white can never thrive. Escaping disease, as at Panama, is one thing, thriving in such a climate is another, and however strenuous may be the endeavor to people the whole of Brazil with white men it must be to a very great extent a failure. At least two-thirds of her territory must in time be the abode of colored races, and in time there will be in most parts but very few pure whites.

We thus need not concern ourselves about European emigration to Brazil north of Rio Janeiro; nature will take care of that part of the problem.

While there are great regions to which the white man will not go to establish himself permanently, the colored races are able to thrive even in fairly cold climates. Thus the facts just stated open up a problem more vast and momentous to us than our slavery question; that is shall we approach the Brazilian conditions?

However kindly our feeling, we can not but recognize that some races make a more valuable return to the species than others. We preach greatly what we now term eugenics which translated broadly means the production of

the best man. We are faced in our own country by this question in a more serious form than is any other great nation. A tenth of our population is now negro which is rapidly in the north mixing with the white; the incoming population is largely itself negroid, particularly that from the Portuguese islands, less markedly from Portugal itself and markedly from Sicily and Naples. Many thousands of jet black negroes calling themselves Portuguese, as they are under the flag, have entered Massachusetts from the Cape Verde Islands in the last few years and every Cape Verde Islander will finally come and help his fellows pick cranberries on Cape Cod, or work in the New Bedford mills. The census gives nearly 50,000 negroes as part of our population not born in the United States, and there are undoubtedly many more than the census notes. The time is rapidly approaching when we may expect a great immigration from the Congo basin of Africa. It becomes a mighty question which it behooves us to consider, and that soon. Says Pearson, in his *National Life and Character*, and he saw farther into the future than most of his time:

The distant future of a country is so unimportant by the side of its immediate needs to the men in possession that even if they were reasonably certain that a particular evil ought to be guarded against at an immediate sacrifice, they would rarely be possessed of the moral force required for the effort.

Shall we have this moral force in the matter of Africa whose millions will undoubtedly before long be at our doors? If not, the present differentiation in character between ourselves and Mexico and much of South America will in no very distant time disappear and we shall have approximated a general likeness in both parts of our hemisphere. It is a matter for our most serious thought, to which at the moment I can give but bare mention, but I would that you would hold it in earnest thought. Shall we have and display that patriotism of race, to use a phrase of Arthur Balfour's, which alone can save us from being a negroid nation? If it is a vital question; one before which the questions involved in the Monroe Doctrine shrink to insignificance.

The Monroe Doctrine does not necessarily involve opposing any warlike action between a European power and an American nationality, for an offense which necessarily calls for such action. This part of the subject is covered by Mr. Seward's despatch, 2 June, 1866, to our minister in Chile regarding the hostilities then active between Spain and Chile. The gist of this despatch is that "the republican system" in any South American State,

shall not be wantonly assailed and that it shall not be subverted as an end of a lawful war by European powers. . . .

We concede to every nation the right to make peace or war, for such causes other than political or ambitious, as it thinks right and wise. In such wars as are waged between nations which are in friendship with ourselves, if they are not pushed, like the French war in Mexico, to the political point before mentioned, we do not intervene, but remain neutral conceding nothing to one belligerent that we do not concede to the other and allowing to one belligerent what we allow to the other.¹

This in nowise contravenes the Monroe Declaration which declares that "We should consider any attempt on their part [meaning the European powers] to extend their system to any portion of this hemisphere as dangerous to our peace and safety," that "we could not view any interposition for the purpose of oppressing them [the South American states], or controlling in any other manner their destiny by any European power in any other light than as a manifestation of an unfriendly disposition to the United States." It must be admitted that the word "republican" in Mr. Seward's despatch, and, which is only implied in the Monroe declaration, is made to cover much which we should be sorry to so term; but in any case the constitutions of all have established such a form as their ideal and they should have full chance to work toward it.

The whole question is thus one of denying the right of a foreign power to dominion in any American state or part of a state nor already in possession of a foreign power. In other words we are very properly opposed to conquest.

While holding that as to the more southern governments of South America our relations should be as a fourth equal

¹ Diplom. Cor. 1866, part 2, p. 413.

with a like understanding as to attempted foreign domination, and not in the nature of a protector which carries with it an idea of patronage, the matter stands on a very different footing as to the regions bordering on the Caribbean sea and the Gulf of Mexico, and on that part of the Pacific in the neighborhood of the Panama Canal. That we must have and exercise a commanding influence in these regions should go without saying. We can brook no increase of foreign control in this region. Our newly established gateway between the two great oceans and the protection of this vital link in our defensive system demand this independent of any question of the Monroe Doctrine. Thus in addition to our policy of aiding in the preservation of any South American state from foreign control, we would oppose anything like new occupancy of any of the West India Islands or Caribbean or Gulf of Mexico litoral, or any part of the Pacific litoral of Mexico or the Central American states, or neighboring islands, such, for example, as the Galápagos.

There are of course already in the hands of foreign nations commanding points in the Caribbean region, as Jamaica, (the most commanding as a single point of all), in possession of the English, St. Thomas which is Danish, Martinique and Guadeloupe which are French. All the important West India Islands are in fact in European possession except Cuba, Santo Domingo and Puerto Rico. It is not unreasonable, as a mere matter of safeguarding our own shores, to demand that there should be no extension of foreign occupancy in this region. In this we are looking after not the safety of any Central or South American state, but our own safety from a naval or military standpoint. The Panama Canal is the very navel of our system, strategic and commercial. Our battle fleet for instance could reach San Francisco from the Caribbean in a fourth of the time taken by the *Oregon* in her famous passage from San Francisco to the Caribbean. Any foreign action which could look to weakening our control of the canal and its approaches thus could not be tolerated.

I am well aware that there are probably some who lay

no stress upon such matters, but it would appear the part of wisdom to apply to the future the lessons of the past. Jefferson, more than a hundred years ago, failed to do this and thus subjected his country to inexpressible humiliation in the seizure of our ships and seamen, to the loss of millions of American property and to the war of 1812, which would never have occurred had we had the dozen or so of battle-ships which even Gallatin, Jefferson's secretary of the treasury, urged upon him. We speak of modern dictatorship on the part of our presidents; no modern president has exercised a tithe of that exercised by Jefferson in these matters and not always to his country's good. There is in such matters but one safe course. All the world will not always shape itself to one's own special views, and for the time at least, it is better to be prepared to resist if struck. If not, it is possible that we might find ourselves the victim in considerable degree, of that which the Monroe Doctrine was established to prevent for others. A first consideration must ever be national security and safety. Some here no doubt are opposed to a strong navy. To such I would recall that it was to the French navy by its occupancy of the Chesapeake in 1781 and the consequent surrender of Cornwallis, that we gained our independence. For had Washington's venture south failed, the Revolution would have failed. It was a last attempt. Had we had no navy in 1812 (and it was but a very little one), we should then have undergone greater humiliation ashore than we did and perhaps dismemberment. Without the navy of the Civil War, the South beyond any reasonable doubt would have succeeded. It was the blockade which starved it to inanition. The world has not so changed in fifty years as to make a war of conquest impossible. It is but a little over forty years when France was in the grip of Germany. We cannot apply our own altruism to others, and as I see it, it appears beyond discussion that our own safety depends upon our ability to take care of our own. Remember that in June, 1860, the only increase of the navy even suggested, was for a few light draft steamers for use in suppression of the slave trade on the coast of Africa, and

every increase was voted down. Less than a year later we began the greatest war of the century.

To assume an attitude; to have a world policy and not be able to hold it, would be to make ourselves absurd and open to humiliation and loss of territory. So much at least is axiomatic. I say these truths "Lest we forget."

The Monroe Doctrine is not in any of its meanings or forms a part of international law. It is but a pronouncement of a policy and as such it may be ignored by any power which chooses to ignore it. It has life and being only as long as the United States is ready to back such policy by force. That there is any danger of action by any European power in defiance of the policy does not now at least, appear. Certainly England has no interest in so doing; there is no sign that Germany wishes to set up a German state under Germany's hegemony. That she desires as many Germans in South America who through natural affiliation would trade largely with Germany is natural and proper, but she would certainly not risk a war with united Brazil, Argentina, and Chile, not to speak of the United States, to bring under her dominion the region occupied by her emigrants. I have ever deemed any such question of war with Germany as impossible. So long as the great Slav question is so imminent; so long as France nurses her feeling for her loss of territory and England, however unreasoningly, her fear of Germany instigated by commercial jealousy, there will be no reaching out by the latter for South American dominion. France has not the remotest desire to set up a French dominion there, nor has Italy, and England declared some eighteen months since through her foreign minister speaking in parliament, that as she had no wish or intention to extend her possessions either in the West Indies or on the continent, she took no exception to the Monroe Doctrine which was purely a question of American policy to do with as we thought best. The danger in the sense of Monroe's pronouncement could thus only exist after a complete effacement of American power, north and south.

Thus to sum up: our most reasonable attitude as to any

question of conquest or occupancy of any part of South America would be as a friendly fourth party to the three greater powers of the southern part of our hemisphere, Brazil, Argentina and Chile, assuring them that our policy would be one of support in the questions involved in the Monroe Doctrine and of looking after our special interests in the Caribbean, the Gulf of Mexico and near Pacific as just defined.

Our action in regard to certain of the Central American states and Santo Domingo has been, in some cases, sharply criticised. But such procedure, as I see it, has nothing in itself to do with the Monroe Doctrine. There are many precedents for such action, and if it be that of a truly friendly and well-wishing neighbor it is correct diplomatically and morally. Of course the most extreme precedent is that of the Holy Alliance itself, as overtly shown in Naples, Piedmont, and Spain. But there are other and more worthy instances, as the intervention of France, Great Britain and Russia in 1827 for the pacification of Greece; the late action of the European powers in Crete; of Great Britain in Egypt; of Russia and Great Britain in Persia (to which the word "worthy" can however not be assigned); the action of the powers in forcing a treaty upon the parties to the Balkan war, and many others, which place such action as ours in Nicaragua and Santo Domingo upon a perfectly correct diplomatic footing. Such precedents would justify intervention in Mexico if the worst came to the worst. In saying this I would not be understood as declaring such action advisable except in the last extremity. It would strain our political system to the utmost; would involve an army of half a million men, an indefinite administration of a vast region and the government for years of some 17,000,000 or more of races alien in temperament, habits, customs, language and religion. Far better, from only a financial point of view, would it be for us to buy up every foreign interest in Mexico. We have through our pension laws bound ourselves hand and foot against the active use of a great army. We should end any effort

at occupation and pacification (should it ever end) with a pension list swollen to such gigantic proportions that our finances would go to wreck under the burden. And above all how under our system could we govern it? And this last question is above all others. I can see in such an effort nothing but disaster. I thus say as to such procedure, God forbid!

With this I close, except to say that I think our relations to our brother republics to the south should be governed by every possible consideration for their temperament and care for their prejudices; that our diplomatic and consular representatives should be of a character to command wholly their liking and respect, and that we should appear in all matters concerning Pan-American questions as an equal only among equals, determined to do the just, the equitable and the kindly. On such a basis there would be no difficulty regarding the Monroe Doctrine.

THE MONROE DOCTRINE FROM A SOUTH AMERICAN VIEWPOINT

*By Honorable Charles H. Sherrill, Envoy Extraordinary
and Minister Plenipotentiary to Argentina, 1909-1911*

In this hemisphere the twentieth century will sooner or later come to be known as the century of the Southerner. Already clear evidence is being shown of the steady strong tendency which must, unless diverted or dissipated by some historical cataclysm, write this title across the century upon which we have entered. And any man concerned in public affairs who does not take into account the viewpoint of the Southerner has no claim to statesmanship, and does not deserve the confidence of his fellows. Nor is this true in our hemisphere alone, but also across the Atlantic as well. For who can fail to have observed the awakening of the Latin races of Europe. Is not the splendid new national spirit of France a significant proof of this movement? And what of the stream of money being constantly transmitted to Italy by her industrious and economical toilers in the harvests and on the railways of both North and South America—toilers who return to their native land and add not only to its public wealth, but also to its worthy citizenship! More marvelous still are the amazing annual increases to be noted in the already impressive foreign trade of Argentina and of Brazil. In our own southern states, are we not witnessing the working out along practical lines of one of commerce's strangest fairy tales? Go to Birmingham or Atlanta or Chattanooga or any of the long list of great modernized cities in the South, and the truth of this proposition will receive ocular demonstration of a surprising completeness. When two years ago upon my return from Argentina I spoke before nearly two hundred commercial organizations, the most instructing experience of all (and there were many) was the realization that municipal col-

lective effort was on the whole better conceived and conducted, and yielding better results, in the south than in any other section. All parts of the United States have come to recognize and to be proud of the New South, and of all it means to the strength of our nation: why are we so reluctant to give the same recognition to the great republics of South America!

I am an enthusiastic Pan-American, and an earnest believer in the high ideals of Pan-Americanism, and one of those ideals is respect for the viewpoint of our fellow Americans. The peoples of our hemisphere have been allowed to develop naturally in an atmosphere of liberty and of ample opportunity, amid surroundings that in Europe the trammels of an older civilization would have rendered either difficult or impossible. This very freedom of the Americas has worked strange and radical changes in the European races that came to it and have become Americanized by its influence. It has accelerated the mentality of the Anglo-Saxon of North America, and it has steadied and broadened the vitality and energy of the Latin of South America, and it is insensibly bringing them nearer together. An interesting ethnological parallel could be drawn between the change effected in an Irishman by moving him from Ireland to New York, and that in a Spanish emigrant before he leaves his home and after he arrives in the subtly Americanizing surroundings of Buenos Aires. If it isn't the new environment that works the transformation, what is it?—and if the same effect is produced at points six thousand miles apart, isn't it fair to call that effect Pan-American! And isn't it fair to consider the viewpoint of the Americanized Latin just as much as that of the Americanized Anglo-Saxon? He is just as much a child of liberty and opportunity as we, and just as worthy of consideration. We hear much of the steadiness and self-control of the Anglo-Saxon, and of the importance that lends to his opinions—when I was in Buenos Aires an anarchist exploded a bomb in the great opera house in the midst of an audience of Pan-American Latins. What happened? First, ask yourself what would have happened if a bomb had exploded in the Metropoli-

tan Opera House among us Anglo-Saxons;—I fear that all of us who are honest minded will reluctantly agree as to the probable results. What happened in Buenos Aires? A remarkable scene, which is a glory to Argentine citizenship. No tumult, no undue excitement. The injured were removed while the orchestra played the national anthem. Announcement was made from the stage that the performance was discontinued, and the audience filed quietly out. If you had been there you would have been as proud of those people as I was—as proud of their poise, and of their reserve strength of character, and furthermore as respectful of their viewpoint, as the most enthusiastic believer in the future of our hemisphere could wish. When I reflect upon that surprising scene, I ask myself why have we throughout all our history constantly disregarded the opinion of our Latin sister republics, and have failed to take them into our councils.

I believe and I affirm that we have almost always sought to be not only just in our dealings with those republics, but also have tried to do what we thought was best for them. But why have we so persistently, so ignorantly, so blunderingly disregarded *their* viewpoint, even carelessly neglected to study it! And what of the Monroe Doctrine in this connection. If a fellow-countryman expresses the opinion that it should be abolished, I say to him "Will you go to the logical conclusion to which that suggestion inevitably leads, and say you are willing that any part of America shall be turned into an Egypt, a Tripoli, an Algeria, or a Morocco?" If he tells me the Monroe Doctrine is good enough as it is, I say to him "Go and live in one of the great countries of South America for a couple of years, learn their point of view, and then tell us if you are contented that our great country, our dear fatherland should go on being misunderstood as a Monroe Doctrine policeman, a clumsy busybody, when you and I know so differently, and when this misunderstanding can be so easily rectified!" Why should we not meet this misunderstanding now existing in South America with the same splendid directness that President Cleveland used in the Venezuela difficulty, or President McKinley in the

Cuban affair! There are friends of mine, dear friends of mine, sleeping beneath the waving grasses on a certain Cuban hillside, and there can be no misunderstanding as to whether or not they laid down their lives for anything else than the highest ideals of Pan-Americanism. And what is the viewpoint of the Latin-American upon the Monroe Doctrine, and how by frankly meeting it can we stop it from seeming to him unilateral and constabulary, and make it Pan-American in scope? Last January, on a day when my heart was deeply touched by receiving through the Argentine Minister a gold medal sent me by the Argentine people, I ventured a brief suggestion upon our to-day's subject, prompted by my knowledge of and love for our Pan-Americanized Latin brothers. This suggestion was, thanks to three powerful institutions (one Argentine, and the other two in New York), cabled to nearly three hundred Latin-American newspapers. That they unanimously approved the suggestion emboldens me to quote from it today, since that wide approval indicates that my heart must have helped my head to grasp their viewpoint.

After first strongly opposing intervention in Mexico, I said: "Let us see if this present discussion of intervention may not perhaps afford an opportunity to set us right upon the subject of the Monroe Doctrine in the eyes of all Latin America, and at the same time provide a possible solution of the very question of intervention itself. Now, for my new suggestion: Suppose affairs should take so serious a turn in Mexico that, either to forestall an armed intervention there by some European power seeking to defend its citizens or else to perform like service for some citizens of our own hemisphere, it finally becomes necessary under the terms of the Monroe Doctrine that the United States intervene, I would suggest that we invite Argentina or Brazil or some other American country to join with us. What would be the result of such an invitation? It would have two marked tendencies, both of which would be highly desirable: First, it would entirely remove any idea among our South American neighbors that our purpose was land grabbing, because a man does not invite

his neighbors to accompany him on an errand intended to benefit him alone. Secondly, and in my opinion, of equal importance, it would free our government from the persistent importunities of individuals and corporations urging our sole intervention to benefit their own pockets, but who would not favor a joint intervention by us along with other powers. Furthermore it would be the best and most convincing form of invitation to Latin America to participate equally with us in the responsibilities and development of the Monroe Doctrine. The great Doctrine would at once become continental, and cease to be unilateral, which is to-day its one great defect. It is not the duty of the United States to police Latin America, and the sooner we get that idea spread broadcast, not only in South America but also in North America, the better will it be for our international repute. Whenever under the terms of the Monroe Doctrine, an occasion for armed intervention in this hemisphere arises, let us, in each and every instance, invite participation in that responsibility from other American countries, all of which are equally concerned in the benefits and responsibilities of that Doctrine."

That was what I said last January, and I feel it even more strongly today.

I hope and believe that there will be no armed intervention in Mexico, and in his resolute effort to obviate the necessity therefor, President Wilson deserves the support of every patriotic citizen of our country. Whatever may be the personal opinion of individuals as to details or methods, this is no time to discuss them, lest the discussion be misunderstood abroad.

I don't claim to know the South Americans better than many others do, but I do claim that no foreigner has ever liked them better than I do, and therefore am I earnestly eager to have their opinion seriously studied, and courteously accorded the consideration which it richly deserves.

SHOULD WE ABANDON THE MONROE DOCTRINE?

By Hiram Bingham, Ph.D., Assistant Professor of Latin-American History, Yale University

"The Monroe Doctrine, or the doctrine of the dual political organization of the nations of the earth, is a barbaric stumbling-block in the way of enlightened international policy." So wrote the late William Graham Sumner, in an essay on "Earth Hunger," in 1897.

At that time, very little attention was paid to his remarks. Professor Sumner had a way of being many years ahead of public opinion in his attitude toward political and economic policies.

During the past few months the number of people who have come to take an unfriendly attitude toward the Monroe Doctrine has very greatly increased. True, this national shibboleth is still a plank in the platforms of our great national parties. In many quarters it is still a rallying cry. A great chain of newspapers, extending from San Francisco to Boston, edited by the most highly paid editorial writer of the day, constantly refers to the Monroe Doctrine as something sacred and precious, like the Declaration of Independence. Other powerful newspapers, less popular in their appeal, but no less powerful in their influence, still resent any attack on what is considered by them the most essential feature of our foreign policy. And they continue to uphold the Monroe Doctrine, while at the same time they try to explain away its disagreeable features.

A recent editorial in a journal devoted to the interests of the army and navy, in vigorously denouncing the present attacks being made on the Monroe Doctrine, and calling loudly on patriotic Americans to see to it that no academic sentimentalists were allowed to weaken our national defenses, declared that without the Monroe Doctrine, we could not hold the Panama Canal!

It would have been just as logical to say that without the Monroe Doctrine we could not hold Hawaii, or Key West, or Boston harbor. The Panama Canal is one of the possessions of the United States. Its defense is a national right and a national duty. In defending the Panama Canal as in defending Key West or Boston harbor, we have back of us the most universally accepted principles of international law. In upholding the Monroe Doctrine, on the other hand, we are merely upholding what has been believed for many years to be a useful foreign policy, but one that has no standing in international law, and is, in fact, neither law nor doctrine but merely a declaration of policy having to do with our relations with foreign nations.

Consequently, in considering the question as to whether we should abandon the Monroe Doctrine or not, we must first clear our minds of any idea that the maintenance or abandonment of this policy is in any way synonymous with the maintenance or abandonment of our national defenses, be they in Hawaii, Boston harbor, or the Panama Canal. Of course, it is perfectly true that to maintain a vigorous foreign policy and one that is at all unpopular, means the maintenance of an efficient army and navy. But without any vigorous foreign policy, we should, at the same time, need an army and a navy, and both ought to be efficient for the same reason that every city needs an efficient police force.

In considering the advisability of abandoning the Monroe Doctrine, let us attempt to get clearly in mind exactly what is meant by the Monroe Doctrine. We shall find that at different periods of our history, it has meant very different things. When it was promulgated by President Monroe in 1823, it meant that we were afraid that the rising wave of monarchy and despotism in Europe might overwhelm the struggling republics in the New World. We were, in a sense, in the position of the big brother on the edge of the swimming pool, who sees his little brothers swimming under water and about to come to the surface; and who also sees a couple of bullies getting ready to duck them before they can get their breath. As a matter of fact, this was

the only republic, at that time, that had come to the surface, scrambled on to the bank, and shown itself able to stand on its own legs. The little fellows in Spanish-America were swimming hard, but they had not got their heads above water. We believed it to be for our interests to see that they had a square deal and were not interfered with as they came to the surface. We promulgated a high-minded, unselfish policy, without a thought of gaining prestige or power in Latin-America. We bravely warned the nations of the continent of Europe not to attempt to inflict their system of government on any land in the western hemisphere, where a democratic or republican form of government had established itself.

From such a high-minded and altruistic position at this, it is a far cry to the connotation which goes with the Monroe Doctrine in the minds of many American citizens of today. Our people have been taught by jingoistic politicians, like the heelers of Tammany Hall, to believe that the Monroe Doctrine means that it is our duty to keep America in order; that it is our policy to allow Europe to have nothing to say about the American republics, and that it would be a national disgrace, almost unthinkable, for us to abandon this sacred shibboleth. It was a Tammany Hall orator, according to Professor Hart, who said, "Tammany Hall is a benevolent institution; Tammany Hall is a patriotic institution; Tammany Hall has the honor of being the first to propose that immortal Monroe Doctrine which blesses and revivifies the world."

And it was a former Tammany politician, who, on being questioned in regard to our present policy with Mexico, stated, a few days ago, that under the Monroe Doctrine it was our duty to go in and annex Mexico, and the sooner we did it, the better.

It is a far cry from the Monroe Doctrine of 1823 to the Monroeism of our politicians and newspapers at the present day. In 1823, this declaration of foreign policy made a profound impression on Europe, and won us the gratitude and the eulogies of the Latin-American republics. At the present time, there is no question that the Monroe Doc-

trine is a cause of world-wide irritation and is almost universally hated throughout Latin-America. In the words of a careful student of Pan-American affairs, who has lived many years in various parts of Spanish America, "the two principal results of the Monroe Doctrine are: intense hatred of the United States on the part of powerful and self-respecting South American nations, able and willing to meet their responsibilities to the countries to whom they are under obligations; and an attempt at evasion of these responsibilities by other Latin-American countries, who, while using the Doctrine where they think they can for such a purpose, equally hate the originators of it."

Contrast this with that memorable sentence in Mr. Cleveland's message to Congress regarding the Venezuela boundary dispute, in which he said that the Monroe Doctrine "was intended to apply to every stage of our national life, and cannot become obsolete while our republic endures."

This was quoted by the editor of the *New York Times* in a recent article in the *Century*, in which the part played by the Monroe Doctrine in the Venezuela dispute was carefully brought out. In a recent number of the *Times*, in an editorial discussion of the present writer's proposal to regard the Monroe Doctrine as obsolete, it was admitted that the Monroe Doctrine was, as a matter of fact, a purely self-ish policy. These were the words used:

The Monroe Doctrine was declared by us with reference to our own interests, and is maintained for no other reason. It was not declared with direct regard or thought of the interests of the weaker republics of the continent, and it will be maintained—or abandoned—with more thought of our interests than of theirs.

If that is the ablest defence which can be made for the doctrine in its present form, it is not surprising that we find so much opposition to it on the part of our southern neighbors. General Reyes, former president of the Republic of Colombia, said recently:

Having for many years closely followed, step by step, the development of the American republics and the convulsions of their ardent and vexed democracies, I am more than ever convinced that unity of action with the United States is necessary to ini-

tiate the advent of that glorious future to which they are so manifestly entitled. But that unity of action can only be accomplished by the removal of the causes which have led to the prevailing doubts, jealousies, and suspicions.

In my opinion, the Panama Canal will solve many of the difficulties which owe their existence to the present lack of intercourse between the people of the north and those of the south, but even that beneficial change of conditions will not serve by itself to eradicate the evils of the past. There must be a wider recognition of the fact that the relations of the United States with the Latin republics are those of a friendly, powerful neighbor, with no other objects than the advantages to be gained from the ties of sisterhood and the extension of commerce. There must be a saner propaganda as to the inalienable sovereign rights and complete independence of even the smallest of the Latin States. There must be no "big stick," and no such use of the Monroe Doctrine as to make it an instrument of terror to the smaller republics, and a subject for ridicule in the greater countries of the South.

The more advanced Latin nations appreciate and sympathize with the benevolent designs and objects of that doctrine, as is shown by the formulation of their own doctrine, intended to protect the smaller states against the employment of armed force by foreign nations for the collection of contractual debts. *But they resent the spirit of domination and tutelage which implies that they need the protection of the United States against foreign aggression.* (The italics are mine.)

It is easy to understand the cause of such remarks when one calls to mind the thoughtless jingoism of some of our newspapers and the more intelligent selfishness of some of our leading editorial writers.

It would be easy to multiply quotations from North American writers and newspapers which justify the fears and hatred of Latin America. And it would be equally easy to gather many paragraphs from Spanish and French authors to illustrate what forms this distrust and hatred take. I have already called attention to a number of these in the little book just referred to.¹

Why is it that it is so difficult for us to formulate an answer to the question as to what the Monroe Doctrine really means? Because there are probably no two words in American history which have been more variously interpreted, which have meant more things to more people, and which have been more highly praised by some and more bitterly

¹The Monroe Doctrine an Obsolete Shibboleth, Yale Univ. Press.

condemned by others. What is the reason of this confusion?

I believe that the reason is that these two words "Monroe Doctrine" have come to be used by us in place of two other words that are less interesting and less significant, namely, "foreign policy." Our foreign policy is the Monroe Doctrine. Whatever our foreign policy happens to be for the moment, it is called the "Monroe Doctrine." Do we decide to intervene in Cuba, we do not say that we believe it to be for our best interests as a nation to overstep the bounds of international law and to carry our intervention into a neighboring territory. We wave a banner and call it the Monroe Doctrine. Are we too busy at home to intervene between Spain and Chile when they go to war and when Spain bombards the port of Valparaiso? We declare that the Monroe Doctrine does not mean that we shall interfere in any righteous war. Do we wish to take any part of Spanish-American territory which we need or which is being badly governed? We refer our actions to the Monroe Doctrine. It is no wonder that Monroeism, as it is called in South America, has come to mean to the Latin-American mind interference, intervention, tutelage and patronizing insolence. This connotation does us infinite harm.

The truth is, instead of facing squarely the question of what is the best foreign policy for us to follow, we cloud our minds with this national shibboleth; we remember that it is nearly one hundred years old; we believe that it has done a great deal of good in keeping Europe from crushing the life out of incipient South American republics; we feel that it is a benevolent institution, and, therefore, we brand whatever selfish or unselfish policy we adopt for the moment with the words "Monroe Doctrine."

It would seem as though for the very sake of clarifying our own ideas and placing our foreign policy on a logical foundation, it would be well for us to abandon a combination of words which stands for so many different things to so many different people.

It can be fairly said that the United States has had as

many ideals and has fought for as high ideals as any nation in history. The calm judgment of our foreign critics sometimes is willing to admit that we have been more idealistic than any modern nation. We once shed a vast amount of blood and treasure in order to suppress an economic institution called slavery, largely because it was not our ideal of the right way to progress toward higher things. We went to war with Spain largely for the sake of giving Cuba her freedom, and then, contrary to the belief of most of the world who were looking on, we did not keep Cuba, but gave her independence. Knowing this and other things of a similar nature, we sometimes flatter ourselves that our motives are always correct, and chiefly idealistic. And the worst of it is, we sometimes so blind ourselves with the dazzling spectacle of our unselfishness that we cannot see our selfishness. In the case of Cuba, for instance, we were so pleased with our unselfish sacrifices, that we shut our eyes to the fact that while we were giving Cuba freedom, we were taking Porto Rico and the Philippines and Guam, and a very useful naval base at the east end of Cuba, and putting them in our pockets. The world did not say that the Spanish-American war gave us no reward for our pains.

Before deciding whether we ought to abandon the Monroe Doctrine and considering what ought to be our policy for the future, let us review a few of the more striking features of our foreign policy since 1823.

For twenty years after the promulgation of the Monroe Doctrine, we were regarded with extraordinary friendliness throughout Spanish-America. Our willingness to recognize the independence of the newly-fledged republics; our willingness to protect them from European aggression, and our generous non-interference with them in the time of their greatest weakness, earned us their gratitude. But in 1846 came the war with Mexico, one of those independent republics that we were going to protect. We had stated in the original Monroe Doctrine that it was the true policy of the United States to leave the new governments of Spanish-America to themselves, in the hope that other powers would

pursue the same course. And yet, we did not hesitate, at the conclusion of the war with Mexico, to take away from her nearly one half her area. It did not help matters that a year or two later, gold was discovered in California. It did not increase our popularity in Spanish-America when it appeared that we were getting enormously wealthy out of the gold and silver mines in California and Nevada, which we had so recently taken by force from Mexico, even though we had paid \$15,000,000 for what we took. It may be replied that it was far better for California and Nevada that we should have taken them, and that we could afford to stand the unpopularity that this engendered in South America. Granting for the sake of argument that this is true, why not admit frankly that when we took California and Nevada, we went contrary to the principles laid down by President Monroe in his famous message of 1823.

In 1898, we went to war with Spain, and eventually took away all her American possessions. We believed ourselves justified in so doing. I hold no brief against the justification of that war. It was undoubtedly a good thing for Spain. Many Spaniards will admit this today. Their country has been stronger and their economic condition has improved since they lost their foreign possessions. But President Monroe had said that "With the existing colonies or dependencies of any European power, we have not interfered and shall not interfere." Is it not perfectly evident that in 1898 we regarded the Monroe Doctrine as outgrown, and said to ourselves that we could afford to disregard one of the most positive sentences in the original declaration of President Monroe? Why should we still feel that there is something so sacred in this national shibboleth of ours that, although we have repeatedly gone contrary to it when it suited us to do so, we must still cling to it as a precious thing, without which our own independence would be in danger of being lost?

In 1906, Secretary Root made his well-known tour of South America. It has been said that this tour was made necessary owing to the fear of the United States aroused throughout South America, by some of President Roose-

velt's messages to Congress, in which he took pains to reassert the Monroe Doctrine, and in which he accepted, quite logically, the very great responsibilities which the maintenance of a policy of "America for the Americans" entailed upon us. He had said in 1905:

When we announce a policy, such as the Monroe Doctrine, we thereby commit ourselves to the consequences of the policy, and those consequences from time to time alter. It is out of the question to claim a right and then to shirk the responsibility for its exercise. Not only we, but all American republics who are benefited by the existence of the Doctrine, must recognize the obligations each nation is under as regards foreign peoples no less than its duty to insist upon its own rights.

After the opening of the third session of the Fifty-Eighth Congress, Mr. Roosevelt had said:

Any country whose people conduct themselves well can count upon our hearty friendship. If a nation shows that it knows how to act with reasonable efficiency and decency in social and political matters, if it keeps order and pays its obligations, it need fear no interference from the United States. Chronic wrongdoing, or an impotence which results in a general loosening of the ties of civilized society, may in America, as elsewhere, ultimately require intervention by some civilized nation, and in the western hemisphere, the adherence of the United States to the Monroe Doctrine may force the United States, however reluctantly, in flagrant cases of such wrongdoing or impotence, to the exercise of an international police power.

These official utterances had greatly alarmed and annoyed the South American republics, and it was no small part of Secretary Root's visit to quiet their fears and assure them of the pacific quality of our intentions. So well did Mr. Root do this, so ably had he prepared himself by the study of South American history, so favorable an impression did he make by his dignified and courteous bearing, and so profound a conviction did his words convey, coming as they did from the actual head of our department of foreign affairs, that great good was accomplished, and an era of friendship and good-will was ushered in.

The most striking effect of this was to be seen in Chile. Owing to a series of misunderstandings, including the blunders of an over-zealous diplomat, the wrong-headed ideas

of many American newspapers, and the seeming interference of American warships during the great Chilean civil war of 1891, we had become extremely unpopular in that vigorous republic of the South Pacific. Then had followed the deplorable *Baltimore* incident, when a number of our sailors on shore-leave in the port of Valparaiso, got into trouble with some of the rougher elements of the port, and a few were killed and several more wounded. We had lost our patience with what we termed Chilean dilatory conduct; we took the law into our own hands, and eventually we issued an ultimatum to Chile demanding financial redress. There was nothing for her to do but to grant our request. But the scar was long in healing, and it may fairly be said that we had less cordial friends in Chile than in any other American republic, with the possible exception of Colombia. Mr. Root's visit to South America and his able exposition of our foreign policy, changed the attitude of the Chileans to a very marked degree. They took the first opportunity of showing their change of heart.

The Fourth Latin-American Scientific Congress was due to be held in Santiago in December, 1908. Former congresses of this nature had been held in Argentina, Brazil, and Uruguay. The organization committee for the fourth congress was composed entirely of Chileans. They decided that in consequence of the new and friendly attitude of the United States, it would be an appropriate thing to make the Congress not Latin-American, but Pan-American, and to invite the participation of the American government, and of universities and other scientific bodies in the United States. Secretary Root saw the advantages that would accrue to the United States in properly accepting such an invitation. In accordance with his ideas, the United States congress passed a suitable appropriation to send ten delegates from this country to Chile. These delegates were received with the utmost courtesy and given the best of everything. It was with difficulty that they avoided offence in declining a few of the many honors showered upon them. At the end of the month which they spent in Chile, it is safe to say that the relations between Chile and the

United States were more cordial than they had ever been before. Washington was selected as the place of meeting for the second Pan-American Scientific Congress, and October, 1912, was designated as the proper time for it to meet.

It has not met yet. (November, 1913.)

The United States congress was asked by Secretary Knox for a small appropriation of \$50,000, about one-half of what Chile had appropriated for the Scientific Congress, when it had met in Santiago, to provide for the expenses of the Congress that should meet in Washington in October, 1912. Unfortunately, our Congress felt too poor to grant this request, and although the appropriations which were passed footed up somewhere in the neighborhood of one billion dollars, the item of \$50,000 for the Scientific Congress was struck out, and our national obligations to provide for returning the hospitality which we had received, were denied. As the result of a vigorous protest and of public sessions of the House Committee on Foreign Affairs, in the next session of Congress the same amount was again requested and the appropriation of this amount was unanimously recommended by that committee. The passage of the appropriation, however, was lost on some flimsy technicality, and our national honor in regard to the obligations of hospitality still remains under a cloud. Apparently, it is part of our foreign policy to accept invitations to Pan-American congresses, but not to provide suitably for such congresses when they have to meet in this country. As the best-known term for our foreign policy throughout Latin-America is Monroeism, this appears to our neighbors to be one of the attributes of the Monroe Doctrine.

There was another sequel to our relations with Chile even more serious than not providing suitably for the second Pan-American Scientific Congress. By sending an ultimatum demanding the immediate settlement of the Alsop claim, Secretary Knox destroyed in three minutes what Secretary Root had taken three years to build up. The delicate edifice of good-will and friendship with Chile, which had arisen from the ashes of the *Baltimore* episode, was destroyed because a Secretary of State felt that the claim

of a private citizen for \$1,000,000 had been left too long unsettled. This is not the place to go into the details of the Alsop claim. Everyone knows that Chile inherited this debt from Bolivia. The claim was recognized, but there was postponement in its settlement. Chile avoided the dire effects of Secretary Knox's ultimatum by depositing \$1,000,000 in the Bank of England, and requesting that the ownership of this sum be decided by the Hague Tribunal. At least, so it was reported in the newspapers. Such matters are too recent to make it wise for the State Department to allow its records to be used as the basis of a thorough history of that episode. But there is no question about the results. The claimant eventually got his money, and we lost the cordial friendship of Chile. In the discussion which followed in the Chilean congress, a speech was made by the aged Senator Vicente Reyes on July 26, 1911. Said Senator Reyes:

It seems to me that no Chilean is to blame for what has taken place; every one has endeavored, in the rôle that corresponded to him, to further the public interests in the most convenient manner. The fault, the real fault—and it is necessary to declare it publicly, and I can say it better than another because I have no intervention, either in the acts of the government, or in the active political life, from which I am removed by reason of my age, so that in pronouncing my opinion, my own exclusive opinion, I compromise nobody,—I shall say, then, that the fault of all this is owing to the intemperance of the United States government that has made an excessive use of its power, *treating us as barbarous tribes were treated in past times*, imposing on us an ultimatum and giving us ten days in which to perform what that government believed we ought to do.

In the following year on August 2 of 1912, a resolution was introduced in the senate of the United States by Senator Lodge of Massachusetts, which has been regarded throughout Latin-America as a still further extension and interpretation of the Monroe Doctrine. It was known as the Magdalena Bay resolution. The subject was so ably treated in an editorial in the *American Journal of International Law* (vol. 6, p. 937) that I take the liberty of quoting it in part:

Midway in the southerly third of the west coast of Lower California, and perhaps 3,000 miles from Panama, is a large bay. The back country is barren and thirsty, but on the shore and off it is moss which contains a dye and fish. Lumber and cattle are said to be possibilities also. An American company secured here from Mexico a large tract of land, several million acres, which border on the bay and run back from it. This country was unprofitable. Its chief creditor, a New Hampshire lumberman, had taken it over and tried to secure himself by making a sale to certain Japanese subjects. Before concluding any bargain, however, his agent very properly consulted the United States Department of State to learn its attitude. This was adverse, it being aware of the outcry sure to be made if a Japanese coaling, fishery, or other station or colony were to be established on our side of the Pacific. Nor did Mr. Knox look with more favor upon a sale limiting the ownership of the Japanese to a minority. The owner and creditor of the concession seem to have sought Japanese aid in colonization because no other labor there was available. The Japanese government had nothing whatever to do with the scheme. *Moreover, by Mexican law no concession holds good under heavy penalty, if transfer is sought by the concessionaires to a foreign government.*

This was the situation then, when the susceptibilities of the Senate were aroused last July, and Mr. Lodge introduced the following resolution:

Resolved: That when any harbor or other place in the American continent is so situated that the occupation thereof for naval or military purposes might threaten the communications or the safety of the United States, the government of the United States could not see without grave concern the possession of such harbor or other place by any corporation or association which has such a relation to another government not American as to give that government practical power of control for national purposes.

It is understood that in secret session for the last word but one "national" was substituted "naval or military."

A Senate resolution is an expression of its opinion. This resolution was intended to be an announcement of national policy to foreign powers. It was introduced after information had been sought from the President on the subject. This went to show that the conduct of other powers in regard to those lands had been entirely correct. In the discussion which led up to and which followed the introduction of this resolution it appeared that its mover chose not to regard it as an extension of the Monroe Doctrine, but as based upon the law of right of self-defense which is fundamental, the Agadir incident being a precedent. But in Africa, the German action was official, governmental; whereas at Magdalena Bay, as Senator Rayner had well brought out in May, it was a question of private commercial use only. Has the United States a right to assume that private commercial use of such a harbor as this, could be so easily converted into government use as to

warrant its prohibition before any sign whatever of abuse or of danger was visible? That the Senate so believes is clear, for it passed the Lodge resolution. That the legal mind shares this view is not so clear. Let us state it in general terms. On the ground of self-defense a state may forbid its neighbor to sell lands of strategic value to the private subjects of a third power, there being no act, but mere suspicion to warrant the fear that the third power will make sinister use of its subjects' property. What becomes of the sovereign right of the neighbor to dispose of its lands, for commercial development? If the principle of self-defense is unduly stretched, will it not break down and become ridiculous? *Is an attitude of constant suspicion consistent with international good-will?*

This new phase of our foreign policy, which aroused such remarks as the foregoing in the United States, was, as might be suspected, treated even more vehemently, not only in Latin-America, but also in Europe. In *La Revista de America* for September, 1912, Sr. José de Astorga, commented as follows (I give a free translation):

The Monroe Doctrine has just suffered a transformation for the benefit of Yankee imperialism, and for the detriment and diminution of the sovereignty of the Latin-American republics, in the adoption by the Senate at Washington of the Lodge Resolution. . . . This resolution, reduced to its simplest terms, says that in the future the governments of the Ibero-American republics are prohibited from negotiating with any foreign companies for the cession of any lands for the purpose of merely commercial or industrial ends, without the previous consent of the White House. . . . Without entering into any discussion of the motives which, from the Yankee point of view, secured the adoption of the Lodge proposal by a nearly unanimous vote [54 to 4] of the North American Senate, it is perfectly evident that this proposal cannot lean upon the so-called Monroe Doctrine as originally declared, and that, furthermore, it involves a most odious and unwarranted offense against the sovereignty and the independence of the Latin republics of the continent. . . . If the republics which occupy the territory of America to the south of the United States are independent nations, in full enjoyment of their political sovereignty, and have the same title and the same capacity in the family of nations as North America has, then neither the Senate nor the government at Washington has the power to proclaim before the world, as a rule of international conduct applicable to the territories of foreign sovereigns, the Lodge proposal.

Anyhow, the importance of securing concerted movement and unanimity of action among the chancellaries of Latin-America in order to offset the imperialistic action of the United States, is urgent, and is of supreme importance. The protests of con-

fraternity, of disinterestedness, and of respect for the political sovereignty and the commercial independence of Latin-America, which the government of the United States sets forth so freely on every occasion, are not able to counteract nor to lessen the eloquence of deeds, and these are the deeds: tutelage over Cuba; the abduction of Panama; the embargo on the custom houses of Santo Domingo; economic and military intervention in Central America; the "big stick;" dollar diplomacy, and the Lodge declaration.

Here we have the Latin-American judgment on the Monroe Doctrine in a nutshell. We can on occasion make charming speeches. We can claim that our foreign policy is idealistic, and we can point to the Monroe Doctrine as evidence of our willingness to protect the weaker against the stronger. Actions speak louder than words. The fruits of our foreign policy have been the acquisition of more territory and direct interference in the affairs of our neighbors.

One of the questions for us to decide is, whether it is worth while to pretend adherence to a shibboleth which has so often spelt intervention, and which means to our neighbors in the western hemisphere that we consider it our duty to intervene whenever sufficient occasion arises.

How much do we believe in intervention?

One of our most distinguished diplomats and statesmen, the late E. J. Phelps, delivered an address in the city of Brooklyn on March 30, 1896, which dealt with the Monroe Doctrine at a time when we had been drawn dangerously near to a war with Great Britain over the Venezuela boundary. That distinguished publicist treated our right to interfere in the affairs of other nations in no uncertain terms. The fact that he was selected by President Cleveland as our minister at the Court of St. James, and that he filled that post with marked success, is sufficient excuse for quoting him at the present time, when once again we have a distinguished Democrat at the head of the nation. Said Mr. Phelps:

International law is international morality and justice, formulated by the general consent of civilized men. That is its basis and its sanction. The claim that Americans are in any

respect above or beyond this law of the civilized world, or that we are invested with authority to interfere in the affairs of other nations in which we are in no way concerned, merely because the location of the dispute is in South America, are propositions that will find no favor among just or thoughtful men. We have no protectorate over South American nations, and do not assume any responsibility in their behalf. Our own rights there, as elsewhere, it is to be hoped, we shall never fail to maintain. But those rights have their foundation and their limit in the settled law to which we are subject as all other nations are, and which is as necessary to us as to them.

And when we undertake to assert that we are not bound by that law, and care nothing for the opinion of the world; that we are Americans and monarchs all of we survey; and that we are going to control the part of this hemisphere that does not belong to us, regardless of the rights of those to whom it does belong, merely for the sake of doing it, and because we think we are strong enough, we adopt the language of the bully, and shall certainly encounter, if that is persisted in, the bully's retribution.

Surely, with these words ringing in our ears, we do not wish to stand by a policy which can be so construed as to spell interference and intervention.

It is difficult to exaggerate the present attitude of South America towards the Monroe Doctrine. As late as September 13, 1913, *La Prensa*, one of the leading papers of Peru and the principal supporter of the present government, prints in the most conspicuous place in the paper a letter from a Chilean newspaper correspondent in New York. The headlines are as follows: "Studying the Situation in Mexico." The Chilean journalist, Montcalm, speaks from New York. He calls on Latin-America to "unite itself against Yankee imperialism." One of the paragraphs reads: "The United States today controls Cuba, Porto Rico, and Panama. Tomorrow it is going to control Central America. It has commenced to control Mexico. Who says that it will not continue still further?" The article ends with a spirited plea to the Latin-American republics to help Mexico out of the hole into which she has got herself by her revolutionary civil war.

In its issue of September 15, 1913, in the same conspicuous position under the heading, "The Voice of a Mexican," *La Prensa* reprints an article from *La Revista*, of Yucatan,

signed by R. De Zayas Enriques, in which he criticises severely our attitude of mentor of the Latin-American republics, and our pretention of being the only arbiter of their fate. He refers to the increasing application of the Monroe Doctrine, which, he says, is already too ample, and refers to the fact that European powers have always paid better respect to the Doctrine than the American peoples themselves. The whole trend of this two-column article is to arouse feeling against the United States.

Recent travelers in South America, and several of our recently returned diplomats, tell the same story. But perhaps no one has put the situation more clearly than the recent Ambassador from England to the United States. It can hardly be denied that the United States has no better friend than Mr. Bryce. In his *American Commonwealth*, he has shown a depth of sympathy and a keenness of appreciation for our institutions which have never been surpassed. His residence in Washington as the British Ambassador increased his already great popularity in this country. His advice is worth heeding, if we heed the advice of our friends at all. In his recent book on South America, he says:

As regards the United States there is a balance between attraction and suspicion. The South Americans desire to be on good terms with her, and their wisest statesmen feel the value of her diplomatic action in trying to preserve peace between those of their republics whose smouldering enmities often threaten to burst into flame. More than once in recent years this value has been tested. On the other hand, as has already been observed, they are jealous of their own dignity, not at all disposed to be patronized, and quick to resent anything bordering on a threat, even when addressed not to themselves, but to some other republic. It is as the disinterested, the absolutely disinterested and unselfish, advocate of peace and good-will, that the United States will have most influence in the western hemisphere, and that influence, gently and tactfully used, may be of incalculable service to mankind.

Surely, this must be our ultimate aim. We do desire to influence for good the western hemisphere. We are beginning to realize that there are several states in South America that are no longer infant republics. They have grown

up. To return to our former metaphor—the little swimmers have got their heads well out of water, and have climbed out and are safely standing on their own legs. They naturally resent any implied assertion on our part that we will protect them from Europe.

If the Monroe Doctrine implies this we-will-protect-you-from-Europe attitude, if it is disagreeable and irritating to those whose friendship is most worth having in the western hemisphere, if, as a matter of fact, we have deliberately broken the Monroe Doctrine whenever it suited us to do so, why should we cling to it so tenderly and so tenaciously any longer? What possible good can it do us? We apparently have a great deal to lose by maintaining it. What have we to gain by pretending to stick to it?

The chief arguments in favor of retaining the Monroe Doctrine appear to be three:

The first is, that the good old Doctrine is ninety years of age; it has survived and flourished nearly a century, and there *must* be *something* in it to have given it such a long life! To such an argument as this, it is only necessary to reply that the same notion was used with even more telling effect against Copernicus, when he declared that the world revolved on its axis. Furthermore, it sounds suspiciously like the defence that we made of slavery in the middle of the nineteenth century. It is an argument that need not be treated seriously.

In the second place, it is claimed that the Monroe Doctrine should be maintained because we have more interests in America than has Europe. "We are remote from Europe; we are close to South America." Therefore, it is natural that we should have more interest than England or Germany in maintaining a benevolent protection over the fortunes of the Latin-American republics. This may be true of the countries in the vicinity of the Caribbean Sea, but it is far from true of the larger republics of South America. Their great cities are geographically nearer Europe than they are to the United States. Their population contains at least a million Italian immigrants, and many hundreds of thousands of Spanish, Portuguese, French,

Germans, and English. While there are probably fewer French than those of any other nationality, the French actually outnumber the citizens of the United States who are living in the larger republics. Consequently, if there is any weight whatever in the fact that a nation has interests in a country where its citizens are employed, our interests are less than those of almost any one of the larger European countries. So far as investments are concerned, there is also no question whatever but that Europe has far more of a claim to be directly interested in the present state and future of the South American republics than has the United States. Compared to the hundreds of millions which England has invested in Argentina and Brazil, for instance, our own investments in those countries are ridiculously small. Consequently, this argument falls of its own weight, for to it we can reply that the larger and more important part of South America is nearer in miles, nearer in days of traveling, closer in ties of relationship, and more directly interested in commercial intercourse with Europe than with the United States.

The third argument is that the Monroe Doctrine has done South America a great deal of good in preventing her from being partitioned, as was Africa. Therefore, let us preserve it in all its pristine strength! It is quite true that the Monroe Doctrine undoubtedly protected South America against European aggression during a large part of the nineteenth century, when such aggression might have been fatal to the independence of several South American republics. But such a condition of affairs no longer exists, and if it should arise, that is to say if Germany should attempt to seize part of Brazil, for instance, or if Japan or China should attempt to coerce Peru into receiving undesirable immigrants, the best course for us to pursue would be, not to step forth single-handed as we did in 1823, but to join hands with the leading nations of South America in protecting the new world from the aggression of the old. It is replied by some that this is merely a modification of the Monroe Doctrine. In so far as it aims to accomplish

certain results, that is true; in so far as it is promulgated in a different spirit and with a direct recognition of the actual state of our southern neighbors, it is different. Taking into account the extremely unpleasant connotation, in the ears of our southern neighbors, of the word Monroeism, we should be in a much stronger position if we would put that word aside, and adopt a new one, such as Pan-American Defense, which shall have for its connotation America for Humanity, and not America for the North Americans.

Having considered the chief arguments for retaining the Monroe Doctrine, let us now briefly sum up the reasons why we should abandon it. First, the original Monroe Doctrine has been disregarded in several historical instances, notably after our war with Mexico in 1847, after our war with Spain in 1898, and in our dealings with Colombia, Santo Domingo, and Nicaragua. Second, owing to the constitutional changes that have taken place in the leading European nations since 1823, there is no danger that, in the words of President Monroe, the allied powers will "extend their political system to any portion of either continent." The world has advanced since then and the European nations themselves would be the first to object to any one of their number seizing a Latin-American republic, or setting up a monarchy there. Third, several of the South American states, notably Argentina, Brazil, and Chile, having attained their majority are no longer infants, do not need our protection and will make better friends and stronger allies if we cease to hold the Monroe Doctrine as one of the tenets of our political faith. Fourth, their friendship is worth having. They are already building super-dreadnoughts, and, with our more extended frontier, and our outlying ports, such as Panama and Honolulu, we need cordial friends in the western hemisphere, and cannot afford to treat them in such a way as to estrange their sentiments. Fifth, the later form of the Monroe Doctrine, sometimes known as the "Big stick policy," or the "American policeman idea," by which we say to Europe that we cannot allow her to take any active interest in the political affairs of the

western hemisphere, and accept the corresponding responsibility to look after her people and her property in the less well established republics, is a policy likely to involve us in tremendous difficulties and possibly in costly wars. It is a policy from which we have nothing to gain, and in which we have everything to lose. It is a policy which is likely to cost us the friendship not only of our American neighbors but, what is really of more importance to us, our European neighbors. Sixth, we should give up the Monroe Doctrine because the premises on which it was founded, and on which it was justified, no longer exist.

Today Europe has more citizens in South America than we have. She has invested a far larger share of her capital in South America than we have. She is bound to South America, not only by these ties of brotherhood and of property, but also by the racial ties which bind together the Latin race.

Geographically, Europe is nearer the chief cities of South America than is the United States; racially, she is closer; practically, she has more business interests there, and more of her sons are living there; and, finally, Europe has no intention to enforcing arbitrary monarchy and despotism on American states any more than we have.

As the premises on which the Monroe Doctrine was based no longer exist, and as the maintenance of our adherence to those words is of harm rather than good to us, it must be evident that the time has arrived for us to abandon this national shibboleth, and to clear the way for a new and logical foreign policy.

If we abandon the Monroe Doctrine, what shall we adopt to take its place? The answer to this question is fairly simple if one is willing to admit that the words "Monroe Doctrine" simply stand for our foreign policy. Under President Monroe, we announced it as our foreign policy to have nothing to do with Europe, and to see to it that Europe had nothing to do with America. We had a kind of splendid isolation. We were separated from Europe by a stormy ocean, which could be crossed only by a painful

journey on board small sailing vessels. We promulgated a doctrine intended to keep foreign complications out of our national life, and to enable us to avoid entangling alliances. Today, as was recently said in an editorial in the *World's Work*, this very Monroe Doctrine is the chief breeder of diplomatic negotiations. In other words, it is a trouble-maker. To take its place, let us adopt a more rational foreign policy. We have already begun to do so. President Wilson, in his Mobile declaration, stated clearly that the United States did not intend to take another foot of territory by conquest. He has declined to send an army into Mexico, although there have been loud clamors for intervention, and many of these clamors, particularly in the yellow journals, have been based upon the so-called "logic of the Monroe Doctrine." But we must go a few steps further if we would make our friends in South America believe that we have really adopted a new foreign policy, and that we have outgrown Monroeism.

One of these steps was recommended by Prof. Theodore Woolsey in an able article in *Scribner's Magazine* in 1909, in which it was proposed that we invite the leading powers of Latin-America to unite with us whenever intervention became necessary. This principle of joint intervention attracted little attention at that time, but its practicability has been rapidly gaining force recently. In 1911, the present writer, in a book entitled *Across South America*, suggested that the time had come to "amend our outgrown Monroe Doctrine, as has already been suggested by one of our writers on international law, so as to include in the police force of the western hemisphere, those who have shown themselves able to practice self-control." This suggestion was given favorable notice by Mr. Bryce in his book on South America just referred to. It was again called to public attention by the Hon. Charles Sherrill, recently our Minister to Argentina, and has since been referred to many times both in print and on the platform.

Some of those who have sanctioned it, feeling that it was necessary to stick to the words of our ancient shibboleth,

have felt that the invitation to Argentina or Brazil to intervene with us in Mexico, should come under the cloak of the Monroe Doctrine; but it seems to me that this is a most unfortunate suggestion. It is to our interests,—it is in the interests of the peace and happiness of the western hemisphere, that we get as far away from these words “Monroe Doctrine” as possible, and that we build up a new foreign policy that is abreast of the times, that recognizes the greatness of several of the Latin-American states, that recognizes that some of them are weak, and need the protection of an international police, and that gives evidence to the world that our foreign policy is really unselfish and is based on high ideals. As a matter of fact, we are a peaceful nation. Our desire to be helpful to our neighbors is sincere. The present administration has given evidence of its intention to discount revolution and to give the aid of its formal recognition only to such governments as are constitutionally elected. We are not going to put a premium on revolution by promptly recognizing any government that comes to the top in the seething cauldron of unstable conditions in any Latin-American country. This is a doctrine of high ideals. It has nothing whatever to do with the Monroe Doctrine.

Furthermore, there are several minor things of practical importance which we can do to show not only that we have abandoned the Monroe Doctrine, but that we have adopted a legitimate new foreign policy. In the first place, by offering to exchange ambassadors with Argentina and Chile, we can give them evidence that we realize their present position in the world today. There is no reason why we should have ambassadors in Brazil, Mexico, and Turkey, and none in Argentina and Chile.

In the second place, we can make a generous appropriation for the second Pan-American Scientific Congress. We can at least offer to treat our international guests as hospitably as Chile did. In fact, in order to make up for lost time and for the seeming insolence due to our negligence, we can afford to do better than they did. And we ought to do it promptly.

In the third place, we can show our personal interest in

our neighbors by visiting them more frequently. There are no longer any serious handicaps in the way of visiting a number of the states of South America. By becoming intimately acquainted with the problems of Peru, Chile, Argentina, and Brazil, we can do more toward aiding in the formation of an intelligent foreign policy than might appear at first sight. It is ignorance that breeds insults.

Finally, let us stop using the words "Monroe Doctrine." It would be well if a formal resolution of Congress could be passed, but since Congress has never formally approved of the Monroe Doctrine in so many words, it is probable that it would be sufficient if our great parties in their next platforms should avoid the repetition of those phrases supporting the doctrine which have been customary for so many years.

For the immediate future, let us adopt a policy of Pan-American Defense. Let us invite to the round table of discussion all the American republics who can show clean records and economic stability. If we believe that any American republic, by reason of civil war or internal discord, is endangering the peace of its neighbors, if we believe that cause for interference in its affairs is arising, let the matter be considered at the round table. Let it meet in some one of the American capitals, not merely to discuss, as Pan-American conferences have done, innocuous policies regarding Pan-American railway projects and international postal regulations, but the actual business in hand. In other words, let these Pan-American conferences not represent a formal exchange of pleasantries every so often, but let them be called for the definite object of settling definite and difficult problems. If there is to be any intervention, let it come as the result of a family gathering, and not as the decision of the American Department of State. Let us remember that it is "as the disinterested advocate of peace and good-will that we shall have most influence in the Western Hemisphere."

If Argentina, Brazil and Chile decline to meet us on these terms, then let us go to The Hague and call a council of all civilized nations, and ask for an expression of interna-

tional opinion, and the appointment of international police. Here is an opportunity for a truly enlightened international policy.

Meanwhile let us not forget that the maintenance of the Monroe Doctrine involves an attitude of constant suspicion both at home and abroad, which raises barriers against the progress of international good-will and diminishes our influence both in Europe and America.

THE MONROE DOCTRINE

By Honorable George F. Tucker

Many views have been entertained as to the meaning of the Monroe doctrine, and as to its claim to a place in the code of international law. The conservatives regard it as a declaration of little value and efficacy; to the devotees of bold and forceful politics it has become a kind of fetish; even a President of the United States asserted nearly twenty years ago that it "has its place in the code of international law as certainly and as securely as if it were specifically mentioned;" and yet, as to its genesis, aim, and validity there can be no room for cavil or controversy. Enunciated over ninety years ago, when Spain was bent on resubjugating her Spanish-American dependencies, which had long before asserted their independence, and when it was apprehended that she was assured of the support of other European powers, the Doctrine has never been sanctioned or adopted by the Congress of the United States, and its place in the code of international law has been strenuously and even bitterly questioned by most of the leading nations of Europe.

And what is this Doctrine? It may briefly be defined as a warning to the governments of the Old World not to establish colonies on, or to extend their political systems to these continents, and to refrain from interference in the affairs of the Spanish-American republics. Conceding that the Doctrine has no place in the realm of international jurisprudence and that it is hardly more than a fiat, we are confronted by the fact that its assertion by this government has more than once received the attention of European powers, and it has been, in a certain sense, recognized by them in the happy adjustment of the contentions which have occasioned its avowal. There are four conspicuous illustrations.

International misunderstandings over a projected waterway at the Isthmus of Panama long preceded the ratification

of the Clayton-Bulwer treaty in 1850. This compact, which was intended to settle a perplexing question only augmented the difficulty, and the discussions and writings to which it gave rise would fill volumes. In the course of time differences were harmonized or contentions withdrawn, and the Hay-Pauncefote treaty has lodged ample power in the American government to construct the Canal; and the bickerings and quarrels of many years are forgotten. During the long period of unrest and disturbance in Cuba, Americans apprehended that Great Britain or some other European power contemplated the acquisition of that island, and Great Britain and France entertained a somewhat similar view as to the intentions of the United States. The two nations urged this country to enter into a tripartite stipulation to the effect that no one of them should obtain possession of the island or exercise any dominion over it. After the rejection of the proposal by this country in 1852, there seemed to be little hope of a settlement of the question, yet now we find Cuba enjoying independence under our own guardianship, and her present condition and her future welfare are matters of indifference to the powers of Europe. On the intervention of the French in Mexico about fifty years ago, the Monroe Doctrine was again invoked. The situation was for a time serious, but at last the invaders withdrew; and ever since no power has assumed to interfere in the affairs of this so-called republic, except the United States itself, now endeavoring through an able, upright and conscientious President to aid the Mexicans in the establishment of a stable government. And, lastly, there is the case of Venezuela, in 1895. The question related to the determination of a boundary line between that country and British Guiana. The feeling engendered between the two nations, parties to the controversy, was intense, if not bitter. However, the question at last reached a definite adjustment, and the incident is now history. These occasions of the so-called application or assertion of the Monroe Doctrine are cited to show that in every instance reason and sense have triumphed, and war has been happily averted.

We are now at the threshold of the future and are asked to

exercise prevision—to suggest how far the Monroe Doctrine ought to apply to prospective incursions of European nations into the territory of Central and South American republics, or to possible interference in their affairs. These questions are difficult to answer, and every case must be treated and settled according to the circumstances creating it, and the disposition and temper of the disputants. It is believed by many that there is little ground for apprehension that foreign powers will endeavor to establish on these shores settlements hostile to democratic institutions or disturb the autonomy of the Spanish-American republics, but if problems relating to land or government or even trade, or the enforcement of pecuniary obligations do come up for solution, there are the most cogent reasons for the exercise of the spirit of accomodation, for the application of liberal construction and interpretation, and for the abnegation not only of the apprehensions similar to those so prevalent at the time of the inception of the Doctrine, but also of jingo sentiments and policies.

The speaker is not inclined to present ideas and formulate rules of his own. It is his purpose rather to ask questions based on governmental conditions, international relations, commercial methods and practices, and the utilization of physical forces for the carriage of merchandise, so radically different from those which obtained or were employed ninety, seventy, or even fifty years ago. We should not forget that at the time of President Monroe's declaration this country had a population of only a few millions, and that her interests were inconsiderable in comparison with those of today, that the Spanish-American countries were emerging from colonial conditions that made the transition to independence and democracy difficult and problematical; that trade between civilized countries was not extensive and was largely limited to merchandise peculiar to an age when wants were few and luxuries little known; that transportation was not yet effected by the agencies which man has since called from latency; that knowledge the world over was the possession of the few, and that such a thing as the education of the masses was hardly contemplated; that racial affinities

and prejudices were marked and prevalent—a fact due to the aloofness of nations, caused in a large measure by slow and imperfect means of communication; that there were few, perhaps no, societies and associations organized to promote the cause of peace and to agitate for settlement of wars and disputes by compromise or arbitration, and that no one dreamed—not even the visionary and enthusiast—of the discoveries and inventions that were to modify the methods of trade and business, augment the wealth of the world, raise the standards of living, bring long separated peoples into closer relations and make possible coöperative efforts to promote amity and good-will among nations.

Is it not a fact that the Monroe Doctrine might possibly be applied today to the detriment of the southern republics in whose interest it may be invoked, and possibly to the discredit of the United States? It is fair to assume that there are only two nations that are likely in any event to oppose or violate this Doctrine or inhibition—Great Britain and Germany. In the past ninety years Great Britain has advanced from the rule of the few to that of the many, so that the subjects of the king enjoy about all the privileges of citizens of our country; she has covered the seas with her shipping, and has developed a colonial system the most remarkable and efficient in the history of the world; she has guarded and guards her subjects in every corner of the globe, and, wherever her flag flies, the lives and property of aliens are accorded the same protection as those of her own. Now is it not probable that, if Great Britain should interfere in the affairs of a Latin-American country, she would establish a system calculated to promote the interests of that country, and not at all inimical to those of the United States? And what system? Not that of the old Great Britain governed by gentlemen, but that of the Great Britain of today governed by the people.

Ninety years ago Germany was a collection of states without cohesion and with a not redundant population. Now regard the aspect of governmental unification, and consider her great advance not only in education and all the activities that go with learning, but in manufacturing and trade and commerce. The growth in population has been marvelous,

and the label "Made in Germany," testifies everywhere to commercial expansion and prosperity, but her territory is hardly sufficient to maintain her constantly increasing numbers, and she naturally seeks other localities for those who are handicapped at home by the struggle for existence. Now if Germany should take over a Latin-American country, would its people be subjugated and deprived of their liberties, or would they affiliate with the conquerors and profit by the appropriation? And how would our own institutions be affected? Would there be ground for apprehension that such an appropriation would be a menace to our democratic government? The speaker does not answer these questions, but he adverts to the fact that there are several million German-Americans; that they have been famed for their indifference to political intrigue, and have been and are equally famed for their diligence, their frugality, their thrift, and their loyalty to their adopted land. So far as is known, they have never attempted to destroy the American republic, but on the other hand have been among the foremost to contribute to its prosperity.

But how about coaling stations and the transference to American shores of the European military system? This suggests other questions. Have not the great powers of Europe all they can attend to in colonial enterprise and expansion, especially since their taking over of the available portions of Africa, under spheres of influence? Would not the maintenance of military strong-holds and coaling stations in Central and South America be an element of weakness rather than of strength? Commanding a large portion of the trade of these southern republics are not Great Britain and Germany, for example, better off than they would be if they were compelled by expensive military and naval measures to guard a commerce which prospers and increases under the protection of the countries with whom it is carried on?

The chief solicitude, perhaps, of the alarmists relates to the Panama Canal. The Clayton-Bulwer treaty has been supplanted by the Hay-Pauncefote convention. Under the direction, and at the expense of this country, the Canal is nearly completed. It is to be neutralized. The United

States may maintain such military police as may be necessary to protect it against lawlessness and disorder; belligerent vessels are restricted in method and activity, and the provisions of the treaty are to apply to waters adjacent to the Canal, within three marine miles of either end. And what is this solicitude? Is it not that the littoral is in peril, that is the shores adjacent to the Canal, particularly on the Atlantic side; that some strong European power may appropriate a part of this littoral, and that the position of the United States may be thus rendered insecure and the Monroe Doctrine made ineffective? Great Britain may be eliminated from consideration, for there is no reason to believe that, after settling the protracted controversy over Isthmian transit, she is going to pursue a course which may weaken the alliance she has entered into to further her own trade. With the English speaking peoples in accord, is there ground for apprehending interference with the littoral, or the establishment of coaling-stations in any parts thereof, or in any of the islands of the Carribean Sea? Is not the logical conclusion that the successful operation of this great waterway will prove such a benefit to the commercial nations of the globe, that no one of them will be disposed to pursue a policy calculated to give umbrage to the others?

A matter which merits attention is the enforcement of money claims. The Latin-American republics have been frequent borrowers of European money-changers, and frequently also the disinclination or refusal to settle has led to threats of coercion. In one notable instance—a little over a decade ago—war was actually resorted to and the American people, misled by the yellow newspapers, were distracted by the bugaboo of an invaded Monroe Doctrine. The case was that of Venezuela. It is not contended that the government of Venezuela repudiated its obligations; in fact, that government only objected to the amount of the claims, and proposed that they be passed upon by a board of Venezuelans, while the creditor nations urged their reference to a mixed commission. The method adopted—the sinking of Venezuelan war vessels and the bombardment of Venezuelan ports—is believed to be one of the first attempts in history to

enforce commercial demands by virtual acts of war. It is to be noted, however, that both Great Britain and Germany disavowed to the American government in advance any intention to acquire territory, the German ambassador assuring the State Department, "We declare especially that under no circumstances do we consider in our proceedings the acquisition or the permanent occupation of Venezuelan territory." The intention to acquire territory was disavowed, but were not the attitude and measures of Great Britain and Germany in a sense an interference in the affairs of Venezuela, and were the interests of South and Central America, and those of the United States in any way jeopardized?

Before dismissing the subject, we feel that the attitude, the views, the preferences and purposes of the Latin-American governments deserve attention, for it may be that today they regard the assumed protectorate of the United States as different from the very acceptable service rendered ninety years ago. Suppose that one of the Latin-American republics desires to hand over its autonomy to a European power or for a consideration to cede to that power a bit of territory for the location of a coaling-station, has the United States a right to set up the Monroe Doctrine, and, if set up, would it prove a deterrent? Without answering this question can we not say that the United States has shown too little general interest in the affairs of her Spanish-American neighbors? The matter of interrelation is one which this country should not ignore, and which means far more to the Latin-Americans than the North American people at present comprehend. During the last twenty years several of our southern neighbors have made such progress, and have so increased their resources, that they are amply able to look out for their own affairs in the event of threatened aggression of European nations. A brief consideration of the respective attitudes of the government of the United States on the one hand and of the Latin-American countries on the other may be profitable. Let us fancy that the United States government opens the colloquy as follows:

"Greetings to our sister republics in Central and South America: We trust that you are well. We are well and are

hopeful of the future. We are at present enjoying great happiness in our remembrances. We recall that ninety years have elapsed since we espoused your cause at a time when you were weak and your European enemies were powerful, as well as hostile to the rights of the people. Your threatened resubjugation to Spain was thwarted by our endeavors, and in a brief period your independence was recognized the world over. For nearly a century we have maintained our tutelage, on four different occasions at least successfully averting the machinations and encroachments of monarchical Europe. We shall continue to regard you as our wards and whenever your liberties are endangered by the threat, or your territory is liable to seizure by the act, of any European government, we shall champion your cause and accord you our support. May peace and prosperity be within your borders, and happiness in your homes. Adieu!"

We will assume that the republics addressed respond in the following phrases:

"Thanks, oh, great and generous nation for the enumeration of your kindly offices, and for the offices themselves. Do not reproach us with discourtesy, if we observe that guardians are supposed to take a continuous interest in their wards. Hence we wonder why your people have not come down to see us during the period of your friendly protectorate. We should qualify the statement, however, for we have been favored with the society of occasional Americans, who masquerade under the cognomen of contractors, and who exact from our governments concessions, which often prove more remunerative to the visitors than to us. Our children wonder why it is that they only see the flag of your country on an occasional embassy or consulate, and why it is almost never seen on vessels in our harbors or at moorings. If the Americans whose preference is for Europe will only honor us with their presence, we will demonstrate the assertion that we can show them the evidences of advanced civilization. We have cities like Valparaiso, Buenos Ayres and Rio de Janeiro, that compare favorably with those of the United States. We have educational institutions of the highest order; we have produced men of great learning and of no

mean repute; we enjoy the advantages, conveniences, and comforts that contribute to the happiness of Europeans and North Americans. We welcome to companionship those of every clime and, with the exception of your own people, they come in generous numbers, and in our cities and settlements are a necessary and component element of our population. For example, Buenos Ayres has over 1,300,000 inhabitants, half of whom are of European birth or descent. Our trade is largely with European countries—particularly with Great Britain and Germany. The foreign merchant does not tell us what to buy, but he studies our wants, and makes his goods and products in the shapes and forms that suit us, and he favors us in matters of payments—not infrequently with long credits. Is it not a fact that you yourselves have been so intent on your home market that you have neglected Latin-American fields, that might have afforded opportunities for profitable enterprise, and that by cultivating these fields you might have brought all the American republics into a union of interest and sympathy and effort? Pardon us, if we remind you that the United States took no part in any Congress with the Latin-American States until nearly two-thirds of a century had elapsed since the declaration of President Monroe. The recent efforts of some of your Chambers of Commerce, and of your advanced men of affairs, to work up markets with us, is highly gratifying. Not the least beneficent result, if their efforts are successful, will be the coming to our shores of many of your people, who, we are sure, will deal with us as fairly as the Europeans have done and are doing. We thank you for expressions of friendship and esteem, and await the approaching day, we trust, when we may extend to your own citizens the felicitations, which we are now endeavoring to pour into your national ear."

It is not easy to advance definite views on an indefinite subject, but it is natural to foresee possible contingencies and occurrences, and to suggest dispassionate treatment of them. Nearly thirty years ago the speaker published a monograph on the Monroe Doctrine, which was intended to be an impartial and colorless presentation of the subject, and

his reason therefor was that the declaration of President Monroe—a proper promulgation for a time when apprehension of interference of European powers in the affairs of the Spanish-American countries was justified—had never been indorsed by congressional action, and had never been accorded a place in the code of international law by the nations on the other side of the Atlantic. The questions asked to-day by the speaker are prompted by the fact that circumstances in the last ninety years have greatly modified the relations of nations, and absolutism—if indeed it exists—no longer alarms the friends of democracy. That the Monroe Doctrine may be again set up as a warning or inhibition, is not improbable, but it is to be hoped that there may be brought, and it is believed that there will be brought to the consideration and adjustment of differences and misunderstandings not the inflamed temper of the jingoist, but the catholic spirit of the patriot.

THE MODERN MEANING OF THE MONROE DOCTRINE

*By J. M. Callahan, Ph.D., Professor of History and
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It is unfair to say that the Monroe Doctrine was a mere *pronunciamento* based on provincialism and selfishness, and that it has never served any useful purpose.

True, one of its earlier basic ideas was the natural separation between the old and the new world—an idea of two separate spheres which was unwarranted however much it may have seemed desirable to Jefferson in the Napoleonic period of “eternal war” in Europe. This idea of isolation was never a vital principle of the doctrine. The United States was a world power from the beginning and early felt the need of naval bases in the Mediterranean. As a world power it has rights in Europe, Africa and Asia.

True, the Doctrine was largely due to self interest, together with the feeling that the United States was logically the political leader among the American powers. Secretary Adams in his instructions to Rush, on November 29, 1823, said: “American affairs, whether of the northern or southern continent, can henceforth not be excluded from the interference of the United States. All questions of policy relating to them have a bearing so direct upon the rights and interests of the United States that they can not be left to the disposal of European powers animated and directed exclusively by European principles and interests.”

The United States, beginning with the transfer of Louisiana from Spain to France in 1801 and the apprehended transfer of Florida from Spain to some other European power in 1811, has steadily opposed any European acquisition of American territory which as a European colony might prove dangerous to American peace and security.

The Monroe Doctrine, based upon this principle, has been preëminently a doctrine of peace—especially secured by freeing the Americans from the contests of European diplomacy and politics. In 1905, President Roosevelt said the doctrine as gradually developed and applied to meet changing needs and conditions, and as accepted by other nations, was one of the most effective instruments for peace in the western hemisphere.

Although its policy was based on self interest, the American government under Monroe gave proper consideration to the interests of Latin America. Although in recognizing the independence of Spanish American countries, it had issued a declaration of neutrality, Secretary Adams later (October, 1823) informed the Russian minister that this declaration "had been made under the observance of like neutrality by all the European powers" and might be changed by change of circumstances. The Monroe Doctrine which followed was directly caused by the belief in the right of free peoples to determine their destinies—and by it the United States, with unusual courage, became a protector of liberty and self government in the western hemisphere. Its high purpose and convenient usefulness was properly recognized at the time by the weak Latin-American republics. It was the outgrowth of the sympathy felt for Latin American peoples who were struggling to free themselves from conditions imposed by European politics and who had been recognized as independent nations by the United States. Monroe, who previously as secretary of state was familiar with Latin American conditions, at first contemplated a bold stand to prevent European interference in Spain itself. After the decision to limit the scope of active opposition to the threatened European intervention in American affairs, he appointed a special secret representative to visit Europe, to watch the operations of European congresses and to furnish reports as a basis of determination of American policy. Luckily he was successful in blocking intervention without resort to more active measures.

The Doctrine has prevented the partition of Latin America,

and without any request of remuneration for the service rendered. Its unselfish purpose and unusual daring, in face of what seemed a serious peril, gave it a well deserved popularity both in the United States and in Latin America countries—many of which have in many instances since endeavored to secure treaty stipulations based upon its principles, or have invited the United States actively to intervene to protect them from the apprehended intervention of European powers or from despots who might prepare the way for European intervention.

In spite of apparent lapses of consistency, illustrated in the case of the Clayton-Bulwer treaty (which was supported as a measure which was expected to free an important part of the continent from European intervention), the basic principles of the Doctrine, interpreted with proper elasticity to meet changing conditions, were asserted with success in other later cases. The most notable cases were the termination of French intervention in Mexico in 1867, and the settlement of the Venezuelan boundary dispute with England in 1895-96—after the famous Cleveland-Olney interpretation which resulted in a triumph of the American demand for arbitration, awakened the entire world to the modern meaning of the “menaces of Monroe,” and caused someone to regard the Doctrine as an international impertinence. Although originally a mere declaration of Monroe, nobody since the action of the United States in the Venezuelan affair can surely say it has never had the sanction of Congress.

The Doctrine, although based primarily upon the right of Latin American states to govern themselves, has been sometimes erroneously regarded as a doctrine of American expansion. It is not based on territorial conquest—although over half a century ago it was sometimes associated with that idea. It expresses a duty and a sympathy toward Latin America and not a desire for territory. Americans, who logically in their early history established their boundaries on the gulf, for a half century have not been inclined to encroach upon the territories of their neighbors.

It is true that much Latin American suspicion of Ameri-

can territorial designs was justified in the decade before the American civil war, when under the influence of American leaders of the southern states, the shibboleth of "Manifest Destiny" was added to the doctrine of national security. In January, 1855, Marcoleta of the Nicaragua legation protested against the projects of the self-styled "Central American Land and Mining company" to encourage immigration to Central America, and especially against the nature of the "schemes devised against Central America by these modern Phoenicians who assume military titles . . . and grasp the sword and musket instead of the ploughshare and ax and shepherd's crook, thinking to make conquest of the golden fleece which they believe to be hung and secreted amidst the briars, forests, thickets and swamps . . . under the by no means attractive and seductive influence of a pestiferous and fever-giving atmosphere." Suspicion was doubtless increased in 1856 by plans for an American protectorate over the Isthmus of Panama, formulated in a treaty (between the United States and New Granada) whose ratification was prevented by a change of administration in the United States and a revolution in New Granada. These suspicions were prominent in producing the project of a Latin-American Confederacy of 1856—a proposed alliance which was regarded as antagonistic to the United States, and which caused Dana, the American minister to Bolivia, to propose to the Buchanan administration early in 1857 a clear statement of American foreign policy based upon the Monroe Doctrine, non-expansion in Latin America, and treaties of alliance with the Latin American states, in order to sustain self government in both Americas. In 1858, in connection with the policy of the American government to secure a neutral transit route across Central America, Nicaragua issued a manifesto against apprehended filibustering expeditions from the United States, and by demanding a European protectorate indicated a line of policy which Secretary Cass promptly warned her that the United States had long opposed and would resist by all means in her power, for reasons "founded on the political circum-

stances of the American continent which has interests of its own."

It is true that, after the Gadsden purchase, persistent efforts were made under the administrations of Pierce and Buchanan, not only to extend American influence and domain in the West Indies, but also to solve the Mexican problem by additional reduction of Mexican territory—or by the establishment of an American protectorate which was expected to result in new acquisitions to the stronger country. These efforts, largely based on the danger of European influence and apprehended European intervention in Mexico, closed with the beginning of the American civil war and with the arrival of the long-predicted European intervention in Mexico.

Under Seward, the American government sought only to preserve Mexico from the Confederates and from permanent European occupation, and the American senate refused to enter into any arrangement by which a proposed mortgage on lands of Mexico might have resulted in new annexations. Later, although Mexico feared American expansion toward the southwest and hesitated to coöperate in the construction of railroads across the international boundary, the United States government remained true to the assurances of Seward in Mexico after the expulsion of Maximilian. It sought no acquisition of territory in Mexico; and much less did it desire territory in Latin America farther south, except in connection with the later projects for the construction of the interoceanic canal whose benefits would be shared by Latin America and the entire world.

The part taken by the United States in Cuba and in the Venezuelan controversy with the European allies has revealed to Latin America the true feeling of the government of the United States. It has shown them that the mother republic is sincerely and earnestly interested in the success of republican government throughout this hemisphere. It has shown that the purpose of the older republic in relations with Latin America is not one of conquest, but one of sympathy, coöperation, and assistance. The true policy of the American government since the civil war was

recently expressed by Secretary Root, and more recently by President Wilson in his Mobile speech.

The idea of an American interoceanic-isthmian canal, which possibly was considered as a minor factor in producing the original declaration of Monroe, was later a prominent factor in causing the United States government to assert a status of "paramount interest," which is now emphasized as a cardinal point of American foreign policy growing from the basic principle of the policy of Monroe and Adams. Seward steadily acting under the doctrine of the larger influence and interests of the United States in American affairs, in 1864 began to assert it in a series of negotiations and treaties with Central America and Columbia in regard to the proposed isthmian canal. His successor, under Grant's administration, hopefully expecting the future "voluntary departure of European government from this continent and the adjacent islands," in 1870-77 favored the acquisition of San Domingo, as a measure of national protection to prevent the apprehended danger of its control as a possession or a protectorate of a European power, and to secure a "just claim to a controlling influence" over the future commercial traffic across the isthmus. Later, he endeavored to negotiate with Columbia a treaty by which he sought for the United States a greater privileged status and more extensive rights of intervention on the isthmus—a treaty which Columbia refused to ratify. In 1880, Secretary Evarts asserted the doctrine of American "paramount interest" in projects of interoceanic canal communication across the isthmus, and the right to be a principal party to any political arrangements affecting this American question. This doctrine received new meaning in 1881 after the occupation of Egypt by Great Britain which already owned a controlling majority of the stock of the Suez Canal, and again after the events of the American intervention in Cuba which brought new opportunities, new duties and new responsibilities to the United States. The construction of the canal under American control was the logical conclusion of a long series of events; and the wisdom of the diplomacy and policy which seized opportunity by the

forelock, and terminated the long period of discussion and delay, can safely be submitted to the test of time.

Although changed conditions in both hemispheres, and of motive power on the ocean, have modified the earlier meaning of the Monroe Doctrine, and may still further modify it, its main basic principle for America has not been abandoned. This principle is not obsolete. It has been retained on the broad ground of national welfare, in spite of the defects in Latin American governments so frequently resulting in troubles due to unpaid claims; and European powers have recently shown a readiness to accept it at the Hague Conference and in connection with the Venezuelan debt question of 1902. The latter incident, according to leaders in England, gave the Monroe Doctrine an immensely increased authority. Mr. Balfour, approving the American policy, suggested that the United States should more actively enter into an arrangement by which constantly-occurring difficulties between European powers and certain states in Latin America could be avoided.

Unless we have reached the conclusion that all Latin America might be better under European control, and that this control would not seriously threaten the peace and permanent interests of the United States, at least one important principle of the Doctrine should still be retained as a fundamental part of American foreign policy. Under whatever name, and however modified to suit the conditions and needs of American foreign policy, it is still a useful principle. It may fitly be called the doctrine of national defense, which in its results may be regarded also as a doctrine of Pan-American defense. In America the United States government has duties and responsibilities which can not be abandoned to the mercy of trans-oceanic powers, nor submitted to the decision of international conferences or tribunals. It must attend to the larger interests of the United States—without any unnecessary interference with the larger interests of other powers. Certainly, in Mexico at present, the United States has a larger interest than that of any European power. She has a far greater interest than any other power in the restoration of peace and the

establishment of a government that has proper basis or permanency in its method of selection and in its policies for adjustment of problems that press for solution. Peace in America, on the basis of good government, is more important to the United States than it is to Europe, and more important to the United States than peace in Europe.

The present basis of policy is the paramount interest of the United States in American affairs—a special interest which, especially in the Caribbean, can be shared with no other power, and perhaps would be questioned by no European power. After the war for the relief of the Cuban situation in 1898—a war which made the United States an Asiatic power and brought it in contact with European politics in the far East—American paramount interests in the West Indies, and in the Caribbean, were greatly increased and especially found expression in the messages of President Roosevelt and in various acts of the American government—including the construction of the Panama Canal which has clearly increased the importance of maintaining around the Caribbean the American policy against the interference of European powers. In this region the United States has duties and responsibilities which it may not willingly share with any European power.

Farther south, the assertion and maintenance of the doctrine of non-intervention has been rendered less necessary by the growth of several more perfect, orderly and stable governments, which themselves are the best guarantors of the Doctrine. The larger Latin American republics, in which governments have reached sure bases of permanence, may properly be invited by the United States to coöperate or participate in the consideration of mutual larger interests in America, and to share the responsibilities incident to the American principle of defense of American nationalities. Doubtless by such a continental extension of the means of safeguarding the Monroe Doctrine, Latin American neighbors through the sobering effect of actual responsibility would cease to misinterpret the motives of the mother republic in the Caribbean and on the Isthmus.

Whether we admit Olney's declaration that "the United

States is practically sovereign on this continent," it seems clear that as a result of its geographic situation it has a "paramount interest" in the western hemisphere which imposes certain rules of policy toward Latin American neighbors—especially toward those in the Caribbean and around its shores. This doctrine was at the basis of the Cuban intervention, of the construction of the Panama canal under American control, of the declaration of policy to Germany in connection with the blockade of Venezuelan ports, of the policy in Santo Domingo, of the recent policy in Nicaragua, and of the present Mexican policy. The essential idea is to prevent the danger of European intervention which might result in the acquisition of territory.

A possible result of this policy is the intervention of the United States to set in order the conditions which invite foreign intervention. Such a policy, however undesirable, may be necessary unless the United States is ready to abandon its past policy in regard to European intervention. Actual intervention of force of arms is a possible necessity which the American government, judging for itself the action which the situation may require, would undertake only after much forbearance and as a last resort to secure peace between warring factions, and to prevent dangers more serious. Such intervention was contemplated in Mexico in 1867, but was fortunately avoided by the French withdrawal which precipitated the fall of Maximilian.

In case a European power seeks redress for an injury which can be fairly settled only by occupation of soil, the American government might logically be forced to accept the rôle of international policemen and assume responsibility of satisfying the injured party. Against Venezuela in 1902, the United States permitted a military debt collecting demonstration with the assurance that no territory would be occupied. She determined the reasonableness of the demand upon the delinquent government, and also the method of collection. In the case of Santo Domingo, she prevented the necessity of European intervention by assuming administrative control of the Dominican finances for the purpose of paying foreign credi-

tors, and with no view to territorial aggression. These two cases indicate the purpose of the American government at Washington to prevent the use of the non-intervention principle of the traditional American policy as a shield to protect delinquent Latin American republics from the payment of debts, as it was used in the case of the proposed joint European expedition against Mexico in 1859.

The United States has never had a wish to interfere in the internal policies of Latin American neighbors. She has had no desire to interfere with those which are orderly, and no inclination to interfere with those which are disorderly. But in the case of Mexico she has refused recognition to de-facto governments irregularly or unfairly elected. The election of Maximilian by a reported "immense majority" was regarded as a farce.

The maintenance of the Monroe Doctrine places upon the United States a responsibility to prevent its foreign policy from becoming a shield to protect the existence of revolution, anarchy and military despotism which increases the debts of neighboring Latin American countries and results in vast foreign claims for property destroyed. The protégés of American foreign policy should more carefully seek to maintain orderly and well administered governments which will not invite foreign wrath. In Central America, the disorder might be reduced by federation; but the problem is beset by many difficulties.

The supreme need of these republics is to establish a basis by which changes of policies and parties can be made peacefully through the ballot box. The continued disorderly condition of affairs must either result in the abrogation of the Monroe Doctrine so far as it protects them, or in the alternative of a more active American policy to secure more peaceful internal conditions. It is possible that arbitration in some form may be applied to civil commotions in such a way as to afford a general remedy if elections are free and fairly conducted. Possibly, some plan for the establishment of a receivership for delinquent states could be devised by a conference of American states. Such a plan might prove of great value in securing peace—and

might in some instances provide for taking charge of the government pending a presidential election. In some instances the plan might result or terminate in confederations which would reduce the dangers of future disorder and prepare the way for peace and prosperity. Under the receiverships, ballot reforms and regulation of election systems could be inaugurated. The United States as a near neighbor stands in a favorable position to take the initiative in the consummation of such reforms.

With the development of orderly governments around the Caribbean—governments which can maintain for themselves the same principle of the Monroe Doctrine which has served as their protection—the United States will gladly be relieved from the often embarrassing responsibility by which she has sought to preserve constitutional government and peace on this hemisphere—especially in the part of it where she has the largest share of responsibility for the maintenance of order.

THE MONROE DOCTRINE¹

*By Albert Bushnell Hart, LL.D., Professor of Government,
Harvard University*

Shock at seeing the foundations of a life-time swept away by the preceding speakers, but willing to accept a change of attitude caused by change of conditions.

I. FEELING OF CONFIDENCE IN THE STATESMEN WHO HAVE GUIDED THE UNITED STATES

Among these who have laid down a distinct doctrine with regard to our relations with other American states are: Jefferson, Monroe, John Quincy Adams, Polk, Seward, Grant, Cleveland, Roosevelt and Wilson.

Tendency in the speaker's mind to believe in his countrymen, and in the uprightness and the sagacity of those whom they have put at their head.

Certain that they did not all mean the same thing by what most of them call the Monroe Doctrine, but they all recognized the need of a policy which did not coincide with the general policy of the country toward foreign nations.

All of them impelled to the declaration (of whatever nature) by the desire to secure peace.

Not one of them (except Polk) intended his form of the Monroe Doctrine to cover territorial aggressions upon his neighbors.

II. A SPECIAL KIND OF POLICY IS ABSOLUTELY NECESSARY BECAUSE THE CONDITIONS OF AMERICAN FOREIGN RELATIONS ARE DIFFERENT FROM THOSE OF RELATIONS WITH EUROPEAN POWERS

Satisfaction of the speaker on seeing his former students disagree with him.

¹Outline of Address at the Conference at Clark University.

Suppose an administration formed of the gentlemen present who have taken ground, either for or against what is commonly called the Monroe Doctrine:

President, Hollander; Secretary of State, Callahan; Secretary of the Navy, Admiral Chadwick; Attorney-General, Mr. Tucker; Ambassadors at large of Latin America, Professor Blakeslee, and Professor Bingham; Expert in Latin American Affairs, Minister Pezet—What policy would that administration adopt?

III. LIMITED INTEREST OF THE UNITED STATES IN EUROPEAN NATIONS

Clearly the United States is not in the assembly of European powers, though they cannot escape several intimate connections with those policies.

1. Through the existence of European colonies (especially British) in America.

2. Through the immigration of Europeans and consequent questions of nationality and citizenship.

3. Through our footing in Asia, in close contact with settlements of European powers.

IV. ESPECIAL INTEREST OF THE UNITED STATES IN AMERICAN QUESTIONS

1. Physical nearness and contiguity of Mexico and Cuba.

2. Infiltration of Americans into other American countries.

3. Immigration of other Americans (particularly Mexicans) into the United States.

4. Investment of American capital in American countries.

5. The Panama Canal as a great inter-American highway.

V. GREAT INTEREST OF THE UNITED STATES IN ALL AMERICAN TERRITORIAL QUESTIONS

1. Advance into Louisiana, West Florida, Texas, New Mexico and California.

2. Possession of Alaska.
3. Canal as a territorial possession.
4. The Canal as an "extension of our coast line."

VI. SPECIAL INTEREST IN HOME GOVERNMENT OF AMERICAN NEIGHBORS

1. Transfer of the foci of insurrection across the border.
2. Loss of life and property of Americans from bad governments.
3. Difficulty of maintaining polite relations with irregular and despotic governments.
4. Excitement and irritation caused in the United States.

VII. SPECIAL MILITARY INTEREST IN AMERICAN CONDITIONS

1. West India Islands as bases of military and naval operations.
2. Northeastern and northwestern British possessions as bases.
3. Panama Canal as a military objective.

VIII. DESIRABILITY OF MAINTAINING PEACE IN AMERICA

1. By preventing wars between foreign nations and American powers.
2. By preventing internal wars between American nations.
3. By preventing internal insurrections within an American neighbor country.
4. By avoiding causes of war between the United States and our neighbors.

IX. DOCTRINE OF INFERIOR NATIONS

1. Such nations exist in various parts of the earth, i.e. Persia, the Balkan States, Turkey, Portugal.

2. Such states are members of the family of nations, but are in the position of minority stock-holders.

3. The policy of European nations is to supervise such powers.

X. UPON THE BASIS OF THESE UNDERLYING CONDITIONS WHAT IS THE NATURAL POLICY OF THE UNITED STATES—WHETHER YOU CALL IT THE MONROE DOCTRINE OR SOME OTHER DOCTRINE?

1. No conferences or congresses with foreign nations upon American affairs.

2. Recognition of special interest and special friendship for the American neighbors.

3. Acceptance of the Drago Doctrine, so that no power shall use military force for the collection of contract debts.

4. Recognition of the presumption of the international equality with the United States of those Latin American powers who shall have demonstrated their capacity to take care of themselves.

5. Recognition of Latin American governments which clearly are supported by the people of the country—but not of political adventurers as heads of the state.

6. Moral aid to all peoples who are trying to raise their civilization.

“If this be the Monroe Doctrine, make the most of it.”

THE DEVELOPMENT OF OUR LATIN-AMERICAN TRADE

By Hon. John Hays Hammond, LL.D.

It is unfortunate that the solution of great problems purely economic in character is not entirely dissociated from party politics, but such is, nevertheless, the fact. Legislation affecting the tariff, the currency and other problems essentially economic and vital to the welfare of the entire nation is determined too often on strictly political lines—settled, indeed, in a large measure by politicians upon the stump, not by business men in boards of trade.

What I shall say with respect to foreign trade is from the point of view of a business man and I assure you that any criticisms I make which may seem suggestive of partisanship are made entirely free from political bias.

I have been requested to speak of our government's Mexican policy, but, in view of the critical condition of negotiations now pending with Mexico, I would prefer to speak of foreign trade in general. I would say this, however, that, irrespective of what we may think individually of President Wilson's Mexican policy in the present serious situation, we must back him up collectively.

"As a great industrial nation, especially in manufactured products, the United States leads the world. Of the value of these products in the year 1910, amounting to \$20,000,000,000, our home market absorbed \$19,000,000,000, or 95 per cent, and our exports amounted to \$1,000,000,000, or only 5 per cent." Authorities regard this as nearing the limit—that is to say, the point of saturation—of our domestic markets, so far as present demands during normal periods are concerned. It is because of the extraordinary capacity of our home markets that our nation hitherto has made no strenuous efforts to exploit foreign markets. Great Britain and Germany, on the other hand, with comparatively

restricted domestic markets, have paid more attention to the development of foreign trade, and for that reason the value of the annual exports "of each of these nations has exceeded that of the United States by 30 per cent."

A new tariff has been recently enacted. It will result, as was designed, in an increased importation of manufactured products, aggregating, probably, a very large amount. The inevitable effect of such imports will be to restrict the capacity of our home markets for domestic products. (I am not discussing the merits of the new tariff, but referring only to its inevitable effect in this one particular.)

Therefore, having regard to these facts, it is obvious that we must either curtail the capacity of our factories, which would result in throwing out of employment hundreds of thousands of wage earners, or we must depend upon the exploitation of foreign markets for the relief of our congested industries.

In her foreign trade Great Britain has followed the lines of least resistance. In the year 1911 she exported to British colonies and possessions (where she enjoyed preferential tariff rates), 35 per cent of her entire exports; while only 30 per cent was sent to other manufacturing countries having a protective tariff, and of the remainder, a large part of her exports was to countries where there was no competition on the part of home industries, i.e, to neutral markets.

America and Germany, on the other hand, have succeeded in developing trade with countries which have highly organized competitive industries in the same lines of merchandise; that is, America and Germany have "bucked the center," while England has "played the ends." Conformably with this policy Great Britain has given special attention to the development of markets in South America. Until recently her supremacy there was acknowledged, but the extraordinary development of German trade during the past few years has threatened the predominance of English interests in that quarter.

I agree with the optimism which has been expressed as to the great opportunity offered the United States for the development of important markets in South America, and

especially on the West Coast, after the opening of the Panama Canal. But we shall undoubtedly have to meet the keen competition of England and Germany and we must be prepared to meet other formidable competitors as well—Japan, for example, which is already gaining a firm commercial foothold even on the eastern coast of South America.

In the extension of her South American trade, Great Britain has given us an object lesson. Within a decade she has trebled her exports to Brazil and to Argentina. While this increase is in a large measure due to special efforts in the exploitation of those markets, it is, nevertheless, the fact—and this is a point I wish to emphasize—that the increase is chiefly due to the investment of enormous sums of British capital in the development of the industries of those countries. Likewise, the experience of Great Britain in many other countries where British capital has been invested demonstrates the proposition that trade follows the investment of a nation's capital as well as a nation's flag. In short, the investment of a nation's capital in foreign countries for the development of their industries is the sesame that opens the door of trade. How wide the door of trade will be opened depends upon the success attending that nation's efforts in securing rapid and cheap communication and transportation; in providing the character of commodities needed by the countries in question; in the establishment of banking facilities to meet the requirements both of the exporter and the importer, and, finally, in the fostering of friendly relations by intimate intercourse between the citizens of the respective nations.

Now, in order to stimulate the investment of capital in foreign lands it is prerequisite that the investor be assured of protection by his government against any unfair interference or discrimination on the part of foreign governments where these investments are made.

If our nation is to pursue a policy of *laissez-faire* and decline to assume its obligation to afford legitimate protection to its nationals, then its nationals will not be so foolhardy as to risk capital in the development of foreign industries. Or if, in spite of the lack of protection from their govern-

ment they nevertheless decide to make such investments, they will do so under the auspices of the flags of other nations which guarantee to their subjects proper protection of life and property.

This may be deprecated as "dollar diplomacy," and I would not have such an imputation, because of the insidious interpretation that has been given by sentimentalists to commercial activities in foreign countries where the avowed subject is to develop remunerative business. If we are to enjoy our share of the commerce of the world our diplomatic relations must be conducted upon lines which we may perhaps designate by a more euphemistic title, but which essentially must be for the object of legitimate gain; for the investment of capital in the development of the industries of foreign countries is not actuated solely by altruistic considerations, nor is business at home, for that matter, conducted under any such Utopian theory.

It will not be necessary for our government to assume a truculent attitude towards the smaller nations where investments may be less securely established than in other countries more highly developed politically and industrially. Nor is it expected that our government should in any way guarantee the success of commercial enterprises; for business men are willing to assume legitimate risks in their investments. But it is, as I have said, nevertheless imperative that our government guarantee the fair treatment of its nationals who have invested their capital in legitimate industry under laws obtaining in the country when the investments in question were made. Certain it is that laws resulting in the confiscation of property legally acquired do not justify a great nation in repudiating its obligations to obtain the redress of legitimate grievances of its citizens. And certain it is, also, that our nation, if it hopes to compete with other great nations in the development of foreign markets, must accord to its citizens at least the same guarantee of the protection of life and property as is accorded the nationals of our competitors in commerce.

With all deference, I beg to differ with the President of the United States as to the opinions he expressed a few

weeks ago in what is known as the "Mobile Declaration," when he states that "interests do not tie nations together—sometimes separate them—but sympathy and understanding do bind them together." Ipsissima verba.

Sympathy and understanding are admittedly essential to binding nations together, but I cannot apprehend how sympathy and understanding can be developed without that intimate intercourse which best results from commercial relations.

The suggestion is certainly idealistic, but I believe that sentimental ties that do not result from community of interests are far too tenuous to withstand the strain of inherent racial and religious antipathies.

What is more idealistic—sublime—than the conception that "marriages are made in heaven;" and yet even the closest philosopher, married or unmarried, knows that that sympathy and understanding which is essential to happy marriages, despite their divine origin, can be developed only by intimate intercourse and by community of interests.

It is community of interests upon which we must depend to maintain the world's peace.

ADVANTAGES OF MAKING THE CANAL ZONE A FREE CITY AND FREE PORT

*By W. D. Boyce, Publisher, The Saturday Blade and Chicago
Ledger*

A wise Providence evidently intrusted the building of the world's industries to the human race. The story of the bringing of the world into form and the creation of the first man took only 600 words to tell. Then the trouble began at an early period by the advent of woman, and the world is filled with volumes of records of what has since happened.

In considering South America commercially, we must first analyze the original stock from which these people sprang. The first land on the earth's surface appeared in Asia, and there we still find the highest mountains. Undoubtedly the first man came into life in Asia, and the human race, spreading northeastward came to the Bering Strait between Asia and North America. It was only a short walk on ice for eight winter months in the year, or a journey of forty miles in skin boats in summer, to cross over to Alaska. No doubt the first human being on American soil was an Esquimau, who came from cold Siberia, lived in an igloo under the ground, was small of body, flat of chest and nostril. He lived on fish and the products of the sea, easily taken in the summer and dried or frozen for winter use. He worked his way farther south and east, and presently lived on top of the ground winter and summer, and, with more sunlight and air the year around, developed a larger and healthier body, bigger chest and a larger nose as his lungs required more air. He killed wild game, and the animal fat agreed with him better than fish, whale, seal or walrus oils. I want to say here, that the Esquimaux and Indians never had or knew what consumption, the "white plague," was, until they caught it from the white man, proving that tuberculosis is contagious.

The Indian improved until he reached the warm country near the Rio Grande, and there in the hot climate, where

life was easy he began to deteriorate. This condition continued through the low parts of Central America and the equatorial parts of South America. We find, however, that when he got as far south as the high elevations of Columbia, Ecuador and Venezuela, he improved and became stronger physically and mentally.

Here I want to call your attention to something few people think about when considering latitude: 250 feet in elevation is equal to 1 degree north or south of the Equator. When you are 5000 feet above sea level on the Equator, you have nearly the same climate every month in the year that you have 20 degrees north or south of the Equator in the summer months.

Another thing I want to remind you of in considering the west coast of South America, south of the Panama Canal, is the fact that from the Equator south it is much colder than from the Equator north, on account of the Humboldt Current, which is a cold-water stream flowing north from the Antarctic Ocean, like our Gulf Stream, which tempers the otherwise icy shores of England, or the Japan Current, on our northwest coast as far north as Alaska. At Sitka, Alaska, 57 degrees north, it seldom goes below zero. This cold-water stream from the Antarctic Ocean cools off the whole west coast of South America, up to the Equator, where it turns west into the Pacific Ocean. While crossing the Equator on the west coast of South America, I slept in my cabin covered by a light blanket.

A year ago I was motoring through England and Scotland with my daughter and a young English schoolgirl friend of hers. We were talking about how far north we were and that *our* Gulf Current kept the little British Island from being frozen up eight months of the year. I jokingly remarked that if we ever had trouble with England we were going to change the course of the Gulf Stream and leave the blooming country nothing but an iceberg. The young lady solemnly replied, "You wouldn't be permitted to do it, would you?" This was no English joke, at least, for an English joke is not to be laughed at.

But to return to the Indian, the basic stock of South

America. He grew stronger with the higher, colder climate of the great Andean plateau and the necessity of hustling for a living, until that great race of Indians—the Incas—who lived on the table-lands of the mountains, with their capital at Cuzco, Peru, had developed a civilization equal to, in many ways, that of the Far East or the Asiatic countries they sprang from.

One of the contradictions I find in the development of the South American Indian races, is that they were not meat eaters to any great extent, for there is no evidence that South America was ever a big game country like North America or Africa. While shooting big game in the interior of tropical Africa, I observed that the negroes who lived on meat were less intelligent and had less physical endurance than the Coast black man who lived on fruits, vegetables and fish.

As the North American Indian started weak and helpless in the Arctic country, so I found the native South American deteriorates as we approach the Antarctic Ocean. The lowest order of the human race I ever observed are the Indians on the Island of Tierra del Fuego, south of the Straits of Magellan. The conclusions heretofore given are from observation and personal experience with the American Indians from the Arctic to the Antarctic Oceans.

Columbus spent three years on a small island three miles from the Island of Madeira in the Atlantic Ocean, gathering evidence from whatever floated onto the shores of his island that there was land a distance away not so great as to destroy or break up that which floated across the waters when the trade winds were from the west.

With this evidence, he returned to Spain and we all know how Queen Isabella pawned her jewelry to back his expedition, and the results. Both Columbus and the Queen believed there was land to the west a few hundred miles, or she would not have "backed" him and he would never have been able to get a crew to sail with him.

The usual impression we have is that Columbus sailed from 3000 to 4000 miles from land to land, but from the Island of Madeira, where he last embarked to the West India

island he landed on, near the coast of South America, he covered only a course of about 1600 miles. We all know how the soldiers that followed the discoverer conquered, killed and robbed the poor, defenseless and peaceful Indians of South America.

President Saenz Peña of Argentine said to me one day:

You must not measure South American honesty and morals from a North American standard; remember our origin. We are a mixed race of people coming from the Indian and the Spanish and Portuguese soldiers, who only came to this country to rob the Indian of his gold, not to make a home. You people of the United States sprang from a pure white North European stock who came to your country to get away from some political or religious persecution, and to make a home for themselves. We are improving rapidly.

I certainly agree with him, but I would go still one step further. The South and Central American people, as a race, are a cross between Latin Europe and the people from northeastern Asia—now developed into the American Indian. With this combination of white and yellow blood to start with, you are dealing commercially with a race different from any other on the face of the earth.

I consider it of greater importance that you fully understand the origin of the people of South and Central America correctly at this time, than how many pairs of shoes or yards of "Americano" they wear a year.

Do not forget, however, that there are about 5 per cent pure blood white people in South America. They are most courteous and kind, and the greatest diplomats on earth, and are the descendants of the first families of Spain and Portugal. When an office holder or public man in the United States fails in the confidence of the public he loses his job—down there he loses his job and frequently his head at the same time. In the United States a man may "come back," but in South America—never.

Heretofore, the greatest efforts in human progress have followed the sun's course; hence the phrase, "Westward the star of Empire takes its course." Our own Southern States' progress, has been retarded through chasing this "star of Empire" westward around the world. It is high time we

were saying, "Southward the star of Empire takes its course." The best unoccupied land in the world is now south of the Equator.

Climate, soil and transportation have their everlasting influence on the people, products and commerce of any country. The climate and soil of South America east of the Andes range of mountains is quite as good as that of the United States of North America east of the Rocky Mountains. Even when you are near the Equator the elevation of the table-lands gives a great variety of products and healthy climate. And when far south near the Straits of Magellan, 54 degrees south, it never gets very cold, because you have open salt water near you in all directions, in the Atlantic, Pacific and Antarctic Oceans.

The prevailing winds of South America are from the east to the west, and the moisture picked up on the Atlantic Ocean is gradually precipitated until the last drop is squeezed out—or frozen out—on top of the high range of mountains near the West Coast. The result is that for 2700 miles on the Pacific Coast it practically never rains and the only vegetation is from irrigation, the water being secured from the melting snows at the top of the mountains. This 2700 miles of rainless desert, the longest in the world, includes all of the coast of Peru and Chile, except the southern end of Chile where the mountain range is low and but a short distance from the Atlantic Ocean.

North America has an area of 8,300,000 square miles; South America 7,700,000 square miles, or 7 per cent less, although the area possible to cultivate is much greater than that of North America. Brazil alone is as large as the United States and will support four times as many of the human family.

When you consider the immense and numerous rivers in South America navigable all the year around, and the great ocean shore-line, also the population and its location, South America is about as well provided with transportation as North America. Of course, everywhere in North and South America you hear, "We want a railroad, or more boats," but the 40,000,000 people south of the Panama Canal are

as well supplied as the 120,000,000 north of the big ditch. The railroads are either government owned and operated, or built and operated by private capital—mostly English. You find the narrow gauge, 3 feet, the standard, 4 feet 8½ inches, or the wide gauge, 5 feet 6 inches, the Russian standard. The first road in Argentina was started by a speculator who bought from the English government some cars and engines used in the Crimean War near Sebastopol, in Russia. As more engines and cars were needed the 5 feet 6 inches equipment was added to. "As the twig is bent so the tree is inclined." There are over 15,000 miles of railroad in Argentina and the population is less than 7,000,000. The government owned roads in South American republics are poorly operated at a great loss, but considered necessary to move troops or open up new sections of the republic to which they may belong.

We export to the whole world annually over \$1,750,000,000 worth of products from our field, mine and factory; but to the ten South American republics only about \$200,000,000, or about 11 per cent of our total exports, while our imports from South America as compared with our exports to the whole world amount to 25 per cent. Our chief imports from the ten South American Republics are coffee, rubber, cacao, hardwoods, some copper and hides. The balance of trade against us with these ten Republics is over 100 per cent and to even this up, or to export to them more than we import from those countries is a very serious commercial question.

It is the proud boast of the United States that we export more than we import, and the figures show that the balance of trade with the whole world is in our favor. While figures will not lie, we may sometimes be misled by them. If we will add to our imports the amount we pay foreign ships for carrying our products, wares and passengers, also the amount paid foreign marine insurance companies, we might find the actual balance of commerce against us, despite the favorable results that trade statistics show. Who knows? Think it over.

I am not going to attempt to give you a lot of figures;

you can get complete and accurate statistics on any particular line for any Republic in South or Central America by applying to the Honorable John Barrett, Director General Pan-American Union, Washington, D. C.

How are we going to overcome the balance of trade with South America, which is against us? In some ways we are at a great disadvantage, in others we have the upper hand. First, we are a food stuff and meat producing country, so are they. They can grow everything to eat cheaper than we can. It is very evident we cannot export our agricultural products to South America. To offset this, she has little or no iron ore or coal. We have an abundance. Everything in which these two items go to produce we are the natural source of supply—in fact we are such a natural source of supply that I found steel from the United States selling all over South America at \$10 per ton less than in the United States. In the interior of Bolivia our sewing machines were selling for \$5 each less than at home. We can export pine or soft woods. There is hardly a tree or stick of timber in South America that will float or make paper. Print paper from the United States was selling in the interior of South America at the same price I pay for it in Chicago.

South America is divided into ten republics, each having the extremes of climate, hot or cold, through latitude or altitude, and just as great a diversity in the needs of the people. There is no great demand in any one republic, owing to the small population, for a large quantity of manufactured articles in any one line, hence, little or no manufacturing.

To plainly show why we should endeavor to establish a permanent market for our fabricated wares, let me use Chile as an illustration: Chile is 2700 miles long, with an average of less than 100 miles in width, extending from 16 degrees south to 56 degrees south, all on the Pacific Ocean, with a population of 4,000,000. The Chileans are called the "Yankees of South America." The great variety of goods consumed in small quantities in this country, from the tropical zone to the Atlantic Ocean, leaves manufacturing unprofitable.

Chile is very rich from the export of nitrate (saltpeter) used all over the world in the manufacturing of gunpowder and as a fertilizer. The government alone receives annually \$50,000,000 export tax on this one article. Chile acquired the nitrate fields from Peru in war.

Forty per cent of Brazil's exports come to the United States, 99½ per cent of this 40 per cent (mostly rubber and coffee) comes in free of duty, while only 12 per cent of Brazil's imports are received from us. I discussed this question with President Fonseca and asked him why they could not make a lower tariff on our products. His answer was, "We would like to, but we need the money."

I visited a colony from the United States in Brazil, at Villa Americano, state of São Paulo, where 50 per cent of the coffee of the world is grown in this state alone. These settlers were originally from Alabama and Georgia, Eighty families—or 360 souls all told—left the United States in 1867 in order to get away from the reconstruction period and go to a country where they could raise the same products they did at home. Although in a rich coffee district, they were sticking to sugar cane, cotton, rice and water-melons. Only a few who sailed from the United States forty-four years before were left. Some had returned to the United States, descendants of others were married to Brazilians, and the general opinion was they had gained nothing by moving. They were mighty glad to see a man from home.

The South American governments derive great incomes from export taxes. They say they need the money—no doubt about it. They do not let the other countries of the world enjoy the advantages of their cheap products or raw stock without paying for it. The tax is levied on the consumer in foreign countries. Peru has an export tax on copper and gold, Brazil on coffee and rubber, Paraguay and nearly all the republics on raw hides.

The United States should be best fitted to supply the real wants of South and Central America, because we manufacture for home consumption for people who are engaged in agricultural pursuits and we can easily adapt the products

of our factories to their wants and customs. We cannot sell to them articles exactly like we use here. We must make for them what they are accustomed to consume, not what we think they ought to have. The English manufacturers lost most of the South American trade to the Germans, French, Italians and Spanish, because the last named countries furnished what the trade required irrespective of their own ideas of quality or utility.

THE PANAMA CANAL ZONE

When in 1840 a question was before the United States Senate affecting the interests of the Pacific Coast, the great and wise Daniel Webster stated that he "didn't know what was west of the Rocky Mountains," and furthermore, he "didn't give a d—n." That is the way most of the people of the United States of North America felt about the countries to the south of us until we began spending money by the hundreds of millions in building the Panama Canal, which has now become our southern boundary line.

Up to date the Panama Canal has cost France and the United States combined, over \$1,500,000,000, principal and interest, on the original investment, and the end is not yet, although we will finally complete and operate what Spain, England, Portugal and France attempted, but failed to finish—a navigable canal between the Pacific and Atlantic waters.

If we make a financial failure of the Panama Canal we will be discredited all over the world, and especially in South America. If the United States can make a success out of an undertaking primarily intended only to connect two oceans so as to, in effect, double the size of our navy, we will demonstrate to South America and the world that we are mighty good people to do business with.

Years ago the wise professors told us that if we connected the Atlantic and Pacific waters at Panama we would change the course of the Gulf Stream. Spain referred the digging of the Panama Canal to the Church, but the bishops decided against it on the ground that "what God has joined together let no man put asunder."

There is no reason why the Canal Zone cannot be made into a city of 500,000 people in twenty years and produce sufficient income from dockage, tolls, taxes, rents, leases, etc., to pay the interest on at least the original capital invested by the United States. We have 286,720 acres inside the Canal Zone. Already many millions of dollars have been spent to make the Canal Zone sanitary and a desirable place to live in the year round. Nearly all of this will be a complete loss unless we build a great city there. The Panama Railroad, for which we paid millions and spent millions more to move and rebuild, will be a "white elephant" on our hands, on the basis of investment, unless we build a big city there.

In one way, a great commercial city can be built along the whole canal from one end to the other with docks everywhere. This city would become a great commercial clearing house not only for the merchants and manufacturers of North, Central and South America, but for the whole world. Trade in every Republic on the American continent is necessarily more or less restricted by a protective tariff, therefore, we need one spot at least for free exchange. It is just as necessary as a clearing house for the great banks in our big cities.

Remember, the entire canal is a land-locked, fresh water harbor, berthing the largest vessels in the world, where barnacles can be scraped off the bottoms of ships—an advantage possessed by only one other great inland port city in the world. The way to build a big metropolis on the Canal Zone is no experiment, no wild theory. It has been successfully worked out and proved by Germany and England and a number of smaller countries.

The way to build a big city at the central point between North and South America, the Atlantic and Pacific Oceans, the Far East and the Far West, is to make the Canal Zone a *free city* and *free port*. By this I mean *free* from *import* or *export duties* into and out from the Canal Zone. This will not affect the primary question of tolls for passing through the Canal. If created a free port and protected through international treaty, so it could not be affected by

changes in our administration or home policies, merchants and manufacturers from all over the world would build factories and warehouses and establish branches and agencies at this *world center* for quick distribution, delivery and sale. Many South Americans would establish agencies and branches there to reach the world's commerce. In fact, it would become an immense world's department store where everything for the use of the people of all nations could be found. It would become the greatest trans-shipping port in the world, especially as many boats suitable for the Pacific Ocean are not seaworthy or insurable on the Atlantic Ocean.

As the lawyers would put it, what you have been saying is *testimony*—give us some *evidence* of what a free port or city will do toward creating a metropolis of half a million in a few years. Here is the evidence: Hamburg, Germany; Copenhagen, Denmark; Gibraltar; Hong Kong (formerly Chinese, now British); Singapore; Punta Arenas, Chile; Aden-on-the-Red-Sea, and the Island of St. Thomas near Porto Rico.

The definition of a *free port* is: "A harbor where the ships of all nations may enter on paying a moderate toll and load and unload. The free ports constitute great depots where goods are stored without paying duty; these goods may be reshipped free of duty. The intention of having free ports is to stimulate and facilitate exchange and trade."

A *free city* is a city or zone where there is no import or export duty of any kind on goods bought, sold or consumed.

After Great Britain had taken Gibraltar from Spain, and that country would not deal with Gibraltar, the Sultan of Morocco forced the British government in 1705, to make a free port of Gibraltar by refusing to supply the food necessary to maintain the fortress, unless all import and export duty was taken off. The law of necessity caused the most powerful government in the world, more than two hundred years ago, to establish the first free zone on a little rock pile three miles long by one-half mile wide, controlling the entrance to the Mediterranean Sea. Here is lesson number 1, that should not be overlooked. Today there is a population of 27,000 at Gibraltar and over 4,000,000 ship tonnage

cleared yearly. As there is no duty, only a tax on tobacco and liquors, there are no statistics on the annual business.

Hamburg, Germany, is a notable example of the benefits of free exchange. Hamburg, through this wise policy, has become the greatest port in Europe. In 1888, 2500 acres of the harbor of this inland city were set apart as a *free harbor*, where ships could unload and load without custom duties. A gigantic system of docks, basins and quays was constructed at an initial cost of \$35,000,000, which at present day cost would be double. A portion of the old town containing 24,000 people was cleared to make room for this great project. Since that time Hamburg has grown enormously, reaching the third position as a port in the world, and today has over 1,000,000 population, being the second largest city in Germany. Without question the free zone of the harbor has had a great influence on the expansion of Hamburg as a port.

Copenhagen is the most important commercial town of Denmark. The trading facilities were greatly augmented in 1894 by making a portion of the harbor a free port. It has had a marked effect on the trade of Copenhagen and Denmark.

Hong Kong Island and City is a British possession acquired from China in 1841. Hong Kong is a free port and has no custom house, and its commercial activities are chiefly distributive for a large portion of the Far East, much as the Panama Canal Zone would become if made a free port. The only commodity that pays a duty at Hong Kong is opium. Owing to the fact that it is a free port official figures on its trade cannot be had, as in the case of ports that collect custom duties. I find a table showing the clearing of ships from Hong Kong: In 1880 the total tonnage was 8,359,994, which by 1911 had grown to a tonnage of 23,063,108—or nearly 200 per cent increase in thirty years.

Since Hong Kong was made a free port the population has increased from a few thousand to 456,739. From this port there is an immense exchange of commodities between Great Britain and her colonies, the ports of China, Japan and the United States. This fact, investigation shows, is

largely due to the advantages arising from the fact that the port of Hong Kong is free from custom duties to all nations. The island of Hong Kong is off the southeast coast of China, from which it is separated only by a narrow channel. It is 75 miles from Canton.

Admiral Chadwick, after my address before the Southern Commercial Congress, wrote me he heartily approved of the plan, and that we could build another Hong Kong on the Panama Canal Zone.

Singapore is another good example. It is the capital of the British Straits Settlements, and lies about midway between Hong Kong and Calcutta, India, and close to the Malay Archipelago. It is less than 100 miles north of the Equator, or 500 miles farther south than the Panama Canal Zone. It has good advantages of position, but above all, the policy of absolute free trade has made Singapore the center of a trans-shipping trade that is surpassed in the Orient only by Hong Kong and one or two of the great Chinese ports. The continuously rapid growth of Singapore and the Straits Settlements, of which it is the capital, has fully demonstrated the wisdom of this policy. In 1819 when the region was ceded to Great Britain that portion of the country had almost no business or population. At present Singapore's free exports and imports exceed \$500,000,000 annually, or about one-seventh of the total imports and exports of the whole United States. There are no custom duties except on opium. The population is about 275,000.

The number of vessels clearing in 1911 was 11,533, with a tonnage of 15,455,476. The commodities were distributed between India, China, Japan, England, the United States and other countries. Neither Hong Kong nor Singapore is as well situated for international trade or enjoys as good and healthful climate as the Panama Canal Zone. We have had 5000 white men, women and children on the Panama Canal Zone for the past seven years, and the death rate is less than that of any big American city.

Port Said is a case in point. The building of the Suez Canal created the city of Port Said on a sandpile at the entrance to the Canal from the Mediterranean Sea, with

fresh water 125 miles away. It is about the "livest wire" of any city in the world—at least that I have ever visited. It has over 100,000 population, and except for an Egyptian duty on many articles would be a great trading center for others than tourists.

Aden, situated on a strip of British territory in Arabia, on the Red Sea, where nothing grows and fresh water must be brought a long distance, has 50,000 population on account of its being a free port and city.

Punta Arenas, Chile, on the Straits of Magellan, the farthest south of any city in the world, is a free port and city, and has a population of 15,000. I was surprised at its importance and its fine stone buildings and good streets. The only local support of Punta Arenas is wool and sheep, mostly from the old Patagonia country of Argentina and the Island of Tierra del Fuego. Evidently its importance arises chiefly from its being a free city and free port.

The free exchange of commodities, on account of there being no duty, import or export, put the Island of St. Thomas, near Porto Rico, belonging to Denmark, on the map. It is a good example of what no export or import duty will do for a poor, out-of-the-way island. Nearly every excursion to the West Indies docks there to trade. Its one port carries the largest stock and does the greatest Panama hat trade in the world. Many vessels coal there. It has a great trade with all the West India Islands.

England has tried out the free port and free city idea thoroughly and this is what the *Encyclopedia Britannica* says:

In countries where custom duties are levied, if an extension of foreign trade is desired, special facilities must be granted for this purpose. In view of this a free zone sufficiently large for commercial purposes must be set aside. English colonial free ports, such as Hong Kong and Singapore, do not interfere with the regular home customs of India and China. These two free harbors have become great shipping ports and distributing centers. The policy which led to their establishment as free ports has greatly promoted British commercial interests.

The reason I have brought this question up is because I believe it the paramount one in the development of our

commercial relationship with South America, and that it will make the Panama Canal pay. If we do not act soon some other country owning one of the West India Islands, well located to trade with ships passing through the Canal, will take advantage of the situation. The Panama Republic intends now to benefit from our investment in the Canal by creating a free city bordering on the Zone.

HOW TO SECURE AND RETAIN SOUTH AMERICAN TRADE

1. Make the goods the market requires; manufacture, pack, measure and invoice everything the way the South American people want it.

2. Build a large commercial city on the Panama Canal Zone and get as many merchants as possible from all over South America to visit, locate branch houses and buy goods there. They will not come to the United States; they do not speak English—they do not feel at home, but will be at ease in a city in a Latin country where Spanish will prevail and every language in the world is spoken.

3. Establish agencies at the capital of each republic and its chief seaport towns. Put in charge young unmarried men from the United States who can speak, or would soon learn, Spanish, and who would marry into the good families of the country. Their future will be secure and your trade also. This plan is followed by all other countries.

4. Work at home in every honorable way to secure a merchant marine that flies the Stars and Stripes. How can you expect South America to think of trading with us when they never see a ship from this country? I covered 40,000 miles in visiting South America and never saw our flag on a North American merchant ship.

5. Price your goods in the money of the country in which you offer them so they will understand your price and what they are paying. Be prepared to give as good terms, credit and prices as your competitor from Europe. Take your pay in drafts on London, Paris or Berlin, and stand the loss in exchange into Uncle Sam's dollars, or better still, keep agitating the question of a chain of United States banks

through South America—for there are none—even if our Government finds it necessary to go into the banking business in foreign countries to extend and protect our trade, as well as visitors from the United States of North America. This is too large a question for me, but it is more necessary for us to have banks in South America than in China, as all our bills of exchange in the Far East naturally come through Europe, anyhow.

6. Establish confidence in our honesty and friendliness. The people of South America have been lied to about the United States by every European salesman for a century. They all know the story of the wooden nutmeg. They nearly all believe that the Monroe Doctrine simply means that we are keeping their country for ourselves until we are ready to take it over, etc. We tell them we do not want their country, and they say how about Porto Rico, Panama Canal Zone, and the Philippines?

7. Do business everlastingly on the square. They are not used to it, but will like it once they find it genuine.

8. Teach Spanish in all our schools. We must do business with South America, Central America, the West India Islands, and the Philippines, in Spanish.

With the highest appreciation of the honor you have conferred upon me, and hoping and believing in a greater nation and closer relationship with South and Central America through making a free port and city out of the Panama Canal Zone, I thank you.

SOME ECONOMIC FACTS AND CONCLUSIONS ABOUT SOUTH AMERICA

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In preparation for the course now being given by the Graduate School of Business Administration of Harvard University upon the Economic Resources and Commercial Organization of Latin America I was sent to South America in October, 1910, to travel, to observe, and to interview. The object was to see the people; to see natural economic conditions such as climate, resources, products; and human economic conditions such as transportation facilities, industrial development, currency, banking; to see the goods that were being handled—for example, through how many middlemen between the countries, how many within the country; and to see changes that might be evident as taking place in the organization of the foreign and domestic trade.

Evidently this was a considerable subject or group of subjects. Of necessity in the time allowed it could be covered only superficially. Avowedly it was so planned. Only the main points could be touched upon. An economic perspective of South America that was approximately correct was sought for. With the frame work of the course constructed on general lines that were according to fact, it was felt that many additional details could be supplied from the material continually increasing at home, from current reports and from correspondence.

The trip lasted a trifle over a year, and amounted to some 26,000 miles of travel in every country in South America, except Venezuela and the Guianas. The Andes were crossed six times in the countries of Colombia, Ecuador, Peru, Bolivia, and Chile. The River Plate was ascended as far as Asuncion, Paraguay. In Brazil, the coffee country, the coast cities and the mouth of the Amazon were covered.

The course on Latin America in the Graduate School of Business Administration of Harvard University, of which much the largest part is devoted to South America, has now been given for five years. Each year has witnessed changes and additions with the increase of reliable information about South America. This sixth year will witness further changes in the course, but no reason has been seen yet for changing certain fundamental economic concepts about South America.

In the time allotted for this paper I should like to give you what seem to me to be important economic facts about South America and to present some economic conclusions which can be fairly arrived at in the light of present knowledge. These facts may be classified as physical facts, facts about the population, facts about trade.

PHYSICAL FACTS

First I should like to call your attention to certain physical features of South America which I believe are fundamental to a correct estimate of its possibilities.

South America is a century older historically than North America. The Spanish and Portuguese had permanent settlements in South America before Captain John Smith was born, yet South America today, with an area equal to that of the United States and Canada combined, has a population scarcely one-half that of the United States alone. Why? There are, of course, weighty reasons, political and racial, and the important economic reason of geographic remoteness. But these are not all the reasons.

One of the most eminent authorities upon the geography of South America has said that Nature must have been in her kindest mood when she created North America, but not when she created South America. It was not until after my return from South America that I read this sentence and was struck by its pregnancy.

Climate

The map of the western hemisphere shows at once an important physical fact about South America. Both continents have a broad bulge in the north, tapering to a point in the south, *but* North America bulges in the temperate zone while South America bulges in the tropics. In other words, four-fifths of South America is in the tropics. Now the tropics do not necessarily connote snakes and jungles and disease. After seven months' residence in the tropical regions of the north, west, and east coasts of South America I can testify to the altitude and trade winds providing many habitable and even delightful spots within those tropics in Colombia, Ecuador, Peru, Northern Chile, Paraguay, and Brazil. Modern medical science and skill is removing the obstacle of tropical disease, but the fact still remains that there are tremendous areas in South America east of the Andes and north of the Pilcomayo where there is an average temperature of more than 70° F. and an average rainfall of more than 100 inches (40 is considerable)—regions where the tropical forest and undergrowth have to be combated continually with steel and acid spray.

Such conditions of climate and conditions that accompany such climate have not so far been hospitable for the Caucasian stock which up to this time has shown itself, in material affairs at least, the most progressive racial element of the globe. And it is significant to note in this connection that the country in South America which is most progressive and whose trade is over one third of that of the entire continent, although having scarcely a seventh of the population or area, is that country occupying the most of that narrow, tapering end of South America extending into the temperate zone—namely Argentina, where conditions are most like those of North America. Nature has not been kindly to South America on the whole, from our point of view, in the climate she has given her.

Transportation Conditions

In her gift of transportation conditions Nature has been much more kindly to North America than to South America. In North America the mountains on the whole have been low lying, and comparatively easy of passage, or, where high, have been reduced by long gently sloping plateaus, as from western Nebraska to the Rockies. South America, on the other hand, has a mountain system which hardly with design could have been made more of an obstacle to cheap transportation from coast to coast, or from any distance in the interior of the west coast to its ports. There is one stretch of the Andes that for over thirty degrees of latitude, or 2000 miles, has not a pass under 12,000 feet altitude, except that of the trans-Andean between Argentine and Chile, where a long tunnel has reduced the pass to under 11,000 feet altitude; but this railroad has fifteen miles of cog-rail, and is not a freight road but a mail, express and passenger road.

These western ranges rise abruptly from the coast or near the coast, with practically no alleviating slopes to lengthen out and lessen the steep climbs to the divide. Cog-roads, switch-backs, 3 and 4 per cent grades, are the rule on the west coast, with the exception of southern Chile. One range such as the Andes makes an ample transportation problem, but throughout most of their length they are a double range, and in Colombia they are triple, almost a quadruple range. These parallel ranges are such as frequently to double and triple the through transportation problem, almost as much as if one range were piled upon the other.

The Andes are the greatest single fact in South America. Not only do they form the transportation barrier that they do, but they have much to do with the climatic conditions. They are responsible for the west coast throughout Peru, and the northern third of Chile, some 1500 miles in extent, being gray and barren and dependent upon irrigation for the vegetation it has. The Andes, again, as they turn back the humid winds from their cold sides, are responsible for

much of the country on their eastern slopes and beyond, being drenched with excessive and torrential rains.

Even the much lesser ranges of the east coast have been placed with irritating perversity from an economic standpoint. In Brazil, for example, the mountains, although not averaging over 3000 feet in altitude, are peculiarly abrupt at the very edge of the coast. No railroad, English or Brazilian, has succeeded in getting an economical freight grade over them. As far north as Bahia they form a veritable screen, shutting off the interior and rendering much more difficult the opening up, for example, of the tremendous iron deposits of Minas Geraes. In Argentina again alone, do we find ideal conditions for land transportation corresponding to those of our own prairie states.

It is true that South America is gifted with a wonderful river system. Two of her rivers, the Amazon and the Plate, are greater than our own Mississippi, and navigable for a far greater length because of their slight gradient and the heavy rainfall at their headwaters. There is also a physical possibility of effective canalization to connect the Orinoco, Amazon, and Plate Systems, should such canalization be sufficiently desired. These rivers give access, however, to the tropical basin already noted. That same slight gradient indicates a basin still unsufficiently developed geologically so that a large portion of it is submerged or subject to submergence at times.

Lack of Coal

Perhaps where Nature has been least kindly of all to South America is in denying her adequate deposits of coal. Although coal is mined at various points it is of inferior quality, and South America today is essentially a coal importing country. Chile, the greatest coal producing country of South America, imports half of its supply from the British Isles and Australia. Cardiff coal, for the Bolivian railroads, is taken up over the Andes, reaching a cost of some \$40 per ton at its final destination. English coal at La Guaira, Venezuela, one of the nearest ports of South America, costs \$12 per ton on the dock. Coal has to be brought

over the seas for the iron deposits of Brazil. This, together with the coastal grades already referred to, have neutralized to a large degree the exceeding richness of that iron ore. Norfolk coal, from the United States, is beginning to enter Brazil and the Plate. South American railroads have spent thousands of dollars prospecting for coal of good quality and commercially accessible. Up to the present time their efforts have not been successful.

Water power there is on the west coast and especially in Brazil. The cities of Lima, Peru, and La Paz, Bolivia, Rio Janeiro, and São Paulo, Brazil, have their public service corporations supplied with hydro-electric power, and the end of the railroad descending into La Paz has been electrified. Just how much water power there is on the west coast, how constant it is, just how harmoniously it can be operated in competition with the use of water for irrigation, which is always a superior use, is decidedly conjectural.

In Brazil, in the drainage basin of the Paraná, there are undoubtedly hundreds of thousands of horsepower of water power. But the fundamental difficulty in the development and employment of water power is the necessity of a large fixed capital investment at the very beginning. It cannot have the gradual increase in capacity, horsepower by horsepower from ton by ton, as in the case of energy derived from coal. Consequently, a large market for the power from water power is needed at the outset. With few exceptions there are not markets in South America yet for large blocks of power. Petroleum produced in northern Peru and more recently in northern Argentina is increasing, but the position of importance of coal and petroleum in the import statistics of South American countries still remains most significant.

My strokes have been few and broad. Many exceptions in detail could be cited—Argentina has already been mentioned. In general, the strokes have been accurate, in portraying South America as not nearly the country naturally for economic development that North America is. In climate, in topography, in power supply, Nature has dealt much more kindly by us than by our southern sister.

FACTS ABOUT THE POPULATION

Let us now turn, and even more briefly, to a feature which happily is much more dynamic, much more subject to change than those physical features which we have just considered. I refer to the population. As you know, the population of South America is much mixed, being of three distinct racial stocks—the native stock, which here it will suffice to call Indians, although of many different strains and qualities; the European, originally from Spain and Portugal, and more recently from those same countries again, and from Italy and Germany as well; the negro, brought in by the Spanish and Portuguese as slaves, but now long since freed and mixing with the other racial stocks.

The proportions in which these stocks make up the population of the various countries vary greatly. In general, it will be found that in tropical, hot and humid lowlands (*tierras calientes*), the negro strain is prominent, and as the higher lands are reached the Indian and European strains increase, and in the temperate regions, to the south, the European decidedly predominates. In the northern part of the continent, Colombia, Venezuela, Ecuador, and northern Brazil, the mulatto (black and white), mestizo (red and white), and zambo (red and black), are much in evidence. In Peru and Bolivia probably 50 per cent of the population is pure Indian, and a large portion of the balance mestizo. In Argentina it is probable that over four-fifths, and very likely nine-tenths, are of pure European stock.

Much of the Indian population of South America is of a type far different from our own. Of a considerable degree of civilization, when the Spanish came, and of an industrious and faithful nature capable of development, the Indians of Peru, for example, have been called Peru's greatest single asset. The railroads, mines, and other industries could not be at present operated without them. In Bolivia and Chile, Indians of a sterner fibre were encountered by the Spanish, which has resulted in a virile mestizo population.

With this as a preliminary statement regarding the population in general it is possible to make some generalizations.

First, in regard to the social stratification. The observant traveler is struck by the lack of a middle class. There is an upper stratum of population amounting to approximately some 2 or 3 per cent of cultured people most delightful to meet, who have traveled much abroad and have usually been educated abroad, and then there is an abrupt descent to a class that is, on the whole, and according to our standards, backward and illiterate. This upper stratum of population is usually concentrated in the cities, and especially in the capitals, so that the cities and capitals of South America are by no means fair criteria of the countries of South America. For example, on the west coast the cities of Lima, La Paz, and Santiago would give one who had sojourned only in them an incorrect idea of the stage of development of those countries. There are shop windows and streets in Lima that will compare with those of any city in Europe or in the United States. The electric traction service between Lima and its port, Callao, is most modern and adequate. It is not until one has been into the back country of Peru and seen the high proportion of Indian population and the conditions in which that population is living that one can judge the development of Peru more fairly.

This state of the population has been reflected in political conditions. Governments have not been representative as we understand that word. This does not necessarily mean that the rules of these unrepresentative rulers have always been beneficial. In Chile it has long been said that a hundred families were the government, but, on the whole, Chile has progressed under this oligarchical sway. Though it may be true that through the government ownership of the railroads they have made themselves low freight rates, it is also true that for the rest of the population they have established low passenger rates, for example, of about 1 cent a mile. Another country could be cited by name, the government of which, it is pretty well known, is under the domination of one man, yet he is an able man, and under him the country is forging ahead. But, happily, these conditions are steadily changing for the better, as the character of the popula-

tion changes. In Argentina the rise of a middle class has been reflected in improvements in the laws and execution of the laws within the last two years. A large proportion of the population there has laid its economic foundation and is now demanding and exercising its proper share in the government. This same holds true, in some degree, in the countries of Chile, Uruguay, southern Brazil, and Peru—once more it will be noticed in that section of South America that lies in the temperate zone, or in a temperate climate.

Another singular characteristic of the population of South America is that despite its being a continent that is agricultural and extractive, and not industrial, the population is yet remarkably concentrated. For example, 20 per cent of the population of Argentina is in the city of Buenos Aires alone, and four other cities of Argentina contain 5 per cent more of the entire population, and yet Argentina is essentially a grazing and agricultural country. One-third of the population of Uruguay is in the city of Montivideo, and Uruguay is essentially a grazing and agricultural country. In Paraguay, 12 per cent of the population is in the city of Asuncion. In Chile, primarily a mining and agricultural country, five cities have over 20 per cent of the population. In the other countries of South America the concentration of population is less marked, but still considerably more than would be normally expected of an extractive and agricultural country. In the United States, much more of an industrial nation, but 26 per cent of the population is in cities of 50,000 and over. Furthermore, if a map of South America were constructed to show the location of the population, it would be found to be concentrated all around the border of the continent. If you can imagine a triangular shaped bowl, the location of the population would be represented by dots all around the rim. The great central basin is practically uninhabited. The cities of Iquitos and Manaos, upon the Amazon, might seem an exception, but they are really outposts for the collection of rubber.

It is no disrespect to any South American country, whom in some of their ways we could copy with profit, to say that

South America, as at present inhabited, is but a shell. There is no back country. One is struck by this in riding out from any large center of population. The inhabited area drops off suddenly unto the uninhabited.

FACTS ABOUT TRADE

In the light of the preceding physical facts and facts about the population of South America we now approach some surprising facts about its trade. South America, with about forty-eight or fifty millions of inhabitants, or about one-fifteenth that of Asia, has a much greater foreign trade than Asia. This is due to two reasons. In the first place, South America has certain products which the world wants very much, and in the supplying of which it has a monopoly to a greater or less degree. The most important products are coffee, rubber, nitrate, cocoa. And in the Plate region it has great natural advantages for producing cereals and meat, which the growing population of the world demands more and more. And in the second place, South America, in its present stage of development, does not provide for itself many of the products that it consumes, but exchanges its own products for them, which extends to the degree even of importing many food stuffs.

The total trade of South America amounts to about \$1,800,000,000, of which roughly \$950,000,000, or 53 per cent are exports, and \$850,000,000, or 47 per cent imports. In this foreign trade the following countries are interested: Great Britain leads with 27 per cent to 28 per cent; Germany is second with 18 per cent to 17 per cent; United States is third, and very close to second, with 17 per cent to 18 per cent (depending on its imports of coffee as to whether it will exceed Germany or not by one per cent or so); and France is fourth with 8 per cent to 9 per cent. These trade figures are for the continent as a whole. If we divide the continent into its natural geographic groups of the north coast, west coast, River Plate, and Brazil, we find the United States leading in the north coast trade, apparently because, of its geographic proximity, for as we descend to Ecua-

dor we find the United Kingdom rivaling it for first place, and in Peru the United States falls to second place, and in Chile and Argentina to third. Its leading position in Brazil is due to its large imports of rubber and coffee, rather than to its exports to Brazil. In Argentina, just the reverse is encountered, she buying much more from us than we from her, which constitutes something of a return cargo problem for our ships from her ports. Despite the idea that seems to be somewhat current, that the United States is not getting its fair share of South American trade, when one considers the heavy capital investment of other countries, and especially of the United Kingdom, and also considers the large foreign colonies and immigration, especially from Germany and Italy, and compares these facts with the United States capital invested and United States population resident in South America, one is inclined to wonder that our trade is as extensive as it is. In the last ten years our trade has increased greatly, but our percentage of the total trade has changed but little, although it has increased somewhat. That is to say, the proportional importance of our trade to South America, as compared with that of the United Kingdom or Germany or France, has changed but little. But, on the other hand, the importance of South America's trade to us has increased some fifty per cent. For example, taking three year averages, the importance of South America in our total foreign trade has risen from 6 per cent plus, in the last decade, to 9 per cent plus, and this in the face of our rapidly expanding foreign trade to all parts of the world. The importance, similarly, of South American trade to the United Kingdom is about 9 per cent, to Germany 8 per cent, and to France 6 per cent. And we are now seeking South American trade in earnest as part of our general producing pressure for a foreign outlet. Old traditional complaints of our poor packing and inferior salesmen are now nearly obsolete. Our credits are less arbitrary and the further extension of credit beyond the present general American policy of ninety days sight draft would be of extremely doubtful advisability. On the contrary, our example seems to be reacting somewhat in shortening credits in general. Our

advertising propaganda, in the language of the country, is found in most remote sections, illustrated in a way particularly pleasing to the people. German salesmen say that our advertising is far superior to theirs in South America. Our diplomatic and consular force in South America is, on the whole, without much doubt the best and is so regarded by many of the foreign colonies there. Cuba and Mexico have served as training schools for our salesmen both in the language and customs of the country. South American duties have been distinctly favorable to our products, since on machinery of all sorts, agricultural, mining, railroad, and auxiliary supplies, the tariff has either been free, or nominal. In such commodities as these lies one of our chief advantages in trade.

To increase our trade with South America it has been urged that there be established an American line of freight steamers. It has been said that thus only could proper service be supplied, and that the flag in itself would increase our commercial prestige. This is not the place for a lengthy argument upon shipping; all that can be said is that constant shippers to South America do not complain of inadequate service or of unreasonable rates. Again, the sentiment of the flag does not seem to enter into trade vitally since France, which is perhaps the country most highly regarded in sentiment by the South Americans, is distinctly fourth in trade and scarcely holding its own, although it has a subsidized French shipping line. Ocean freight service is one of the most flexible services in the world. Tramp steamers come from the other side of the world if there be sufficient demand for them. Under present conditions, both economic and legal, there is but little doubt that the United States cannot construct or operate shipping lines so cheaply as Great Britain or Germany. If they perform transportation service adequately for us, and more cheaply, it would seem that we may well continue that arrangement. It is beginning to look, however, as if very shortly we should be able to compete with them in both the construction and navigation of ocean-going boats, without the aid of any subvention.

As to the establishment of an American bank, it does look as if our trade had reached the point where an institution, owned and directed by Americans, to furnish exchange and credit information and to give other financial assistance to Americans, is warranted. Great Britain and Germany each have several banks in South America, and France, Italy, and Spain have each a bank there. So far as can be learned all these banks have paid well. It also appears as if the argument for greater prestige applied more forcibly to the establishment of a bank than to the subsidizing of a shipping line. Those trading with South America, however, say that the foreign banks, through their New York agencies, give adequate and reasonable banking service. One of our greatest banks has been looking into the subject carefully but what action it is to take toward establishing an American bank in South America is not yet publicly known.

It has seemed to me as if a much more influential step toward building up our trade in South America would be the establishment of an American department store in the city of Buenos Aires, at least, and probably better in the cities also of Rio Janeiro, Santiago, and Lima. In my own experience with retail stores in South America I was impressed by the lack of display given to American goods, even in articles in which our ascendancy was acknowledged, such as firearms and some kinds of hardware. This, I am inclined to think, is chiefly due to the stores being affiliated with other nationalities. The leading department store in South America is in Buenos Aires, and is owned and operated by French capital. The people of Buenos Aires are highly delighted with it, and it is an excellent store, but it does not compare with department stores in the United States of the same grade. It seems to me that an association of American exporters, actual and prospective, might well consider organizing a department store company for the purpose of displaying American goods in South America, and eventually for profit. Such a department store would display the goods in which we have an advantage and import other goods just the same as our department stores in this country import goods from Europe and elsewhere for their trade.

SOME CONCLUSIONS

Now, finally, if I may be permitted, I should like to draw some conclusions as to the economic and consequent trade possibilities of South America. The rôle of prophet has never been a safe one, nevertheless I am going to venture a few statements about the continent with the main basis of fact for my deductions.

As has been stated before, South America divides naturally into the geographic groups of the north coast, the Guianas, Venezuela, and Colombia; the west coast, Ecuador, Peru, Bolivia, and Chile; and the east coast, which subdivides into the River Plate (comprehending Uruguay, Paraguay, Argentina), and Brazil.

Taking first the north coast—in Colombia we have perhaps the most difficult transportation problem in any portion of South America because not only do we have the greatest number of parallel ranges of mountains therein, already referred to, but also the main arteries of water transportation, namely the Magdalena and the Cauca, are both obstructed, the Magdalena by a bar at its mouth, and the Cauca by unnavigable falls near its point of discharge into the Magdalena. This necessitates at least two rail transshipments of goods in the progress of their transportation up the Magdalena River to the most important cities of Colombia—Bogota and Medellin.

On the west coast, in Peru, we have a country which, although its total area is over 600,000 square miles, one-fifth of that of the United States, yet it is not a country so economically attractive as these figures would indicate. There again the parallel ranges of the Andes have shut off the interior from the coast and affected the climate radically. The coastal strip of Peru averages from 25 to 30 miles only in width, and is absolutely arid and barren, irrigation being required for any vegetable production. An American company, already with large investments in Peru, has studied the irrigation possibilities of this strip. It estimates that with 1,500,000 acres already under irrigation it is possible to increase that amount of irrigable area 1,000,000 acres, or to a total of 2,500,000 acres.

The intermountain region of Peru is between these two ranges of the Andes. Much of it is so high as to limit its agricultural productivity. Furthermore, its valleys are long and narrow, one of which, for example, is 300 miles long, by about one mile in width, presenting a most difficult transportation problem. From present knowledge it cannot be seen how this intermountain region can ever support more than local needs. Finally, there is a third and much greater portion of Peru, to the west of the Andes, the Montaña. Little is known about it except that it is a tropical forest with decidedly excessive rainfall, giving high humidity. By far its chief commercial product today is rubber. The position of wild rubber in the world's market is being more and more seriously threatened by the plantation rubber from the East—Ceylon and the Malayan Straits. Present figures seem to indicate clearly that the ordinary grades of rubber can be put on the market by the plantation growers of the East more cheaply than the wild rubber can be secured in Peru and Brazil.

Peru, at present, has a population of 4,000,000 (no one knows exactly, but this is probably the best estimate). Its present irrigated area is 1,500,000 acres, which can possibly be increased two-thirds. Peru has mineral possibilities (it already has one of the greatest copper mines of the world), but mineral production alone has never been the basis of great population. Take, for example, our western states. It was not until they became agricultural, through the employment of irrigation, that the population increased.

Peru has a favorable position, geographically, for trade with the other countries of the west coast, and its commerce with Chile and Ecuador is steadily increasing. This geographic advantage might aid its industrial development, but from the character of the population I should much sooner expect this development in Chile than in Peru. Furthermore, when one remembers how the products of our own country and Europe are being carried around the world, and over tariff barriers, one need not expect a decided industrial development, to the extent of competing in foreign trade, in either of these countries in the immediate future.

Without attaching any special significance to the figure itself, but merely to give you some approximate idea, I think now that I am an optimistic prophet for Peru to hazard the estimate of its present population of 4,000,000 sometime increasing to 10,000,000.

In Chile, which has almost twice the trade of all the other countries of the west coast put together, we have a country of some 3000 miles in length, averaging only 90 miles in width, and half of which width, nearly, is occupied by mountains. The upper third of Chile is as barren and arid as the west coast of Peru. The real heart of Chile is in the central valley, south of Santiago, which has a total area of only about 18,000 square miles. In this upper third of Chile, as barren as it is, has lain the greatest source of its revenue and prosperity—namely, the deposits of nitrate, which have been the basis of the saltpeter supply for the use of that article in a score of manufactured products the world over. This nitrate is now in danger of competition from artificial nitrate to a commercial degree. It is already being produced in experimental quantities.

Chile has today barely 3,000,000 population. Its total population has increased but little, although its cities have increased somewhat. The copper possibilities of Chile have been increased by the construction of the Longitudinal Rail Road to the north, lessening the cost of transportation. The 18,000 square miles of cultivated land, the nitrate beds—threatened with possible competition—the copper mines, a greater initiative on the part of the population than that of the other countries of the west coast neutralized somewhat by greater geographic remoteness, constitute the fundamental basis of Chile's future, as at present seen. If Chile's 3,000,000 of population increase to 6,000,000 Chile is to be congratulated.

Bolivia, the greatest mineral country in South America, has a transportation problem on every side. The haul from the Pacific coast, though short, is over passes of 12,000 feet altitude. A third of the area of Bolivia is from 10,000 to 12,000 feet altitude. In the east, it has much the same tropical problem as Peru, and a long haul, although much

easier, by water, to the Atlantic. Bolivia's present population is 2,000,000.

The economic disadvantages of these aforementioned groups are reflected, of course, in the trade figures. For example, the total trade of the north coast is only a trifle over 4 per cent of that of the total trade of the continent, and the total trade of the west coast is 20 per cent of the total trade of the continent, of which Chile, with its nitrate, has 13.5 per cent.

Now it is the west coast of South America that will be affected by the Panama Canal. But for reasons of its geographic relations to Europe and to the United States, and the routes of trade, and expense of tolls, it is extremely doubtful if the west coast, south of Valparaiso, will be affected in any considerable direct way by the Panama Canal. Possibly a present population of 10,000,000 on the west coast, all located north of the agricultural section of Chile, will be affected by the Canal.

Coming to the east coast a vastly different situation presents itself. In Argentina we have easily the country of greatest possibilities in South America. It already supplies over 36 per cent of the foreign trade of South America, although having but about 15 per cent of the area and 14.5 per cent of the population. Argentina has the products which the world needs, and must have increasingly as population increases—namely food stuffs. We are practically ceasing already to export them. Argentina has just begun making meat shipments to us. Land values are steadily rising in the Plate region. But even in Argentina there are facts to be considered.

In Patagonia, south of the Rio Negro, the productive quality of the land as evidenced in the support of sheep, is one to six, when compared with the land of the province of Buenos Aires, which is certainly one of the richest, if not the richest area of land of the same extent in the world. In the central part of Argentina the question of insufficient rainfall is serious. At the western boundary of Argentina the rainfall diminishes to 4 inches, but there irrigation is possible, and is in effect. In the north of Argentina there

is much saline and alkaline land and swamp land. The amount of fertile land in Argentina is not limitless, and is probably overestimated. The possibilities of dry farming are not exhausted, by any means, but it can be said that the Argentine government regards as a serious problem the great areas of semi-arid land between San Luis and Mendoza. A survey of the physical resources of Argentina recently completed estimates that two-fifths of its area is arable land. Once more, still mindful of the precarious footing of a prophet, it can be ventured that an estimate of 30,000,000 as a possibility for the present 7,000,000 of population of Argentina need not be regarded as pessimistic.

In Brazil, a country whose area is nearly equal to our own excluding Alaska, we have much more of an unknown quantity. Transportation conditions and labor conditions in Brazil are indeed serious. The labor situation it is being sought to remedy by immigration, and by industrial education, and general bettering of conditions. No one really knows much about Brazil. It has a population at present of about 21,000,000 probably, three times as great as Argentina, but with 5 per cent less trade. Ninety per cent of Brazil and over is in the tropics. Its position in trade is due chiefly to its products—rubber, coffee, and cocoa. In coffee its position seems secure, its proportion to the world's supply is steadily increasing and it now furnishes nearly three-fourths of it. In rubber exactly the reverse has taken place—its proportion to the world's supply falling to about one-half at present, and still decreasing, and it is perfectly true to say that Brazilian rubber interests are seriously alarmed over the future of their rubber. Experimentation in plantation rubber is being conducted, and labor and transportation conditions are being bettered in an attempt to hold its position in the world's rubber market.

I should dislike to be considered too conservative about South America. What I have sought is to leave with you two ideas, one general, the other specific. One an economic perspective of South America that I believe to be correct, and the other a concrete suggestion for our South American trade to establish an American department store in at least

one city in South America, and preferably in four cities—as a potent stimulator of trade.

I firmly believe that despite the general natural inferiority of South America to North America, it will progress more in the next fifty years than it has in the last four hundred. Its time has come. Political stability is on the increase all over South America, and public financial responsibility of the southern countries is practically assured. Isolated, small, private capital investment is not yet recommended, however. Large scale, corporate investment is much more advisable. To Americans seeking their fortune it may be said that the men chiefly desired at present are those technically trained in the various branches of engineering—civil, electrical, and mechanical. And in Argentina at least our agriculturists are looked upon most favorably. To the American in general seeking his fortune I am confident that the opportunities are better now, and for some time to come, in the United States and Canada, and that in the long run the comforts of life—what the economist would call “consumer’s surplus”—will be found greater in the United States and Canada.

The English and especially the Germans, it is true, are going to South America, but remember that Germany, in an area no larger than New England, New York, and Pennsylvania, is supporting a population of over 65,000,000, or three times the population that those states are supporting and we consider them crowded. Conditions due to dense population similar to those of Germany prevail in England.

The young American, with a love for travel and adventure, the American with technical training, the American engaged in foreign trade, or seeking to engage in foreign trade, may be advised to go, if he is assured of a definite opening. Other Americans before going may well consider.

THE PROBABLE EFFECT OF THE OPENING OF THE PANAMA CANAL ON OUR ECONOMIC RELATIONS WITH THE PEOPLE OF THE WEST COAST OF SOUTH AMERICA

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With the actual opening of the Panama Canal so near at hand, it may seem to some that the consideration of this subject had better be postponed for a decade or so until the actual effect rather than the probable effect can be the topic for discussion. To such minds the proper time for considering this subject has long since passed. It might have been worth discussing when the question as to the advisability of our digging the canal was in the air, but at present, they say, it is simply a waste of time.

To this it may be replied that the American people dug the Panama Canal for military expediency and because it suited them to do so, chiefly to knit our own country closer together, and without regard to its good or bad effects on the west coast of South America. Consequently there was no particular object in discussing this subject in connection with the advisability of digging the canal. Furthermore, while there is no question that a study of the actual effect of the canal on the west coast will prove to be both interesting and instructive if undertaken during the course of the next decade, there are also good reasons why it is expedient to consider this subject now, even while we are on the threshold of the new era.

The chief of these reasons is the keen optimism which prevails in some circles in the United States and to a greater extent on the West Coast, that the opening of the canal is going to usher in an era of great prosperity; is in fact, going to effect a veritable economic revolution. If this is true, we must prepare for it; if not, we must be on our guard against it. In either case the very existence of this optimism is a sufficient cause

for the most careful consideration of the possibilities. Forewarned is forearmed. No man starteth to build a house without counting the cost thereof, lest when his work is but half completed he find that he cannot continue, and his half-built edifice remaineth as evidence of his folly. In other words, it is the policy of wisdom both for us and for South America to look ahead as far and as carefully as possible.

Now that we have mentioned this optimism, it may as well be admitted in the beginning that the probable effects due to this very optimism are among the most difficult things which we have to estimate. Psychology is, I suppose, a science, although some people still classify it under philosophy, and regard it as extremely empirical. The day may come when the masters of psychology will be able to give us as accurate a prediction regarding the probable force of any given set of beliefs or opinions as the economic geologists give today in regard to the probable value of any given mineral deposit. No one denies that geology is a science, even though we all know that the reports of economic geologists with regard to the probable success of a mine are not always infallible!

But at present, psychologists have not got to that point where they can even approximate the positive effects of widely disseminated beliefs. Consequently, it is extremely difficult, if not absolutely impossible, to say to how great an extent the psychological side of the opening of the Panama Canal is going to affect our trade with the west coast and our relations with the people of Ecuador, Peru and Chile. Yet this part of the problem cannot be lightly dismissed, for it appears to be one of considerable magnitude.

Nearly every intelligent Peruvian and Ecuadorian with whom one talks believes firmly and enthusiastically that, with the opening of the Panama Canal, his country is going to start out on an era of great commercial prosperity. To his sensitive and imaginative mind, the defenses to a rich and great city are about to be pierced. The opening of the waterway is to him the unlocking of the gates permitting him to enter and enjoy the results of a long and arduous siege. With the inrush of the waters into the canal will come an inrush of

capital, immigration and trade, which will raise his country out of its present despondent condition and place it in the forefront of the world's progress. Veritably it is a miracle which is about to happen.

The Chilian is somewhat less optimistic. He is sure the the canal will benefit Chile, but just how much is another question. He is keenly conscious of the fact that heretofore Chile has been nearer Europe on the ocean waterway than any other west coast country, while the opening of the canal will reverse this position and make Chile the farthest away. At the same time, the Chilian is doing what he can to take advantage of any new opportunities by actively building new docks and new railroads. A large section of the longitudinal railway which parallels the coast has recently been completed, and plans are already being considered for large extensions. By reason of its wealth of nitrates Chile is prosperous. Export duties on this valuable product give her an abundant revenue. Her climate is more temperate; what agricultural land she has is more available. The Indian stock in the south of Chile is more vigorous than that of her northern neighbors.

Owing to adverse economic conditions the ardent optimism of the Peruvians and Ecuadorians has not enabled them to do as much as they would like in preparation for the opening of the canal. Furthermore, there is the well-known tendency which prevails in so many tropical countries of believing that things are going to happen without actually doing very much to make them happen. Consequently, much as I feel that the west coast people are going to be disappointed in the extent of the prosperity which is about to come to their shores, I have not found any evidence to show that this disappointment, if it comes, will mean great financial loss, accompanied by the hardships incident to the collapse of a boom, unless this boom is engineered by outside capital. Even in that case, the hardest blow will fall on the investor, and there are relatively few capitalists on the west coast.

The psychologic effect on the minds and actions of the business men of the United States is far more difficult to estimate,

and is likely to be followed by graver consequences. If a considerable number of American manufacturers and capitalists get carried away with the idea that the opening of the Panama Canal means a great boom on the west coast of South America, if they believe that the completion of that waterway is of equal significance with the completion of the first transcontinental railway across the United States, or with one of the great industrial discoveries such as the practical application of steam to navigation or the replacement of iron for wood in the construction of ocean vessels, if they catch any part of the tremendous optimism and enthusiasm of the average Peruvian, for instance, something very serious is going to happen. American energy and initiative, backed by American capital, will be directed to new projects, and enterprises involving great risks will be undertaken.

It is possible to conceive of a great increase in our trade with the west coast of South America, due solely to the fact that American manufacturers believe that the opening of the canal has opened to them a new market, and made it possible for them to secure trade in regions where they have supposed this was heretofore impossible. It is entirely within the bounds of possibility that American capitalists, looking for larger returns on their investments, and believing that the opening of the Panama Canal is equivalent to opening the doors of tremendous opportunity on the west coast, will place large sums of money in enterprises which they would not otherwise have thought of considering.

We have no means of estimating precisely the extent of this optimism in this country. It varies in different sections and varies largely with the temperament of the people with whom one talks. If we could only tell exactly the force of it, we should be able to predict with reasonable accuracy the size of the approaching boom.

Before any such boom gets started it behooves us to observe as accurately as possible the foundation on which it will have to rest. If the economic and geographical foundations exist for such an extension of trade and capital as would follow any such optimism on our part as exists on the west coast, then the future has indeed in store for us many won-

derfully attractive features. If on the other hand, sufficiently broad bases do not exist for the building up of such an edifice as we have just contemplated, a crash is bound to follow, and a crash that will cause suffering both here and abroad in direct proportion to the superlative or unwarranted enthusiasm which has been aroused by the psychology of the opening of the canal.

In other words, if our examination shows this foundation to be broad, solid and stationary, the sooner the average American business man makes up his mind to join in the movement the greater will be his gain. If, on the other hand, we come to the conviction that the foundations are narrow and uncertain, the more cautious the American manufacturer and capitalist are, the less they will lose in time and money, and the less the west coast will lose in reputation and good prospects.

The probable effects of the opening of the Canal on our relations to the west coast depend, therefore, not only on the amount of enthusiasm that is aroused in the United States, and on the west coast; but also, in the long run, on the actual economic and geographical conditions on that coast. Having considered the psychological side, let us now turn to the geographical and ethnological.

In the first place let me ask you to look at a physiographic map of South America. The first thing that will strike your attention is that the great highlands of South America run continuously up and down the west coast within a few miles of the seaboard. On the east coast are a number of high mountains, but on the west coast there is a long section which you will see is over 16,000 feet above sea level, and a still longer section which continues for thousands of miles without a break at an elevation of over 10,000 feet.

It looks as though nature had built a bulwark, an enormous Chinese wall, to protect South America from approach on the west. This enormous mountain barrier makes the little Gateway at Panama seem very futile so far as the great bulk of the South American continent is concerned. Here is a barrier several thousand miles long, and varying in height from 8000 to 20,000 feet. Scarcely ever is it less than 10,000

feet above sea level. It is not fair to say that the opening of the Canal will not affect the height of this mountain wall, for anything which cheapens transportation makes it easier to bring in the steel rails and locomotives which can climb the Andes and reach the central and eastern parts of South America. At the same time, it must not be forgotten that, owing to the lack of any such barrier on the east coast, and owing to the existence there of navigable rivers like the Amazon, the Madeira, and the Rio de la Plata, the valuable central and eastern plains of South America are much more accessible from the Atlantic than they will ever be from the Pacific coast.

Speaking of rivers you will observe that there are no navigable rivers on the west coast. Speaking of plains, it is perfectly evident that the great plains where agriculture and animal industries can be carried on to any great extent, are not on the west coast, but on the east, and are tapped by navigable rivers in a country where railroads can be built easily and cheaply, instead of with the maximum both of difficulty and expense as on the west coast.

If the day ever comes when aeroplanes are relatively as safe and as cheap as bicycles, then life in the Andes will see a great revolution. But the opening of the Panama Canal has relatively little to do with the maintenance cost of Andean transportation. Even those railroads which are already in existence and are in the best locations for securing trade and building up local industries, find it excessively difficult to pay expenses. Eliminate all the differences in cost of building these railroads between what they actually cost and what it would cost to construct them after the opening of the Panama Canal, and even on that basis of capitalization, they could only with the greatest difficulty pay a very moderate interest on the investment.

When one looks at the physical character of South America, it is easy to understand why this is so. Before a railroad can get more than 100 miles into the interior, it must climb up into the sky, two or three miles. Take for instance the Oroya Railroad which runs from Lima, the capital of Peru, into its richest mining district. In the first 75 miles it has to

climb up over 15,000 feet. This means enormous expense of maintenance. Even if the railroad ran through a rich and rapidly developing country, it would have serious financial problems to face. As it is, its difficulties are almost insuperable. And when one gets up on top of the plateau, what then? Life at great altitudes is anything but pleasant. The possibilities are extremely limited. There are mines and there are great mineral deposits. Some parts of them have been exploited by wealthy and enthusiastic capitalists; very few have paid dividends. It is a grave question whether the opening of the Panama Canal will aid much to alter the conditions of transportation, the difficulties of securing labor, and the unpleasantness of conducting mines at an elevation of over 13,000 feet above sea level.

There is no place in the world where transportation problems are more difficult than on the west coast of South America. The rails in southern Peru have to cross a pass at an elevation of 14,666 feet above sea level. The new railroad in northern Chile has a pass nearly 14,000 feet high, and the next railroad that crosses the Andes to the great silver mines and tin deposits of southern Bolivia crosses at an elevation of 14,500 feet. The transcontinental line goes through a tunnel at an elevation of over 10,000 feet. This great mountain chain of the Andes, translated into terms of economic efficiency, means enormous costs of transportation, terrific difficulties in building railroads, canyons from 4000 to 10,000 feet deep separating sparsely populated mountain uplands, where it is not easy to believe that there is enough economic basis for the construction of the extremely costly railroads which would have to be built to connect them.

We have heard from some of our friends in Washington that the opening of the Panama Canal is going to open a tremendous opportunity to commerce and trade in this country on the west coast of South America. I am quite willing to admit that if the geographical conditions were turned about, the opening of the Panama Canal would indeed be the means of a vast opportunity in South America for the commerce and trade of this country.

Just imagine for a moment what the opening of the Pan-

ama Canal would mean if the east coast of South America were fringed by a mountain barrier 10,000 feet high and the west coast had navigable rivers and enormous plains. It almost paralyzes the imagination to attempt to estimate the enormous development which would speedily follow the shortening of distances. Instead of this being the case, the reverse is true, and the great bulk of South America will not be one day nearer than it ever has been, and the worst of it is that this bulk is not only larger in area, but far more important economically. The possibilities for the future development of Brazil and Argentina are so great that it is impossible to estimate them, but such remarks, unfortunately, cannot apply to the west coast where the hand of Nature has not been any too kind.

Not only did nature build a stone wall to shut off the west coast from participating in the normal development of the South American continent, but she proceeded to build a desert wall as well. There are more than 2000 miles of the west coast that do not get more than 10 inches of rain a year. Here, again, it would seem as though nature had given an extraordinarily heavy handicap to the Pacific side of South America.

Not content with raising a huge mountain barrier, she has put in a barrier of desert for nearly 2000 miles, and as though adding insult to injury, at the two extremities of the west coast, where the desert does not exist, Nature goes to the other extreme and gives too much rain. As a result, the western edge of the Republic of Colombia is a dense tropical jungle, fever stricken and extremely unhealthy. The southern coast of Chile, where there is abundant rain, is in a cold region, very much like Norway. The temperate latitudes are largely desert. Incidentally, one observes by looking at a rainfall map of South America that those regions which are properly watered, having between 40 and 80 inches a year, are almost entirely in Argentina, Uruguay, Paraguay, Brazil, and Venezuela. In other words, the east coast, besides having the advantage in navigable streams and plains, has a great advantage in rainfall. There seems to be very little comfort for those who are looking for a geographically solid

basis for the economic development of the west coast, even after the Panama Canal is opened. In the North we have tropical jungles and in the south cold araucaria. The central portion is desert and a great deal of it is Alpine.

It may be interesting to note in passing that the causes of this curious distribution of rainfall are threefold: the height of the Andes, the direction of the Humboldt current, and the direction of the prevailing winds across the continent of South America. These winds coming from the Atlantic, laden with moisture, cause great rainfall in the Amazon Valley and on the eastern side of the mountains, and leave no moisture to be precipitated on the west coast. The Humboldt current, cooling the entire coast as far north as Ecuador, causes some mist and rain to be deposited at sea and along the fringing foothills during some part of the year, but prevents the sunburned coastal strip from securing even that little rain that it might expect in occasional westerlies. One of the surprising things some people find when they go down the west coast is that the water is too cold to permit them the luxury of tropical sea baths, as in Hawaii.

In view of all this, conditions are most undesirable for anything like ranching or agriculture on the west coast, whereas on the east coast, Nature, in addition to giving them extremely fertile plains and a fine agricultural country, has given them the best rainfall that one could wish for, for the purposes of agriculture and animal industries.

Now, keeping clearly in mind the actual geographical handicaps of the west coast, the long desert on the seaboard, the high dry plateau back of it, and the lofty chain of mountains rendering transportation extremely difficult and excessively expensive, let us attempt to estimate just what economic basis the future development of the west coast has to depend upon.

First and foremost comes mineral wealth. If there is enough mineral wealth it can overcome untold difficulties of transportation. It does not need rainfall or vegetation; it merely requires a market. Mineral wealth is the strong point of the west coast. The very aridity of the northern Chilean desert is the cause of Chile's great wealth of nitrates. The

exploitation of the nitrate fields by English and other foreign capitalists, and by the Chilian capitalists themselves, has gone on apace during the past twenty-five years. The necessary railroads and port works have been constructed, labor has been introduced, and refining plants have been built. The only clouds on the horizon, are, first, the fact that there must be a definite limit to the amount of nitrate which can be profitably extracted, and, second, the recent successful extraction, in Norway, of nitrates from the nitrogen in the atmosphere.

The length of the ocean voyage from the nitrate fields to the agricultural fields of Germany, one of the best customers for Chilian nitrates, will be shortened about 3000 miles by the opening of the Canal. This will cheapen the cost of nitrate in Germany and thereby benefit the European farmer, *if*, as seems likely, the canal tolls do not offset this to a great extent. Similarly, it ought to cheapen the cost of fertilizers to our western farmers, who will undoubtedly import nitrate through the port of New Orleans. Eventually, it seems as though this might be of great benefit to agriculture in the United States, and, by increasing the demand, of considerable benefit to the Chilians. The outlook here is decidedly promising. The question as to the limits of production of the somewhat restricted Chilian nitrate field need not concern us here at this time, for there seems to be plenty of nitrate for at least fifty or one hundred years to come.

Unquestionably, the agriculturists of the Mississippi Valley ought to be prepared to take advantage of the cheapening of the cost of nitrates which must follow the opening of the Canal. It is common knowledge that we in this country lag far behind Europe in our knowledge of intensive cultivation and scientific agriculture. With our broad and fertile prairies, we have not had to practice such careful husbandry as the European farmers. This is one of the causes of the high cost of living. There is no doubt that the time is coming when we shall learn the advantage of making our soil produce as much as it possibly can.

The sugar planters of Louisiana, who believe that they face ruin in the prospect of free sugar, have yet to test the

result of using Chilian nitrates. It may be that with the cheapening of this product in the port of New Orleans, it will be possible for the Louisiana planter so to increase the yield of his fields that he will be better off than in the old days of protected sugar. It is well known that the most profitable sugar plantations on the Hawaiian Islands have long used scientifically made fertilizers in keeping the production of their sugar-cane fields up to the maximum. Even in my boyhood I remember sailing-vessels coming to Honolulu laden with Chilian nitrates.

Cargoes, like nitrates, which bulk large and have relatively small value, cannot pay heavy transportation charges. It certainly would not have paid to have carried them across the Isthmus of Panama by rail for the sake of getting them quickly to New Orleans. A tramp steamer, with a load of Chilian nitrate, bound for Iquique to New Orleans, will find its journey shortened by 6000 miles, saving 50 cents to \$1 per ton. Here in this nitrate business is something definite and tangible, a solid basis for future growth, and a cause of increased prosperity both to Chile and to the Mississippi Valley, if not also to the states of the Atlantic seaboard.

The guano of the Peruvian islands comes under the same head. The chief difficulty here is that, owing to the very limited quantity of this product and the need for it in Peruvian agriculture, it does not seem likely to prove a large factor in the future development. Only recently an executive order has stopped the collection of guano on those islands from which the Peruvian Corporation secured their most valuable product and one of the chief sources of their none-too-large profits.

Next to nitrates, probably comes copper. The world-wide increase in the use of electricity seems to be creating a steadily increasing market for this metal. There are enormous copper deposits in Peru and Chile. Probably the best known in this country are the mines of Cerro de Pasco and of the Braden Copper Company. Stories of extraordinary new finds are continually coming in; contradictory reports concerning the future development of very extensive projects, one of them necessitating the building of a \$5,000,000 rail-

way in order to connect one of these copper deposits with the seacoast, are current in the South American journals. With the shortened water transportation, undoubtedly an increased amount of copper will be brought from the west coast to the United States. As long as copper is as valuable as it is at present, about \$330 a ton, it is worth while to pay the high charges of the Panama Railroad. Whether the increased output of copper, which will be encouraged by the greater ease of transport, will seriously affect the price in this country is a matter of dispute. On the other hand, there is no doubt that the money spent in west coast mines for wages will increase the purchasing power of the people of the west coast.

Next to copper in importance from the mineral standpoint comes the tin of Bolivia, which must find its outlet either through the ports of the west coast or by the railways of Argentina. It was the original intention of both the Argentine and Bolivian governments to build a railway south from Potosí, so that this most important tin-producing region would find its outlet on the Rio de Plata rather than on the Pacific Ocean. But the actual railroad which has been constructed from Oruro to Potosí makes it more probable that this tin will come out by way of Antofagasta. Here again is the basis for increased prosperity in Bolivia and for cheaper tin for American manufacturers. Whether it will work out that way or not remains to be seen.

With regard to the more precious metals, such as gold, silver, and vanadium, they are of such great value in proportion to their bulk that it is doubtful whether the opening of the Panama Canal will seriously affect their production, even though it will make it a little cheaper for mines to secure heavy machinery. The chief cost of transporting this machinery in the past, however, has not been the long ocean voyage, but the difficulty of getting it ashore on a coast where good ports are extremely scarce, and the enormous cost of transporting it over the mountains to the mines where it is needed.

I remember visiting a well-known gold mine in southern Peru in 1911, where a quartz-crushing plant was being in-

stalled. We were informed by the manager that the cost of bringing some of the pieces of the machinery over the two days of pack-mule trail was almost equal to the value of the mules. In other words, the mule contractor found that after a mule had made one journey with such a heavy piece of machinery it was good for nothing thereafter. It seems to me highly problematical whether the cheapening of ocean freights will cause any great increase in the amount of railway building, and after all the greatest barrier in the way of developing a mountainous mineral region is the cost of transportation and the maintenance of roads.

Finally, there is the question of petroleum. Within the past few years profitable oil wells have been developed on the coast of northern Peru. Recently word has come of the intention of British capitalists to invest a large amount of money in exploiting oil fields in Ecuador and Colombia. The opening of the Canal will enable the west coast oil to find a nearer market.

The minute one leaves the question of mineral resources and begins to take up the question of agriculture, it can readily be imagined that this is a subject which has very decided limitations. To be sure, there are considerable areas in Peru, at present desert, which might be irrigated. Last winter when I was in Lima I was told that there were two representatives of foreign capitalists then in Lima, attempting to secure concessions which would make it worth while to invest from \$5,000,000 to \$10,000,000 in irrigation enterprises. Considered with their relative bearing on the great question of any extraordinary era of commercial prosperity, such enterprises would only be interesting as straws to show which way the wind was blowing. The fact remains that the capital was willing to come if it could get reasonably favorable consideration. I do not speak from personal knowledge, but I have been told on what I believe to be good authority, that both enterprises fell through because of local conditions which would not be affected by the opening of the Panama Canal.

It is easy for the enthusiastic Latin-American to let his imagination get the best of him and to overestimate the

value of the great natural resources of his country. It is difficult for him to realize the enormous human handicaps that exist between the consummation of his wishes and actual conditions. He is not to be blamed for this; it is, on the contrary, a praiseworthy quality. People inhabiting a region where Nature has placed great obstacles in the way of human progress must necessarily be optimistic or they will be crushed by pessimism. At the same time, it behooves the investigator to take careful account of this optimism, which, by raising too many artificial obstacles, frequently gets in the way of the investment of capital. Not only optimism, but pride of race, and justifiable self-respect, frequently obstruct the course of those who would secure profitable concessions.

It is true that a certain amount of sugar and cotton can be raised on the Peruvian coast. The land available for such purposes is not unlimited and there are, furthermore, serious handicaps in the way of great progress along these lines. Both water and labor are scarce. At the same time, and within certain definite restrictions, the amount of machinery which could profitably be sold to sugar and cotton planters in Peru is undoubtedly capable of increase. Cheaper freights, more speedy delivery, and lack of the necessity of transshipment at Panama ought to benefit both the Peruvian planters and American manufacturers of machinery. To how great an extent this benefit is capable of enlargement, time alone can tell. Those who are interested will have to make a special study of this subject.

From this review of economic resources it is readily seen that while the future of the west coast has nothing in store at all comparable in extent to the future of the east coast, there are great possibilities from the tremendous deposits of copper, nitrates, and tin, and the possible extent of oil fields. The development of these mineral industries means the necessity of building railroads. The influx of capital which must follow this will slowly increase the purchasing power of the people, and thereby increase the demand for American manufactured products.

This now brings us to the second aspect of our problem, namely, the ethnographic or racial side. Who are the people

that form the great bulk of the market of the west coast? The majority of them are non-Spanish-speaking Indians. The people whom you meet in the cities, as you travel up and down the coast, are, most of them, Spanish-speaking descendants of the early Spanish conquerors and former Spanish colonists. But when you get in to the back country you find hundreds of thousands of civilized Indians who do not use the Spanish language. These people are extremely conservative. They have very few wants, and they do not form an active purchasing class. Their wants have got to be carefully studied by the American exporter, and in particular the wants which they are going to develop during the next generation. Ecuador, Peru, and Bolivia are governed by Spanish-speaking people, and if you visit the cities of Guayaquil, Lima, Valparaiso, and Iquique, or even interior cities like Arequipa and Santiago, the people whom you meet, and most of the people whom you see, speak Spanish. But the great mass of the population of the Andes, both north and south, is still primitive Indian, speaking Quichua and Aymará.

The Indian problem is a very serious thing; it is in fact the most serious thing that confronts the governments of Peru and Bolivia today. In eastern Peru the rich man, the well-to-do man, the man of culture and refinement, almost without exception gets his money from land on which he has planted either coca, the source of cocaine, or sugar cane, from which he gets sugar to a certain extent, but to a far larger extent aguardiente or "fire-water."

The cost of transporting coca leaves or "fire-water" bears some fair proportion to the value of the product in a land of mule transportation. Consequently it pays to raise and develop these crops, but unfortunately it results in an entire economic system based on the production and consumption of two deleterious things, cocaine and fire-water, and the chief consumers are the Indian laborers, the majority of the people of the Andes, whose efficiency is thereby steadily diminished. It is a vicious circle and one of the greatest problems that confronts those countries. Personally, it seems to me possible to establish in these interior valleys planta-

tions of cotton, and to utilize the tremendous resources of power from the streams, and so to build up a circle which will provide to the Indians something besides two things that damage them and take away all ambition and progress.

Furthermore, as I have previously said, the Indians are extremely conservative; their habits are very difficult to change. You may show them the best form of the most efficient spade to work with—they prefer the old kind. You may provide them with steel plows, but unless you make them use them, they will continue to use the pointed stick. Consequently, there is a difficult problem to meet there, an ethnological problem that demands earnest attention and first-hand study. The Indians are not ready for a boom.

Finally, let me recapitulate:

Keen optimism prevails in some circles in the United States and, to a greater extent, on the west coast, as to the probable results of the opening of the Panama Canal. Many people believe that a veritable economic revolution is going to set in and that the west coast is on the verge of an era of great prosperity.

It is difficult to estimate exactly the psychological results of the opening of the Panama Canal. At the same time, there is no question that the great optimism which prevails will cause many business ventures to be undertaken. Some of these might well be done now, but actually they will not be begun until after the opening of the Panama Canal, because many business men firmly believe that the opening of the Canal means the opening of very great opportunities. The inhabitants of the west coast are likely to be disappointed in the extent of the prosperity which is about to come to their shores. At the same time, their ardent optimism is likely to arouse them to greater economic efforts. The psychological effect on the business men of the United States is likely to lead them to believe that the opening of the Canal will open to them a new market and will make it possible for them to secure trade in regions heretofore inaccessible. If the economic and geographic foundations exist for such an extension of trade as will follow great optimism on our part, then the future has in store for us many wonderfully attractive fea-

tures. If, on the other hand, sufficient broad bases do not exist, a crash is bound to follow unless we have foreseen the danger and avoided going further than we are warranted in doing.

The geographic bases of the future expansion of the west coast may best be seen by a careful examination of the physiographic, rainfall, and vegetation maps of South America. These show that the west coast is a narrow strip bounded by lofty mountains and the ocean; that the larger part is not provided with adequate rainfall, but is really a desert; and that there are no navigable rivers on the west coast. The great well-watered plains, the navigable rivers, the enormous stretches of agricultural and ranch land, are east of the wall of the Andes. It almost paralyzes the imagination to attempt to estimate the enormous development which would speedily follow the opening of the Panama Canal if the geographical conditions of South America were reversed. The tremendous shortening of distances which is going to take place so far as ocean transportation is concerned, will not bring the great bulk of South America one day nearer than it ever has been. The great future for American commerce and investment lies in Argentina and Brazil. This is not saying that there are no opportunities on the west coast, but those opportunities are chiefly connected with the development of oil fields and of mines of copper, tin, and nitrate, and the building of railroads in connection with the development of mineral industries.

The opening of the Panama Canal will enable the west coast of South America to secure necessary machinery and railroad equipment somewhat more cheaply, but probably the saving will not amount to more than \$1 per ton. The greatest benefit so far as the United States is concerned, will be in the ability of the Mississippi Valley states to secure cheaper fertilizer from the nitrate fields of Chile and to secure a nearer market for their own manufactured products. The greatest benefit which the west coast will receive will be in lessening the time it takes her copper, tin, and nitrates to reach Europe and America, and her machinery and manufactured articles to arrive. The saving on shipments which

have heretofore gone by the Panama Railroad will be considerable, but the actual saving in cost on each shipment which has heretofore gone in tramp steamers from New York through the Straights of Magellan will not be very great after the Panama Canal tolls have been paid. It is possible that this saving may not amount in many cases to as little as 50 cents per ton.

The more cautious the American manufacturer and capitalist is, the less will he lose in time and money, and the less the west coast will lose in reputation and good prospects. At the same time, it is undoubtedly true that, Panama Canal or no Panama Canal, the west coast of South America offers many opportunities to American manufacturers and capitalists which are not being taken advantage of today, but which are likely to be taken advantage of in the future after we get people acquainted with the west coast. The running of through first-class passenger steamers from New York to Peru and Chile by the Panama Canal will undoubtedly enormously increase travel to those countries. The intimate knowledge thus gained will lead to an extension of trade and investment. With the lack of delays caused by congestion of shipping at the Isthmus of the west coast, merchants will be encouraged to increase their purchases, since they will be able to count on the date of delivery with far greater exactitude than at present.

In conclusion, I cannot urge too strongly the necessity for first-hand investigation of the field. The economic condition of each west coast country should be studied from the point of view of the different manufacturers who are interested in promoting their foreign commerce. Millions of pounds sterling have been invested in South America by British capitalists, without their having secured adequate return, because they formerly rushed in without securing first hand knowledge of the particular fields in question. It is not to our interest nor to the interest of the west coast countries, to have an inflated boom followed by disastrous conclusions. At the same time there is no question that the American manufacturer is not taking full advantage of the opportunities offered him by the actual and steady economic de-

velopment of the west coast. He has not, as a rule, made a careful study of things, and of the problematical purchasing power of the millions of Indians, inhabiting the highlands of Colombia, Ecuador, Peru and Bolivia. German manufacturers are far ahead of him in this particular thing, owing to the far greater number of German wholesale merchants in the mountain cities and towns.

While it is true that the opportunity for enormous development is far greater in the highlands of Brazil and on the plains of Argentina than in the rocky fastnesses of Chile and Peru, the fact remains that there are great mineral deposits awaiting development, and awaiting such a careful study of the conditions incident to their development as will overcome the obstacles placed there by Nature, and make possible the extraction of these minerals economically and profitably. The opening of the Panama Canal will allow cargoes of ore to be brought to the United States more cheaply than before. This will stimulate activity at the mines and improve the economic status of the laborer, and consequently increase the demand for manufactured products which could be exported from this country.

Finally, if the American manufacturer and exporter will secure first-hand information in regard to the peculiar conditions of the various countries, and will not expect more than Nature gives him a right to expect, he can take a part in the development and up-building of the economic future of the west coast, which will bring profit to himself, credit to his country, and prosperity to the west coast. Such a result would be a most desirable effect of the opening of the Panama Canal on our relations with the people of South America.

SOME OF THE OBSTACLES TO NORTH AMERICAN TRADE IN BRAZIL

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I am not and never have been directly interested in trade. During the ten years of my travels in Brazil I have been in the employ of the Brazilian government as a geologist, or I have been otherwise engaged in the study of the geology and natural history of the country. My travels, however, have taken me into all parts of the country, into nearly every one of the Brazilian states, and among all classes of people. What I have to say therefore is based entirely on my own observations and on what I could learn from the people rather than upon hearsay or upon such information as one can pick up in the seaports and in the large cities.

I cannot undertake to discuss or even to mention all of the obstacles to North American trade in Brazil for the reason that I do not pretend to know what all of those obstacles are. In the brief time I can give to the subject I shall only ask your attention to such obstacles as have come to my attention and for which we North Americans are ourselves responsible.

I assume at the outset that it is generally known that Brazil exports the bulk of her products to the United States, and that she imports the bulk of foreign supplies from Europe.

These facts may be readily gathered from statistics, and they may be seen in process in the large Brazilian cities which are the ports of entry and distributing centers, such as Pará, Pernambuco, Bahia, Rio de Janeiro, and Santos. But the impression that one gets in the large cities where the commission merchants are well supplied with samples, and stand ready to receive orders for American as well as for European goods, are not nearly as convincing as that

which one gets on the frontier of trade, that is in the shops of the small dealers, in the homes of the planters and cattle growers, and in the humble cabins of the poor fishermen, or of the rubber cutters of the interior.

The shelves of the little retail shops through the distant interior of Brazil furnish the self-satisfied North American enlightening visions that cannot be seen or appreciated in the up-to-date shops of the Rua d'Ouvidor or on the fashionable avenues of Rio de Janeiro. For these little up-country shops are the distributing posts for everything of foreign manufacture that reaches the common people and the laboring classes all through the enormous interior of that country.

The commission merchants of the coast cities keep all sorts of things, many of which may seldom or never be sold. But the up-country dealer cannot afford to pay the transportation on mule-back over a thousand miles of almost impassable bridle-paths upon things that there is any doubt about his selling. One may therefore be very sure that the goods in the retail shops of the interior are there because the dealer knows they will be sold—that there is a sure market for them, however small the demand.

In such a place one usually finds the following articles of North American manufacture: kerosene oil, Singer sewing machines, cheap clocks, Ayres' proprietary medicines, and Lanman and Kemp's Florida water. Everything else is of British, German, French, Italian, or Portuguese manufacture. I have myself seen hundreds and hundreds of such stores.

It is my purpose to ask your attention to the reasons for this state of affairs as they appear to an uncommercial traveler, and in so far as we are responsible for it.

It is in the retail shops I have mentioned that one fully realizes what some of the obstacles are to our trade with Brazil, for it is chiefly in them that some of these obstacles are operative.

The obstacles to North American trade with Brazil that have attracted my attention on the ground are these:

1. Our ignorance and indifference to the language of the country.

2. Our ignorance of and indifference to the customs of the people, and consequently to the demands of the trade.

3. Bad packing or indifference to the methods of transportation in the interior.

4. Indifference to the credit system of the country.

5. Our lack of serious intention to build up and maintain permanent business.

6. Fatal and unscrupulous business methods, including the sale to the Brazilians of things the people cannot use and should not buy.

7. Our high tariff laws which render competition with other countries difficult.

8. Finally I shall refer briefly to what are often spoken of as obstacles to trade, namely the absence of American ships and American banks.

The language. The language of Brazil is Portuguese, but there is a wide-spread impression in this country that the language is Spanish. A great many people have the delusion that, even if the language is not Spanish, the Spanish will do just as well. I assure you that this is a serious and a fatal error. It is true that Spanish is generally understood along the frontier with Uruguay, Bolivia, and Peru, just as it is in this country along the Mexican frontier, but through the interior and over the great body of the country the Spanish language is as little known as it is in the United States. Over and over again I have seen efforts made to sell in Brazil articles that have to be accompanied by printed directions, as in case, for example, of medicines, and the directions were sent out in Spanish.

I venture the guess that if an American manufacturer wanted to send a traveling salesman to work up trade in Brazil for the first time, he would, in nine cases out of ten, supply him with catalogues printed in the Spanish language. I venture a second guess that the aforesaid manufacturer would instinctively look for a salesman who understood Spanish. And I venture a third guess that the Spanish speaking salesman with the Spanish catalogues would make a first class mess of any business he might attempt in Brazil.

Persons who contemplate business with Brazil cannot

attach too much importance to the Portuguese language. And by Portuguese I do not mean bad Spanish, nor do I mean a sailor's vocabulary of unconjugated verbs and undeclined adjectives and articles. I mean the Portuguese language grammatically spoken. The merchants of Brazil are generally men of good breeding, and they resent doing business with persons whose language suggests that they belong to the ignorant classes.

It may be worth noticing in this connection that men familiar with both Portuguese and English can be readily found at New Bedford, Massachusetts, and about Oakland and Sacramento in California.

Customs of the country. It goes without saying that, like other people, the Brazilians have some customs peculiarly their own, and they have certain others that are peculiarly not ours. These customs lead to the use of articles that are but little or not at all used in our own country. In studying the market conditions in Brazil it seems clear that such matters should be given proper consideration. I have found, however, among some of the hopeful beginners in the Brazilian field the impression that the people only needed to be told what to buy and they would buy it; that they only needed to be reminded that this is all the fashion in the states. But Brazilians are conservative, and they are also human, and they are very like some of us in this, that when they are buying a thing they like to buy what suits them and to buy it of the size, color and in the quantity that suits.

I once found that in a certain region an unsuccessful effort had been made to introduce American calicoes. The case interested me, and I made some inquiries about it. I found that the American calico was regarded as superior to the British article being sold in competition with it, but the American calico was put up in large bolts, while the British goods were done up and sold in dress pattern bolts of a definite number of meters, and each one had a pretty label pasted on it. At that time the American manufacturers urged that one could cut off from the American bolt as many or as few meters as were wanted. But though the Americans had

the reasons and the better goods on their side, the British merchants got the trade.

In this connection perhaps I should note that the metric system is legal and the one in common use in Brazil.

Packing. The effect of indifference to proper packing may not be at all apparent to one acquainted only with the trade in the sea-ports and along the railway lines, but to a person familiar with the roads of the interior packing at once seems a matter of prime importance.

It should not be forgotten that Brazil is an enormously big country—quite as big as the United States—that the railways are comparatively few, and that the greater part of the country is remote from them. Wagon roads as we know them in the United States cannot be said to exist over most of the interior, though they are extending rapidly in the southern states. The result is that goods going into the interior have to travel for weeks or even months on the backs of pack-mules. There is absolutely no other way for them to be moved.

Goods, in order to reach their destination in the interior, must evidently either be packed for shipment at the factory, or they must be repacked before they can start on these long overland journeys.

How many of our merchants know or concern themselves with the fact that goods shipped into the interior of Brazil should be so done up that two packages will make an average load for the pack animals; that these loads must be put on and taken off the animals at least twice a day, that the packages must withstand tropical sunshine and be exposed to tropical rains; that they must be strong enough to be unhurt by a thousand bumps against trees and rocks along the roads, and must be rolled in the mud and dust over and over again before they reach their final destination?

The European merchants know these things, keep them in mind, and pack the goods so that they are of convenient sizes and weights and otherwise properly conditioned. The American manufacturer says we do our goods up in boxes of such and such sizes, shapes, and weights; there they are;

take 'em or leave 'em. And what wonder is it that the Brazilians leave them?

Credit system. The methods of paying for merchandise are not the same in Brazil as they are in this country. I do not undertake to say whether the credit system in vogue in that country is good or bad, nor can I say whether it is possible for our merchants to adjust themselves to it. But I am confident that if our merchants want to do business with that country they will have to offer the Brazilians the same credits that European merchants offer. It may help us understand the situation to say that part of the European system consists in charging a very consoling rate of interest on bills.

Lack of serious intentions. The more I have seen of our spasmodic efforts to get hold of trade in Brazil the less hope I have had of such trade coming to this country. A wave of enthusiasm about Brazilian trade occasionally passes over our business men. They come to the conclusion that a virgin field there awaits our energy and our aggressive up-to-date methods. This enthusiasm is helped considerably if our home market is a bit dull. A traveling salesman who knows a little Spanish and who has had some experience in Mexico perhaps, is hustled off with a good line of samples and lots of catalogues—in the Spanish language. Perhaps the salesman spends six months or more in Brazil and by hook and by crook rounds up some orders and sends them along. By the time the orders reach the house in New York, the enthusiasm of the firm has cooled down considerably, or perhaps the home market has improved. In either case the orders are trifling and hardly worth bothering about, and they are filled with an indifference that bodes ill for future orders for American goods in Brazil. Right here is one of the most serious obstacles to North American trade in Brazil.

Such conduct may not make any great difference to that one firm, for it may never interest itself further in Brazil, but every American firm that follows in the footsteps of its fellow countryman will pay dearly for his indifference, or his sharp practice.

It is worth while to contrast such methods with those of

the best British and German houses doing business in Brazil. These houses are in the trade, not for the purpose of getting out of it as soon as possible and with a big rake-off, but for the purpose of staying in it for life, and of building up an honored firm and passing it down to future generations with an unsullied reputation for integrity and fair dealing. Such houses usually have several branches; perhaps the parent house is in London with branches in Manchester, Birmingham, Pará, Pernambuco, Bahia, Rio de Janeiro, Santos, and S. Paulo. It is the custom of the Pernambuco branch, let us say, to have a young man sent out from England from time to time. This young man starts in at the bottom, he learns the Portuguese language, and gradually works his way up from the lowest rank to a good place in the Pernambuco house. Perhaps he is then transferred to the Rio branch, and remains there until he comes to be the manager of that branch. In due time he is promoted to the Manchester or London branch, and he may come to be the head of the firm. Behind this man is a procession of young Englishmen traveling almost identically the same road. Everyone of them speaks the Portuguese language, every one of them is perfectly acquainted with the business customs of Brazil, and knows what is wanted in the market and why it is wanted. They have relations established with the wholesale and retail dealers within their respective territories, and they keep in living touch with the business of the entire country.

I recommend our merchants and manufacturers to seriously ask themselves whether they think they can compete successfully in the Brazilian market with houses built up by such methods. Of course there is no reason why they should not compete; but such competition must be taken seriously, and the British merchants must be met on their own high ground. When our merchants enter the Brazilian market with the intention of staying in it for generations, and with the intention of winning their way by studying the market, by dealing honorably, and by giving the people all they can afford to give them for their money, they'll gain a foothold, and they will not gain it before.

Unscrupulous business methods. An honest merchant may well protest that he is not concerned with unscrupulous methods in trade because he does not practice them and does not allow them to be practised in his business. But such a man and every honest man is made to suffer and to pay dearly for the wrong methods of those who precede them in the field. Of course unscrupulous methods may embrace any kind of wrong done the people with whom we have to deal. I recall a choice lot of examples that have come to my attention early and late. The less said of them the better. But there is one variety to which I refer that is quite too often regarded as perfectly legitimate. I refer to the selling to the Brazilians of things they cannot use without some sort of instruction and direction, and the failure to supply that instruction.

One case out of the several that came to my attention will show my meaning.

The representative of a firm of American manufacturers of agricultural implements got the ear of a Brazilian planter, and by means of attractive pictures and glowing accounts of what plows can do, persuaded the planter to buy a gang plow. I should add that the pictures were not misleading, nor were the stories about the plows exaggerated, nor was the price unreasonable. Apparently all dealings were perfectly correct. When the plow reached Brazil there was no one on the plantation or in the vicinity, or probably in the whole state, who knew anything about a gang plow. They managed to get it put together after a fashion and then the question was how to draw it. There was not an animal on the place that had ever worked in harness, and there were no harnesses, and even if there had been, the horses and mules were all too light for such service. The result was that the plow was necessarily abandoned, and the planter does not know to this day whether he or the salesman is responsible for the money he lost in the transaction.

I imagine that there may be a difference of opinion in regard to cases of this kind, but I can make my own views clearer perhaps by citing another instance that was dealt with differently and with different results.

Many years ago the Baldwin Locomotive Works of Philadelphia got an order for a locomotive to go to Brazil. The manufacturers took special pains to see that the locomotive sent was capable of doing the work required of it, and that it was as sound and trustworthy in every respect as they could make it. And do you suppose they then shipped it out and left the Brazilians to set it up and run it? Not a bit of it. They sent out with the locomotive a skilled mechanic from their own shops whose business it was to take charge of the landing of the locomotive, to set it up properly, to start it, and to teach the Brazilian engine driver how to run it, and to stay with him until the lesson was thoroughly and properly learned.

As might be expected, the locomotive gave perfect satisfaction, and lead to a large and profitable business for the Baldwin Locomotive Works that has gone on now for nearly seventy years.

But that company has never let up for a single day in its vigilant attention to its locomotives and to the interests of its Brazilian patrons. The result was that for a long period of years you could hardly give away in Brazil any locomotive that was not a Baldwin.

High tariff in the United States. I have no idea of discussing tariff laws. I merely call attention to the fact that inasmuch as our tariff laws have raised the cost of many of our manufactured articles, it follows that those articles cannot be sold in the open competition of the Brazilian markets. All such goods are shut out of Brazil, and must remain shut out until our manufacturers can compete with those of other countries.

There are some anomolous cases, however, in which the American manufacturers' profits are so large that they are quite able to compete with European manufacturers in the Brazilian markets. I have noted that certain American made sewing machines for example, are sold at much lower prices in Brazil than they are in the United States.

The question of American banks. Over and over again I have heard it urged that the lack of American banks in Brazil was a constant obstacle to American trade in that country.

I can only offer an opinion on this subject, based on much observation, and some experience.

That opinion is that if there were American banks in Brazil the great bulk of their business would be just what the existing British banks are doing. The bulk of Brazil's exports goes to New York, but the exporters do not want their money either in Brazil or in New York; they want it in London where they can buy merchandise with it.

If there were American banks in Brazil the situation would not be changed. If an American bank were called on to handle the finances of a coffee crop that bank would have to pay for the crop in London and nowhere else.

Lack of American ships and steamers. Very similar are the opinions in regard to the lack of American ships and American lines of steamers. Some people seem to think that we might gather in a lot of trade with Brazil if only there were American ships to carry things back and forth. But I have noticed that, in practice, the merchants both in Rio de Janeiro and in New York, other things being equal, ship by vessels that can carry their merchandise most cheaply. They are not influenced to any appreciable extent by matters of sentiment.

If we had so many ships that their competition for trade reduced the freight rates below those asked by British or other ships, then, and then only, would our ships get the carrying trade.

AMERICAN INTERVENTION IN CENTRAL AMERICA

By Philip Marshall Brown, Assistant-Professor of International Law and Diplomacy, Princeton University; formerly American Minister to Honduras

Since 1906 Central America has had two wars, three successful revolutions and five abortive uprisings, not including several conspiracies to assassinate the President of Guatemala or recent plots in Nicaragua for the overthrow of the revolutionary government which supplanted the Zelaya régime.

During this turbulent period the policy of the United States has developed by progressive steps from simple mediation, to direct intervention in the internal affairs of these republics. Our government has been almost incessantly occupied with the difficult task of trying to reconcile their differences, head off revolutions, avert war and facilitate the return of peace. We have come to realize that in order to prevent intervention on plausible grounds by European powers, the obligation of securing more stable conditions in Central America for the protection of all interests, logically devolves on the United States. This has become a most embarrassing problem and we are constantly reminded that:

When constabulary duty 's to be done,
The policeman's life is not a happy one.

In June 1906, President Roosevelt with the coöperation of President Diaz acted as mediator between Guatemala on the one side, and Salvador and Honduras on the other, to terminate the brief war then in progress. The treaty of peace signed on board the American gunboat *Marblehead* submitted all differences to the arbitration of the two mediators and, moreover, invoked their moral guarantee for the fulfillment of the provisions of the treaty. This direct recognition of

the obligation of the United States to mediate and intervene in their affairs was assented to by all of the five republics with the exception of the government of President Zelaya, who desired a free hand for the carrying out of his ambitious schemes to dominate Central America.

The friendly mediation of the United States was insufficient to deter Zelaya from making war in February, 1907, against the government of President Bonilla in Honduras though it was able to prevent the conflict's spreading to Salvador and Guatemala. American warships actively intervened on both the Atlantic and Pacific coasts of Honduras to protect foreign interests and prevent the needless destruction of life and property. In August of the same year, the American government was able by strenuous diplomatic representations to avert war between Nicaragua and Salvador. But it was evident that more definite and effective measures would have to be adopted to preserve peace in Central America.

On the initiative of President Roosevelt, a peace conference of the five republics was held in Washington from November 13 to December 20, 1907. The work of this conference, consisting of several conventions on various subjects, was received with considerable optimism. It was believed by many that the basis had been laid for permanent peace. The key to the whole structure was the Central American Court of Justice to which all controversies of whatever nature were to be brought for final adjudication. It was heralded as a triumph for the cause of compulsory arbitration between nations; and Mr. Carnegie was induced to provide the court with a beautiful building at Cartago, Costa Rica. Those familiar with conditions in Central America, however, were not misled by the palliative measures adopted by the Washington conference. They realized that remedies on paper, without provisions for practical application and enforcement, were nothing but mockeries. The first decision of the Court of Justice, in a controversy between Honduras and Guatemala, was greeted with general derision. It was evident that the composition of the court was largely political; and that no means existed for enforcing

respect for its decisions. Conditions in these countries continued as disturbed as ever and Zelaya showed his cynical contempt for the Washington conventions by launching a filibustering expedition against Salvador in February, 1909.

By this time the American government was thoroughly convinced that the Washington conventions were of no value unless literally *enforced* and it reluctantly came to the conclusion that it must be prepared to forcibly prevent any further depredations by the Zelaya government. This decision was a momentous departure from the policy of non-intervention hitherto scrupulously observed, though it was the logical step in the fulfillment of the obligations of the United States, not only in behalf of all foreign interests, but also towards the people of Central America.

The revolution on the Atlantic coast of Nicaragua in October, 1909, and the unjustifiable execution of the two Americans, Cannon and Groce, by order of Zelaya, compelled the United States to again intervene directly in Central American affairs. Zelaya was obliged to flee and the revolutionists were able ultimately to triumph. Another development in American policy was the agreement of our government to assist the new government in Nicaragua in the rehabilitation of the finances of that country.

A treaty was negotiated with the Nicaraguan government by Secretary Knox, giving the United States the right, as in Santo Domingo, to act virtually as the receiver and guardian of the customs revenues. Although this treaty was not ratified by the Senate, the arrangement itself was carried through and American officials designated by the United States now control in large part the finances of Nicaragua. Furthermore during a formidable revolution in August and September of 1912, the United States landed troops in Nicaragua at the request of the Nicaraguan Government for the announced purpose of protecting American lives and property, maintaining a legation guard, and preserving free communication with the legation. The national railroad which had been hypothecated as guarantee of an American loan to the government, was operated under the protection of American soldiers. A considerable force was

dispatched to Managua, the capital, and actually aided the government to repel and frustrate the revolution, which otherwise would have in all probability succeeded. Several American soldiers were killed during these operations.

The government at Managua, which owed its continued existence to American support, subsequently signed another treaty with Secretary Knox, whereby Nicaragua agreed to allow the United States the sole rights to the construction of any canal across Nicaragua, as well as a coaling station in the Gulf of Fonseca in return for assistance for the rehabilitation of its finances. This treaty has been approved by President Wilson's administration, and is still awaiting action by the Senate.

The formidable revolution headed by Ex-President Bonilla, which threatened to sweep the whole of Honduras in February of the present year, was again the occasion for the direct intervention of the United States. British and American marines were landed at Puerto Cortes which was declared neutral ground where hostilities would not be permitted. The inland town of San Pedro Sula, at the end of the railroad leading from Puerto Cortes, was also occupied and administered by the joint forces. The two rival factions, that of the government and that of General Bonilla, were notified that further disturbance and bloodshed would not be allowed and that some peaceful solution of their differences should be found. The apparently happy result of this intervention was the choice of a provisional president agreeable to both factions and a peaceful change of government with the prospect of an orderly, free election in the near future. The department of state at the same time announced the readiness of the United States to lend its good offices in support of certain measures for the refunding of the national debt of Honduras.

A treaty similar to the earlier treaty originally negotiated with Nicaragua, was also negotiated by Secretary Knox with Honduras, but likewise failed of ratification. The government of Honduras has since been endeavoring to find a way to meet its foreign indebtedness without being compelled to resort to an American receivership.

From the preceding rapid survey of recent events in Central America, two important facts are to be emphasized: first, that from a policy of scrupulous non-intervention in the affairs of these republics, the United States has been unwillingly lead into a policy of direct intervention; and second, that these interventions have become as startlingly frequent as they have become increasingly embarrassing in their nature. The question which naturally arises at this point is whether it is fitting and necessary that the attention of our government should be so constantly occupied with the domestic concerns of these countries: whether this "constabulary duty" of keeping the peace between, and even within, these states, can long be maintained without great embarrassment and disagreeable complications: whether, in sum, intervention in their internal affairs is the only possible solution of the problem.

Certain of the delegates at the Washington conference of 1907 signed the conventions with frank misgivings. They felt that such measures were only of a temporizing character and that the conference had failed in its opportunity to adopt a definite, radical remedy for the political ailments of Central America. In a special statement submitted to the Conference, the delegates from Honduras and Nicaragua expressed their doubts as follows:

We hope that the establishment of the Central American Court of Justice, agreed upon in the most important of our conventions, shall for the time being be the key to our political structure and shall remedy to a great extent our evils and shall prevent war in the future. We believe, however, that it does not suffice to satisfy the sentiment and aspirations of the Central American people, and that within a short time it will be felt, through the free trend of opinion and through the obvious relation of our public needs, how essential is a more intimate and complete amalgamation (Foreign Relations, 1907, p. 727).

In a separate statement the Honduran minister for foreign affairs also declared:

. . . proceeding with loyal frankness, we must agree that if it is indeed true that by the creation of that court we have taken an advanced step toward the wellbeing and the good name of the countries we represent, by this step alone we have not assured the

positive and fruitful peace of Central America. . . . In this sense and obeying impulses of the most sincere patriotism, I make known here the profound conviction which continual political deceptions have rooted in my mind, that the union of the five republics in one single nation becomes necessary as the only saving means that is to lead our peoples without new obstacles or anxieties along the same path of progress that has led the United States and Mexico to the height of prosperity they now enjoy (*Foreign Relations*, 1907, p. 722).

With earnestness and ability the representatives from Honduras and Nicaragua labored to convince the other delegates of the supreme necessity of bringing about the union of the five republics. They pointed out that the re-establishment of the federation of Central America was the fundamental feature of their political existence, so acknowledged and declared in several of their constitutions. They insisted that no great sociological or other differences existed between the states of Central America: that "Central American wars have never been armed conflicts between peoples, but between governments: that no territorial conquests have ever taken place: no war indemnities or humiliating reparations have ever been imposed by one people upon the other as an abuse of victory." They drew attention to "the opposition of interests, of political tendencies and reciprocal jealousies in matters of predominance" in the Philadelphia Convention of 1787: how "some states had their social status organized according to democratic principles: in other states a powerful aristocracy reigned supreme: some were agriculturists: others were devoted to industrial pursuits: some favored slavery and others had marked aversion for it:" how the Philadelphia Convention, "believing that all those differences were not incompatible with the political union, devoted its efforts to find a rule of law to harmonize all opposing tendencies, systems, and interests, and to attain the prevalence of the Union over all opposition."

These arguments were of no avail and the majority of the delegates at the Washington conference summarized their views as follows:

. . . while they consider the political union of Central America as the greatest and noblest aspiration of patriotism, they likewise think that the circumstances and conditions in which the Central American people find themselves at the moment are not propitious to decree national reconstruction, which, in order that it may be durable and solid, requires that their economic, moral, political and material elements shall have been harmonized.

They do not think therefore that it is opportune to discuss in the present conference a project for the immediate establishment of a union, but solely those measures which will tend toward preparing in a stable manner for this union, strengthening their means of communications, establishing a coasting ship commerce, linking together the economic and social interests of the people of the Republics, unifying their customs and tax laws, and encouraging the frequent meeting of Central American conferences. . . . The steps here taken toward making peace certain in Central America, toward guaranteeing security for capital and labor, toward improving their elements of production, their social interests, and their initiative in self-government, will contribute in no small part towards this end (*Foreign Relations, 1907, p. 672*).

Before testing the soundness of this point of view it is desirable to recapitulate briefly the main facts regarding the old Central American federation as well as the various fruitless attempts for its restoration. When the Spanish provinces of Central America seceded peacefully in 1824, they naturally gravitated together in a loose federal union, following the traditions of the "Audiencia Real" of Guatemala under which they had previously been grouped. During the latter years of Spanish rule, especially after the Constitution of 1812 which was signed by deputies from the five provinces, they had enjoyed a large measure of self-government. Each province and town was at liberty to elect its own "ayuntamiento" or council. In fact, it may fairly be asserted that at no subsequent time has Central America had as great privileges of self-government as during the latter years of Spanish domination. Owing, however, to this strongly developed provincial sentiment, to the extremely loose federal form of union and to the intense rivalries of political leaders for predominance both in the federation and in the separate states, this union proved to be a fiction and was dissolved after a nominal existence of fifteen years. The wonder is that it lasted as long. There was no external pressure in the form of a common enemy, nor was there a deep sense of community

of interests to hold the states together. Their separate existence for the past seventy years, with almost incessant wars and revolutions, has only served to retard their development and foster prejudices which have no solid grounds on which to rest. In their division has been their weakness.

Since 1839 efforts to restore the union have been made from time to time; and whenever the project is suggested it is natural that sceptics should object that, while the idea is laudable, it is impossible of realization. This pessimistic point of view, however, is open to the charge of superficiality for the reason that, while it is true there have been various attempts to re-establish the union, in actual fact, there never has been any serious, well calculated undertaking, properly supported in such a way as to guarantee success. It is worth while, therefore, to consider briefly certain of these movements for union, which represent the three methods usually employed: namely, that of diplomacy under the initiative of the United States, in 1874, 1881 and 1883, that by force of arms, resorted to by President Barrios in 1885, and that through alliance, attempted by the presidents of Honduras, Nicaragua and Salvador in 1896.

In 1874 the American minister to Central America was instructed to use his good offices to bring together the presidents of the five republics in order to settle existing differences and lay the foundations of a permanent union. Minister Williams' efforts in this direction, were, however, without definite result. The diplomatic discussions produced little more than a platonic recognition of the desirability of the union. The matter was taken up again in 1881 and 1883. General Grant in his reception of the diplomatic representative from Guatemala and Salvador in August, 1880, expressed his sincere hope for the federal union of Central America. Secretary Blaine in a comprehensive dispatch to the American minister at Guatemala, under date of May 7, 1881, manifested the keen interest with which the United States viewed all attempts to establish a union. He also indicated that the government at Washington would be gratified to learn of "some directly practicable method by which the United States could aid in the establishment of a

strong and settled union between the independent republics of Central America." The subject was again recurred to in 1883 but the diplomatic negotiations were of a purely tentative character.

In 1885, General Rufino Barrios, president of Guatemala, a man of commanding personality, who clearly understood the needs of Central America, attempted to bring about the union by coercive measures. After vain efforts of a pacific character to persuade the other states to join together, he proclaimed the union; placed himself at the head of his troops and summoned the remaining republics to give their immediate adherence. In the first battle with the Salvadorian army, Barrios was killed, and with him ended all hope of accomplishing the union through the force of arms.

The last attempt to restore the union was in 1896 when the presidents of Honduras, Nicaragua and Salvador united to form the Greater Republic of Central America. Neither Guatemala nor Costa Rica would join: the former apparently from motives of distrust, and the latter because of its traditional policy of isolation. Though recognized by the United States, this greater republic was hardly more than a fiction. It was essentially a personal alliance of the rulers of the respective republics; and was dissolved by mutual consent after a nominal existence of three years. As was sensibly remarked by General Regalado of Salvador, whose opposition wrecked the scheme, "This union is the work of a few men, not the desire of the people."

Of the three methods employed to establish the union; namely, force, alliance and diplomacy, the latter alone has not been thoroughly tested. The United States, though committed in principle to the ideal of the union, has taken no positive steps in this direction. It has contented itself, as already indicated, with expressions of sympathy with the project and tentative negotiations designed merely to sound the sentiments of the different Central American governments. In fact, since the pourparlers of Secretary Blaine begun in 1881 and abandoned in 1883, the idea of restoring the union through diplomatic means has almost entirely remained in abeyance. In the meantime, the United States

has felt compelled to seek the maintenance of peace and the remedy for the ills of Central America through friendly mediation and constabulary measures, and has now arrived at the point of positive intervention in the internal affairs of these republics. In spite of the inevitable failure of such a temporizing policy, it may be admitted that it was doubtless necessary to exhaust all possible expedients, in dealing patiently and cautiously with so abnormal a situation, in order to demonstrate conclusively their entire inadequacy and the necessity of a thorough, statesmanlike solution of the problem.

It can hardly be denied that intervention in the domestic concerns of these countries is as repugnant to our American ideals as it is ineffective in results. It is objectionable first, because it is not the business of the United States to be occupied with the internal affairs of other states; second, because it would prove extremely embarrassing through financial arrangements, however desirable in themselves, or through any other assumed obligations, to become responsible in any way for the administration of any of these countries; and third, because any intervention in derogation of their sovereign rights under international law, arouses the suspicions and apprehensions of these republics as well as of other Spanish-American states.

This policy has been ineffective because it ignores the root of the whole trouble; namely, the separate existence of states too small to thrive alone, embroiled constantly in petty dissensions originating, usually, in the personal rivalries of their respective rulers. The time would now seem to have arrived for our government to consider seriously whether the union of these five republics into one solid, self-sufficient state would not prove to be the most effective and satisfactory remedy for a condition of affairs which loudly calls for drastic treatment.

The conventional argument against the union is that previously quoted from the report of the majority of the delegates of the Washington conference; namely, that the people of Central America are not yet prepared for union, that it is first necessary to bring them into intimate contact through

the construction of railroads, etc., etc. This is undoubtedly the ideal process from the academic point of view but it is so painfully slow and the results so disheartening, that one is led seriously to question whether such a process will ever really prepare these countries for union. The efforts of the Washington conference in that direction seem to have been barren of results. In regard to the building of railroads, certain of these republics are quite unable to assume the financial burden of constructing the important links required to bring them together, nor does such construction offer sufficient inducements for the employment of private capital. The finances of several of these countries are in a deplorable condition; and their national resources have been recklessly exploited as well as mortgaged for many years to come. No long period of normal peace has prevailed uninterruptedly in any of them, with the sole exception of Costa Rica, whose peculiar conditions differentiate her in some ways from the rest of Central America. Honduras, equal in size to Pennsylvania, with a population of 500,000, a total revenue of \$1,000,000, and a national debt of \$6,000,000, has had two wars, three revolutions and several uprisings within the past seven years. It seems preposterous that Central America, possessing a total area slightly larger than California and one-fourth that of Mexico, with a population of less than 4,000,000, presenting no greater differentiations than Maine and Arizona—a people, in fact, essentially one in customs, sentiments and common interests—should be cursed with the burden of five distinct, sovereign republics.

Had Virginia and Massachusetts refused to unite in 1789 because of the lack of easy means of communication and differences in customs and interests, what mutual prejudices, dissensions and conflicts would undoubtedly have arisen! How increasingly difficult it would have become for them to surrender their sovereign rights to one strong central government! And yet, this is almost precisely what has occurred in Central America. No people ever stood in greater need of each other's support. Their combined resources would have supplied the elements necessary for a strong state able to

exact and maintain the same respect as Mexico and other Spanish-American states. Divided, they have staggered painfully along and been the victims of many needless misfortunes.

The large majority of the people of Central America are not turbulent in disposition or difficult to govern. On the contrary, they are as a rule submissive and peaceful to a fault. It is this very quality which has made it possible for misguided and ambitious politicians to exploit these countries. The people are not to be blamed for the unstable conditions which have so long existed. To them may be applied the observation of the French orator in reference to France in 1793: "I do not accuse the king; I do not accuse the people; I accuse the situation."

It is time that the United States, as the disinterested friend and the moral sponsor of these smaller republics, should face squarely the question whether it will any longer be an active or passive party to the perpetuation of such intolerable political conditions. Whether rightly or wrongly, other nations are inclined to hold the United States responsible for the continuation of this unsettled state of affairs. They maintain that, were it not for the Monroe Doctrine, other nations, such as England or Germany, whose financial and other interests in Central America are very great, would long ago have taken the necessary measures to ensure peace and order.

Such an intervention, with its menace of foreign protectorates and annexations, would naturally have been most offensive to the United States. Do we, on the other hand, wish to assume the obligation of supervising the domestic affairs of these Republics? Do we desire—as portended by recent interventions—to establish four or five quasi-protectorates? Surely, such a policy could only be justified when all other expedients had failed. There remains, fortunately, as a most satisfactory means of escape from an embarrassing situation, the untried solution of the union of the states of Central America.

We may consider this proposition for the establishment of the union from two aspects; first as to the probable effects of the union; and second as to how it may be brought about.

It is confidently to be expected: (1) That the disappearance of the five separate governments, with all their alluring fields for exploitation, will remove the main cause of the constant factional struggles and the wars which inevitably follow in their train. (2) The heavy financial burden of supporting five distinct governments with their elaborate administrative machinery and respective budgets, will be greatly lightened. (3) The economic and financial resources of these countries will be united for their mutual benefit in such necessary improvements as the construction of railroads to develop rich territories and bring all parts of Central America into close contact. (4) Instead of being exposed to ruinous arrangements with exacting and non-too-scrupulous syndicates, they could undertake, at a great saving, a single refunding operation for the settlement of their foreign debts and the rehabilitation of their finances. (5) With their common financial credit immensely strengthened by the cessation of wars and revolutions, they would no longer be menaced with the hypothecation of their customs revenues for the sake of foreign claimants. (6) The territorial integrity and independence of Central America will be effectively guaranteed. (7) The United States, by committing itself irrevocably to the maintenance of this independence against all aggression, would be acquitted of any suspected ambitions for territorial aggrandizement; and would win the warm approval and the confidence of all Spanish-American states.

The limits of this article, unfortunately, will not allow an elaboration of the preceding arguments. It is necessary, however, to indicate briefly how these fortunate results, which may confidently be expected from the establishment of the union, are to be safeguarded against hostile influences and disintegrating forces. The only safe insurance against such undoubted perils, particularly at the outset, would have to be found in the support of the United States. Such a protection would, in all probability, be mainly of a moral kind for the simple reason that, if it were formally declared by the United States that it would not tolerate any attempts, of whatever nature, to overthrow the newly con-

stituted government of the union, few would be so foolhardy as to undertake any aggression doomed to certain failure. If it be objected that such a responsibility would be too great, the only answer is, that, one impressive intervention by the United States, in sympathy with the aspirations of the people of Central America, is infinitely to be preferred to many, constantly recurring, interventions in the internal affairs of the separate republics.

There remains to be considered the important question as to how the union may be brought about. It obviously cannot be accomplished either by force or through the initiative of the rulers of these states. Each government is suspicious and attributes to the other ambitions for leadership and predominance. Public opinion, owing to the absence of an entirely independent and fearless, free press in these countries, cannot take the initiative in this movement. Even with public opinion fully aroused, such a movement would require disinterested leaders commanding general confidence. It is doubtful whether many such men could be found under present conditions. Such being the case, there can hardly be any room to doubt that the altruistic initiative of the United States would be welcomed with enthusiasm. Certain ambitious politicians would naturally be opposed to the project and would probably be ready to thwart it with the usual argument that these countries are not yet prepared for union. Once they realized, however, that the United States was determined to bring to bear its powerful influence in support of the union, these same politicians would unquestionably be compelled to fall into line. Though cloaking no selfish and ignoble ends, American policy—it must be admitted in all candour—has not always been entirely comprehensible to the people of Central America. They have viewed with increasing distrust and apprehension our interventions in their affairs. But in such a lofty undertaking as helping them to realize their most cherished ideal, the United States could count on their implicit confidence and gratitude.

It is not the writer's purpose to develop a complete program, indicating in detail the necessary steps which should

be taken by the United States in assuming the initiative in this movement. A few broad outlines should suffice. First, it is essential that we commit ourselves unreservedly to the principle of the imperative need of the union of the states of Central America. Second, our government should inform the governments of these Republics that it considers the union as the only adequate remedy for the ills they have so long endured, and that it is prepared to assist in every way it properly can to attain this object. Third, it should invite and induce each of the five governments to send commissioners possessing plenary powers, to a conference to be held on neutral ground, to discuss the formation of the union and to draw up the bases for the ultimate accomplishment of that end, whether at once or by progressive steps requiring, possibly, several years of preparation and re-adjustment. Such a discussion would most probably open the door to many delicate and trying questions, whose solution would require the utmost patience and the most skillful diplomacy. A consistent adherence, however, to the central principle of the need of the union, should produce tangible and effective results. There is ample room for discussion as to the precise measures required to bring about the union. But there should be no room for discussion as to its complete desirability. In the project presented to the Washington Conference in 1907 by the delegation from Honduras, is to be found a tentative program for the formation of the union, which might serve as a *point de depart* for another conference called for this purpose (Foreign Relations, 1907, p. 670).

It would be unwise to attempt to minimize the difficulties in the way of this project, nor is it possible in the limits of this article to point out the numerous and weighty factors which must be taken into consideration in this connection: for example, the relations of Mexico to Central America. Allusion should be made, however, to the attitude of Costa Rica. For more than thirty years, while the other states of Central America have been racked by internal dissensions and petty wars, Costa Rica has been entirely free from revolutions and has been able to avoid becoming embroiled

in the factional troubles and intrigues of its neighbours. This may be due to conditions peculiar to itself. It is, nevertheless, a fact which is of no little encouragement for the rest of Central America. The economic development of Costa Rica has naturally been very great, and its people have been able to enjoy marked prosperity. It is not difficult, therefore, to understand why they have been unwilling, heretofore, to be drawn prematurely into any close political connection with the other states of Central America. It is possible that Costa Rica may still be indisposed to amalgamate her interests with those of her neighbours, even though the union should be brought about through the initiative and the protection of the United States. Such an attitude would be particularly lamentable inasmuch as Costa Rica would be in a position to lend the most substantial elements to the union. This should not deter the other States, however, from going ahead with the project, because the reluctant sister would be at liberty to come in whenever she might so desire, remembering that in the constitution of 1847 it was affirmed "that Costa Rica forms a part of the Central American nation and will coöperate toward its reorganization in conjunction with the other states."

Secretary Blaine fully appreciated the vital importance of the union of the Central American States as the surest remedy for their persistent maladies. His instructions of November 28, 1881, to the American minister in Mexico, in reference to aggressive attitude of that country towards Guatemala, are of especial interest as a clear enunciation of American policy.

But in reference to the union of the Central American republics, under one federal government, the United States is ready to avow that no subject appeals more strongly to its sympathy, nor more decidedly to its judgment. Nor is this a new policy. For many years this Government has urged upon the Central American States the importance of such a union to the creation of a well ordered and constitutionally governed republic and our ministers have been instructed to impress this upon the individual governments to which they have been accredited and the Central American statesmen with whom they have been associated. And we have always cherished the belief that in this effort we had the sincere sympathy

and cordial coöperation of the Mexican government. Under the conviction that the future of the people of Central America was absolutely dependent upon the establishment of a federal government which would give strength abroad and maintain peace at home, our chief motive in the recent commotion in Mexico was to prevent the diminution, either political or territorial of any of these states, in order that, trusting to the joint aid and friendship of Mexico and the United States, they might be encouraged to persist in their effort to establish a government which would, both for their advantage and ours, represent their combined wealth, intelligence and character (Foreign Relations, 1881, p. 816).

In his general instructions to the American diplomatic representatives in Central America, dated May 7, 1881, Mr. Blaine also said:

You cannot impress too strongly upon the government to which you are accredited or upon the public men with whom you associate the importance which the government of the United States attaches to such a confederation of the states of Central America as will respond to the wants and wishes of their people. Our popular maxim, that "in union there is strength," finds its counterpart in the equally manifest truth that, "in division there is weakness." So long as the Central American States remain divided they will fail to acquire the strength and prestige to which they are entitled. . . . The statesmen of Central America may feel certain that, with a common representative government, wielding the power and consulting the interests of the several States, their connection with the railway system of the continent will be eagerly sought and they will both give and receive advantages which always follow the establishment of commercial relations and political sympathy. All internal improvements, including the great project of the interoceanic canal would receive great stimulus and aid from a firm union of the Central American states and the strong government that should grow from that union (Foreign Relations, 1881, p. 102).

It is fruitless to speculate as to what Blaine might have done to forward the union, had he remained longer in power at that time. His statesmanlike vision in grasping a great idea and his boldness in carrying it into effect were demonstrated in the realization of the Pan American Union. Since his day the United States has waited patiently in the hope that the republics of Central America would be able to work out their own salvation. It would now seem certain that they cannot do so unaided. The futility of peace conferences and sentimental agreements has been proved beyond

question. The obligation of the United States towards these countries is generally recognized. Acting the ignominious part of a policeman, we are intermeddling in their domestic affairs and cannot foresee whither such a policy may lead. A courageous, radical remedy is urgently demanded. The administration at Washington, which by a measure of the highest, constructive statesmanship, is prepared to aid the people of Central America achieve their noblest ideal, will build for itself a lasting monument in the hearts of all Spanish-Americans. The United States will be freed from all aspersions of pursuing unworthy aims as well as from the perils of irksome interventions. It will be able to demonstrate irrefutably that the Monroe Doctrine does not serve to perpetuate bad government, but that its beneficent effect is to enable the people of this western hemisphere to emerge from chaotic political conditions, and unhindered to achieve their highest aspirations and destinies.

THE DOMINICAN CONVENTION AND ITS LESSONS

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The occasion for American intervention in Dominican affairs in 1905 was the imminence of serious complications between the United States and foreign powers, growing out of the active measures taken by such governments to enforce the rights of their creditor-citizens as secured by formal contracts or by international protocols with the Dominican Republic.

For thirty-five years before (1869-1904), Dominican history had been a miserable succession of revolution and anarchy, interrupted by ruthless and blood-stained dictatorships. Of this mis-government the financial counterpart was the accumulation of some \$40,000,000 of public indebtedness, much of it semi-fraudulent in character but possessing sinister importance by reason of commitments which the Dominican Republic had been driven into making with creditor governments.

If the United States had been willing to contemplate the full operation of these instruments, much of the reason for intervention as an international necessity would have disappeared. On the other hand, if the seizure of Dominican

¹ Much of the historical and descriptive matter contained in the following paragraphs has already been published by the author in one form or another: "A Report on the Debt of San Domingo," 1905; "The Readjustment of San Domingo's Finances" in *Quarterly Journal of Economics*, May, 1907; "The Financial Difficulties of San Domingo," in *Annals of the American Academy of Political and Social Science*, July, 1907; "The Reorganization of Dominican Finances," in *Proceedings of Lake Mohonk Conference*, October, 1912; "The Regeneration of San Domingo," in *The Independent*, August 28, 1913.

custom ports by foreign powers for the prolonged period necessary to discharge heavy debts, and the appreciable voice in the internal affairs of the country that such occupation was certain to carry with it—if these things were deemed inconsistent with the traditional policy of the United States in the West Indies, then it appeared that some positive action on the part of the United States was imperative.

The expressed preference of such foreign governments had been to take independent action in compelling San Domingo to respect her contract and treaty obligations. In deference to the United States, this attitude had been waived, and the American government besought to take the initiative in the matter. There was every reason to suppose that, failing intervention on the part of the United States, independent and immediate action would have been seriously considered by such foreign governments.

On April 1, 1905, an interim arrangement was effected by the United States providing for administration of the Dominican customs. Thereafter San Domingo enjoyed a civil calm and an economic wellbeing such as it had not known for two generations. Insurrections ceased, agriculture revived and trade developed. The government was enabled to meet its current expenses, to accumulate a surplus for larger requirements, and to segregate a fund towards the adjustment of its debt.

The American-Dominican convention of July 25, 1907, was designed to preserve such conditions, with less considerable involvement on the part of the United States. Instead of the United States both adjusting the debt and collecting the customs for the payment thereof—as was proposed in the original protocol arranged between the two countries—the Dominican Republic itself arrived at a voluntary agreement with its creditors, and the United States undertook to administer the customs for the service of the debt so adjusted.

The details of the readjustment were (1) a drastic scaling down of recognized debts and claims; (2) the extinction of burdensome monopoly-concessions recklessly granted by the Dominican government; (3) the provision of a considerable

residual amount for the construction, under proper restrictions, of permanent public improvements. All of the foregoing was effected by the creation of a refunding loan of \$20,000,000, of fifty-year, 5 per cent bonds, accepted by creditors upon the basis of the debts as readjusted, and secured as to interest and amortization service by a customs receivership on the part of the United States.

In detail the service of the debt was assured by the appointment, by the President of the United States, of a general receiver of Dominican customs, who, with the necessary assistants, likewise appointed, should collect all the customs duties of the Republic until the payment or redemption of the bonds so issued. From the sum so collected the general receiver, after discharging the expenses of the receivership, paid over to the fiscal agent of the loan on the first day of each calendar month the sum of \$100,000, to be applied to the payment of the interest and the amortization of all the bonds issued. The remainder of the sums collected by the general receiver were paid monthly to the Dominican government.

The Dominican government might also apply any further sums to the amortization of the bonds, over and above the 1 per cent sinking fund provision stipulated; but, in any event, should the customs revenues collected by the general receiver in any year exceed the sum of \$3,000,000, one-half of the surplus above such sum of \$3,000,000 must be applied to the sinking fund for the further redemption of bonds.

The Dominican government agreed to provide by law for the payment of all customs dues to the general receiver and his assistants, and to give them all useful aid and assistance and full protection to the extent of its powers. The government of the United States in turn undertook to give to the general receiver and his assistants such protection as it should find to be requisite for the performance of their duties.

Provision was also made that, until the Dominican Republic paid the whole amount of the bonds so created, there was to be no increase of its public debt, except by previous

agreement between the Dominican government and the United States, and that the like agreement should be necessary for any modification of the Dominican import duties. The accounts of the general receiver were to be rendered monthly to the contaduria general of the Dominican Republic and to the state department of the United States for examination and approval by the appropriate officials of the two governments.

The Dominican convention has now been in operation for six years—a period long enough to estimate its work and consequence with some reasonableness. In that time little short of a revolution, social, political and economic, has been wrought in the country. Not a revolution of the old type, involving waste and ruin, but a revolution in the arts of peace, industry and civilization. The people of the island, protected from rapine and bloodshed, free to devote themselves to earning a livelihood, are fairly on the way to becoming a decent peasantry, as industrious and stable as sub-tropical conditions are likely to evolve. Agriculture, the great economic mainstay of the Republic, has gone forward by leaps and bounds. The cultivation of cacao, tobacco, sugar and cotton are no longer the speculative possibilities of brief interludes of peace, but normal, lucrative occupations. All of this has been reflected in an incredible expansion of the commerce of the country, both exports and imports. The foreign trade of San Domingo for (1911–12) the latest fiscal year for which figures are available, aggregated nearly \$20,600,000, as compared with some \$5,000,000 for the year preceding the convention. The terms of the debt service have been maintained with perfect fidelity, not only in the matter of the interest charge, but in the amortization of the loan much beyond the anticipated provision.

The total customs collections for the ten months of the sixth convention year (1912–13) have aggregated \$3,312,019.12, compared with \$2,983,181.90 for the corresponding period of 1911–12. If the present rate has been maintained for the remainder of the fiscal year—and it is certain that such has been the case—the total customs collections for

1912-13 will exceed \$4,000,000, being practically double the collections realized at the time the receivership was inaugurated and insuring a supplementary payment of \$500,000 toward the amortization of the loan, in addition to the \$200,000 for which statutory provision is made. With the further rapid improvement in the fairly limitless economic development of the country, and with continued progress in the direction of reducing the high import duties and entirely abolishing all export duties—along which a wise initial step has already been taken—there is certain to be even more notable improvement in public revenues, thus not only making possible ampler expenditure, but ensuring earlier discharge of the national debt.

In political affairs there has from time to time been a reappearance of unwholesome tendencies, and the past year witnessed something of this kind—some part of which, at least, is to be charged to the policies of our own government. The immediate interest of the Dominican convention consists in its efficacy in rescuing an international derelict. But its collateral significance to the United States is even greater—applicability of the essential provisions of the arrangement to other financially bankrupt, revolution-torn and internationally menaced republics of Central and South America. It accordingly becomes worth while to scrutinize minutely our experience with San Domingo in order to determine—and hereafter avoid—any possible errors in connection with our activities in that direction. There have been at least three such lapses: (1) the continuity of administrative oversight has been disturbed; (2) a political upheaval based upon violence has been countenanced, and (3) the incurring of so-called revolutionary debts has been validated.

1. The change in administration in Washington in March, 1909, effected serious disturbance in the conduct of Dominican affairs. At the very outset we severed all connection with those advisers whom circumstances had made intimately acquainted with the Dominican problem and whose counsel had up to that determined every step in connection therewith. Thereafter Dominican affairs

were directed in formal departmental routine by officials who were without any prior knowledge of the subject, who were unfamiliar with San Domingo and its people and who were compelled to rely for their equipment upon imperfect departmental records. The change was not merely from one group of advisers to another; but from persons who knew every detail of the Dominican problem to others who were unacquainted with any part of it.

The consequences of this abrupt transition were soon felt in San Domingo in the form of administrative difficulty and political agitation. The intimate personal note which had from the outset figured in the influence exerted by the United States and which was of such peculiar value in the formative period could not be replaced by departmental routine, handicapped as it was by insufficient knowledge. Certain things which it was desirable for San Domingo to do and which it had before been possible to accomplish by mere suggestion, were left undone because they could not be made the subject of formal instructions. On the other hand such communications as were sent tended to excite by their new formality and rigor a feeling of hurt and resentment.

Out of this new relation there developed in San Domingo a feeling that the convention administration enjoyed less cordial regard in Washington. Industrious circulated by the elements hostile to order and honesty, this rumor served as a pretext for political unrest. Premonitory symptoms, easy of recognition and simple of correction, were neglected in Washington and the train laid for revolutionary outbreak.

It is true that the orderly government and the honest administration of the convention government in San Domingo had excited some hostility and resentment in the circles that had profited by the old régime. The suppression of graft, the elimination of sinecures, the refusal of concessions, the drastic scaling down of semi-fraudulent claims, the rigid administration of customs regulations and the impartial collection of taxes and dues—were innovations so radical as to inevitably arouse the hatred of those to whom

such perquisites had come to be regarded as proprietary rights. It is likely that a certain personal brusqueness and occasional tactless conduct on the part of the Dominican executives may have occasioned some animus in more respectable quarters. But on the other hand, it is certain that there were few persons in San Domingo whose opinions were entitled to respect who did not believe that the government was being honestly and efficiently administered and that the country itself was entering upon a new political and economic era.

These were conditions as to policy and personnel which it was desirable for the United States to seek to maintain. The principal Dominican executives were unusually fine examples of the Latin-American publicist, men of high moral character, unblemished personal integrity and of real and tested patriotism. The President was probably the best loved man in San Domingo and the minister of finance, the brainiest. Both men understood the motives which had actuated the United States in entering into the convention, and believed in us and in our intentions. Upon the minister of finance had devolved the detailed conduct of the debt adjustment and in this he had displayed financial ability and political statesmanship of a high order.

2. The convention President was assassinated on November 20, 1911, and the minister of finance escaped the same fate only by flight to Jamaica. The assassination itself was the act of a political malcontent, unrelated save in the general way suggested above, to popular feeling and to political condition. Nothing that the United States could have done would have removed the possibility of such an act of individual violence. But for the consequences of the assassination—far-reaching and portentous—the United States was more responsible. Immediately after the assassination, the reigns of government were seized by a military leader; a kinsman figure-head of the same name was installed as provisional president and two months later elected president for a six-year term.

This procedure the United States should never have tolerated. Exercising the ample power vested in it by sec-

tion II of the convention, the United States should have seen to it that the office of president and other vacated positions were filled in accordance with the spirit of constitutional government, instead of countenancing a coup d'état made possible by assassination. By keeping our hands off at this time, we revived the most vicious feature of the old order of things—disregard of orderly government in favor of political violence. A premium was put upon revolution and disturbance, and much of what we had professed was apparently negated. There was no choice as between intervention or non-intervention, but only as between inaction then and gun boats later. All Dominican history made it certain that failure to preserve political stability at this stage would entail more serious involvement thereafter.

The revolutionary government endured exactly one year. Through its whole course ran political disturbance of such increasing force as eventually to compel American intervention. This entailed the recognition of the revolutionists, the resignation of the dictator-made president and the installation of a compromise successor as provisional president. Of the doubtful wisdom of the actual selection, it is unnecessary to speak. More general considerations arise in connection with the recognition of the revolutionists, as an unfortunate precedent in the future relations of the United States to San Domingo. It is very possible that with matters gone as far as they had no other course remained open to the United States, and that this necessity must be accounted the inevitable sequel of the original error of acquiescing in the coup d'état. But the consequence was none the less grave. The Dominican mind once again revived the cherished principle of native politics—a doctrine become temporarily passé in the enforced calm of the preceding six years—that if a patriot be dissatisfied with the constituted government, he may take to the bush and eventually secure honor and emolument for his "revolution." A political settlement on such lines carried the assurance of its own destruction. On March 31, the resignation of the provisional president was presented to

the Dominican Congress and accepted, involving further disturbance and adjustments until the present administration was established—the stability of which still remains to be determined.

3. A no less serious feature of the intervention of September, 1912, was the validation on the part of the United States of a large amount of public indebtedness incurred during the dictator administration, by authorizing a new bond issue to provide for its discharge. Whether the mode of sale and the price realized for this loan offer any ground for criticism can not be determined without full knowledge of circumstances and records. Immediate judgment is however possible with respect to the validation itself.

The validation in question consisted in the affirmative exercise, on the part of the United States, of the authority conferred by section III of the convention: "III. Until the Dominican Republic has paid the whole amount of the bonds of the debt, its public debt shall not be increased except by previous agreement between the Dominican government and the United States."

The purpose of this clause was to prevent San Domingo, for a long term of years, from sinking back into the morass of semi-fraudulent debt from which the financial readjustment of 1907 had extricated the country. In drafting the convention an absolute prohibition of further debt contraction was at first contemplated and this was only modified in the thought that the economic regeneration of San Domingo might go on so rapidly as to make desirable some large public improvement for which current revenues would be inadequate. It was never anticipated that recourse would be had to this provision for the recognition of floating administrative debts and claims within the early years of the convention and while its working was still experimental.

Of the character of the floating indebtedness so validated by the United States, it is impossible to speak as details have not yet been made accessible. Inasmuch as it appears to have originated in the main during the twelve months of the dictator government, the presumption is that it differs

in no material respects from much of the pre-convention indebtedness. But even to the extent to which it may have been free from the unsavory quality of the old Dominican indebtedness, it should never have received the sanction of the United States as justifying a new loan secured by a lien upon customs receipts and a service administered by the customs receiver.

The spirit of the debt adjustment of 1907 and the letter of the convention had been to serve notice upon all prospective lenders that future advances to the Dominican Republic were at the lenders' risk and must, unless sanctioned by the United States, be in the nature of temporary loans repayable as to interest and principal from out of current revenues. If, during a twelve months of wasteful and inefficient administration in which graft and prodigality held carnival, any particularly daring lenders were willing to make advances, upon terms satisfactory to themselves, to a depleted treasury—it was certainly not the duty of the United States to secure such advances. It would have been wisdom on the part of the United States to have discouraged the contracting of such indebtedness; but failing to do this, it was in the last degree unwise to have approved its existence. If such indebtedness existed it should have been discharged by San Domingo in succeeding years from out of current revenues, made possible by less wasteful administration. The experience of the convention government had shown that such retrenchment was possible and the increased flow of customs revenue made it easier now than then. Such a mode of discharge would not, of course, have offered the comfort to the lenders that the debt validation did, but far from this involving any injustice, it would have been a salutary treatment of daring financial enterprise and a deterrent to further ventures of this kind.

It thus appears that with respect to administrative oversight, political stability and financial policy there has been appreciable departure from the course defined by the Convention and pursued during the first years of the customs receivership—with the consequences of occasional friction

in San Domingo and unnecessary concern in the United States. But there will never be a reversion to old conditions. The convention clearly defines the duties and the obligations of the two contracting countries, and its wise and statesmanlike provisions are ample to meet every contingency likely to arise—if we will but avail ourselves intelligently of them. It would be an incredible thing if the traditions and practices of two generations should not struggle to reassert themselves. Yet on every hand there is evidence that a new degree of national consciousness is crystallizing, that a new type of national leadership is being evolved and that new ideals of national well-being are taking form.

To sum up, the extension of the good offices of the United States to the Dominican Republic has meant that debts and claims aggregating nearly \$40,000,000 have been and will be honorably discharged for about \$17,000,000; that the Republic's credit has been established on a very high plane; that onerous concessions and monopolies have been redeemed and important works and improvements undertaken; that adequate revenues for the maintenance of orderly government have been assured; that social progress and economic betterment have been made possible and that imminent danger of foreign intervention has been removed, and all this without loss of territorial integrity or menace of independent sovereignty on the part of San Domingo and without embarrassing involvement or troublesome burden on the part of the United States.

IN JUSTICE TO THE UNITED STATES—A SETTLEMENT WITH COLOMBIA

By Earl Harding

As a people we have been so engrossed with interest in the building of the Panama Canal that we have given but little thought either to the means employed in securing the right to build it, or the uses to which it shall be put. The Canal has been our one great national enthusiasm—aside from baseball. We have been fascinated by its bigness and its military glamor. We have accepted indifferently the official diplomatic version of the accomplished fact of the secession of the Department of Panama from the mother country, Colombia, and since the apparent collapse of the senatorial investigation of 1906, most of us have forgotten the preliminaries and have turned our attention to watching “the dirt fly.”

One result of our national enthusiasm was to create an atmosphere jealous of investigation and impatient of criticism. Editors learned, or thought they learned, that the very word “Panama” was loaded with danger because the public seemed not to be able to differentiate between exposure and condemnation of the lawless acquisition of the Canal Zone and an attack upon the Canal enterprise itself. Wherefore there was a long period during which intelligent discussion and honest criticism of the Panama affair were so unpopular as to be almost entirely suppressed.

Many a time I have been advised to “forget Panama.” Many a time I have been told by men who should know better, that the people of the United States would never look back of their glorified Canal far enough to see its inglorious history. They were unwise prophets. The Canal itself has made the people of the United States think. They are beginning to realize that to “take” the Isthmus and “make the dirt fly” were phases of a national problem quite apart

from the operation of the Canal under conditions of international friendliness. Such conferences as this have been made possible by a new popular interest in the countries to the south of us, and this interest has been created by the Canal. Through such activities as this the vital importance of the Panama question is being brought home to the thoughtful people of the United States.

"In Justice to Colombia," the title given by the editor to an article in October *World's Work* in which I suggested a readjustment of boundaries at Panama as a step toward a settlement with Colombia, failed to reflect the spirit in which I wrote. I am not pleading for justice to Colombia; I hold no brief to present her claims; my major concern and sympathy are for my own country, and I bespeak a settlement of the "Panama question" *in justice to the United States*.

Most, if not all, of us believe in international justice in the abstract; but when it comes to the accomplishment of this ideal, whenever it is proposed in such a case as the affair of Panama to undo, so far as may be possible, an international wrong, we are confronted by the protest of that brand of jingoism that is too narrow ever to acknowledge a national fault. We are told that a consistent and unbroken front must be presented to the exterior world; that a nation's foreign policy, no matter how unrighteous or ill-advised, must be given undivided support, and that to gainsay it is sedition. We are solemnly told that if we really did steal Panama we must not confess it by making reparation; that it is nobler for us and our children and our children's children brazenly to endure the stigma thrust upon us by one overt act than to permit the nation to acknowledge and make amends for the commission of a flagrant international wrong.

He who sets out to tell the truth about the affairs of Panama must, therefore, answer first for himself this ethical question:

Does citizenship impose the moral obligation to uphold your government in an immoral foreign policy, when the life of the nation is not at stake?

For myself, I refuse to subscribe to this dual standard of political morality—one code of ethics for our domestic affairs and another for our foreign relations. I have no patience with the patriotism that holds our public servants to account, by criticism, investigation or impeachment, for what they may or may not do at home, yet absolves them from moral and legal restraint and holds their acts above review or repudiation the moment they cross our international boundary and commit some lawlessness in the name of the people of the United States.

Nor do I believe that the thoughtful men and women of this country imagine that as a nation we would suffer loss of character or caste or self-respect by frank acknowledgment that in a moment of ill-advised haste, in the false light of distorted truth, we committed an act of international injustice for which we desire to make honorable amends.

As to the entire righteousness of Columbia's claims and the method for adjusting them, public opinion in the United States has crystallized only in part, but there is a consensus approaching unanimity in the view that we cannot *afford* longer to ignore a weaker nation's demand that its case be given a fair hearing. The average citizen has gathered the impression that there was something questionable, at least, in our seizure of the Isthmus, and he wants the mess cleaned up. I am inclined to credit this aroused public opinion more to our awakening commercial consciousness than to a stimulated sense of abstract justice, though both forces have been conspicuously active in the few years that have passed since it was virtually impossible to obtain a hearing on the merit of Colombia's claims. We have waked up to a realization that it isn't good business to have Latin America forever pointing to our treatment of Colombia as justifying its aversion to "the Great Pig of the North." We have been experiencing a changed attitude toward all of Latin America with the approaching opening of new avenues of trade expansion; our commercial interests recognize as they never have before, that they have misunderstood and neglected a great, undeveloped world of opportunity southward, and that self-interest if not national self-respect

demands that the Panama controversy, as an obstacle to cordial relations, should be settled at any reasonable cost—and settled before the opening of the Canal.

Our question is, then, no longer *shall* we settle with Colombia but *how can* we settle?—and by settlement I mean not merely the award and collection of damages, not the enforced payment of a ledger account ten years past due, but such an adjustment as shall satisfy the injured pride of a despoiled and affronted nation, and rehabilitate the United States in the confidence and esteem of our southern neighbors.

How generous, how far-reaching that adjustment should be in order that it may meet the requirements of international justice and at the same time serve effectively to accomplish the essential material results, is a problem that calls for sober thought and helpful, sympathetic counsel both within and without governmental circles. We need a more intelligent and general comprehension, in the United States and in Colombia, of the rights and wrongs of the Panama question, if we are to have a public opinion that will recognize and support a just and effective settlement. And in endeavoring to create an enlightened public opinion we shall be discouraged at times, I fear, by the obstinacy of certain prejudices—particularly the prejudices of those persons who have been content to accept without proof the diplomatic version of the Panama affair.

The situation we must meet is set forth very concisely in a recent editorial in the *Chicago Tribune*, which I will read:

Colombia's grievances against the United States have always found a closed door because of the prevailing American opinion that there could be no equity in the claims of a nation caught so openly in sharp and dishonest practices. The Roosevelt retort, fostering and protecting the Republic of Panama, was accepted generally as a piece of larger justice, and Colombia, raging in its discomfiture, was observed with amusement.

Colombians have never ceased to press their demand for arbitration, and it has been an unusual procedure for the United States to be deaf to such an appeal. The prevailing opinion that a small rascal hurt by his own tricks was the plaintiff explains the indifference and obduracy here.

It is reported now that Secretary Bryan is willing to accept the demand for arbitration. It is altogether better so; better policy and fair justice. The United States should give Colombia a chance to put its loss in figures and present a statement of its damages to an impartial court. If it have in equity a claim for damages the claim should be met. A nice regard for our national honor requires at least a hearing.

This editorial is literally true. Ten years' denial of even a hearing can be attributed to a popular impression that this charge of attempted blackmail against Colombia was just. The accusation was false—so devoid of a basis of real fact that to its denial might be coupled all the qualifying adjectives that we have heard so often with the short and ugly word. The charge was foisted first upon the public through the sinister activities of the Panama Canal Company's lawyer and lobbyist, whose amazing confession that he bent to his employers' selfish ends the Congress, the President and the Secretary of State of the United States, is a document of public record.

I have searched the record of diplomatic correspondence transmitted to the United States senate, the Spanish version of the same records and Colombia's instructions to her diplomatic representatives in the archives of the foreign office at Bogota, the annals of the Colombian congress and the files of the Colombian papers of the period, and I find no vestige of justification, official, semi-official or unofficial, for this accusation of attempted blackmail against the United States. Yet it is upon this charge, iterated by a selfish and corrupt lobby and reiterated as cumulative slander by a man who should be aware of the truth—upon this accusation supported by no more than the assertion of interested persons, has public opinion hostile even to a hearing of the case been maintained in the United States.

A still more humiliating aspect of the truth is that the only suggestion that would warrant the assumption of a contemplated "hold-up" was not directed against the United States, but against the French Panama Canal Company, or the holders of its securities, who in certain proved instances were speculative bankers in Wall Street. Colombia never demanded, nor so much as officially or unofficially

suggested after the ratification in Washington of the Hay-Herran treaty that the \$10,000,000 payment by the United States should be increased. The Panama Canal Company's lobbyist, boasting that he drafted the diplomatic correspondence of our state department relating to this subject, and claiming pay from his employers for this alleged service, pointed out in writing that he foresaw that Colombia contemplated exacting a fee of probably \$10,000,000 for the privilege of transferring the company's non-transferable and nearly lapsed concession. The Canal lobby in Washington then set up the cry that Colombia was attempting to blackmail the United States.

Proof of these assertions has been a public record for nearly two years, and still a few editorial pages that are supposed to represent the enlightened public opinion of the United States occasionally reiterate this charge that Colombia was caught red-handed trying to blackmail the United States, and that therefore this great nation can afford to ignore the little nation's demand for justice.

To case-hardened materialists who can see nothing in international righteousness there is another way to appeal—through the wiles of that comely handmaiden of Justice—Expediency. We can "match them one better," I believe, on their argument that it isn't good business to pay for a thing twice. We may win them to an interest in the truth if we can show them that, having paid Panama \$10,000,000 for the canal rights, we can also pay Colombia, make a new arrangement that will do justice all around, and benefit ourselves in the bargain.

Taking stock first of our own necessities: *We need a wider Canal Zone.* Our ten-mile strip across the Isthmus, with the cities of Panama and Colon excluded from our jurisdiction, was planned when we were negotiating with Colombia and knew that it was futile to ask for more. After creating the Panama Republic we might have asked for and received as much additional territory as expediency seemed to require, since it was the original purpose of the handful of American and Panamanian conspirators to declare the independence of only the Canal Zone itself, which

they were to "bring under the protection of the United States."

Our territorial arrangement, with the dual government at the termini of the Canal, has proved to be so unsatisfactory that the advisability of annexing the whole Republic has been contemplated seriously by those burdened with the responsibility of providing for the Canal's protection. For obvious diplomatic reasons this could not be admitted officially; nevertheless, the inconvenience and the inadequacy of our arrangements at Panama must be apparent to anyone giving serious consideration to the military and commercial problems and possibilities of the Canal. If our ultimate necessities are not obvious now, project yourselves twenty-five or fifty years into the future, and visualize the municipal hodge-podge that must result from the up-coming—I will not say growth or development—of the commercial centers at the termini of the Canal with the separate governments and cross-purposes that must obtain so long as Panama and Colon are excluded from Canal Zone jurisdiction. Contrast this with the metropoli that should be developed in time at this American-made Bosphorus, this new cross-roads to the commerce of the world, if we but apply world-sense and foresight to bringing these cities under single-purposed administration, and planning and developing them as the great free port of the Western hemisphere.

For working out our military problem we need to bring under our control the entire watershed of the Canal, going back to the headwaters of the Chagres River to the South, and north to the limits of the basin of Gatun Lake—in all a Canal Zone 50 to 60 miles wide, instead of 10. With the possible addition of the Pearl Islands, this enlarged zone should provide all of our ultimate necessities for controlling the military approaches to the Canal and developing its greatest possibilities as a commercial center. Mr. Lindon W. Bates, on whose world-wide experience I have been privileged to draw, and whose engineering studies of the Panama problem are familiar probably to most of us, believes that ultimately the crossing at the Isthmus

should sustain a population of 1,000,000, and that adequate preparations in the way of city planning should not be deferred.

It seems too patent for argument that a shifting of arrangements at the Isthmus is inevitable; the only question is when should it be accomplished.

To acquire at *any* convenient time the territory that we ultimately shall need for Canal purposes could not reasonably be regarded as aggression, but if it could be obtained now in conjunction with a readjustment of boundaries that would work a measure of justice and satisfaction to Colombia, would it not appeal to the Panamanians as a less ruthless procedure than the taking of this needed territory twenty-five or fifty years later, when the next generation of Panamanians might have come actually to believe in the fiction that they established their own independence?

Until within the last three or four years Colombia has cherished the vision of a decree of international justice that should restore to her all of her plundered territory; but nearly every Colombian concedes by now that such a dream cannot come true.

"Then let Colombia set down her claim for damages in dollars and cents, and let us pay it," is the next suggestion.

Will you please remind our friends who believe that this is the way to clear our Canal title and save our self-respect, that gold is not a universal ointment. We might pay ten million dollars, twenty, fifty, yes, a hundred millions as indemnity; we might say in effect, "We don't think we owe you this money, but take it and stop making all this fuss;" and if we waited long enough Colombia, despairing, might take the money—but this would not stop the fuss. We might think we had removed the weapon and healed the wound, but the infected barb would still lie buried deep and we would hear from it year after year.

We might, as another alternative, after ten years of denying the facts and attempting to placate our accuser, let ourselves be dragged as a culprit before the bar of international justice, and if an arbitral court gave judgment against us, pay it with the protest that such procedure implies.

Suppose your brother—let us be idealists, concede a brotherhood of nations, and apply the measure of brotherhood here—suppose your blood-brother should inflict an irreparable injury, shoot off your leg or arm, say, and then deny his responsibility and say never a word of regret or sympathy; then at the end of ten or fifteen years you should drag him into court and make him pay—and he should send you a check, nothing more, no regrets, no apology, no “I am sorry, Brother, it was unfortunate and was wrong, you were at fault as well as I, but let us be freinds.” Suppose!

Now this, it seems to me, is the essence of our Panama problem: Unless we can resolve this quarrel so as to remove the causes of bitterness and leave no rancor of justice denied, we would better save our money and keep the question an open one until history shall give us a fairer perspective. Paying an indemnity unaccompanied by an acknowledgment that would satisfy the pride of the Colombian people, could serve no more practical purpose than throwing away our money. He who imagines that a sop of money alone would accomplish a real settlement of this grievance shows only his ignorance of the people with whom we have to reckon. That money will buy anything in Latin America, may find credence among those who form their judgments from such language as the following, applied to Colombia by a former President of the United States: “Government by a succession of banditti,” an “archaic despotism, inefficient, bloody and corrupt;” or this defense of the “taking” of Panama: “We did our duty by the world, we did our duty by the people of Panama, we did our duty by ourselves. We did harm to no one save as harm is done to a bandit by a policeman who deprives him of his chance for blackmail. The United States has many honorable chapters in its history but no more honorable chapter than that which tells of the way in which our right to dig the Panama Canal was secured and of the manner in which the work itself has been carried out.”

We have been given the impression that the Colombians are a lot of lazy, blackmailing savages; few of us have had the opportunity to see with our own eyes the culture of their

unique civilization, to know them face to face as an industrious, resourceful, and law-abiding people. I wonder how many of us who have judged Colombia by the measure of ex-official denunciation have heard that Simon Bolivar modeled his constitution after ours, and that until November, 1903, our Declaration of Independence and the portraits of our Presidents had honored places on the walls of the House of Representatives at Bogota, and that after the affair of Panama they were torn down and thrown into the street?

Money will not bridge such a gap in international relations. Colombia made this clear by rejecting in 1909 the hated tripartite treaty proposing that Panama receive recognition of its independence and contribute \$2,500,000 as its share of the Colombian foreign debt. Colombia exiled General Rafael Reyes, president, and Enrique Cortes, his minister to Washington who negotiated this treaty. She rejected President Taft's tentative offer of \$10,000,000, ostensibly for coaling station privileges and an option on the interoceanic canal route *via* the Atrato River. She has pressed for arbitration as the only self-respecting course she could follow, until recent developments transferred the negotiations to Bogota, where a committee of various political parties representing the foreign office is now dealing directly with the American minister.

For ten years the Panama question has taken precedence over every other issue in the Colombian press. The trend of discussion within the last month is indicated in an illuminating though possibly premature item in one of the latest Bogota papers, from which I read, in translation:

Insistent rumor points to the very strong probability that there have been signed in Washington, approved and signed here by the ministry and ratified by the commission of foreign relations, an understanding with the United States consummated on the following bases:

1. The government of the United States shall declare before the diplomatic corps in Washington that it owes reparation to Colombia, for having trampled upon her rights during a former administration.

2. At the opening of the Canal, the first American ships to pass through shall display the Colombian flag.

3. Colombian ships shall be guaranteed in perpetuity free passage through the Canal.

4. The boundary of Colombia shall be extended to the Canal Zone.

5. The United States shall pay to Colombia as indemnity \$20,000,000.

6. Matters in dispute relating to the Panama Railroad shall be submitted to arbitration.

I have a strong conviction that the Panama question should be kept out of a court of arbitration, excepting as it may be agreed possibly to submit collateral subjects: for a general arbitration, bringing solely a judgment for pecuniary damages, could not result happily. It would cause inevitable delay and tremendous expense, and would profit mainly the lawyers and press-agents who have attempted with scandalous effrontery to sell political influence, or pretended influence, to Colombia's representatives. It is to avoid such attempts at bartering international justice, and not for what might be unearthed at The Hague, that I have urged that the campaign to force the question to general arbitration should not be approved.

Colombia feels the injury to her pride more than the loss to her purse. She has held, and will continue to hold, the question of indemnity secondary to recognition that her national honor was violated.

I have been reminded that not many persons in the United States are inclined to take seriously the idea of national honor in one of the southern republics, and particularly not in Colombia. All the more then should we regret our ignorance! A people who fight three years, losing 80,000 men out of their total population of 4,000,000, piling on one battlefield, where 15,000 perished a huge monument of sun-bleached skulls that stands to this day a grim reminder of their last civil war—a people who can fight like this over the issue of a usurper, a free press and religious liberty—do you think it becomes us to sneer at their ideals and, speaking with no knowledge of the facts jump to the conclusion that they have no national honor?

To make amends that will meet Colombia's requirements and not meet the antagonism of the prejudiced and ill-informed of our own country—how can we accomplish that?

The most acceptable reparation for theft is return of the stolen property; if not intact, then so much as can be recovered, with some equivalent for the remainder.

Panama entire we cannot restore; Colombia does not expect it; but what is there to prevent handing back to her in frank recognition of her violated sovereignty, that part of Panama south of the Zone? The Canal would then become the geographical as well as actual dividing line between the continents. Colombia would be restored to the prestige of contiguity to the waterway. If the Zone were widened to the headwater of the Chagres the possibility of administrative friction would be very remote.

There is a very practical advantage both to Panama and to the United States in restoring the southern end of the Isthmus to the mother country. Its inhabitants, the San Blas Indians, defy the authority of the Republic of Panama and still maintain their loyalty to Colombia. Would our jingoes rather have the San Blas Indians friendly Colombians or hostile Panamanians, neighbors to the Gatun locks by one night's journey?

The most likely objector to the restoration of southern Panama to Colombia is an American who was given a few hundred thousand acres of this land as a reward for his generalship in that revolution of bloody memories—total killed and wounded, one jackass, one Chinaman! I know something of this territory whereof I speak. Cruising down the coast thirty or forty miles, thence up the broad miasmatic Bayano River, I found the alligator preserves of this Pan-American patriot. I had to go to see him there because on the day we arrived in Panama with an order of court to take testimony as to the real history of the secession, J. Domingo Obaldia, then president of the Republic, had written his faithful servitor this note:

My dear General; You will please make it convenient to visit your hacienda in Chepo and remain until further orders.

The General was not expecting "further orders" until the bothersome inquisitors should be well on their way back to New York; much less did he expect me.

Admitting that this territory is inconsequential to Panama and of no great intrinsic value to Colombia, it would become in its restoration to the mother country an instrument of tremendous importance. Its restoration would appeal to every son of Colombia who resents the epithets "black-mailer" and "bandit," and to whom the humiliation of national dismemberment means a personal affront; it would be to the Colombian tangible proof that the justice of his country's claims had been at last recognized before the world. Restitution of so much territory would open the way for a frank and friendly discussion of the ledger account of damages for property that cannot be returned; it would be a step toward a genuine settlement.

"But what about the Panamanians and their rights?" we are asked. "Are you going to rob the Panamanian Peter to pay the Colombian Paul?"

As to the moral rights of the Panamanians how extensive are they, in view of the deceit by which the congress and people of the United States were led to recognize their make-believe Republic on the assurance that they "rose literally as one man?" In truth, a handful of conspirators, nearly everyone an employee of the Canal Company, and the real leaders being American citizens, were all who knew about a revolutionary movement until the "blow" was struck. The Panamanians, through their self-appointed leaders, knowingly surrendered themselves hostages to exigency, to serve the purposes of the United States. Have they then moral grounds for expecting more than scrupulous fairness and sure protection from the vengeance of the mother country?

And if we seek to shroud the infant Republic in an aura of sentiment, can we find any inspiration in the sordid story of purchased treason—so much per general, so much per colonel, so much per soldier, with later a riotous distribution of easily-acquired American gold among the patriots of this soul-stirring war for liberty? If we hesitate to suggest infringing the area of Panama's sovereignty out of respect for sentiments of nationalism, should we not recall that Panama's span of pseudo-independence is but a decade,

while Colombia recently celebrated her centennial of constitutional self-government?

The Panamanian Peter would be divested of the form but not the substance of the material benefits for which he consented to make a perfectly safe revolution, under the pre-arranged protection of the United States. American administration and development of the terminal cities would be to his advantage. He would still have to the north of the Canal Zone the richest part—more than half—of his present domain, where he could exercise his genius for self-government with much more freedom than Uncle Sam can ever allow him in the midst of the Canal Zone.

So far as it affects the terminal cities and watershed, or any other portion of the Panama Republic which the United States may require, such a programme of readjustment is easy to arrange under the following clause of the Hay-Bunau-Varilla Treaty:

The Republic of Panama further grants to the United States in perpetuity the use, occupation, and control of any other lands and waters outside of the zone above described which may be necessary and convenient for the construction, maintenance, operation, sanitation, and protection of the said canal.

In substance we agreed to maintain Panama's independence, but not necessarily the integrity of her then, and still, undefined territory, the boundary at each end of the Republic being in question.

Ten years of administrative experience, fraught with friction and petty annoyances, show not only the convenience but the ultimate necessity for a single administration to insure the most advantageous development of the canal as a commercial enterprise; the military reasons for controlling the watershed are also obvious.

Whether legally we could impose upon Panama the alternative of restoring the San Blas region to Colombia or incurring the displeasure of the United States, I leave to the Internationalists as a question not likely to call for their answer, since a suggestion from Washington would doubtless be sufficient to secure Panama's cheerful acquiescence.

The editorials that followed the publication of this sug-

gested plan of settlement must have been a revelation to those who have no faith in the ultimate awakening of public opinion in this country. Only two papers out of some thirty or more whose editorial comment has been called to my attention, presumed to deny contemptuously that Colombia has a just claim.

One of them is the *Kansas City Star*, the organ of the Progressive party in that part of the country. The *Star* repeats the charge of blackmail as the final answer to Colombia, and declares that the taking of Panama under the circumstances "is held by the American people as one of the most noteworthy achievements of a noteworthy career."

The other publication that does not concede that we have anything to settle with Colombia is the *Outlook* which in its issue of October 11 says in part:

The people of Panama were unanimous in their revolt against Colombia, and the authority of Colombia collapsed in a night because she had neither moral nor physical power to enforce her authority. The people of this country will never concede that Colombia has a shadow of a claim against the United States for its prompt recognition of an oppressed people struggling for their rights. A queer idea of justice to Colombia is this proposal to attempt to satisfy her national pride and reconcile her warring factions with one another and with the United States by a Poland-like division of the territory of a people who have shown their right to liberty by daring to fight for it.

I wonder how the editor of *The Outlook* could write such a statement, with the picture before him of that bloody revolution in which the total casualties—and those accidental—were one jackass and one Chinaman!

The speaker preceding me has urged us to remember that the Canal cannot be a blessing to us while its title is clouded by an unrighteous act. I believe we must go farther, and realize that its *material advantages* cannot be ours until we shall have made a just settlement with the nation from whom we took the right to build it. Recent editorial expressions indicate that a considerable number of people are more impressed with the idea of providing for our own ultimate necessities at Panama than with the doing of abstract justice to Colombia for Justice's sake. If we can get their

support in no other way, then let us reconcile Justice with Expediency, and while doing no injustice to Panama, readjust our relations in a way to do full justice to Colombia, and to secure to the people of the United States the full benefits of the Canal.

THE RELATIONS OF THE UNITED STATES WITH THE LATIN-AMERICAN REPUBLICS

By Leopold Grahame, formerly editor of "The Buenos Aires Herald" and of "The Argentine Year Book"

To discuss the "Relations of the United States with the Latin-American Republics" without dealing with the conditions and policies which govern them, would be merely to re-affirm the noble and elevated sentiments expressed by the acts and declarations of the illustrious Presidents of the United States, from James Monroe down to the present eminently distinguished incumbent of that exalted office.

The relations of the United States with the Latin republics of the American continent, are based upon a mutual sympathy for those liberty-loving principles, essential to the greatness of any modern nation. It is a fundamental error to suppose that friendship with one nation implies the estrangement of another. The specific character of international relations differs according to the traditions and antecedents of the people and to the more material factors in their intercourse. The Latin republics, whilst indebted to a heroic generation of their own race for their emancipation from the yoke of colonial serfdom, owe the firm establishment and maintenance of their justly-claimed independence to the sympathies and active support of the people and early governments of the United States who initiated the policy which has made this country the champion of sovereign rights throughout the American continent and the guide of the younger nations in the evolution of their political conceptions and aspirations.

Those nations recognize with gratitude the help thus extended to them in their struggles for freedom and organic constitution; and they also recognize that in safeguarding

American independence from possible foreign foes, the United States has never encroached upon their individual liberty. Therefore, all the antecedents and all the traditions impel a sincere desire on their part for the development of American union, by harmony of thought and of action with the great representative of continental integrity. These are the links of gratitude which form the relations of the south with their elder sister of the north.

The reciprocal relations are to be found in the similarity of conditions which gave birth to all the nations of America and led to the attainment of the proud position they occupy today in the world's affairs. So, as the United States had to conquer savage Indians, to suffer war, and to endure misery and great sacrifices in the effort to develop the resources of vast uninhabited territories and to establish the principles of liberty and justice, many of the Latin nations of America have successfully overcome the same difficulties and today are inviting the rest of the world to add to their developments and to share their wealth. These are the sources whence have sprung the friendship and sympathy of the United States for those ardent democracies. It is that touch of human nature which makes us all kin. It is that inborn sentiment of admiration for high and just ideals which arouses in the minds of educated Englishmen of the present time, a reverential respect for the memory of the great men who framed and signed the Declaration of American Independence. It is the same spirit which inspires Spain to delight in the triumph of her truant children across the seas and in the magic awakening of Ibero-America. It is the conquest of the arts of peace and of true civilization over the feudalism and barbarism of the past. It is the worship of the Statue of Liberty gazing out from every harbour of the American continent; and it is upon the foundation of sympathy and friendship arising out of that lofty conception of true democracy, that American unity is being built up and the relations of all the American countries defined and maintained.

It has been urged that the phenomenal progress of the greater countries of South America has merged this senti-

mental view into more practical considerations; but those who are acquainted with enlightened public opinion in Latin America, regard the suggestion as devoid of all real foundation. The nations of the new continent should not and will not forget that from Great Britain they have received the bulk of the capital which has given vitality to their currents of commerce and industry; and that from other European countries they have secured the laborers to sow and reap their abundant harvests; but these conditions in no way impede an extension of friendly relations with the United States, looking towards further progress, increased trade, and a policy whereby to consolidate the destinies of all the American nations.

The causes which have chiefly operated to restrict the social and commercial intercourse of the southern countries with the United States, are the difficulties of distance and the lack of direct means of communication, but, above all, a mutual want of knowledge of the conditions, of the desires, and of the widely divergent racial characteristics of the people respectively inhabiting the two divisions of the continent. It is this ignorance of essential conditions, prevailing throughout America, that has led to international misunderstandings, to misconceptions and to doubts and suspicions, which have militated against an extension of commercial and friendly relations, so necessary to the welfare of the entire continent. If that not inconsiderable number of people in the United States who associate the term "South America" with all the elements of disorder and dishonesty; and those people of Latin America who regard the policy of the United States as being dictated by the ultimate purpose of territorial conquest and other selfish objects, were to examine the records of history and the actually existing circumstances, there would be a change of conditions that would give to the word "America" an interpretation signifying the highest ideals of justice, of peace, and of progress.

Warm-hearted, impulsive, and eager for political emancipation, the Latin-American people have invariably subordinated material advantage to social and intellectual

development; and if, through the initial error, in some cases, of implanting laws and institutions in advance of their times, turbulent political conditions were produced during anxious periods of their national formation, their latter-day progress in every field of human activity demonstrates their capacity for self-government and the possession of those rare qualities which make for national greatness in the fullest sense of those words. The basic conditions of all the Latin republics are identical; and the solid advance which has been made by Argentina, Brazil and Chile, will assuredly be repeated in the republics of lesser importance, in a degree corresponding to their opportunities, their geographical situation and the extent of their resources. All of those countries have suffered and have had their national forces weakened by the many uprisings which followed their liberation; but most of them have realized the necessity for discarding their factional colors; and, under a common flag, to unite in diverting their energies from revolutionary activity, to the more beneficial course of developing their national industries, of advancing their intellectual movements, and of directing their legislation towards securing freedom and the highest form of protection for the interests of those who inhabit their territories. The people of those lands are now dedicating their efforts to objects which exalt the human mind and give high rank to nations. They cherish the principles of liberty, within the limits of order, and they are striving for continued progress under constitutional and honest governments.

Practically, all their constitutions are modelled upon the lines of the magnificent instrument which has made this country great and free; and, I need only point to the first provision of the national Constitution of the Argentine Republic, to show the breadth of the principles upon which the sovereignty of that country was founded. Its primary objects are declared to be:

to create national unity, to consolidate justice and internal peace, to provide for the common defence, to promote the general welfare; and to assure the benefits of liberty to us, to our descendants and to all the people of the world who may reside in Argentine territory.

Nor is this charter of the people's rights and liberty a mere matter of theory. The principles it embodies have been carried into practice in every form of legislation. In that republic, as in others of Latin America, there is absolute civil and religious freedom; there are no restrictions upon healthy immigration, or upon the nationality of land-owners. The naturalization laws are liberal enough to enable foreigners of merit to hold official positions without regard to the customary residential qualifications; the patriotic and other national celebrations of the inhabitants of foreign birth, are respected, and even participated in, by the sons of the soil; and, side by side with this remarkable development of free institutions, there is an earnest and deeply-rooted desire that whilst internal peace is being thus consolidated, there should be no causes for suspicion, or international conflicts amongst the American nations.

All the people of Latin America regard as paramount to every other consideration, the integrity of their national territory and their complete independence; and, influenced by those sentiments, it is hardly surprising that they should have misunderstood the motives underlying the occasional exercise of vigorous diplomatic action on the part of the United States in her past relations with some of the less-advanced countries of Latin America. Recent events have shown, beyond question, that the true policy of the United States in regard to the Latin nations of America, is to assist in their peaceful and progressive development, without encroachment upon their sovereignty or upon their independence; but it must be remembered that the most valued interests of this country would be imperilled by a condition of chronic disturbance within the borders of some of its neighbors.

American action in Cuba, demonstrates that the acquisition, by conquest, of the territory of any of the Latin republics, is repellent to the principles of the clearly defined attitude of the United States towards the southern countries. The policies of Rush, of Henry Clay, of Monroe, of Lincoln, of Blaine, and of other great apostles of American liberty, are being continued today by all the recognized leaders

of American thought. For the first time in the history of the United States, that great man, Elihu Root, laid aside his important duties as secretary of state, to preach the gospel of Pan-Americanism throughout Latin America. His distinguished successor, Williams Jennings Bryan, inspired by similar motives, traveled through thousands of miles of the continent to assure the Ibero-Americans of the friendly sympathy of the great republic of the north with their legitimate aspirations. That eminent citizen, ex-President Roosevelt, is, at the present moment, devoting his labors and his energy to the self-imposed task of assisting the international union which is the hope of all good Americans; and to this brilliant roll there must now be added the honored name of the present illustrious chief executive of the United States, President Wilson. Only a few days ago, that faithful servant of the people, speaking with all the responsibility of his position and with all the sincerity which marks his every utterance, declared the policy of his administration, in relation to the republics of the western hemisphere, to be one of morality and justice, against political or financial expediency. That declaration of the President whose disregard of material advantage for the enforcement of high-minded principles, will add lustre and prestige to the name of the United States in the council of nations, should be printed in letters of gold throughout the American continent.

In the definition of the policy so expressed, President Wilson wisely added to his references to the sister-republics the statement, that

We must prove ourselves their friends and champions upon terms of equality and honor. You cannot be friends upon any other terms than upon the terms of equality.

That is the key-note of the whole situation. The cultured and sensitive Latin mind resents condescension, domination, or, the suggestion of inequality. Prior to Senator Root's visit to South America, in 1906, there existed a very wide distrust of American policy which was intensified by international rivalries and by the belief, in the

Argentine Republic, arising out of press misrepresentations, that the United States had designs, as the result of a supposed diplomatic alliance with Brazil, to establish a hegemony in that part of the continent. Fortunately, the eloquent and frank declarations of the state secretary to the effect that the United States was actuated by the sole purpose of promoting the friendly intercourse of all the American republics; and that anything in the nature of an alliance was opposed to the policy and traditions of his country, produced an entire revulsion of feeling and cemented the bonds of that friendship, which has been so beautifully manifested during Colonel Roosevelt's recent visit to that favored land. Such incidents point clearly to the conclusion that every serious rupture that has disturbed the friendly relations of the United States with the other republics, has been due to ignorance of actual conditions, or, to a distortion of the real facts of the case.

The United States has two spheres of action in Latin America, diplomatic and commercial; and, in this connection, I would refer to a matter which I regard as of the highest importance to a satisfactory fulfilment of those missions. With a natural desire to enjoy fitting and dignified representation in the capitals of Europe, the United States has entrusted its principal embassies to the care of a long succession of brilliant men who have worthily represented the interests and maintained the traditions of this great country; but, without detracting from the high character and qualifications of the many distinguished citizens to whom have been confined the diplomatic missions to the smaller countries of Latin America, it may be said to have become a custom to regard such appointments as altogether of minor importance. May I be permitted to suggest that the services of the great diplomats of the United States are more needed in the capitals of some of the republics of Central and South America, than in London, Paris, Berlin, Rome, Madrid, or St. Petersburg? It is not complimentary to the countries which have sent to Washington such distinguished diplomats and international jurists, as Nabuco, Quesada, Garcia Merou, Da

Gama, Naon, and others, that the mere suggestion that men of the type of Joseph H. Choate, John Hay, James Russell Lowell, Whitelaw Reid, or David Jayne Hill, should be sent to represent their country in the South American republics, would be popularly regarded as ridiculous.

There are many other factors to be considered in the relations of the United States with the sister republics; and one of the most important of these is the approaching opening of the Panama Canal. The operation of that colossal monument to American enterprise, will bridge the distance and remove the necessity for the circuitous routes of travel which now separate the north from the south; and will produce an active interchange of visits that will bring the people of the two races into closer touch, with the result that their better mutual knowledge and understanding of character and conditions will lend to increased association and friendship. For that reason alone, it is imperatively demanded that peace and order should be established in all the countries adjacent to the Canal Zone. That condition of affairs is indispensable to the welfare of every part of the continent. Today, all countries must conform to the higher order of civilization imposed upon them by the exigencies of universal peace and good will. The minor republics of the American continent have many beautiful examples to follow; and for these they have only to look to Argentina, Brazil, and Chile, whose great achievements in every phase of national effort and duty have evoked the admiration of the world at large. In a corresponding degree it is the duty of those less fortunately situated, to enter upon the same forward march, in order that they may attain the position to which their traditions and their resources entitle them.

It is a happy augury for the future that the sentiment of American union is gradually deposing the spirit of imperialism which, in latter years, has found favor with a small section of the American people. It is a still happier augury that increasing interest in the establishment of good relations with Latin America, is being promoted by such distinguished men as those present here today and by such

institutions as this great university. This illuminating conference constitutes a combination of enlightenment and justice; and it has afforded me deep gratification to participate in the furtherance of its noble aims and objects which cannot fail to be productive of beneficial results to the cause of Pan-Americanism. The influential representation of the Pan-American Union, at this gathering, affords proof of the importance and worthiness of the occasion; and I feel sure that in offering a tribute of admiration to the magnificent services of its Director-General, John Barrett—the friend and ambassador of Latin America—and of its Assistant Director, Senor Yánès, in the propagation of the true doctrine, I am but re-echoing the sentiments of all my distinguished fellow-guests from different parts of the continent. Through the Archipelago of the Antilles, through the States of Central America, from the Rio Grande to the Straits of Magellan, and from Punta Arenas to the most eastern extension of South America, there will be a profound appreciation of the efforts of Clark University to strengthen and bind in friendly union all the nations of America.

THE MIND OF THE LATIN-AMERICAN NATIONS

*By David Montt, General Correspondent of "El Diario
Ilustrado," Santiago, Chile*

Before starting the reading of this paper I wish to make it known that I come here to express my personal views on matters referring to the South American nations and not as a representative of any institution and having no authority to speak in behalf of my government.

This paper, which has been prepared at short notice, will deal especially with the influence of the United States and the European powers upon the development of this group of republics which I call the Latin-American nation. I have entitled this paper "The Mind of the Latin-American Nation" because my purpose is to deal especially with the foreign influence on the making up of the Latin-American soul and not with the development of our industries or the exploitation of our natural resources by foreign enterprise and capital.

Whenever I make my statements of a general character, I wish it to be understood that I am doing so by inductive logic because I think that many of the problems that affect my own nation are common problems affecting the life of all the Latin-American countries. I am considering the nations as having a mind, a mind of a complex constitution if you wish, but to which more or less the same laws that govern the human mind can be applied. We often hear of persons acting under the influence of suggestions, or auto-suggestions, and I think that nations often act under such influences, disobeying many times the dictates of justice. A prominent writer on psychology has said: "The subjective mind is constantly controllable and controlled by suggestions coming either from without or from within." This statement applies equally as well to nations. It is the influence upon

the mind of the Latin-American nation coming from without that I wish to review.

In the first place let me recite a few historical facts and make known, in justice to the United States, what this country did at the birth of our republics and the influence of those facts upon our succeeding life. When Napoleon fell, who was, as somebody said "The crowned people," and when Russia, Austria and Prussia organized the Holy Alliance, Spain asked for its support in order to subject the insurgent colonies of South America. The United States, with the backing of Minister Channing of England, exposed to the world the plans of that backward and oppressing alliance and recognized the independence of the new republics, soon after the proclamation of our own independence in 1818. Once reëstablished the despotic government of Ferdinand VII, Spain renewed her attempts to regain control of the Latin-American republics. The United States proclaimed the Monroe Doctrine, which was then our protecting shield and moral support against the ambitions of the European monarchies. Since that time the Union has been sending us elements of defense, elements of intellectuality and of material development. As years go by, we find, however, that the beneficial influence that the United States had at the beginning of our independent life, is overshadowed by the moral influence of the continental powers. However, we had enough impulse given to us, by the example of this great Union, to enable us to keep alive our democratic institutions, which today are endangered by the influence of the European monarchies, which has created and maintain an undesirable aristocracy in the heart of our apparent democratic institutions.

It would be hard to make laws dealing with the moral influence of a nation upon another and the development of trade between them. Today, we could not say, for instance, whether moral influence brings trade, or whether trade brings moral influence. The fact is, however, that during this period of moral influence of the United States upon Chile the trade relations between the two countries were most encouraging and satisfactory. It was during that period

that American enterprise had the most flourishing start in South America. During that period Wheelwright, an American, established the first steamship line in the Pacific connecting Chile directly with this country. The same man started the exploitation of our coal mines and nailed the first nails of the first South American railroad, between Copiapó and Caldera. Meiggs, an American civil engineer, soon after connected by railroad our capital city and our main port, Valparaiso. Even during our fight for freedom, we saw American spirit and American enterprise coming to our assistance. As early as 1811 Arnold Heber brought to Chile the first printing press, which we keep, today, as a sacred relic in our national museum in Santiago. I can rightly say, therefore, that Americans were the founders of the national press in Chile. A few years later we find another American who, associated with a Chilean, founded one of the oldest and most important papers published in Latin America, *El Mercurio*.

I have mentioned the fact of the press being founded by American citizens and the fact that this press was therefore highly saturated with American ideas and ideals, because I think that this "Fourth Power of the State" was then largely responsible for the friendly attitude of Chile towards the United States in the early period of its life. The press is certainly a power and whether directed for good or evil its influence upon the minds of the people cannot be denied. It is a common belief that yellow journalism in this country precipitated the Spanish American war. It is also a common statement that it was a selfish and prejudicial idea which animated the yellow press. Recent disclosures made in connection with the proceedings against the Krupp interests in Germany have revealed to the world that this same selfish motive animated the larger part of the press of both Germany and France, in order to keep alive the ill-feeling and differences between the two nations. In this case, this most shameful campaign conducted through the columns of the press had no other purpose than to promote and increase the purchase of armaments by the two countries mentioned. This very same scheme was tried and carried nearly to successful completion between two South Amer-

ican republics. It is not long ago that two sister nations, which always had the same ideals, the same abundance of resources, the same pursuits, were brought to the verge of a war. Again, it was the influence of European armament manufacturers which impressed the minds of these two nations to make them think that their trivial differences could not be settled without resorting to arms. It took the patriotism and courage of highly spirited citizens of both countries to bring out the truth and wake us up from this dreadful nightmare. That we were only acting under foreign influence is proven by the fact that we settled the affair in a most peaceful manner and the friendliness of the two nations was strengthened by closer ties. As a final chapter to the incident, we erected on the peak of the Andes a monument to the Great Master, as an expression of thanks to providence for having liberated us from the very undesirable influence of these European gun manufacturers. The differences between the two nations were then settled forever and I am proud to say today that no other two nations in the world are coöperating, and will coöperate in the future, more efficiently towards the welfare of mankind than Argentine and Chile.

The satisfactory solution of the problem of Argentine and Chile has left to my knowledge five international questions to be settled in South America.

Let me briefly review these differences, because I think that their statement and their acknowledgment will be a factor in their solution. Furthermore, I have too high an estimation of the good sense of the Latin-American republics to think that any of these problems will ever produce an armed conflict. But instead the promotion of commercial intercourse between these nations will entirely do away with these differences and bring permanent and satisfactory conditions. Ex-President Taft very well expressed it: "Trade is peace." I also think that the absolute elimination of the Monroe doctrine will very much tend towards the promotion of a strong union among the South American republics.

As I have stated before, this doctrine has been of great

value to the Latin-American nations, because at a time they were unable to defend themselves against the attacks of foreign powers. This inability of ours to resist the attacks of foreign nations was then largely due to our lack of the spirit of coöperation, a fact well known and characteristic to the Latin races. A fact that is now preventing, in South America, the organization of large political parties. I am pleased to say, however, that we are getting over these drawbacks and that our admiration for the wonderful progress of this country is making us realize that to attain similar progress we need to develop the spirit of coöperation.

But this is a little digression.

In saying that the absolute elimination of the Monroe Doctrine will help very much towards the promotion of a strong union in the South American republics I meant to say that by leaving Latin America absolutely free from this now only apparent protecting shield of the doctrine already mentioned, it will further bring out the need of a Pan-American Union. Let me now briefly state what I consider the most interesting international problems in South America today. As I have said, my idea is that their impartial exposition will be a factor in their solution. As I am a Chilean, and realizing that as such the impartiality of my utterances would be doubted, I will leave out the statement of the differences between Peru, Bolivia and Chile, which, fortunately, are today practically settled in a most satisfactory and dignified manner.

I have before me the exposition of three problems with which to occupy part of the time I have been assigned in this morning's session. These problems are: (1) The relations between Argentine and Brazil; (2) the problem of Paraguay; (3) the problem of Uruguay.

THE RELATIONS BETWEEN ARGENTINE AND BRAZIL

The origin of the differences between these two countries lies in the ancient rivalry between Portugal and Spain, during the time of South American conquest, which was then evidenced by the frequent conflicts between the

Spaniards and the Portuguese. For the sake of information, it would be well to state that although Spain, at that time, was always successful in her wars with Portugal, very often the latter nation obtained better results after the differences were settled. So the Portuguese diplomacy was pronounced and it is claimed that the Jesuits were expelled from the Spanish possessions by the workings of this diplomacy. It is obvious that this religious order was in fact the advanced army of the Spanish civilization. Therefore, when Brazil saw the light of its independent life it found itself the possessor of an immense amount of land. Argentine received from Spain smaller territorial rights but with them also obtained from the mother country the hereditary hatred of the Spaniards for the Portuguese.

Although, in fact, the actual cause of the trouble lies in the desire of both nations to control the outlet of the River Plate, which is to Argentine, and would be to Brazil, what the Mississippi River is to this country. Many South American statesmen declare that this issue alone is endangering the independence of Uruguay. But the foreign immigration to Argentine, Uruguay and Brazil and the common sense of the peoples of these countries are extinguishing the prejudices of the past and creating, as I said before, a strong current of international trade, all of which, together with equality of military and naval power, both of Argentine and Brazil, are furnishing a most stable guarantee of peace, and a most solid foundation for the development of a permanent friendship between the two nations.

THE PROBLEM OF PARAGUAY

This problem deals rather with the constant internal unrest of the country, due to foreign influence. This situation had its origin in the war of the Triple Alliance. Paraguay was then not divided among the victorious nations, simply because Argentine thought it to be a good policy to keep it as an independent nation, proclaiming to that effect the then famous and well known doctrine "that victory does not entitle to territorial rights." The present result of this

settlement of the war is, as I said, the internal political unrest in Paraguay, as well as in Uruguay. No other example could be given in the history of the world of a more active influence of foreign nations in the internal policies of any country. It has been a known fact for years, that whenever the government of Paraguay is in the hands of a political party agreeable to Argentine, Brazil would help the opposing party morally and financially, allow it to organize its forces in Brazilian territory, and encourage it to overthrow the existing administration. Reverse the circumstances and you will find that a similar process goes on in Argentine with respect to Brazil. But to my knowledge these things have ceased to happen. The South American countries are growing wiser and their present energies are mainly directed to the wonderful development of their inexhaustible natural resources. This is, I think, our greatest blessing, for nations that are busy and intensely preoccupied in the development of their natural resources will never think of diverting their energies and misusing their strength in the ungrateful task of an international war.

The attitude of the United States towards these questions has been, in the past, far from being definite. To my knowledge it has changed with the changes in the administration. Up to recent years, however, the general policy of the government in Washington has been to treat the South American nations in a fashion similar to that employed in dealing with the countries of Central America. A striking example of this occurred only a few years ago in a proposition between Chile and the United States, better known as the Alsop claim. In that instance, the department of state sent out an ultimatum to the ministry of foreign affairs of my country stating that the American representative in Santiago would be called back to Washington should the question not be settled within ten days. At the time no intelligent person in Chile denied the justice of the claim, but the method of procedure was the thing we objected to. Such an instance as this is liable to develop an ill-feeling between North and South America, but fortunately for us this parti-

cular case was satisfactorily settled by arbitration. When these questions of international interest come up in South America, the eyes of the world will always turn to this country to see what it will do, under the circumstances.

As previously stated, I esteem too highly the intelligence and common sense of the Latin-American nations to think that they could not settle their differences without the unwelcome interference of foreign nations. The policy of the present administration, in keeping its hands off Mexico, is commanding the admiration and respect of all the South American continent. Had the United States always proceeded in the same tactful manner, that it is now using with regard to the Mexican situation, there would have been no foundation for the ill-feeling, which to a degree, is still felt in South America towards the United States.

The elimination of misunderstanding between nations is always a most desirable thing. The visits to South America of prominent statesmen, like Hon. Elihu Root, and later of Hon. Wm. J. Bryan, have done much towards the elimination of misunderstandings in the Pan-American continent. Tours of inspection and study of the Latin-American conditions, like the recent tour of the Boston Chamber of Commerce, are also most important factors in eliminating prejudice and modifying the opinions of both American and South American people. The gathering of Pan-American congresses are also doing much towards bringing the nations of the western world into closer touch and last, but not least, the organization of conferences, like the one in which I have the honor of being present, prepare the ground for the thorough understanding by the Latin-American nations of the ideals and purposes of the people of the United States and will hasten the beginning of a second era of genuine American influence in South America.

HIGHER EDUCATION IN LATIN AMERICA

By Edgar Ewing Brandon, Ph.D., Vice-President of Miami University

Striking contrasts and unexpected similarities between home and foreign practices form the basis of observation when one begins to investigate foreign institutions. Considering that this address must cover a wide area in a short time, I have constructed it in its main lines upon the principle of comparison, feeling that whether I did so or not, my hearers would consciously or unconsciously apply this principle. The first comparison involves the definition of "Higher Education." In the United States, as the term is applied, it is commonly considered as embracing the independent college or the department of arts, science and philosophy in the university, the graduate school, which is a continuation of the college, and the professional schools of law, theology, medicine, pharmacy, dentistry, engineering, education, agriculture, and in later years, commerce. All studies in these professional schools have been designated as higher education although formerly a secondary school diploma was not uniformly a prerequisite to admission, and unfortunately, it is not yet everywhere demanded.

In Latin America, higher education is confined almost exclusively to the professional schools of law, medicine, pharmacy, dentistry, engineering, agriculture, education and commerce. In many states, however, the schools of agriculture, education and commerce are not there classed as parts of higher education. Only two or three countries retain in their universities the department of letters and philosophy. Strictly speaking, there is no graduate school. Schools of art and music are not an integral part of the university organization, but are everywhere subsidized by the government and enjoy a prestige not usually accorded to such institutions in the United States. Higher education

in Latin America is, therefore, almost wholly professional education, and to these professional colleges, admission is gained directly from the secondary school as in Continental Europe. Full secondary education is, however, absolutely required for admission to the traditional liberal professions, and also to those of more recent creation, such as agriculture, commerce, etc., when these form part of the university.

FACILITIES

A Latin-American university is, therefore, only a group of professional schools. Naturally there is little cohesion or unity. In some countries, such as Brazil, Bolivia and Guatemala, there is no university organization; the schools of law, medicine, etc., are separate institutions, dependent directly upon the government and answerable directly to the minister of public instruction. Moreover in the countries that have the university organization, many provincial universities have but two faculties—as law and pharmacy. In speaking of the facilities for higher education in Latin America, it will be more practical, therefore, to group together the schools of a single profession than to cite the number and names of the universities. At the time of my investigations in 1911-12, there were approximately sixty-eight law schools in Latin America, distributed as follows: one each in Cuba, Haiti, Santo Domingo, Guatemala, Salvador, Costa Rica and Uruguay; nineteen in Mexico; four in Columbia; three in Venezuela; four in Ecuador; three in Nicaragua; four in Peru; four in Bolivia; four in Chile; four in Argentina; ten in Brazil. Of medicine there were thirty-two, distributed as follows: one each in Cuba, Haiti, Santo Domingo, Guatemala, Salvador, Honduras, Peru, Chile, Paraguay and Uruguay; two each in Ecuador, Bolivia, Argentine and Venezuela; three each in Columbia and Brazil; seven in Mexico. Nearly every medical college contains also the departments of pharmacy and dentistry. Of engineering there were fifteen colleges, distributed as follows: one each in Cuba, Mexico, Columbia, Venezuela, Ecuador, Peru and Uruguay; two in Chile; three in Argentine; four

in Brazil. Of agriculture there were fourteen: one each in Cuba, Mexico, Honduras, Venezuela, Peru, Bolivia and Uruguay; two each in Chile, Argentine and Brazil.

Only Cuba, Chile and Argentine have colleges of education, and only Argentine, Bolivia and Mexico have colleges of commerce. I distinguish between a school and a college as applied to the departments of education, commerce and agriculture, etc., on the basis of entrance requirements, a "college" demanding the full secondary education for admission, a "school" having lower requirements. Practically all countries have schools of commerce and agriculture as well as normal schools and some are admirable of their type but few countries offer higher education in commerce and education.

Theological education for the Roman Catholic church is given in the diocesan seminaries and is relatively elementary. The archbishop may maintain a *gran seminario* in which the studies reach higher levels. A few of the old universities continue the traditional faculty of theology, but the number of students is negligible.

The college of liberal arts as a separate institution does not exist anywhere in Latin America (except possibly at Bogota and MacKenzie College at São Paulo in Brazil) and only the universities of Peru, Cuba and Argentine retain the departments of philosophy and letters.

EQUIPMENT

The matter of equipment in the institutions of Latin America is very unequal and there is even a large disparity in the equipment of the different colleges of the same university. In the mere matter of buildings, no South American University has suitable and adequate buildings throughout. As most of the institutions are of comparatively ancient foundation, they have inherited the colonial quarters, which were copies of the monastic universities of mediaeval Europe, while the institutions of more recent establishment have been compelled often through poverty to content themselves with hired buildings. Of the larger and more cele-

brated universities, only those of La Plata and Uruguay have all their departments housed in edifices that post-date the colonial era. Buenos Aires has distinctly modern buildings for the colleges of medicine and agriculture. The college of law is established in an ancient property to which have been added in time newer lecture halls and a library. The college of letters and philosophy occupies a building which was formerly a residence, while the college of engineering occupies a block of buildings erected at different epochs and for different purposes, one of the chemical laboratories being installed in the chapel of a colonial convent. As regards buildings, the University of Chile may be taken as typical of the varied material equipment of a good Latin-American university. The medical college has a building erected especially for it some forty years ago. It is dignified in appearance and relatively adequate. The dental college (which however in Chile is not a part of the university organization), has a thoroughly modern structure. The engineering college occupies a good building some fifty years old. It was constructed to accommodate the whole university of that day. It is consequently not well adapted to its present uses. The law college has to content itself with a hired building which was once a residence. The same is true of the college of architecture.

In nearly all countries the medical schools are the most favored in the matter of buildings. Even in the smaller countries, this department has been given relatively modern buildings and good facilities for the prosecution of its work. Next in order of commodious quarters comes the engineering college. Its work, so largely laboratory in character, has incited the erection of suitable buildings. The agricultural colleges, being very recent and demanding larger grounds for experimental work, have drifted to the suburbs away from the crowded conditions of the older departments. The colleges of law and of letters have been and are still the least favored.

The libraries are not as extensive or as rich as the great age of many universities would lead one to expect. This is explained in part by the fact that in the colonial period

the institutions were strictly ecclesiastical and their work was almost exclusively theological, or preparatory to theological studies. The university library of that time comprised, therefore, only classical and theological works. Another explanation is the fact that the chief universities are located at the national capitals and every country has its national library, which has often been developed at the expense of the university library.

The striking feature of the university libraries is the large number of works in languages other than the national language. It is true that Spain has not nearly kept pace with her European neighbors in scientific studies and scientific production. The Spanish-American countries have not yet produced many original scientific works themselves, and have, therefore, been forced to have recourse to foreign literatures for the materials of advanced study. This is unfortunate, as it unconsciously gives a tinge of depreciation to the national idiom as a vehicle of learning. French scientific books form the great majority of the library collections and are also much used as regular texts. This arises from the historic prestige of the French language and the ease with it is acquired by other Latin peoples. Of the works consulted by students and professors in the library of the medical college of Montevideo in a recent year, 154 were in German, 231 in Portuguese, 239 in English, 1243 in Italian, 2793 in Spanish and 5816 in French.

Laboratory equipment is fairly adequate to the demands made upon it. Unfortunately, from a North American viewpoint, the Latin-American practice fails to make the fullest use of the laboratory. As a rule, it is used simply for demonstrations by the instructor in the presence of the class and not for frequent individual experiment by each and every student. Hence one of the greatest advantages of laboratory studies is lessened. Particularly is this true in engineering and agricultural schools. In medical schools, more individual use is made of the equipment. Many Latin-American educators admit the inadequacy of the mere demonstration method in laboratory, and the best universities

are changing their practice in this respect; but the advance in engineering schools is greatly hampered by tradition.

The lack of better buildings must not be attributed to indifference to higher education. The Latin-American takes an exceptional pride in handsome public buildings and in the material aspect of the universities. In some countries, the rapid growth of the population has so increased the university enrollment that the public revenues have been inadequate to the demands made upon them. Buenos Aires has as many thousands in her university today as she had hundreds thirty years ago.

In states where immigration has not been marked, the reorganization of higher education in the past two decades in order to adapt it to the new scientific era has exhausted the available resources.

There is scarcely a country, large or small, rich or poor, that has not built and equipped its institutions of higher learning as well and as fast as it could well afford. Some have been even too lavish here in proportion to the expenditures for elementary and secondary education.

ORGANIZATION

Latin-American universities are more closely related to and more dependent upon the political powers of the country than is the case with North American state universities. They are, however, in name almost universally autonomous, i.e., the professors constitute a corporation that is self-perpetuating. Vacant professorships are filled by the faculty itself. The control of the state resides in the fact that the chief executive, through the minister of public instruction, has the veto power over every election, and the further fact that the institution is directly dependent upon the state for its revenues. Few have endowments of any considerable value, and no fixed percentage of the state revenues are allotted by statute or constitutional provision to the university as is the case in many of our states. The veto power is, however, seldom exercised in a way to infringe upon the liberty of teaching, or in the sense of political spoils. In a

few states, where autocratic methods have been in vogue in politics, the same principle extends to the universities, but these states are exceptions. The institutions of higher learning in Latin America, whether universities or detached departments of professional schools, are all state institutions. They may have had their beginnings far back in colonial times and been originally chartered by the church, but they have been completely secularized and now owe allegiance to the state only. Further, they are more than mere academic bodies. They not only train for the professions, but their degrees virtually confer the sanction to exercise the professions. They are the state's agents for the administration of the so-called learned professions.

It is true that the Roman Catholic Church in Chile and also in Argentine maintains a Catholic university comprising certain faculties, but these universities have no power to grant professional licenses. In this sense, the state in Latin America maintains a monopoly of higher, or at least of professional education.

There is still another bond that links the Latin-American university with the state that is foreign to North American customs. Notwithstanding the fact that a teacher by profession and but recently a college president sits in the White House at Washington, it is nevertheless true that academic life in the United States has run in quite different channels from the political life. Not so in Latin America. There statecraft and the professorate have been closely allied. A man of talent easily passes from the professor's chair to political administration and as easily returns. The Latin-American professor is seldom devoted to research as a vocation. It may be an avocation. (I have already noted that there are no graduate schools strictly speaking.) His teaching is practical in that it aims simply to prepare for a profession. Moreover, the professor does not limit his activities to the university. He practices a profession at the same time. In fact his teaching is secondary. He is first of all lawyer, physician, engineer, journalist or agriculturist. His lectures of three or six hours per week are a by-product of his activities. As an educated, cultivated citizen, he is therefore

easily available for a political position. It would not appear incongruous to us that professors in the law school should easily gain political preferment; but that professors of medicine, engineering, pharmacy and other technical subjects should be directly in line for political positions is to the North American an anomaly. To understand the situation it must be remembered that in Latin American the professions are filled almost exclusively by the aristocracy, and it is by virtue of this fact that physicians, engineers, and others, who are at the same time professors are called to political life. It is not so much that the university contributes to the political life of the country as that the personnel of the university is recruited from the same class that directs the state. The interchange of functions is therefore most natural and facile. With us, it has often been a cause for regret that our higher education has few points in common with our political activities. Our tradition is not wholly an evil; our policies suffer somewhat probably, but there are compensations.

The internal organization resembles that of a European university. There is a dean of each college chosen annually by the professors. He is seldom reëlected, as it is the custom to rotate the office. He is assisted by a small council also chosen by the professors. The head of the entire university, the rector, is elected by the professorship. He, like the deans, seldom serves for a long time. There is also a university council composed of representatives from all the faculties. The council has legislative powers for the entire institution, and it arranges the budget for the university, distributing the funds among the various colleges.

Notwithstanding the existence of the university council and the rector, who represent the entire institution, a Latin-American university is a far less unified body than a North American state university. Each department is inclined to lead its own life apart. The council is not as unifying an agency as a board of trustees, and the rector who holds office for but a year perhaps and then returns to his professional chair is not the important centralizing figure that the North American university president is. He has neither

the prominence nor the authority. The different colleges may be located in widely separated districts of the city. The university organization is, therefore, often only nominal. Hence, the practice of omitting it entirely and conducting the departments as separate institutions under the minister of public institutions, as in Brazil, Bolivia and Guatemala.

TEACHERS AND TEACHING

The fact that the Latin-American professor is rarely a teacher by profession has far-reaching effects on the character of the teaching body and still greater on the character and scope of the teaching. In the first place, it fills the professional chairs with men of the highest class of society. They may not be erudite, but they are the most cultured of the nation. They give the university a dignity that could not, in countries where rank in society counts for so much, be imparted by mere erudition. Since the great majority of the students are of the same social class and since the teaching lacks the technical and burdensome detail that a scholar might introduce, there exists a community of spirit between students and professors not so common with us, and this tends to create a corporate sentiment, such as existed in the mediaeval universities.

As the professor has active vocations, which he considers more vital than his lectures, he cannot be held to regular attendance. A professor who gives four-fifths of his lectures is considered a model of regularity. Not infrequently he is absent one-half the time, and the annual report of the institutions will include a table of professors' attendance. To remedy the matter, each chair is provided with a substitute professor, who may be called by the administration to fill the place of the absentee, in the event his absence is foreseen and reported.

The curriculum is divided into a great number of courses and each course has its professor. He usually gives three lectures a week. If the course includes laboratory work, this exercise is conducted by a laboratory assistant, who has neither the rank nor dignity of a professor. This sharp

distinction between lecture and laboratory reacts unfavorably on the latter. Since the professor does not give it his personal supervision, the student is tempted to regard the laboratory as of lesser importance. Especially is this true in engineering, where the laboratory exercises approach the conditions of common manual labor. The class distinctions which are so sharp in most South American countries almost debar an engineering student from certain laboratory exercises that form the veritable basis of his profession.

The teaching consists almost uniformly of formal lectures; class discussions are rare, and questions and answers on an assigned topic still more so. However, the Latin-American student is not averse to these latter methods. The liveliest class I witnessed was conducted by the class discussion method on an assigned topic.

The common lecture method of teaching necessarily throws great emphasis upon the final examination. Attendance on the part of the students upon lectures and even upon laboratory exercises is nowhere strictly enforced. There are seldom written or oral examinations during the year.

The great emphasis is laid upon the year-end examinations. During the last month, lectures are relaxed, if not discontinued altogether. Sometimes this is by tradition and is at the option of the professor; sometimes it is by formal university statute. This month is allotted to the student in order that he may prepare for his final year-end examination. Each student is examined individually and orally in each subject. There may be also a written examination, but it is the oral test that is the great event. It takes place before a *jury* of three professors. The student draws by lot a certain number of topics which he develops, and in addition he may be asked questions by any member of the jury. The jury ballots secretly on the grade to be assigned. If the candidate passes, he is promoted to the next class. If he is conditioned, he may apply for another examination before the opening of the next session. If he fails, he must remain in the same class another year and the period of his graduation is thus deferred a year.

The organization of a Latin-American university as out-

lined above necessarily produces certain conditions, which are striking to a North American.

The assignment of but a single course to a professor requires a relatively large faculty. An institution of less than three hundred students may have as many as forty professors, not including the substitutes and the laboratory assistants. The pay roll, therefore, will be a long one, but the total expenditures will not be greater than in the United States. In proportion to the time he devotes to teaching, the Latin-American professor is paid about the average salary of the North American professor. The stipend varies greatly however in different countries.

Since the student enters the professional school directly from the secondary school, the length of the professional course is long as compared with our practice. In medicine, six and seven years; in law five or six years; in engineering, four, five and six years. The last years in the medical college are devoted almost wholly to clinical study and practice and, therefore, take the place of the post-graduation internship. The law course is much broader and more comprehensive than the average course in the United States, including as it does, political science, history and philosophy of law and international law.

On account of the close relation existing between the professorate and the political administration, and also on account of the students coming from families that compose the governing class, the university is a strong center of political influence. In the olden time when commercial influence counted for little and even today in these countries least affected by economic ideas, the university is the most potent force in politics.

PRODUCT

The almost total disappearance from the university of the college of letters and philosophy should not lead to the conclusion that all Latin-American graduates are devoting themselves only to the professions. In Latin America a professional course, especially in law, is a traditional liberal

education. Not more than one-half of the graduates, even of the medical schools, enter upon the practice of the profession. The sons of landed proprietors return to the administration of their estates; others turn their attention to journalism, governmental administration, etc.

Neither should it be concluded that because higher education is compressed into professional schools, that the liberal culture is lacking. The secondary school curriculum embraces the elements of subjects not usually attempted in the United States in schools of this grade—economics and philosophy are almost everywhere taught in the last year of the Latin-American high school. It is true that the classics rarely have a place, but on the other hand, modern foreign languages, always two and sometimes three, are taught throughout the entire course. In the professional schools, too, many subjects are included that with us are found only in the pre-professional college course. In law, psychology, history, economics, finance and sociology; in medicine, general courses in botany, zoölogy, physics, etc.; in engineering, general courses in the physical sciences. Besides, the whole trend of the professional courses is toward a broader education than would be a professional course with us, were it not preceded by the college. Especially is this so in law. The stress universally laid upon Roman law and the customs that were the base of it compensates for the omission of classical studies, while the importance ascribed to the history and philosophy of law and to international law gives a breadth of view not usually obtained in our relatively narrow law curriculum. The fact that Latin America has produced more than her share of eminent international lawyers is a direct effect of the type of legal training in vogue. Indeed the law school is the college of liberal arts in Latin America. Its curriculum has supplanted in large part the department of philosophy and its students are there quite as much for liberal culture as for professional training.

Latin-American universities look abroad for post-graduate study; to Europe principally for law, medicine and general culture; to the United States principally for engineering and dentistry. In agriculture the honors are more equally di-

vided. Almost every country maintains a considerable number of fellowships for foreign study, to say nothing of the large number of young men who go abroad for study on their own account.

This dependence upon foreign countries for advanced studies and also for ideals in art, science, literature and social progress has its disadvantages for Latin America. Native ideas are often mistrusted and as a consequence initiative in the higher things of life is discouraged. Strong characters, who would work reforms social and economic, are looked upon as dreamers; the weaker men become pessimistic in the face of the greater local difficulties. A recent work of South American fiction portrays such a returned scholar who finds conditions at home so difficult as compared with what he has seen abroad, that he loses his patriotism and declines to help the fatherland whose pensioner he has been for years. I am certain that such a person is not an empty imagination of the author. The situation is a perplexing one. Latin America needs graduate study for its leaders in science, but the traveling fellow often loses on one side as much as he gains on the other. Sympathy with his own people and with home conditions is as necessary for the public man as knowledge of the sciences themselves.

Real graduate study cannot progress in Latin America until university teaching becomes a distinct profession. The teacher who gives three hours per week of his time to the class and the rest to non-academic pursuits may be a good teacher for a professional school, but he can never become the scholar that the graduate school demands. The best prospect for the development of this grade of instruction (at least in some lines) is at the University of La Plata. This institution is of very recent foundation and takes pride in being different from its neighbors. It has tried to break away from the professional tradition and to stimulate research and an academic atmosphere.

Aside from this institution, however, the tendency in Latin-American universities today is to accentuate the professional and the practical. In the University of Buenos Aires, the largest in Latin America, the department of phi-

losophy and letters is the only department that is not growing. Elsewhere it either does not exist or is stagnant. The emphasis is all laid on professional schools, particularly on the colleges of engineering and agriculture. However the enrollment is not the largest here. Young men still enroll in excessive numbers for the professions of law and medicine, although the authorities, both university and political, are urging students toward the more commercial vocations of engineering and agriculture. These schools receive large appropriations and are fostered in every conceivable way. It is not easy, however, to thwart a tradition. The so-called learned professions still receive the larger quota of the university population. It is only where commercial life has become intense that the predilection for the time-honored law course has begun to lessen.

THE UNIVERSITIES AND AMERICAN INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS

By George W. Nasmyth, Ph.D., President of the Eighth International Congress of Students. Director of the International Bureau of Students

In the permanent work for the real object of the Clark University Conference on Latin America, to promote closer relations, mutual understanding and friendship between the United States and Latin America, the Universities of Pan-America have a position of great importance. We have seen the importance of the universities as a part of American foreign policy in the awakening of China—the beginnings of the Chinese Republic can be traced in large part to the influence of Chinese students returning from their study in American universities. We are just commencing to realize the influence which the German universities have had in the shaping of American education, and to make conscious use of the exchange of professors and students to establish closer German-American relations. But the opportunities for the universities in improving American international relations is greater still on account of the dominant position of the Universities of Latin America in shaping public opinion. If the students of the United States and Latin America can be brought into closer contact, we shall not have the next generation of Latin America interpreting the utterances of our Jingoistic press as the true expression of our public opinion, and we shall not have the widespread ignorance in the United States of Latin-American civilization and of the achievements of many of the Latin-American countries in all departments of human life.

Definite steps have been taken to enlist the universities more completely in the continuance of the work of the conference. It is encouraging to review the beginnings

which have already been made. The increasing importance attached to the study of the Spanish language in the universities of the United States and its almost universal recognition in the entrance requirements in recent years has been a factor of far-reaching influence. This has been followed by the establishment of professorships in Latin-American history and civilization in a constantly increasing number of universities. The courses offered last year in the following universities may be cited as examples of this important tendency:

Columbia University, Prof. William R. Shepherd, course on "Latin America."

Clark University, Prof. George H. Blakeslee, "Latin America."

Dickenson College, Carlisle, Pennsylvania, Prof. Leon C. Prince, "Spanish America."

University of Illinois, Prof. William S. Robertson, "History of Latin America."

University of Nebraska, Prof. Clark E. Persinger, "Spanish America."

University of Nebraska, Prof. Guernsey Jones, "Asiatic and South American History."

University of Pennsylvania, Prof. Leo S. Rowe, "Latin America."

University of Southern California, Prof. David P. Barrows, "South America."

University of Wisconsin, the work of Prof. Paul S. Reinsch in "Latin-American Political Institutions" is being given by Prof. B. S. Moore and Prof. Stanley K. Hornbeck.

Yale University, Prof. Hiram Bingham, "Latin-American History."

Another factor of increasing importance has been the coming of students from the Latin-American countries to the Universities of the United States. The tide has been turning from Europe to North America in recent years so that at the present time the United States has more than four times as many as France. The total number of students from Latin America in the year 1912-13 studying in American colleges was 436.

The geographical distribution of the Latin-American students in thirty-four universities, colleges and technical institutions was as follows:

	CUBA	MEXICO	PORTO RICO	CENTRAL AMERICA	ARGENTINE	BRAZIL	CHILI	COLUMBIA	ECUADOR	PARAGUAY	PERU	URUGUAY	REMAINDER	TOTAL, SOUTH AMERICA	TOTAL, LATIN AMERICA
California.....		4		2	3		3						1	7	20
Chicago.....		1		3											4
Columbia.....	5	3	6	5		2					1			3	22
Cornell.....	16	8	2	4	10	11		1	2	4		1		29	88
Harvard.....	2	4					1	1						2	8
Illinois.....	2	2	10		3	2					2			7	21
Indiana.....															0
Iowa.....			1												1
Johns Hopkins.....			1												1
Kansas.....	1														1
Michigan.....	4	4	18		3			3			3			9	35
Minnesota.....	3														3
Missouri.....	2	5									2			2	9
Nebraska.....															0
Northwestern.....	2	6	2								2		1	3	13
Oberlin.....	5	1	1												7
Ohio State.....			3	1	3	4								7	12
Pennsylvania.....	10	14	16	11	8	18	1	4	5		3		1	40	81
Pennsylvania State.....	1		17		2						1			3	20
Princeton.....			1												1
Stanford.....		1													1
Syracuse.....	10	1	7			8	1							9	27
Texas.....	10														10
Virginia.....		1				1								1	2
Washington.....															0
Yale.....	2		1	1			1							1	5
Lehigh.....	5	2	1	3		1		1						2	13
M. I. T.....	6	4	3	2	1	5		1	1	1				9	24
Purdue.....	1	2				1		1						2	5
Wesleyan.....				1	1									1	2
Total.....	88	63	90	33	34	53	7	12	8	5	14	1	3	137	436

The largest number of Latin-American students is claimed by Cornell University, with 88, then comes Pennsylvania, with 81, and then at a long distance, Michigan with 35, Syracuse 27, Massachusetts Institute of Technology 24, Columbia 22, Illinois 21, California and Pennsylvania State 20 each, etc., making a total of 436 Latin-American students in these 30 institutions. The total number of Latin-American students in all the French universities was 100 in 1910, 120 in 1911, 128 in 1912 and 123 in 1913.

In the order of countries, Porto Rico sends the largest number of students 90 (as compared with 107 in 1910-11); Cuba is second with 88 (62 in 1910-11). Mexico comes third with 81 (94). Brazil has shown the largest increase in recent years and has now 54 (as compared with 16 in 1910-11). Argentine sends 32 (an increase of 2 over 1910-11). The Central American Contingent of 31 (34) is about equally divided between Guatemala, Panama, San Salvador, Nicaragua and Costa Rica. Peru sends 13 (12); Columbia 11 (4); Ecuador 9 (5); Chili 7 (10); Paraguay 6 (9) and Uruguay 5 (1). The total for South America last year was 137, an increase of 1 over 1910-11. The increases in the individual countries were due in some cases to prosperity, as in Brazil, and in some cases to the direct action of the governments in awarding scholarships and encouraging foreign study in other ways.

In many of the institutions where the numbers are large the students have Spanish-American or Latin-American Clubs. These are helpful to their members and form a needed center for social intercourse, but, it is unfortunate that one influence is often to cut the Latin-American students off from contact with the other students, preventing them from learning the language and entering into the college life of their fellow students. It is possible that a policy of electing a larger number of associate members from among the sympathetic North American students who appreciate and are interested in the Latin-American culture, would serve to lessen the disadvantages while retaining the advantages which they undoubtedly offer.

The Cosmopolitan Clubs have had a large share in the movement for closer international contact between all American students in recent years. In institutions in which strong Cosmopolitan Clubs exist the Latin-American students often take an important part in their activities and reach the larger university communities by means of Argentine evenings, Brazilian evenings, Spanish-American evenings, Latin-American evenings, etc. The Cosmopolitan Clubs have been largely instrumental in establishing contact between the student bodies of North and South America

also. Through their efforts a large delegation of students from the United States took part in the Third International Congress of American Students at Lima, Peru, in 1912. These congresses, which seek to emphasize the unity of ideals and the community of interest of America's new generation, illustrate the mine of undeveloped resources for international friendship which are present in the student bodies of American universities. At no other time is it so easy for the Latin and Anglo-Saxon to learn to understand and value the other as in youth, and this understanding once gained is treasured for life.

Since the Seventh International Congress of Students at The Hague in 1909 another bond has been established between the students of Pan-America by means of the "Corda Fratres" or International Federation of Students. The Association of Cosmopolitan Clubs and the Federacion Universitaria of Buenos Aires joined the International Federation at this Hague Congress, and at the Pan-American Student Congress in Lima in 1912 the entire Liga de los Estudiantes Americanos entered the "Corda Fratres" movement. At the Ninth International Congress of Students held at Ithaca, N. Y., last September, the Latin-American delegation reached a total of 35 students, many of whom were sent by their governments. The interest of the Latin-American students in the International Federation and the Congress was so great that it was decided to hold the Tenth International Congress, August 15-30, 1915, in Montevideo, Uruguay, and the representative from Porto Rico, Mr. Miguel A. Munoz, was elected the secretary of the Central Committee of the Federation.

In considering the definite measures by which the work of the conference for better relations with Latin America may be continued by the Universities, we may build on the foundations already laid, and the following may be suggested as a beginning:

1. *Courses on Latin America*, like those already introduced with such success into a dozen universities, should be introduced into every important institution in the United States during the next few years.

2. *A System of Exchange Professors* should be established with the Latin-American countries, similar to those between the United States, and Germany, France and Japan. Besides a deeper insight into Latin-American political institutions, literature and art, we have much to gain from the Latin-American point of view in such subjects as law, where the Roman law, the Napoleonic code and the philosophy of law have been developed and studied in republican governments and under conditions similar to our own.

3. *Scholarships and Interchange of Students.* A system of scholarships analogous to the Rhodes scholarships, available for study in the United States by students from each of the Latin-American countries would be the ideal plan. Such a system of Pan-American scholarships regarded as prizes, and, with conditions for securing students of high ability and character, would be a powerful influence extending far beyond the students directly concerned. Failing an endowment for this purpose, however, the existing traveling scholarships and exchange fellowships now offered by many of the Latin-American governments should be developed, with provisions for insuring a knowledge of the language and ability to benefit by the opportunity to the fullest extent. (The Argentine government is now considering the establishment of 100 such scholarships.)

4. *International Hospitality.* With better organization, the Spanish and Latin-American Clubs and Fraternities in the universities could become centers of hospitality and intimate intercourse for Pan-American students. The universities can assist directly, also, by the appointment of advisers for foreign students, and by strengthening the Cosmopolitan Clubs, which are devoting an increasing amount of attention to the students from Latin America.

5. *Information.* The value of study in the United States would be greatly increased by the publication of a handbook in Spanish and Portuguese (preferably by the Bureau of Education) giving advice in regard to preparation, and information concerning the requirements for admission, the special advantages offered by the various institutions, tuition, fees, cost of living, etc.

6. *Pan-American Two-Cent Postage.* This is a measure of far reaching educational importance, as a means for facilitating the communication of ideas, and thus creating closer intellectual relations between the Americas.

7. *Pan-American Scientific Congress.* The Conference might well pass a resolution in favor of the United States government making adequate provision for the Second Pan-American Scientific Congress, and thus take a step toward the removal of this national discourtesy.

8. *International Student Congresses.* Wide publicity should be given in student publications to the Fourth International Congress of American Students, at Santiago de Chile in July, 1914, and to the Ninth International Congress of Students at Montevideo, Uruguay, August 15-30, 1915, in the effort to secure large and representative delegations of students from the universities of the United States.

9. *International Study Tours.* In connection with these congresses study tours through the principal countries of South America should be well organized.

10. *Formation of Cosmopolitan and International Polity Clubs.* The fundamental trouble with the public opinion in the United States which has led to the misunderstandings which now exist with Latin America is not wrong motive, but indifference, and ignorance (1) of the importance of international friendship and coöperation, (2) of the principles underlying these, and (3) of the practical means for attaining them. We should establish in every important college and university a club for the scientific study and the propaganda of the true principles of international relations, and thus create an educated and powerful public opinion which will insure more cordial relations with Latin America, as well as with Europe and Asia, in the future.

PATAGONIA AND TIERRA DEL FUEGO

By José Moneta, Captain, Argentine Navy, Commanding Battleship "Rivadavia," formerly member of the Argentine Boundary Commissions with Chile and Brazil

Until very recently, maps of South America have been published in which Patagonia appears with a color different from that of Argentine, as if it were an independent country. This is in accordance with the general idea of the world, that that region of South America is populated only by Indians and that it is the theatre merely of great desolation and misery.

From the famous voyages of Magellan, and of Bongainville, Drake, Sarmiento and many others, all of them surrounded by the most extraordinary and romantic adventures, to those of Captains King and Fitz-Roy on board the *Adventure* and *Beagle* from 1826 to 1830, very little information could be had regarding that region. The navigators referred to its desolate shores and to the enormous disappointments, troubles and penuries they had suffered. The Indians found were considered giants and undoubtedly this fantasy exaggerated their characteristics.

In fact, the name of Patagonia cannot be referred, as it is believed, to the great size of the legs or feet of the men found. These on the contrary had comparatively small feet; they were corpulent, but had very short legs; they were therefore giants when on horse back or sitting in a boat, but their height rarely exceeded 6 feet.

Perhaps the atmospheric refraction that gives extraordinary effects in all the Patagonian coast, raising a great deal the height of the objects, made the natives look big when the travelers could not approach them nearer than 200 or 300 yards. Possibly this was the origin of the legend.

I am saying that they had these measurements, because the traveler of today will hardly find camps of Tehuelches or

Genaken Indians as the pure blood natives are now very scarce. I think that my friend Charles W. Furlong of Boston, a studious explorer who a few years ago went to visit them, has not found more than fifty real Teheulches together.

Those Indians were never numerous nor were they fighters and at present they are disappearing very rapidly. Other types of human races, now totally extinguished, have been evidenced in the investigations of the geologists, for whose studies like those of the zoölogists and botanists, Patagonia offers a great field of action.

In the description of Fitz-Roy's journey, whose principal object was to make the hydrographical chart of the South Atlantic, there are found interesting observations about the different opinions and controversies regarding the natives of that region. As in that description he refers to other earlier navigators of those shores, the interest of its reading increases with the relation of many adventures and extraordinary enterprises often full of terror, that showed the strength and spirit of those brave explorers.

The imposing solitude of the region, the enormous distance and long absence from home, predisposed them unfavourably, and the same Fitz-Roy, and the eminent naturalist, Darwin, who accompanied him, returned from their voyage with a very poor impression of those lands. Two things that the sailors of those times ardently wanted to find in their anchoring grounds were missing, fresh water and wood.

Darwin went up the Santa Cruz River, but he did not reach the lakes. At his return he said Patagonia was a sterile and good-for-nothing land.

Somebody has said that this mistake of the immortal author of the *Origin of Species* saved for Argentinians that part of the continent, not awakening England in the desire of possessing it. The Monroe Doctrine was then in its infancy; and Argentina was fighting with the natural difficulties of the organization of the country.

In the year 1880, Argentina began to make effective its rights upon the Patagonian shores and lands, installing authorities in some places; and from then on explorations

through the interior were initiated by officers of our navy and army, and by geographers from several institutes.

To determine the boundary between Chile and Argentina a treaty was signed in 1881, agreeing that down to parallel 52 degrees south the Andean Cordillera should separate the two Republics. A great difficulty came in the determination of that line. Argentina maintained that it was the line of the summit in the same Cordillera, while the Chileans contended that it should be the continental water shed, separating the streams flowing from the Cordillera toward the Atlantic at the east, and toward the Pacific at the west. The lakes on the region increased the difficulty; some of them empty into the monotonous rivers of the Atlantic, others reach the Pacific in impetuous torrents that cut through the total mass of the Cordillera.

This phenomenon of a dividing line separating waters which flow into opposite oceans, and which partly rise in plains and glens hardly higher than the level of the sea, and which overcome such formidable obstacles as the Andean Cordillera, piercing its crystalline axis and the enormous mass of rocks which have accumulated upon this axis, constitutes, as one of the most eminent Argentine geographers, Mr. Francis Moreno says, "a fact which is unique in the world."

The dispute was submitted to the arbitral decision of the King of England. A commission of geographical officers was assigned, and in accordance with its report the arbiter gave to each nation what in his judgement rightly belonged to it. The decision was accepted with due respect, initiating between both countries an epoch of true friendship that will always last. In the same way Argentina had respected previously the arbitral decision that was against her in the Misiones dispute with Brazil, awarded by President Grover Cleveland of the United States.

The southernmost nations of the American continent have taken into practice this pacific method of arranging their disputes, that is yet only an idea dreamt by prominent men of the greatest nations of the world.

All danger of international complications having disappeared the first step of the government was to exchange contracts for war material amounting to some millions of dollars, into contracts for railway material for immediate use in the construction of lines between the Atlantic and the Andes.

Let me say, before examining the actual condition of that land, that the name "Patagonia" is not a political denomination of a certain section of Argentine soil. Its northern limit has always been considered to extend from Rio Negro to the Strait of Magellans, not including the pampa territory more immediate to Buenos Aires, which is much more populated and richer, and in such an actual prosperous condition that as soon as the census lately ordered by congressional law is finished, it will be incorporated without any doubt in the number of the Argentine provinces.

Patagonia, properly speaking, is divided into four national territories, Rio Negro, Neuquen, Chubut and Santa Cruz, each one with a governor and other authorities appointed by the national executive power. Its total area is 323,000 square miles, which is about the same in size as all the States of New England together with the states of New York, Pennsylvania, Ohio, both Virginias and North Carolina.

A slight description of the territory will give you an idea of its nature and climate.

The valleys irrigated by the capacious rivers Negro and Colorado, navigable in their larger part, are made fertile by the periodic flows of these fluvial arteries; but as the flows sometimes become so great that they constitute a danger, the national government has made a contract for the construction of enormous works of canalization and irrigation, with the object of fertilizing great extensions of land that are now deprived of that benefit. It will not be surprising when the work now begun is finished, to see the district or valley embraced by both rivers transformed into one of the most productive agricultural sections of the country.

The climate is generally dry and healthy. The mean temperature is 57° F. All the region is adaptable for agriculture. Wheat, flax, barley and vegetables grow perfectly,

as well as alfalfa and other forage fit for live stock. All kinds of fruit are cultivated and vines of esteemed value are harvested.

There are fifty schools in that district where 3000 students receive instruction.

The oriental part of the territory of Neuquen is flat and very rich in pastures, while the occidental is crossed by the branches from the Cordillera, which leave between them beautiful and picturesque valleys irrigated by many rivers and brooks. Generally all the territory is fertile.

The climate is very healthful and adaptable for the development of animal and vegetable life. Nevertheless, it varies according to the districts: in the east and southwest it is cold and at the summit of the mountains there are perpetual snows.

The Nahuel-Huapí Lake, one of the largest of the Patagonian region is at a height of 2952 feet above the level of the Pacific Ocean. Its contour is very irregular, and in its steep borders there are deep gulfs similar to the Norwegian "fjords." The beautiful panorama that nature offers in the rugged regions that surround the lake, can only be compared with the picturesque Central Alps, the summit of Mount Tronador being 6600 feet in height, with deep valleys and forrests of pines, cypresses, araucarias and other trees which thrive similarly.

The bluish waters of the lake which are fresh and drinkable, agitate as those of a sea on account of the strong winds of the Cordillera. Its depth exceeds 200 fathoms, and is navigated by steamers that connect with the ports on its borders.

It contains thirty-five small islands; receives water from several tributaries from which the capacious Limay River, a branch of the River Negro, navigable in all its extension, has its origin.

Important hydraulic works will be made on this territory; among them the most remarkable one, which is almost finished, will be the dam in the Vidal basin, a natural depression of the land that makes an enormous receptacle of which the hydraulic capacity is enough to provide with artificial fertilization the territories of Neuquen and Rio

Negro; both will then be able to give their soils a permanent and sure agricultural exploitation without being exposed to the chances of good and bad harvest.

Actually in those Andean valleys, irrigated by capacious rivers whose currents will some day be used as an economic motive power, there are more than a quarter of a million acres of land, unsurpassable for the production of cereals, vines, and fruit trees; and there are already several agricultural colonies that obtain valuable crops of grain and grapes.

The live stock wealth is also plentiful in proportion to the inhabitants. The agricultural and mining products are exported through Bahia Blanca and a large quantity of the meat products are exported to Chile. The native flocks are being refined with thoroughbreds from the septentrional countries of Europe which are those best adapted to the climate and to the topography of the country.

The mining industry promises a great future and there are now three companies working its rich mines of gold. Copper, quartz and coal also exist. Oil beds have been discovered, which are easily accessible, but at this time no work has begun.

The soil of Chubut is fertile and adapted to the tillage of the temperate zone, as is proven by the prosperous Welsh colonies, established on the lower basin of the Chubut River which is formed by wash-out lands unsurpassable for the cultivation of cereals. It is true that there are besides these valleys, arid, rocky and dry districts, but there are also prairies with good pastures, and in the basins of the lakes and rivers there are great stretches of woodlands, with trees that supply excellent white wood, such as araucaria, oak and pine.

The expansion of agriculture to any great extent in the valleys of the Cordillera is not at present possible, notwithstanding the fertility of the soil, as the enormous distances to the ports of shipment together with the lack of means of transportation, make impossible their development. Future railroads that will connect these valleys with the Atlantic coast will establish an epoch of agricultural production of an incalculable value.

Santa Cruz is made up of a series of extensive sloping

plateaus that descend in succession, from the Cordillera towards the sea, whose sinuous shores are bordered by hills or sand banks of small height.

The Deseado River is dry toward the interior and is now only a deep entrance of the sea. The Santa Cruz River is navigable in its larger part, carrying to the Atlantic the waters of the great lakes Misterioso, Viedma, Argentino and others; all of these are joined by narrow but deep channels.

The general aspect of the region of the lake is similar to the one previously referred to when speaking of the Nahuel-Huapí Lake.

The climate is cold and healthy. The minimum temperature registered at Gallegos, which is the coldest point of the coast, is 10° F. below zero. Generally 4° below zero is reached during winter.

Santa Cruz has rich gold mines, rich placer mines, coal and salt mines; on its shores there are a large number of seals. The Andean region has an enormous forest wealth.

Even though the population is small, the commerce of the territory is enormous; there are at the capital (the town of Gallegos), very important exporting concerns and branches of three banks. There is a refrigerating plant that turns out about 200,000 muttons yearly.

In all this enormous extension of land, there are at present only 100,000 inhabitants, something like 30,000 in each of the northern territories and 10,000 in Santa Cruz; as a total there is one inhabitant every three square miles. In the states of Arizona, Wyoming and Nevada there were more than double this per square mile in 1890.

Those 100,000 inhabitants of Patagonia are of the white European race, with the exception of a very few Indians and half-breeds whose number does not reach 5000.

In 1866 a small Welsh colony was founded in the territory of Chubut, who emigrated from their country under conditions similar to those of the Pilgrims of Massachusetts. Before twenty years elapsed, the first Patagonian railway connected their prosperous colony at the valleys of the river with Port Madryn which offered a natural port for their products. Notwithstanding certain difficulties in assimila-

ting them to the life of the country, we can give assurance that the present generation of Argentines, sons of these Welshmen, love the land where they were born and the flag that protects them, and offer themselves with enthusiasm to the military service which is compulsory in our country.

This has been brought about in part by the frequent visits of ships of our navy which practice now and then on that coast, as well as by certain Italian immigration with which they have begun to mix.

Further south, near Lake Munster and Colhuapé, there are some Boer colonies to which the national government gave land and facilities. The rest of the population, in the ranches to the Straits, is of English and German origin; there are also Austrians, Swedes, Norwegians and Dutch, but in the commerce of the towns the Italians and especially the Argentines predominate.

In this region there are now 295,000 acres of land that have been cultivated, half of this being in the territory of Rio Negro. There is a total of 841,000 cows, 10,000,000 sheep, 500,000 horses and 300,000 goats. How many acres of cultivated land and how many of these animals could Patagonia have, whose climate is well superior to that of many countries, when it will be populated in the proportion of the poorest State of the United States, is hard to guess.

Of the quadrupeds of the Patagonian fauna the common ones are the guanaco, the hare and the fox. The number of guanacos increases towards the south and that of the hares diminishes until they almost disappear at the Strait.

It is impossible to calculate the number of guanacos scattered in that enormous territory; I have seen twenty years ago in valleys near Gallegos River multitudes of those animals which densely cover all the hills giving to them the red tint of their backs as far as the eye-glasses could reach. The impression was that there were right there, thousands of thousands. Since the establishment of ranches the owners do not pursue them any more in order to avoid the destruction of their wire fences; therefore, they have gone towards the Cordillera losing the advantage of spending the severe winters in the temperate valleys near the Ocean; owing to

this an important decrease has occurred. A very few Indians hunt them for their skins; of these they join together about twenty generally by the inferior part of the skin of the young ones, making thus a handsome rug that is very much appreciated.

At the south there is always found the "puma" or American lion, which causes great damage to live stock and is therefore pursued.

There are all kinds of birds belonging to the temperate and cold zones; there is an abundance of ducks, "abutardas" and swans; the Patagonian swan has a white body with a black neck and is smaller than the European and North American.

All over the coast there are sea gulls and a great variety and number of aquatic birds. The penguins build their nests in bushes near the sea shore; enormous flocks of these ridiculous birds may be seen standing on the beach showing the feathers of their white breasts which contrast strikingly with their dark bodies much as if they were a crowd in a stadium. Other times further than 300 miles from shore their dissonant screams from the water, when they appear between two plunges, are an omen of the next storm to the superstitious sailor.

Nature has not given Patagonia many natural ports. The first important port starting from the north is San Antonio, in the Gulf San Matías. Work has begun on this port and is being dredged to a depth of 35 feet; a wharf is also under construction.

Port Madryn at the furthest end of Gulf Nuevo is another port of importance. There are two wharfs for landing and an excellent anchoring-ground. Further south, the only port of importance are Deseado, Santa Cruz and Gallegos. There are many other small ports but none of them are very desirable. Luckily, as the prevailing winds all over the coast are from the northwest, west and southwest, the navigators can count upon calm sea in most of them for general operations; it is not strange to see steamers anchored near the shore in places where there are no bays nor indentations, shipping wool, hides and other products.

At the furthest end of Gulf San Jorge, where the landing of Comodoro Rivadavia is located, opened to the winds from the sea and where a small town has been built since this is the point of export for the products from the colonies of Lakes Munster and Colhuapé, there was discovered in 1907, while drilling for water, an important fountain of oil at a depth of 535 meters. Since then thirteen perforations have been made with satisfactory results; from the geological studies made along a large part of the coast it is believed that the petrolific beds extend to great distances north and south of Comodoro Rivadavia. The chemical analysis of this oil shows that it is an excellent combustible. The Public Works Department uses it already in the engines of the Patagonian railways, with unsurpassable results.

From this oil valuable derivatives can be obtained; some wells supply oil that contains 65 per cent of lubricating oil which indicates its excellent quality. Last year the production of this combustible reached 1000 tons a week. The government has retained all this section and another large area in which the rights of working the oil deposits will be offered in public auction.

The discovery of this fountain of incalculable wealth located at the sea side only two days by water from the port of Bahia Blanca and four from Buenos Aires, which is the second most important port of the whole American continent, adds an element very valuable for the future progress of the Argentine nation, already blessed by nature with the most precious gifts of a very fertile soil and unsurpassable climate.

The national government is actually constructing railroad lines following a very well studied plan already outlined and projected. At the present moment the following are being built: One that starts at port San Antonio towards the west to Lake Nahuel-Huapí. From there it turns towards the south through the valleys to Colony 16 de Octubre which is at the origin of the Chubut River; at points it connects with the one coming from Rio Deseado. Another line starts from Comodoro Rivadavia and goes to Lake Buenos Aires, and cuts the former more or less at the meeting of the Rivers

Senguel and Mayo. The total extension of these railroads now under construction, will be approximately 1000 miles.

The Andean Cordillera which from Chiloé towards the south seems to sink in the sea, yet keeping the same aspect, its imposing peaks covered with perpetual snow, and deep channels between the numerous islands, turns towards the east until it disappears at the last point of its tail at the Isla de los Estados or Staten Island at the east of Tierra del Fuego. This last name designates the archipelago at the south of the Strait of Magellan; it is composed of one large island divided by a meridian between Chile and Argentina and by numerous smaller islands at the west and south of it.

The name of Tierra del Fuego or Land of Fire did not originate from the existence of volcanos in activity. Perhaps the first Spanish navigators, who were very religious and did not forget any saint without a geographical accident, saw some fires that the Indians always make on the island; as the forest starts right there, there is no opportunity to see that signal before on the Patagonian coast.

The western and southern part of all those islands, battered by the cold winds from the Antarctic, is of pure rock but where it is protected by the mountains there are very dense forests of beech-trees, found in the lower lands and near the channels, some of them of a meter and one half in diameter. Higher up the trees decrease in height until they become a mass of tangled bushes at a level of two-thirds the height of the mountains, as if the permanent snows and the violent winds would not allow them to grow.

This forest vegetation which extends from the Patagonian lakes to Cape Froward, the southern extremity of the continental land, continues throughout all the southern half of Tierra del Fuego and the contiguous islands to the islands of the Estados.

The various panoramas that these channels offer, especially in summer, the numerous islands and small barren islets with their shores covered with woods which show in contrast all the shades of green, the rocks and peaks, some spotted here and there by the snows and others under the eternal ice of the high mountains that sometimes falls in glaciers to the

water side, are of an indescribable beauty, only comparable to that of the lakes of Switzerland.

Unhappily good weather does not prevail; continuous gales of sleet, hail and snow follow one another in rapid succession, specially in the western part of the archipelago. At the Beagle Channel, there are, nevertheless, some weeks of good weather with fair and sunny days.

At the eastern and northern part of Tierra del Fuego properly speaking, there are prairies and very fertile valleys, and its interior reminds us, owing to its permanent greenness, of the center of England.

Three kind of Indian races with different languages and characteristics lived in Tierra del Fuego: the Alacalufs and Yahgans who used to live principally on fish and navigated in canoes made from a single tree, and the Onas who lived in the northern part of the mountains and resemble the Patagonian Indian.

Of the canoe Indians it can be said that they have almost totally disappeared; alcohol, small-pox and other diseases obtained from their contact with the white race have almost extinguished them; they were short and of very small extremities. The Onas who lived in the woods and prairies of the north and east were of a higher type, tall, strong and of better proportions than the Patagonians; they always traveled on foot and with extraordinary speed; they did not know horses; when the first horses were taken for the demarcation of the boundary line between Chile and Argentina in 1891, it was the first time they had seen one, and thought that the man on horse-back and the horse constituted only one animal with two heads.

All those Indians were very poor; they used to hunt with their arrows guanacos and birds that are found in great numbers. When a whale went aground on the shores it was a cause for great joy and festivity; they devoured crazily whale meat and rubbed their bodies with the grease.

Another great festivity for them was a shipwreck, from which they not only provided themselves with provisions but with utensils that were needful. With steam navigation through the Strait and the greater knowledge of the coast,

shipwrecks decreased; in regard to this I recall an old Indian who told me: "Life is becoming too hard, there are no more wrecks."

It has never been proved that these Indians were cannibals; in the cases of the murder of white persons that we know, what they did was to burn their bodies in a bonfire.

There are no more than 600 Indians in all; the whole land is covered by ranches in prosperous condition, some of them connected with great plantations of the Chilean region which overlooks the Strait, having ports with facilities for shipping their products.

The Argentine part inhabited by only 3000 people has 12,000 cows, 1,700,000 sheep, and 11,000 horses.

The navigation of the Strait has been affected by the Trans-andean railroad from Buenos Aires to Valparaíso and will be affected much more by the Panama Canal. The Chilean population of Punta Arenas will remain a center of activity for all that region so important for its live stock, gold and coal mines.

The capital of the Argentine territory of Tierra del Fuego is at Ushuaia on the Beagle Channel. Here there is an important reformatory prison; the working of lumber, gold mines and other products keeps it in a state of prosperity. There are also branches of the national bank and of important commerce concerns. There is frequent communication with Punta Arenas and steamship lines connect it with Buenos Aires.

Staten Island is an ensemble of abrupt peaks of the most irregular and imposing forms. It is not populated; in a small island north of the former called Año Nuevo, where there is a lighthouse, the government keeps a magnetic observatory directed by officers of our navy, as well as a powerful wireless station.

Many of the sailing-ships that turn Cape Horn pass through the Strait of Lemaire when they have good wind with which they save many miles.

Calms combined with strong currents in the neighborhood of these coasts as well as dense fogs and errors in the ship's position, after long days at sea, are the cause of frequent

wrecks on the shores of both the island and the continental land.

The national telegraph goes through the coast to Cape Virgenes and towards the interior to the Colony 16 de Octubre. Besides this there are wireless stations in Punta Delgada, Virgenes, Año Nuevo and Ushuaia.

The ports of the Patagonian coasts are frequently visited by good steamers of a subsidiary line of the Hamburg-American Line, that maintains a service every fifteen days; there are two other lines of Argentine ships besides cargo-boats and sail boats specially freighted by the exporting companies.

With this showing of civilization and progress, Patagonia and Tierra del Fuego are no longer ignored and mysterious lands. The navigator nears the coast and sees light-houses and beacons. Houses in the lively towns show their whiteness and the smoke of the railroad engines and factories can also be perceived.

Patagonia of the legends, used to localize fantastic narrations or to give funny titles for nobles of operettas, is now a country in full progress; to give it a peculiar tone, it will only remain the penguin at the coast and the guanaco at the interior; and Argentines of the future generation will be able to increase with four or five the number of their provinces or states in a similar way as the United States has increased the number of stars on its beautiful flag.

THE PHYSICAL BASIS OF THE ARGENTINE NATION

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The point of view which is accepted in this paper is that of a study in evolution, involving the well established principle that any organism on migrating into a new region becomes modified by adjustment to its environment, and develops activities suited to the conditions of life by which it is surrounded. As applied to all the lower ranks of animals, the bearing of this principle of adaptation is not questioned, nor does its validity need to be argued in applying it to races of men, or even to nations. Let me illustrate the point by referring to the migrations of Asiatic tribes into Europe, where several thousand years ago new nations were born and civilization began that evolution from which we are developing. It was in the new environment that the human race made progress. Once more, and for the last time, when Columbus led the Europeans to the American continent a similar great opportunity offered itself to humanity. Under the tremendous stimulus of modern forces we already see progress toward the evolution of a higher type of man, the Pan-American.

In all parts of the Americas the American type is becoming distinct in physical and mental characteristics from the European stocks from which it originated. Everywhere evolutions are going on, in each region according to the racial factors of the colonizing peoples and the physical factors of the environment into which they have migrated. From the snowy north lands of Canada, through the fertile savannahs of the United States, in the tropics of the Isthmus and the Amazon, on southward across the vast

river flats of the Paraguay, over the breezy Pampas to the misty channels of Magellan, under all the varied conditions of plain and mountain, of sunny grass lands and shady forests, the European races have spread and are evolving new types of men, developing new nations. Their evolution reflects the influence of local environment. Reciprocally, their environment is being changed by them, as they cultivate the soil, introduce great herds of domestic animals, establish lines of communication, and exploit the natural resources for their own use and benefit.

In the temperate zone of South America is a people sprung from the same stocks as the North Americans, occupying a land in many respects similar to that of the United States. A hundred years ago that people freed itself from Europe. During the succeeding decades it fought its way to national unity. In the last thirty years it has made great progress toward developing the resources of the land for the service of mankind. It has gained independence, has defined its domain, has developed individuality. Having secured high rank among the progressive powers of the world, the Argentine nation stands on the threshold of a great future. Conscious of its strength it looks confidently forward. Scarcely conscious of any limitations it pays little heed to those conditions of environment which will inevitably determine its character and prosperity, yet it can not escape them. As Channing said of individuals, so of nations: "Life is inexorably conditioned and conditions us." And that nation will go forward most securely on the path of progress which early takes account of the resources and limitations that constitute the physical basis of its civilization.

In the Old World the exploitation of the natural resources went on for centuries wastefully until scarcity resulted, and compelled care-taking, renewal, and conservation. In the New World waste also has been excessive and still goes on, but recently we have been roused to the possibility of national poverty in forests, waters, and soils, and having taken an inventory, we in the United States are striving to establish the principle of conservation of the natural

resources for the use of future generations as well as for the benefit of this one, in order that our nation may be prosperous in the future as it is now.

Argentina may be said to stand in national development in relation to the resources of the country somewhat in the stage which had been reached by the United States in 1860, and in the extension of railways, the disposition of her public lands, the exploitation of forests, and the activity of her people, there are many features which remind one of the period of material progress on which the United States entered after the Civil War. The tide of immigration rises and sinks in her ports, great wealth is accumulating in private hands, corporations of immense resources are extending their power over railways and lands, her statesmen are carrying out public works of great cost and proportionate promise of utility. Yet of Argentina as the home of a nation, as the seat of a great world power, men know accurately scarcely as much as they knew of the United States forty years ago. Explorers' sketches direct railway extensions. There surveys are needed. Guesses are the starting points of reclamation projects that involve millions of dollars. There surveys and long continued measurements of streams are essential. Public lands of vast extent are to be settled for agriculture or to be leased for grazing. There surveys, investigations of water and soils, comparative studies by trained specialists are wanted. The list of national enterprises and necessities might be extended; but enough. If in sketching the country, I seem to speak knowingly, remember that I speak with but partial knowledge.

To outline the physical basis of the Argentine nation we may take a glance at the country itself. The total area is 1,500,000 square miles or one-half that of the continental United States. It is a country long from north to south, wider in its northern and warmer section, and tapering to the point of Cape Horn. If we place the map of South America over that of North America, so that the latitudes of the southern hemisphere coincide with the same latitudes of the northern, Argentina is seen to reach from Hudson's

Bay to Yucatan, and the greater part of the country falls in the zone of the Gulf of Mexico and the lower Mississippi Valley between New Orleans and St. Louis.

By this comparison we suggest that there is an extreme range of temperatures comparable with that between the tropics and southern Mexico and the semi-arid conditions of northern Canada, but this is not wholly true, because the oceans moderate the temperatures of the narrower continent, making the heat less torrid and the cold less severe. Buenos Aires lies in the latitude of Memphis, Tennessee, and has a mean annual temperature equivalent to that of South Carolina or Alabama. The curve of the same mean temperature—about 60 degrees Fah.—swings south through the Province of Buenos Aires and westward across the Territory of Rio Negro to the Province of Mendoza, through districts which resemble Texas, Arizona, and the Valley of California. Thus we may say that the central region of Argentina corresponds closely with the southern gulf states and the southwest. Northward the temperatures are somewhat higher, and in the extreme northeast of Argentina we find conditions resembling those of southern Florida and the coast of Mexico. There the winter temperature rarely touches frost, and the maximum in the western arid region is as high as that of the Yuma desert.

Turning to the far southern portions of the country, we are apt to think of severe conditions around Cape Horn, but on the east coast they are not so extreme as is generally supposed. The mean annual temperature on that coast is equivalent to that of the southern coast of Maine, but the minimum is not lower than that of Puget Sound, while the maximum is that of Nova Scotia. In the fiords west among the glacier covered mountains the local conditions are often far more rigorous and snow squalls are common even in summer. Farther inland in the high plateaus of southern Patagonia, the cold winds from the Andes give the winter conditions of northern Texas or Kansas, while the summer temperatures are those of southern Canada and Alberta.

Thus Argentina, which reaches from within the tropics

almost to the Antarctic Circle, experiences a range of temperatures less than those found in the United States, and must be characterized as a region of mild, temperate or subtropical climate throughout the greater part of its extent.

Next to temperature, rainfall claims our attention, because absence or scarcity of water determines the use of the lands for crops or herds, and the activities of the people. Argentina lies between two regions of excessive rainfall, and includes a margin of each one. From across Uruguay and tropical Brazil blow the humid trade winds, bringing rain to all the northeastern provinces. In the southwest of the country the Argentine Andes catch some of the heavy rains with which the constant west winds soak the misty forests of southern Chile and cover with snow fields the western ranges of the Cordillera. Between the two humid districts lies a drier zone which stretches diagonally across the continent from the south Atlantic coast of Patagonia northwesterly past Mendoza to the Pacific coast of northern Chile.

Where the amount of annual precipitation is as much as 500 millimeters (20 inches or more) agriculture may generally be carried on without special methods for preventing evaporation or supplying water to the crops, but where the rainfall is less than 20 inches, dry farming or irrigation becomes necessary. In Argentina about two-fifths of the land has a rainfall exceeding 20 inches, whereas the other three-fifths have less than that amount of annual precipitation. Here is a factor which at once distinguishes the northeastern district of greater rain and warmer climate from the western and southern districts of lower rainfall and in general cooler climate. The northeastern comprises all that portion of the country which borders the Rio de la Plata and its confluent streams, the Uruguay, the Paraguay, and the Parana, and which extends back from these rivers beyond the limits of Argentina and westward nearly across the provinces of Buenos Aires and Sante Fe to San Luis, Cordova, and Tucuman. The drier southwestern more extensive region includes the southern and western parts of the province of Buenos Aires, all the provinces of the north stretching along the foot of the Andes, and into the Cordillera, and also the

plateaus of Patagonia east of the Andes. The southwestern humid zone is confined to the Andean belt and its foothills.

The agricultural products of the country vary with the conditions of temperature and rainfall so briefly sketched. Were farmers of the United States transplanted to Argentina they would find congenial climates and products to accord with their experience at home in different sections of the country. The orange grower of Florida and the cotton grower of the Gulf States would be at home in the northeastern part, in Corrientes, Entre Rios, Sante Fe, El Chaco, and Formosa. The corn planter might till his fields in the northern part of Buenos Aires province and the wheat farmer in the central and southern parts. The sugar grower from Louisiana would find cane and the sugar monopoly at Tucuman, the orchardist of California could grow grapes and fruits under irrigation in the valleys at the foot of the Andes about Mendoza. The cattlemen of northern Texas and the sheep-herder from Arizona and Wyoming might duplicate their ranges from Cordova south to Santa Cruz, and in the far south, in Tierra del Fuego, the web-footed Oregonian would find congenial gray skies, mists, and rain.

After this general survey it is desirable to distinguish more clearly the nucleal region of Argentina. The river provinces that range along both sides of the navigable Parana and Paraguay on the north and east are Entre Rios, Corrientes, and Misiones; on the south and west Buenos Aires, Sante Fe, and the territories of El Chaco and Formosa. These form the nucleus of the Argentine domain about which the other provinces and territories are grouped. Here are the rich delta lands and the pampas favored by climate, soil, and facile communication with the world. Here will gather a dense population and will always be the seat of Argentine wealth and commerce—the heart of the Argentine nation.

The tourist landing in Buenos Aires and proceeding west or south over the Pampas, fails to see this river region which we may learn to know best by a trip up the Parana and Paraguay. From the broad muddy estuary of the Rio de

la Plata we pass into the channels of the islands of the delta of the Uruguay and Parana. Proceeding up either river we find the banks rising in bluffs of brown earth to 100 feet on one hand or the other, opposite wide groups of low verdant islands. According to the geographers the banks should continue rising as we penetrate into the continent, till the plains should pass into hills and the hills into mountain ranges, but we would need to travel far toward the Andes and toward the Amazon before we should reach the normal aspects of river valleys. Five hundred miles above the delta of the Paraguay the banks are lower, the islands and swamps more extensive. One thousand miles from the river's mouth we still see on either hand the vast lowlands of the interior of the continent. Delta-like in all its aspects, the immense basin in which the great rivers gather from the uplands of Brazil and Bolivia is in fact a delta—a delta in the heart of the continent. The basin is a sinking land, the rivers are filling it with sediment; it has sunk deeply and the alluvium has accumulated to a corresponding depth. Here are immense plains now widely flooded by the tropical rains, but a slight change of level would convert them from swamps into rich extensive agricultural lands.

If from this excursion up the Paraguay we return to the Pampas of Buenos Aires with a knowledge of the inland delta lands now forming on the upper river, we may recognize the delta formed long ago but now raised above the reach of the rivers by which it was accumulated. Beneath the plains of the Pampas lies the immense mass of alluvium of ancient rivers that flowed from the Andes in earlier epochs. At Buenos Aires it is 3000 feet deep. It forms the lobe of the continent south of the Rio de la Plata and extends to distant hills in the south in Buenos Aires, and in the west to those of San Luis and Cordova.

Although this soil is alluvium and therefore of the same origin as the great class of alluvial soils throughout the world, it differs from those with which the farmers of Europe and the United States are most familiar. Soils like it are found in small districts on the Rhine and the Danube, and

are more extensive in the valley of the Missouri. In the great plain of China, the Yellow River has spread a formation very like that of the Pampas. The common condition which brings all these soils in distant regions into relation with one another is in their origin as wind-blown material. They belong to the type which has received the name of loess, and are derived either from the wind-drifted dust of deserts or from the fine silt ground beneath glaciers. Their common characteristic is extreme fineness of grain and a large amount of undecomposed mineral substances. The soils of the Pampas differ from those of the other regions named in that they contain a very large proportion of volcanic dust, rich in the essential elements of plant food. A peculiarity of the loess soils is their capacity to store up water and to retain their fertility under cultivation. The Chinese fields have been tilled for more than 4000 years without exhaustion, and there is every reason to believe that the fields of the Pampas, under intelligent culture, will also remain practically inexhaustible.

On the west and south of this nucleal region is the marginal zone of the districts less favored with rainfall and therefore more limited in agricultural possibilities. It is here that water plays a more important part than soil and that the great irrigation projects of Argentina will be developed as the nation grows. Mendoza set the example more than thirty years ago and has become rich through her vineyards and orchards. All along the foothills of the Andes similar conditions exist in many rich valleys as far south as the Province of Chubut, the conditions changing, however, with the latitude, the amount of sunshine, and the date of early and late frosts. The lands which may be irrigated are so extensive that they might use far more water than flows even from the snow-capped Cordillera and in time every possibility for the storage and regulation of the streams will be developed.

Eastward beyond the reach of the Andean streams, in the territories of central and southern Argentina is the great area of land which must always be devoted to grazing, and in large part to sheep raising. In the northern and

drier regions of Patagonia the fine woolled Merino finds a congenial home, and there may be grown the wool suited to the manufacture of fine clothing and knitted goods. As we go south into the colder and moister districts toward the straits, the Merino gives place to the heavier and coarser English breeds, which are bred rather for mutton than for wool, and there already are located the freezing establishments which prepare mutton for the European markets. At the present time cattle and sheep herding are still carried on on a large scale in the provinces of Buenos Aires and Sante Fe as well as in Entre Rios and Corrientes. By far the larger proportion of the 20,000,000 head of cattle and the 80,000,000 sheep of the republic are to be found in these territories; but that condition is not one which will persist when the ranges shall be turned into farms. Where it is practicable it is more profitable to grow wheat and corn than to grow beef and mutton, and the economic advantage will in time displace the less profitable industry. Then the farm lands, which are now held in large tracts, will be divided into small farms worked by the owners themselves. The conditions of sheep and cattle raising will change as they have changed in Iowa and Illinois, and become subordinate to agriculture, while the lands which lying beyond the great agricultural regions must always be devoted to grazing, will be enhanced in value through the greater demand for their products.

Agriculture, grazing and commerce are the activities clearly indicated as those which the Argentine nation must develop on the basis of the physical resources of the country. May we add to them manufacturing industries? Argentina has no coal and throughout nine-tenths of her territory no large amount of water-power which can be utilized for manufacturing. Here she is definitely and narrowly limited, and must always be dependent for manufactured products upon countries more fortunately conditioned. But she is not entirely without resources which may be developed as a competing factor to relieve her of absolute dependence upon other nations. There are two districts in which water-power may be applied to manufacturing

on a scale sufficient to affect the welfare of the nation. One of them is in the far northeast where the falls of Iguazu may yield twice the power of Niagara, and the other in the southwest where many streams in the valleys of the Cordillera will afford power to attract a manufacturing population that will there find a congenial climate in a region of great beauty and healthfulness. The power of Iguazu is near the great centers of commerce, being situated on the Parana and capable of transmission down the valley of the river to within reach of navigable waters. The falls are fortunately included within a national reservation, and the government will be able to control their exploitation. The Cordilleran district is as far from Buenos Aires as St. Louis from New York, or Rome from London, and at present is still isolated for lack of communication; but railways are in process of extension toward it, and it will soon be brought within reach of freight and also of tourist traffic. Three raw materials of prime importance—wool, hides and wood—are immediately available in the district itself and the surrounding areas, and there will eventually be established important manufacturing industries to supply the great agricultural provinces.

The review of the physical conditions which form the basis of development of the Argentine nation confirms the generally accepted opinion that it has a great future as an agricultural and pastoral people, which shall continue to supply the less fortunate countries of the world with grain and meat. It is also clear that the material resources offer no other prospect, and therefore the prosperity and leisure which are essential to high intellectual development depend upon the exploitation and conservation of the soils and waters of the Argentine domain.

Exploitation and conservation are by many considered to be contradictory terms, exploitation being taken to mean exhaustive utilization for immediate profit, and conservation representing the idea of preservation for future use. But this view has often been shown to be incorrect. Exploitation of natural resources with due regard for prevention of waste and reproduction of crops is conservation.

Conservation means that that which is ripe shall be used, whereas that which is not ripe shall be neither used nor destroyed, but shall await the time of maturity. This applies to all things that grow, to grass and to trees. The things that do not grow, such as soil and waters, are conserved in preventing their waste and promoting their highest utilization.

From this point of view the Argentine conditions present certain definite problems in conservation. To define them we may take specific instances. The forests of Argentina are limited. They fall into two very distinct classes, those of the tropics and those of the temperate Cordillera, which differ not only in the kinds of trees but also in their utility. In the tropics are various useful species, of which two, the quebracho and the maté yerba, are the most conspicuous. The quebracho forests have almost entirely passed from government control and in private hands are rapidly being cut to make quebracho extract for tanning. The maté, or Paraguayan tea, which takes a more important place in Argentine life than coffee does with us, is a small bush from which the leaves may be picked as tea leaves are in China and Japan, without injury to the plant if due care is taken, but the Yerbales are being seriously injured by wasteful methods of gathering the leaves to reduce the cost and increase the profit. The government is awake to these conditions and high officials are striving to correct them, but it remains to be seen whether the Argentine congress can pass and the Argentine executive enforce laws that shall protect young quebracho trees or insure their planting, and prevent the destruction of the maté yerba.

In the Andean forests there is a different problem. Most of them are still in the hands of the government and by the organization of an efficient forest service may be brought absolutely under government control. A reorganization of the forest service is in progress and if the program which is now proposed be adequately supported the question will be solved. At the present time protection against fire is the most urgent necessity, since these forests lie on the

borders of Chile within reach of the wandering cattle herders whose long established habit is to set fire to the forests in order to clear away the undergrowth and utilize the grass, which springs up among the burnt tree trunks. Thorough police control, constant watchfulness, easy communication, and an awakened public spirit are needed in the Cordillera. The important service for which these forests should be conserved is that of regulating the streams which flow from the Cordillera across the eastern semi-arid region of central Argentina. They cover the mountain ranges where the annual precipitation is very heavy and a large part of it falls as snow. The dense growth of the Andean beeches, cedar, and bamboo protects the ground and prevents the rapid run-off in the streams. Even as it is there are great floods and in summer proportional scarcity of water. But if these forests be stripped from the steep slopes of the Andes the floods will be greatly aggravated and the waters available for irrigation will be so diminished that the valleys which should become the seat of a dense and prosperous population will be left to the solitary sheep herder and his flocks. This being the condition it is fortunate that the forests, as they now stand, have not in themselves great intrinsic commercial value. The cipres, or cedar, a good lumber when well grown, is not very abundant nor often free from knots or defects. The coihue, or Andean beech, the most common tree, is in general over ripe, as is apt to be the case in virgin forests, and a large proportion of the trees are unsound. The wood is exceedingly heavy, will not float in the streams or lakes, and is expensive to transport to market. It therefore offers little temptation to exploit it commercially. Yet means must be found gradually to replace these old over-ripe forests with cultivated stands of useful lumber varieties. Thus the conservation problem of the Andean forest comprises three questions: how to prevent fires, how to remove the natural growth to the best advantage without destroying its effectiveness in controlling the waters, and how to replace it with more valuable species. These problems will not be solved in one generation, but the Argentine administration is taking

steps toward fire protection and recognizes the necessity of forest reserves. In this direction it is making an excellent beginning.

The conservation of the waters and their utilization to the greatest possible extent of economic service is the most important factor among the natural resources. Lands suitable for irrigation are very extensive throughout the three-fifths of Argentina which must be described as semi-arid, and the waters available for irrigation are quite inadequate to cover more than a small fraction of the appropriate areas. The irrigation problem centers in the streams that flow from the Andes and the valleys along their courses. The greatest of all, the Rio Negro, is already being developed by the construction of a dam on its northern branch, the Neuquen, to irrigate lands in the valley, and irrigation is practiced in the vicinity of Choelechoel on the river. Studies are in progress of the lake basins in which the waters gather before they leave the Andes, and the general question of the complete utilization of the waters will be developed along the lines ably outlined several years ago by the Italian engineer, Cipoletti. Irrigation works of more or less local importance are in progress in various other parts of Argentina, partly under government auspices and partly under contracts between the government and the great railroad systems. Yet it must be said that no adequate study of the great problem of conservation and utilization of the waters of the country is being made. There is no other resource of equal importance to Argentina, yet there is no organized service engaged in mapping the watersheds and measuring the rivers. The engineers who plan costly public works are obliged to proceed upon very inadequate guesses of the volumes of water which they may have to handle, and without maps of the watersheds from which the streams gather. Under these circumstances any irrigation project is likely to be a costly experiment and there can be no wise selection of the lands and waters which may be most economically and most advantageously developed at the present time. To emphasize this point I need but cite the experience of the reclamation service of the United States,

which was that only one in ten of the projects for storage and utilization of waters for irrigation in the United States gave such promise of a reasonable return upon the cost of construction under government supervision that it could be undertaken on the condition that it should eventually pay for itself. The works carried out by that service are more important to the people of the United States and they involve engineering questions as difficult as those of the Panama canal. They have been based upon thorough topographic and hydrographic studies and so upon definite information of the nature of the territory and the conditions of supply of the water in each case. In Argentina further progress in the development of her water resources should be based upon like studies covering the Andean Cordillera and the streams which flow from it.

One of the results of a survey of the water resources of the country will be the determination of the available water powers. Here in the United States, where we reckon that we shall not exhaust our coal supplies for a century and a half, we, nevertheless are anxious that the nation shall retain control of the inexhaustible power which the falling streams can be made to yield. How much more urgent is that control of waterpowers in Argentina, where there are no other sources. The laws already reserve to the government rights over the streams and their banks, but it is none too early to direct attention to the fact that whatever manufacturing may develop will be entirely dependent on the water powers and subject to the control of whoever owns that power.

In a country where lands are still held by individuals in enormous tracts and where cultivation of the soil has not yet displaced the pasturing of great herds of cattle and flocks of sheep, the question of soil conservation has not presented itself, nor is it a question which will in the great agricultural regions of Argentina soon be an urgent one. Erosion on the plains of the Pampas is confined to scouring by the winds, and where the soil is deep does not inflict much injury. Some districts there are, especially in the southwestern part of the Province of Buenos Aires and adjacent

regions of the Pampa Central and Rio Negro, where there is a hard layer of limestone at moderate depth below the surface. In some districts the depth of soil is less than a foot, and elsewhere there are bare surfaces of limestone forming stony plateaus. These were once covered with soil which has been swept from them by the wind, and where the limestone is not deeply covered the same result must follow if the surface is not protected by vegetation. In these districts in both grazing and cultivation every precaution should be taken to keep the soil from blowing away. The greatest injury now being done to such areas is due to overgrazing and the destruction of the grass that holds the soil in place.

Grazing being an industry which in Argentina takes rank in importance with agriculture the entire nation is interested in the grasses on which the herds and flocks pasture. Where private lands are stocked for absentee owners there is danger that they may be overgrazed, and where squatters pasture their flocks on public lands there is practical certainty that the grasses will be severely injured. A difficult situation is apt to arise through fluctuations of the rainfall from year to year. With the greater moisture of wetter years the number of sheep carried is increased to the limit of richer pasture and when leaner years follow the range is grazed to the grass roots before the flocks are reduced by forced sale or starvation. For these conditions on private lands there is no remedy save that of resident ownership and intelligent management. On public lands there is a reform as practical as it would be profitable; that of bringing the public ranges under a leasing law, by which the irresponsible squatters would be replaced by responsible lessees. This is not the place to consider the terms of such a law, further than to suggest that Australia has set a successful precedent, which proves that long term pastoral leases may be satisfactory alike to the government and the sheep owners; but it may be said that in Argentina a first step has been taken this year in imposing a tax on all sheep and cattle grazing on public lands. The owner who is taxed will acquire certain rights. The rights will be recognized

by permits, and under a plan like that now being worked out in the United States or under a law of pastoral leases on the Australian plan, the grazing on public lands will come under government regulation.

Control and regulation of grazing will not, however, be effective without better knowledge of the grazing plants than is now available. They have been collected, classified, and named. The number of species of grasses known from Patagonia is very large, but their nutritive value, conditions of growth and reproduction, relative abundance, and other characters bearing on their value as fodder plants remain unknown. Here is work for the botanist who is willing to follow the sheep and from its habits learn the lesson of conservation in the arid plateaus. In the United States it has been shown that such studies have practical value, inasmuch as by abstaining from grazing certain lands during the flowering and seeding season of the pasture plants, the pasture may be made richer instead of poorer, even though heavily stocked during the rest of the year.

From whatever side we approach the problem of conservation in Argentina, we are met by the lack of knowledge of the natural resources and conditions of development. While it is true that South America has been known longer than North America it has been a shorter time and less effectively studied scientifically. The world is still ignorant of facts that vitally affect its availability as the environment of new races.

The Argentine is predominantly a Latin race. Of four million immigrants in the last half century, three million were Spaniards and Italians, and although many of these were laborers who return home each year, they still constitute the dominant strains. The peoples of northern Europe, especially the English and German, exert a great influence in commerce, but they can not be said to determine the trend of racial development. The native Argentine of Latin descent of three generations or more in the country is stamped with the qualities of independence and self respect which mark the American who has outgrown the servile conditions of the poorer classes in Europe. Poor he may be,

but a man he is, and conscious of a man's rights. He is enduring, hardworking, temperate in his language, and except for occasional excesses, in his habits. In him is the promise of a strong people. Mingling of the Spanish and Indian bloods in the north has produced a laborer who is sought for his strength and endurance in the tropics, though he is quick to resent arbitrary control. In the southwest the Indian blood is of that indomitable race, the Auracians, who resisted the Spanish soldier for centuries, and in Chile have won recognition as an important and valued element of the Chilean people.

Between the Argentines of the poorer class and the class that by virtue of intelligence, ability, education, and wealth rule the country, is a great gulf, to be filled in the future by the agricultural population that will occupy the immense estates now held by a relatively small number of great families. In the evolution of the people, the selection of that farming class is of the highest importance to the quality of the future race. The conditions are not now favorable for immigration is unrestricted, selection is not thought of. Neither is the number of smaller farms growing rapidly, for lands are expensive and their subdivision proceeds slowly. But there are forces working inevitably toward changes which in another generation will strengthen Argentina by establishing the prosperous middle class of citizens she now lacks.

Among the leaders of the nation stand the heads of those families who won their right to leadership in the long warfare for independence and national unity. That struggle ended when Mitre and Roca mutually relinquished their opposing aspirations to the presidency and placed the welfare of their country above party service and ambition. The generation which was then in its boyhood now governs and grapples with the problems of national development that have assumed stupendous proportions. I do not refer to the political questions that divide conservatives and radicals of various degrees, but rather to those which relate to the development of the national domain by national or by private enterprise. Here we touch the conditions that will affect

the destinies of Argentina long after the factional strife of the hour is forgotten. There are in the counsels of the government far-sighted statesmen who are striving with intense devotion to meet the issues of the hour in the way that shall guard and promote the future greatness of the nation. Their difficult task is rendered more difficult still by conditions incident to the development of the young nation. The lack of knowledge of the country and its resources is one. Another is the lack of trained investigators of Argentine nationality, which is due not to want of ability but to disinclination of the able young men to enter on scientific careers, other than that of medicine. In the latter as in law they have demonstrated brilliant ability. It is to be hoped that they will soon prove themselves equally competent in engineering and the natural sciences. Argentina needs them.

THE ADAPTABILITY OF THE WHITE MAN TO TROPICAL AMERICA

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The tropical portions of America and Africa, as every one knows, are the richest unexploited regions in the world. If ever they are to be developed the work must apparently be done by people of European origin, for the native races seem incapable of doing it alone, and Europe and America are scarcely willing to leave the task to Asiatics. Yet in spite of innumerable attempts during the past four hundred years the problem of the adaptation of the white races to a tropical environment still remains one of the most serious that has ever confronted mankind. Shall the white man forever be an outsider, a mere exploiter, or shall he become a permanent denizen of the regions which he develops? This question has been debated so often and so vainly that the present discussion would scarcely be warranted, were it not for two reasons. In the first place, certain phases of the subject do not seem to have received due attention; and, in the second place, recent investigations suggest a new way whereby at least a part of the truth may be discovered. The question to be solved is briefly this: Modern medical science is rapidly enabling the white man to combat the diseases which have been so deadly in tropical regions. In other ways, also, we are learning to overcome the disadvantages of a tropical environment. Does this give us ground for believing that races of European origin can dwell permanently within the tropics and retain not only their health, but the physical energy and mental and moral vigor which have enabled them to dominate the world? The success which has thus far been attained in this attempt can scarcely be considered encouraging, but is that any reason for discouragement in the future?

In order to make our discussion concrete, let us limit it to South and Central America, and to that portion which lies within twenty degrees of the equator. By taking this latitude as a boundary we exclude Rio de Janeiro and the southern part of Brazil, where most of the strength of that country lies, although far the greater portion of the actual area lies within our boundaries. We may also exclude the City of Mexico, although it lies slightly less than 20° from the equator. This leaves southern Mexico, Central America, Columbia, Venezuela, Guiana, Ecuador, Peru, Bolivia, and all except the most progressive part of Brazil. These countries have an area of nearly 5,000,000 square miles, or fully one and one-half times as much as the United States. The population is estimated at only 35,000,000 or 40,000,000. In this vast area the number of genuine white men, that is, people of pure European race, is only a few million, and most of these are confined to the seacoast, or to relatively small areas among the mountains. An area of 4,000,000 square miles is today practically untouched by the white man, except when he comes temporarily in the character of an exploiter, or as an official of one of the South American republics. Nowhere else in the world does there appear to be so vast an area which at the same time contains so few people, and has such enormous latent wealth. It is no wonder that travelers grow enthusiastic over it, and that those who believe that through the elimination of disease the white man will be enabled to live here, are convinced that a wonderful future is in store for it. This is probably true, but before these countries can rival those of temperate regions we must know vastly more than is now the case as to how man is influenced by his environment. Today the most advanced regions within the limits here defined are typified by southern Mexico, with its happy-go-lucky peasants and banditti; Guatemala, with its unchanging, stolid Indians, who literally will not work so long as they have anything to eat; Nicaragua and Honduras, with their constant revolutions; Ecuador, with its callous indifference to the direst plagues in its own ports, and Peru, where in spite of the culture of the small number of Spanish inhabitants,

the vast majority are utterly illiterate. We are apt to blame the people of these tropical countries for their backward condition, but in that we sadly wrong them. They are not backward because they want to be so, and they would gladly make progress if they could. Something holds them back against their will, and we who have the good fortune not to be thus held back can do no greater service either to ourselves or to them than to discover exactly what that something is. In order to do this, the first requisite is a clear understanding of our problem. Therefore it will be well to review some of the conditions which for ages have acted as handicaps to every race whose lot has been cast in tropical America. Let us first consider the effect of these conditions upon primitive people, and then see how far there is a reasonable prospect that the white man can overcome them. Some of the conditions which we shall consider are familiar, and have been much discussed, but others have received relatively little attention.

To begin with one of the most familiar topics, the ease with which a living can be made is constantly cited as one of the reasons for the backwardness of tropical people. The importance of this among lower races can scarcely be questioned. If the traditional palm-tree will support a family, the members of that family are not likely to work, except under some unusual impulse. The necessity to provide for a cold winter, or for a long dry season, does not trouble them. Clothing may be desirable because it is the fashion, and because it serves as a means of adornment, but it is not a real necessity. A warm house is equally unnecessary, and a shelter from the rain can quickly be made with a few poles and palm leaves. Where such conditions prevail, progress is almost out of the question, since there is no stimulus—nothing to promote ambition or energy. In Central and South America, however, this most exploited hindrance of equatorial countries seems to be of relatively small importance. In certain regions, to be sure, the means of supporting life can be obtained with great ease, but this is limited to restricted areas, chiefly near the coast, or on the slopes of the mountains. Elsewhere, which means in by

far the larger part of tropical America, the case is quite different. Although a small number of people can support a precarious existence in primitive fashion, their lot is by no means easy, and the population cannot become dense, nor can it greatly advance in civilization, because as yet no means have been devised whereby a large number of people can procure a living.

This is due to the conditions of agriculture. The ease, or rather the difficulty, with which agriculture can be carried on in tropical countries is greatly misunderstood. The ordinary traveler sees the luxuriant vegetation and infers that crops can be raised with great ease. Noting, however, that in the few places where fields are cultivated they are usually full of stumps, bushes and large weeds, he promptly accuses the natives of shiftlessness. He sees too that a field is cultivated this year and abandoned next, and proceeds to berate the natives for lack of persistence. He fails to realize that throughout large portions of tropical America agriculture is so difficult that even the white man has not yet learned to carry it on. He may raise bananas and coffee in a few limited areas, but he does not do this in the worst places. Moreover these crops are much easier to raise than are the staple crops which have to be planted every year. I do not mean by this that he could not raise the staple crops, provided fevers did not exclude him from large areas, but merely that he has not yet done it. In the regions to which I refer, that is, such places as large portions of the Amazon Basin, rain falls at almost all times of the year, and the dry season is so short, or at least so interrupted by showers that the forests always remain damp, and vegetation grows with extraordinary luxuriance. Any one who has tried to keep a garden free from weeds during a rainy summer will appreciate the difficulty, but his task is incomparably easier than that of the denizens of the tropics, for he has the winter to help him. Moreover he can cultivate his land every year instead of intermittently.

As an example of the difficulties of agriculture, let us take the Pacific slope of Guatemala, which is by no means the wettest part of the country. I traversed the region in

March, 1913, in the middle of the dry season. The people had recently finished the work of making the season's clearings. The traveler in such a region wonders at first why everyone seems to be clearing new fields. The reasonable thing would seem to be to burn the corn stalks and weeds, and cultivate the old fields again, but this is not done. After a field has once been cultivated it is allowed to lie fallow for four years. The first crop is abundant and requires a relatively small amount of labor, but if the same field is planted a second time, the crop is very scanty. Apparently the soil is quickly exhausted, perhaps because of rapid weathering under the influence of constant heat, and rapid leaching because of constant moisture, or perhaps because of certain bacteria which flourish in tropical climates and break up the nitrogenous elements of the soil thus destroying their value as plant-food. Plowing might perhaps help matters, but it is very difficult—far more so than in temperate regions. In the first place, when a field is newly cleared the roots and stumps prevent plowing. If the field is left until the stumps have rotted, new plants grow up to such an extent that a fresh clearing is necessary, and the process of plowing is still very difficult. At the end of the first year after an ordinary field has been sown, plowing is out of the question except where the most advanced methods are available, and it is of no use to burn the fields over and plant a new crop, for the return will not justify the labor. Hence, after one cultivation, fields must be allowed to lie fallow for about four years. During this period the bushes grow to a height of ten to twenty feet, according to the amount of rainfall, and the ground recovers its vitality. Then the bushes are again cut and allowed to dry, and when the land has been burned off a good crop may be raised. Evidently the clearing and burning of the bushes are essential parts of agriculture. If the dry season is long, this process is easy, for three weeks of steady sun suffice to dry all but the larger trunks sufficiently so that they can be burned. If showers fall every day or two, however, the trees and bushes have little chance to dry. This happened in 1913 in Guatemala, and I saw many fields where the

vegetation had been cut but could not be burned. After the dry season was over, it was useless to attempt to burn the brush, for even if it had been dry enough the new vegetation, which had instantly sprung up, was sufficient to prevent burning. Without burning, it would have been useless to plant corn, for the native vegetation would have strangled it. Hence in many cases the people raised no corn crop that year.

Conditions of this sort prevail not only in large parts of Central America, especially on the east side, but throughout much of the Amazon Basin. Just how large the area is, it is impossible to say, but probably 2,000,000 or more square miles is no exaggeration. In all this region, then, it has hitherto been practically out of the question to clear the forest and get it dry enough to burn. Hence agriculture has been impossible, and will remain so until the white man introduces wholly new methods. This he will doubtless do, but the task will not be easy. I would emphasize once more that although the white man has shown himself able to raise bananas and coffee on the borders of the moist tropical areas he has not done so in the worst portions. Moreover, he has devoted himself to special crops which yield a large return in proportion to the labor, and which do not have to be planted every year. They will always be important as luxuries, or even necessities, in northern countries, but they cannot be the primary food crops of a dense population. The primary crops, for the most part, must be planted each year, and this involves the plowing of the land, or else the cutting and burning of the bushes in order to give the seeds a chance. This can of course be done if sufficient effort is expended, but the fact remains that throughout a large part of tropical South America the task is so difficult that neither the white man during the past four hundred years, nor the native races during thousands of years, ever seem to have accomplished it in such places as the great Amazon Basin.

Before passing on to more important matters mention should be made of another factor which prevents people from living permanently in certain portions of the tropics

and from developing a high civilization. The difficulty in this case arises from the unequal distribution of the rainfall during the various seasons of the year. For instance, portions of the vast grassy plains, or Llanos, of the Orinoco Valley are almost impassable at certain seasons, because they are flooded by the heavy equatorial rains. Yet, during the long dry season, which here prevails during our winter months, those same plains become so dry that in many places it is impossible to get water except by digging deep wells. The difficulties which here confront agriculture are so great that the native races have never succeeded in surmounting them. In fact before the introduction of cattle, agriculture was quite impossible for another and wholly different reason. There was no means of breaking up the sod, which is an essential prerequisite, if crops are to be raised. Even the white man has found agriculture so difficult that he has rarely attempted it, and has utilized the plains only for cattle raising. This also is beset with many difficulties, because of the superfluous supply of water and mud at some seasons, and the drought at others. In still other regions, although a fairly dense growth of jungle covers the ground, the water supply presents a serious difficulty, for during the long dry season most of the springs disappear; hence deep wells are necessary and these are a difficult matter for primitive people, not well equipped with iron tools. This, it is true, has little direct influence upon the white man, but indirectly, as we shall soon see, it adds its quota to his difficulties.

The fact that in large portions of tropical America it has thus far been impossible for any large number of people to obtain a living has most important consequences in more favored regions. Among the factors which most promote progress, the intercourse of race with race holds a highly important place. Even the most active and energetic community is likely to stagnate if left to itself. In tropical regions the conditions which have just been described render intercourse peculiarly difficult. Where vast areas are uninhabited because of dense forests and the consequent difficulty of agriculture, and others because of floods and excess

of water on the one hand, or the long dry period on the other hand, it is clear that the places where people can live are likely to be very much scattered. The dense forest is almost impassable. It is usually the haunt of dangerous wild beasts, and it presents a barrier quite as effective as lofty mountains or sandy deserts. The swamps and mud due to excessive floods are not quite such serious barriers, since they disappear during the dry season. Even then, however, difficulties arise, for the distance from water to water is often great, and there are no villages where food and shelter can be obtained. Thus intercourse is hindered not only by mountains, seas and the ordinary obstacles which play a part in the temperate zones, but by other and even more efficient obstacles. Hence the primitive inhabitants of tropical America have had little intercourse with one another, and have not had the advantage of the constant stimulus derived from contact with new ideas and habits. This would seem to be one of the important reasons why the people of the tropics have remained backward. Even today it is producing important results. Wherever white men have settled in tropical America they are isolated. Peru, for instance, has little communication with the rest of the world; the same is true of Ecuador and Columbia, and, to a less extent, of Venezuela. This is partly due to their mountains, but far more to the fact that the great plains to the east of them are even now practically impassable. If the plains of the Amazon Basin were as easily crossed, and as densely inhabited as the plains of Illinois and Iowa, Peru would be almost as much in touch with the rest of the world as is California.

Thus far we have spoken of some of the handicaps which apply to primitive people, but which can ultimately be overcome by energetic races of northern origin. There is one way, however, in which for a long time to come these conditions will act as a handicap even to the Northerners. Partly because of them, and partly for other reasons, the native inhabitants of Central and South America, that is, the Indians, are very backward. They are dull of mind and slow to adopt new ideas. Perhaps in the future they

will change, but the fact that they have been influenced so little by four hundred years of contact with the white man does not afford much ground for hope. Judging from the past, there is no reason to think that their character is likely to change for many generations. Until that time comes they will be one of the white man's greatest obstacles. Experience in all parts of the world shows that the presence of an inferior race in large numbers tends constantly to lower the standards of the dominant race. This can scarcely be emphasized too strongly. Here in America we know to our cost that the presence of the negro, even though he forms only a ninth part of the population, is one of our gravest problems. If he could be eliminated from the southern states, their future would be much brighter than is now the case. Yet they are not so great a handicap, apparently, as the native races of Central and South America. Whatever the negro may have been when he was first brought to America, he is certainly now far less stolid and indifferent, far more subject to stimulating influences than the Indians of tropical America. It is literally true in Guatemala, for instance, that the more an Indian is paid the less he will work. If one day's pay will buy two day's food, he will work half the time, if the pay is increased so that one day's pay will buy food for three days, he will work one-third of the time. The experiment has been tried again and again, and there is practically universal agreement as to its result. The most considerate employers of tropical labor agree with the most inconsiderate in saying that in general it is useless to attempt to spur the Indians by any motive beyond the actual demands of food and shelter. Kindness and consideration on the part of the employer undoubtedly promote faithfulness, but they seem rarely to arouse ambition or energy. With the negro, as everyone knows, somewhat the same condition prevails, but by no means to so great an extent. In Central America, for example, it is generally thought that a negro from Jamaica is somewhat more efficient than an Indian, while a negro from the United States is much more efficient. The negro in the United States is generally considered to be more efficient than he was in

Africa, whereas the Indian of tropical America, staying in his old environment, does not seem to have changed. Doubtless the change in the negro is due to a new social environment quite as much as to a new physical environment, and many authorities believe that the change in social environment is vastly the more important of the two. This, however, does not materially alter the case. As conditions are now, it is manifestly impossible to change the physical environment of the Indians so long as they remain in their present habitat, and it seems to be extremely difficult, also, to change their social environment. Those who dwell permanently in the white man's cities are influenced somewhat, but here as in other cases, the general tendency seems to be to revert to the original condition as soon as the special impetus of immediate contact with the white man is removed. I think we may fairly say that this has been the case almost everywhere within twenty degrees of the equator. Here again I would not be understood as saying that it will necessarily continue thus, but merely that the process of change is bound to be very slow. The aborigines show no sign of disappearing, or of being swallowed up by a multitude of immigrants, as has been the case in temperate latitudes. On the contrary there appears to be a general impression that in the equatorial countries of Latin America the proportion of Indian blood is increasing at the expense of the pure white. This is because the white man, except perhaps in a few favored places, suffers from tropical diseases far more than does the native, and unless he is wise enough to adopt the latest discoveries of medical science his children die or grow up weak. It is notoriously true that in India there is almost no such thing as a fourth generation of Indian-born British. The original stock is so weakened by tropical conditions that the children must either be sent back to Europe to recover their health, or else they become enfeebled and their descendants soon die out. Even with the help of modern medical science, it is far from certain that the number of permanent white inhabitants of the tropics can increase greatly, and there is reason to think that that same medical science may do much to prevent

the death of children among the natives, and may thus gradually increase their numbers. Such an increase of the natives has already occurred in India, not so much because of the conquering of diseases, as because of the prevention of famine.

If the conclusion just reached is correct, we seem to be justified in the further conclusion that for a long time to come tropical America will contain a dull, unprogressive Indian population. The presence of such a population will constantly expose the white man to a most deteriorating influence. For example, the inferior mental ability of the lower race, and its incapacity for effective organization is almost sure to lead to the abuse of its labor and to its exploitation in some form of peonage, even though the fact may be disguised by legal phraseology. Again, the presence of a despised race, which cannot easily retaliate when imposed upon, is almost certain to lead to low sexual morality. In the same way, political equality is almost certain to become a mere form of speech, for the dominant race will not permit the other to gain rights at its expense. Manual labor, too, will be despised, for it will be associated with the idea of an inferior race. All these things may be looked upon as disadvantages of the lower race rather than of the higher, but I believe that the higher race reaps by far the greater injury. The conditions which have just been mentioned appear to be among the most potent factors in rendering it difficult for the white man to attain as much success in tropical regions as in those farther to the north or south. Their evil effect is roughly proportional to the difference between the two races. That difference is at a maximum where a low tropical race remains in its original, unstimulating environment, and is brought in contact with immigrants of a highly developed race who completely change their environment. The newcomers are released from old restraints at the time when they come into contact with conditions which make a peculiar demand for exactly those restraints. Hence, instead of being stimulated to greater political freedom and equality, sterner morality, and more intense industry, as was the case among the settlers in New

England, the immigrants who come from the North to tropical America are in danger of being weakened in all of these respects. The effect on the original immigrants is bad enough, but on their children it is far worse. The settler, or European colonist, possessed of wealth and power, can to a slight degree shield his children from the deteriorating influence of the natives, but even in such cases children are in constant contact with servants. They grow up with a supreme contempt for the natives, and at the same time with the feeling that they can treat them as they choose. If poorer people, that is, colonists in the ordinary sense of the word, attempt to live in the tropics in large numbers, especially if they are people who work with their hands, their children are exposed still more to all the contaminating influences of contact with the natives. Hence the second and third generations, and the fourth and fifth, if there are any, suffer more than their ancestors.

Thus far we have been dealing with external handicaps; that is, with those which may have an important effect upon the white man, but which are outside him. Let us turn now to others which touch him more vitally. The first of these is tropical diseases. This subject has been so much discussed that I shall here refer to it only briefly. There can be little doubt that malaria, and the many other diseases which are characteristic of tropical countries, have much to do with the low state of civilization in those regions. The old idea that the people who live in tropical regions are immune to local diseases is no longer accepted by students of tropical medicine. Adults, to be sure, are often immune, but apparently this not true of the race as a whole. Vast numbers of children die in infancy and early childhood from the same diseases which prevent the white man from permanently living in the tropics. Others suffer from the diseases, but recover. They bear the results with them to the grave, however, in the form of enlarged spleens, or other grave injuries to the internal organs of the body. The world has of late years been astonished at ravages of pellagra and other diseases due to such organisms as the hookworm. We have found that people who are subject

to them cannot be highly competent. Their mental processes, as well as their physical activity, are dulled. So long as a community is constantly afflicted with such disorders, there is little hope that it can rise high in the scale of civilization. All this is now universally recognized, and need not here be further amplified. Nothing is more hopeful for the tropics than the rapid progress which has been and is being made in the control of these diseases. If they could be eliminated, not only would the white man be able to live permanently where now he can be only a sojourner, but the native races would probably be greatly benefited. How great this benefit would be we cannot yet tell, but it is highly probable that the elimination of the diseases which especially affect children in the tropics would do much to increase the vitality, energy and initiative of the native races. This in itself would be an immeasurable boon not only to the natives themselves, but to the white man, who would thereby be freed in part from some of his worst social dangers.

This highly desirable result cannot be obtained quickly. We hear it said sometimes that the achievements of the United States in Panama prove that diseases can be eliminated anywhere in tropical countries. This is true, but it must be remembered that Panama is a highly specialized case. During the building of the Canal a great number of people were collected into a small area, and enormous sums of money were freely expended. Everyone, too, was subject to strict, semi-military rule, and similar conditions will presumably continue under civil rule. Such methods cannot be applied to millions of square miles. The expense would be absolutely prohibitive. The ordinary farmer in tropical regions cannot expect to be protected by his government. He must protect himself. In the long run even tropical races may learn to do this, but it will be a difficult and expensive matter, and will require a radical change in the people themselves. That change will doubtless come, but not for generations, and not until a long selective process has gone on whereby those who do not adopt modern

medical methods for preserving health will be gradually eliminated, while those who adopt them will persist.

We now come to what seems to be the most important portion of our subject. It is likewise the portion as to which we must speak with the most hesitation. We may hope that the white man will ultimately cultivate the forests, traverse the waste places, elevate the native races, and conquer the diseases of the tropics, but will he do this as a genuine colonist, or as an outsider whose mind is always full of the idea of getting back "Home?" The answer depends largely upon the extent to which he can permanently retain his physical, mental, and moral vigor—not merely for a few years, but for generations. Hence we are led to inquire whether aside from the specific diseases which can be eliminated, there is anything in a tropical climate which prevents a vigorous development of civilization. I realize that in entertaining this possibility I am going counter to the opinion of practically all anthropologists, and I am not at all confident that I have reached a final solution. All that I can do is to present certain facts which have lately been discovered, and show what seem to be their logical consequences. These facts seem, at first sight, most discouraging. They apparently indicate that even though the diseases of tropical regions be overcome, northern races cannot there be as efficient as they are in their own habitat. In hot climates man appears to be handicapped by a definite lowering not only of his physical energy, but of his mental activity and moral vigor. I would hasten to add, however, that this does not mean that this inhibition of activity cannot be counteracted. It may perhaps be no more formidable a handicap than are tropical diseases, although its elimination will probably not take place so quickly.

Before coming to the causes of such a climatic inhibition, let me call attention to one of the most notable and regrettable effects of a tropical environment. This is the lack of will power which is almost everywhere displayed by a large proportion of the northerners who come to equatorial regions.

It manifests itself in four special ways, namely, in relative lack of industry, in an irascible temper, in drunkenness, and in sexual indulgence. For the present we are not concerned with whether these things are due to physical or social environment. Doubtless the two work together. The point upon which to fix attention is that for some reason self-control, which is merely another name for will power, seems to diminish among practically all people who go to tropical countries.

In the amount of work accomplished, that is, in the quality known as industry, the difference between people in tropical and other climates is very noticeable. Practically every northerner who goes to the torrid regions of America says at first that he works as well as at home, and that he finds the climate delightful. Little by little, however, even though he retains perfect health, he slows down. He does not work so hard as before, nor does the spirit of ambition prick him so keenly. If he is on the low, damp seacoast, the letting down process is relatively rapid, although its duration may vary enormously in different individuals. In the dry interior the process is slower, and on the high plateaus it may take many years. Both in books and in conversation with inhabitants of tropical regions one finds practical unanimity as to this tropical inertia, and it applies both to body and mind. After long sojourn in the tropics it is hard to spur one's self to the physical effort of a difficult mountain climb, and it is equally hard to force one's self to think out the various steps in a long chain of reasoning. The mind, like the body, wants rest. Both of them can be spurred to activity but the activity exhausts one's vitality. When we come to the explanation of this well recognized inertia, however, there is much divergence of opinion. One man will say that within the tropics the northerner does not need to work so hard as farther north, because salaries are higher; another says it is because servants are cheap; still another claims that hard work is dangerous to the health, and almost all agree that "anyhow one doesn't feel like working down here." Probably all four of these factors coöperate and each, doubtless, produces pronounced

results, but the last two, that is, health and "feeling," seem to be the most important when many generations are taken into account. In spite of individual exceptions, it seems to be generally true that white men who spur themselves up to work as hard within the tropics as they do at home are in great danger of breaking down in health. They become nervous and enfeebled, and are likely to succumb to some of the many tropical diseases. This is one of the most powerful deterrents to the development of an efficient white population in tropical regions. If the more energetic members of the community ruin their health, they are pretty sure to die before their time unless they go back to the north. Thus if white colonization takes place on a large scale in tropical America there is grave danger that the less energetic elements will be the ones to persist and to become the ancestors of the future population. The other factor, the feeling of inertia, may perhaps be interpreted by teleologists as a merciful provision of Providence to warn the white man that he must not work too hard in the torrid zone, but that will scarcely help to advance civilization. Few people will question the reality of the tropical inertia. It is the same lassitude which every one feels on a hot summer day—the inclination to sit down and dream, the tendency to hesitate before beginning a piece of work, and to refrain from plunging into the midst of it in the energetic way which seems to be natural under more stimulating conditions.

Lack of will power is shown by northerners in tropical regions not only in loss of energy and ambition, but in fits of anger. The English official who returns from India is commonly described as "choleric." Every traveler in tropical countries knows that he sometimes bursts into anger in a way that makes him utterly ashamed, and which he would scarcely believe possible at home. Almost any American or European who has traveled or resided in tropical America will confess that he has occasionally flown into a passion, and perhaps used physical violence, under circumstances which at home would merely have made him vexed. This is due apparently to four chief causes. One of these is the

ordinary tropical diseases, for when a man has a touch of fever, or of some other illness, and is afraid that he is in for a long siege, his temper is apt to get the better of him. In the second place, the slowness of tropical people is terribly exasperating. The impatient northerner uses every possible means to make the natives hurry, or to compel them to keep their word and do things according to their promises. His energy is usually wasted—the natives do not seem to be influenced at all, and the only visible result is an angry and ridiculous foreigner. Yet there are often circumstances where a show of anger and violence seem to be the only ways of getting things done, and this is frequently used as an excuse for lack of self-control. A third reason for choleric temper is found in the fact that the consequences of becoming angry are less dangerous than elsewhere, because the inert people of tropical America often submit to indignities which an ordinary white man would bitterly resent. Of course they resent ill treatment, and will retaliate if possible, but they generally do not have sufficient energy or cunning to make their vengeance effective against the powerful white man. Finally, those who have lived in the tropics generally find that, even when things go quite smoothly, and when they are in contact with people of their own kind and are in comparatively good health, they are on the whole more irritable than at home. In other words, their power of self-control is enfeebled. Of course there are many exceptions, but that does not affect the general principle.

Drunkenness, our third evidence of lack of self-control, need scarcely be discussed. The white man's alcohol in the form of rum is scarcely more injurious to the natives of Africa than is his alcohol in other forms in tropical America. In most portions of Central America the highly intoxicating drink known as "Agua ardiente" ("white-eye"), can be procured very cheaply. In some places, such as Guatemala and parts of Mexico, where I speak from personal experience, drunken men and women may be seen upon the streets at almost any time of day. Nowhere else, during extensive travels in America, Europe and Asia, have I ever seen so

much drunkenness as in Guatemala. Among the white men who go to tropical America a large number drink as badly as do the natives. Various causes for this can readily be seen. The drunkenness of the natives is partly due to the cheapness with which strong intoxicants can be prepared from the lees of sugar, or other sources. That of the white men arises partly from the constant heat which makes people want something to drink at all times, partly from the monotony of life, and still more from the absence of the social restraints which exercise so powerful an inhibitory influence at home. Back of all these things, however, among both the white men and natives, there seems to lie a certain enfeeblement of the will which may be closely connected with the physical inertia which prevents people from working hard, and with the lack of self-control which manifests itself in bursts of anger.

The last of the ways in which weakness of will is evident in tropical America is in the relation of the sexes. Upon this rock a large number of northerners are wrecked. It is due partly to the low standards of the natives themselves, partly to the mode of dress among the women, which constantly calls attention to their sex, and partly to the free open life which naturally prevails in warm countries. In addition to this there seems to be another reason. Either the actual temptation to sexual excess is greater than elsewhere, or else the inhibitory forces are weakened by the same effects which cause people to drink, to become angry, and to work slowly. Perhaps the matter can best be illustrated by a remark of a missionary of a small and extremely devout sect, a most austere man, whose whole soul was devoted to preaching the gospel. Speaking of Central America in general he said: "When I am in this country evil spirits seem to attack me. I suppose you would call it something else, but that is what I think they are. When I am at home in the United States I feel pure and true, but when I come here it seems as if lust was written in the very faces of the people." His experience is that of practically all northerners. The evil effects of undue sexual indulgence need not be discussed. I shall merely refer to

a remark of Gouldsbury and Sheane, in their authoritative book on the *Great Plateau of Rhodesia*. They hold that one of the chief reasons for the backwardness of the people of Rhodesia is that so large a part of their thought and energy, especially in youth, is swallowed up in purely sexual matters.

The serious evils mentioned in the preceding paragraphs, that is, a diminution of energy, outbursts of temper, drunkenness, and immorality, are ascribed by many people to social causes. I recognize the importance of this view and largely concur in it. Nevertheless, consideration of some statistics which I have recently compiled suggests that physical causes may play an equally important rôle. Two years ago, at a conference on Japan, corresponding to our present conference on South and Central America, I briefly mentioned certain investigations on the effect of different climatic conditions upon human activity. The problem which then presented itself was to make actual measurements of the effect produced by different climates. Obviously it is impossible to do this directly. It might, of course, be possible to measure the efficiency of two similar groups of people of the same race, age and general status, under different types of climatic conditions. The results, however, would be absolutely inconclusive. It would be impossible to determine whether any differences which were discovered were due to original differences in the people, to differences in their food, or to a hundred other variable factors. Another possible test would be to take a given group of students, for example, whose homes were, let us say, in southern Texas, but who were studying in the north. They could be tested while living in the north and again in the south, but here again the results would have little value, because the change from one place to the other would in itself create a difference in the minds of the subjects. It would also be practically impossible to make sure that their diet, occupations and general environment, aside from the matter of climate, were the same in both cases. After due consideration of these matters, the only practicable test, for the present at least, seems to be to take a group of

people—factory hands, for instance—and compare their efficiency from day to day. Their social environment, food and mode of life remain unchanged. Aside from changes in factory management, and other similar matters for which proper allowance can be made, the only changes which influence all the members of such a group are those connected with the weather, or with the coming of Christmas, or similar seasonal occurrences. By choosing people who are doing piece work which is recorded day by day, it is possible to determine the relative efficiency on days of any given temperature, or on damp days, windy days, and so forth. When such data are properly compiled they show how people would behave under all sorts of climatic conditions.

In pursuance of this object I have obtained the statistics of about 500 people for each day during the year. They were piece workers in factories in southern Connecticut, partly men and partly girls. In order to combine mental and physical work, I have also, through the courtesy of Professor Cattell of Columbia University, obtained figures for tests of three children upon the typewriter. The tests extended over a period of two years. They were made daily during the first year, and weekly during the second. A third line of evidence, purely mental consists of the daily marks of fifteen hundred students at the Military Academies at Annapolis and West Point. Thus we have tests of both physical and mental activity. Both types show the same phenomena. I do not here propose to discuss the results in detail, for they are embodied in a series of articles in *Harper's Magazine* and in a volume, entitled *The Distribution of Civilization*, shortly to be published. I shall merely give one or two conclusions.

The first and most important conclusion is that in spite of man's boasted independence of climate by reason of fire, clothing, and houses, he is influenced by the outside temperature in much the same way as are plants and animals. Biologists have long known that every species of plant grows best at what is termed its "optimum" temperature. Growth begins at a temperature a few degrees above freezing, but is then very slow. As the temperature rises the rate of growth

increases, slowly at first, then rapidly, and finally slowly once more until the optimum is reached. Then, if the temperature rises still higher the rate of growth begins to decline and soon falls off very rapidly.

Recent studies seem to show conclusively that animals are influenced by temperature in the same way as plants. In the case of the crayfish, for example, the matter has been investigated with great care. The curve of activity of such an animal closely resembles that of plants, although of course the optimum temperature varies according to the species. The method of investigation consists in measuring the amount of oxygen consumed in a given time at a given temperature, or the amount of carbonic acid given off. Other chemical reactions of the body have also been examined with similar results. The whole subject is in its infancy, but certain facts are already clear. The activity of an organism is closely related to the speed with which oxidation takes place, and the completeness and rapidity with which waste products are removed from the body. At low temperatures plants and cold-blooded animals cannot grow rapidly or be very active, simply because the various chemical processes of life cannot take place fast enough. As the temperature rises these processes all become more rapid, and the organism exhibits greater energy which manifests itself either in movement or in the laying on of new tissue. This continues until a point is reached where the chemical processes take place so fast and break down the tissues so rapidly that it is physically impossible for the organism to get from the air enough oxygen fully to oxidize the broken down materials. Unless these are oxidized they are not easily eliminated. Hence they accumulate in the body, and apparently act almost like poisons. As soon as this occurs the activity of the organism declines, and there is a correspondingly smaller necessity for oxygen. Thus a certain amount of oxygen is left unused by the fundamental life processes, and is available to oxidize and remove the injurious waste materials which have begun to accumulate. If an organism, because of strength of will, fear of enemies, desire for food, or some other stimulus, is unduly active at

high temperatures, it lays up within its own body a store of unoxidized and unexcreted waste materials which either lead to death, if the unfavorable conditions continue, or else necessitate periods of the least possible activity in order that nature may restore the disturbed balance. The whole matter is too complicated to be explained in detail, and it needs far more extensive study on the part of biologists. We do not yet know how the effects of temperature upon warm-blooded animals compare with those observed in cold-blooded animals and plants. Nevertheless the striking resemblance of the curves of physical activity of factory operatives and of mental activity of students, on the one hand, to the curves of plant growth and of physiological activity among lower animals, on the other hand, suggest that a close relationship between temperature and activity is a universal biological law.

For the people thus far tested, practically all of whom were descendants of the more progressive nations of north-western Europe, the temperature of greatest physical efficiency is 59° or 60° F, while for mental activity it may be somewhat lower. This conclusion is especially important because of the large number of people involved. It agrees with some results obtained by Lehmann and Pedersen in Denmark on the basis of three individuals. The fact that even when only a few individuals are tested, the relationship is apparent shows how universally the same law applies. The optimum temperature may vary according to the individual and according to the race, but the amount of variation is probably only a few degrees, and it makes no difference as to our present conclusions. The common idea that we are most active in cold weather is deceptive. To be sure, we are active when we are out in the cold, because we must keep warm, but the actual amount of work accomplished in winter is much less than in the spring and fall. Low temperature, however, does not seem to produce such lasting effects as does warm. It may cause the body to burn up its materials too fast, but it does not load it with harmful unoxidized waste, or in some other way inhibit activity. This apparently is why tropical

peoples have rarely been characterized by great achievements, and why the white man today is less efficient in the tropics than elsewhere.

In the lowlands of tropical America the temperature is everywhere above the optimum. This means that there is no escape from unfavorable conditions, and that the inhabitants of that region, no matter what their race, cannot be expected to be active in body and especially in mind, or strong in will so long as present conditions continue. This, however, is by no means the whole story. The work done by factory hands and others in Connecticut shows that another climatic element is of vital importance. In all the cases examined it was found that while the mean temperature is the most important of the climatic factors, the change of temperature from one day to the next has an influence which cannot be ignored, and which may be almost equally great. If the temperature today is the same as yesterday, people work comparatively slowly. If the temperature today is higher or, more especially, lower than yesterday, people are stimulated, and the stimulus is almost proportional to the amount of change. The only exception is that an extreme change appears to be too much, and does not produce proportionate results. The way in which the stimulus acts may be illustrated by a simple comparison. Consider the difference between the amount of ground covered by a horse that is allowed to go his own gait and by one that is gently urged at proper intervals. If the animal is constantly but slightly urged—as man would be by a temperature which is highly favorable, but which never changes—he will go fairly fast, but will at length become exhausted. If he is somewhat urged, however, and then allowed to go more slowly, and then urged again, he will cover the ground faster than if allowed to go his own jogging gait, and he will require less time for rest because he will be less exhausted. Apparently this is what happens to mankind in temperate regions. Change from season to season stimulates him, and then lets him fall back to a slower pace; change from day to day has the same effect, but on a smaller scale. Hence he is kept up to his work,

and therefore accomplishes much. In tropical America just the opposite happens. The mean temperature throughout most of the lowlands is above 80° F. Therefore the amount of accomplishment must be relatively small. This, however, is by no means the worst feature. Far more injurious is the fact that even in the mountains where the mean temperature often falls to a favorable level there is no appreciable seasonal stimulus, and no daily changes such as accompany our storms. Therefore the human horse gradually drops to a low state of efficiency. This is not mere theory—it is simply a logical application of what actually happens every year among the people of Connecticut and other parts of the eastern United States. If those people were put into a tropical environment, and all other conditions of their environment remained exactly the same as at present, their efficiency would drop greatly. By special effort they might remain for a time not far below their present level, but special efforts cannot last year after year without exhausting people's vitality. Whether the decrease in efficiency would be 10 or 50 per cent we cannot yet determine, but it is safe to say that it would be large. Nor is the mere decrease in physical activity the most important feature of the case. Since common experience shows that as a rule our minds work best when our bodies are in good health, and since our investigations show that physical and mental work are influenced in essentially the same way, it follows that the high temperature and lack of change in tropical America presumably weaken the power of man's mind. This, perhaps, accounts for the fact that almost no great ideas have ever been born and perfected within the tropics. The same sluggishness of mind which prevents the faculty of invention from being highly developed may account for the lack of will power which seems to be the greatest of all tropical handicaps.

Taken as a whole the results which have just been set forth seem at first sight most discouraging. They seem to imply that although the white man, coming temporarily as a sojourner, may overcome the physical obstacles of tropical America, and may learn to protect himself from tropical

diseases so that he can dwell there permanently, he must apparently face the fact that his vitality and, still more, that of his children, will inevitably be depressed. He will not be able to work as he did in more northern climates, and he cannot have the self-control and mental activity which he there possessed. He goes to the tropics with an inheritance vastly better than that of the aborigines, and this will stand him in good stead for many generations, but yet in the end his lot seems no better than theirs, for if he stays there permanently, he is in serious danger of slipping slowly backward, simply because he cannot make the strenuous exertions by which people in more favored regions are continually going on to some new achievement.

This discouraging view is by no means justified. It is like that of the poor laborers who went about in mobs to break up machinery when the steam engine was first introduced. They thought that machinery was taking the bread from their mouths. They little realized that it would put into the hands of their children hundreds of things which in their own day were possible only for the rich. The view of South America here presented is in reality extremely hopeful. Everyone recognizes that tropical regions are backward, and that, in spite of all our optimistic talk, we have made almost no progress toward any permanent occupation or development of millions of square miles of what are probably the most productive regions in the world. We must frankly face the fact that even the little progress which has been made in recent decades is almost entirely the work of men from the north, and that generally the important things are done by the first generation, or else by people of later generations whose lives have in good measure been spent in more favored regions away from their tropical homes. Four centuries ago the world stood face to face with the wonderful opportunity of a new world. For a hundred years almost nothing was done in the way of permanent colonization. Except for a few Spanish colonies Europe was content merely to explore and exploit. Then the temperate regions of North America began to be settled, and to grow great, and later their example was followed

by the temperate lands of South America. Today our attitude toward the less favored tropical portions of South and Central America is almost like that of Europe toward America as a whole three hundred years ago. In 1600 A. D. not a single successful colony had been established in what are now the most successful parts of the New World. That fact might then have seemed as discouraging as does our present lack of success within the tropics.

The comparison that has just been made does not quite cover the real conditions. We might better compare ourselves with a primeval group of naked, fireless, houseless savages who want to inhabit a land where the winters are long and cold. Such men would say that while an occasional man, hardier than his fellows, might stay in such a land through the winter, and while it might be possible for many people to go there in summer, permanent occupation of the country was absolutely out of the question. This view would not be at all unreasonable. Yet if some happy accident led one of the savages to discover how warm a man might be when he stripped the hide from a bear and threw it around himself, how quickly there would be a change of opinion. When fire became known opinion would change still more. And when some lucky genius discovered that a man could pile up stones or sticks and cover them with mud or skins or grass and thereby form a house which would keep out rain, snow and wind, and within which a fire could be made, would not the whole tribe laugh at their former lack of faith? Or rather would not each one say that he had always expected some such thing, and that he was on the very point of making a bearskin coat, inventing a house and discovering fire when someone else got ahead of him?

Today we are like these savages. We have long recognized that there is some fatal influence which has kept tropical regions from developing on a par with temperate regions. The vast majority of us believe that this is due to climate. Our trouble has been that we have not understood exactly how climatic influences work. We have not known whether they actually cause the human mind to deteriorate, or

whether they merely hinder its development. We have not known whether the white man can live and thrive in the tropics, or whether he must inevitably deteriorate. Only one thing has been clear, namely, that the most obvious tropical hindrance is the terrible prevalence of disease. This we have attacked, and our final success can scarcely be doubted, although there is a vast amount still to be done. We have reached the position of the savages after they discovered the use of clothing, but before they had learned to use fire and houses. Our next task is to find out more precisely how temperature and changes of temperature, together with humidity and other climatic factors, affect the human system. We must measure all sorts of physiological and psychological functions in terms of these factors, and we must be able to work out the exact measure of the influence of any given type of climate. Then we shall be ready to search for remedies. Perhaps we shall devise some means of varying our supply of oxygen. Possibly we shall give the people of tropical regions the necessary variety of climate by moving them in wholesale fashion from the mountains to the plains and back again at short intervals. Possibly we shall devise a plan whereby some means of creating the stimulus which now comes from the optimum temperature and from frequent changes shall be as much a part of a tropical house as a stove or furnace is a part of a house in regions with cold winters. All these are vague suggestions, but they indicate the sort of things that may perhaps be done. The future of South America depends largely on our success along these lines. We have conquered low temperature in large measure. Our next great task is to conquer the uniform heat of the lands within the tropics.

INDEX OF AUTHORS

BARRETT, JOHN C.....	19	HOWLAND, JOHN.....	95
BINGHAM, HIRAM.....	126	HUNTINGTON, ELLSWORTH.....	360
BINGHAM, HIRAM.....	216	MARTIN, SELDEN O.....	197
BOYCE, W. D.....	181	MONETA, JOSÉ.....	328
BRANDON, EDGAR EWING.....	307	MONTT, DAVID.....	299
BRANNER, JOHN C.....	235	NASMYTH, GEORGE W.....	321
BROWN, PHILIP MARSHALL.....	245	PEZET, FEDERICO A.....	1
CABRERA, LUIS.....	47	REYNOLDS, S. W.....	82
CALLAHAN, J. M.....	161	SHERRILL, CHARLES H.....	121
CHADWICK, F. E.....	108	TUCKER, GEORGE F.....	151
GRAHAME, LEOPOLD.....	290	WELLS, LESLIE C.....	104
HAMMOND, JOHN HAYS.....	176	WILLIS, BAILEY.....	342
HARDING, EARL.....	274	WINTER, NEVIN O.....	64
HART, ALBERT BUSHNELL.....	172	YANES, FRANCISCO J.....	30
HOLLANDER, JACOB H.....	263		

SUBJECT INDEX

- Anglo and Latin America: comparison of inhabitants, 4-10; conquest of Spaniards, 9-11; discovery of 3-4; geographic conditions, 11-12; immigration, 12-13, 16-18; international relations of, 1-18; political life, 14-18.
- Argentina: agriculture, grazing and commerce, 213, 340, 349-351, 355-357; area and location, 24; Argentine, nation, physical basis of, 342-359; forests, 340, 352-354; immigration, 359; national development, 137; neucleal region, 347-349; Paraguay, 299-300; Patagonia, 213-214; physical conditions 351-357; population, 24, 214; temperature, 213, 345-347; trade, 24, 213, 340-341; waters, 354-355.
- Bolivia: area, 24, 212; minerals, 212; physical conditions, 212; population, 213; transportation, 212.
- Brazil: area and location, 23-24; customs, 238-239; lack of American ships and steamers, 244; language, 237-238; North American trade in Brazil, some of the obstacles, 235-244; packing goods, 239-240; progress, 215; relation to Argentine, 299-300; tariff, 243-244; trade, 214, 235; transportation and labor conditions, 214.
- Central America: American intervention in, 245-262; arbitration between Guatemala and Salvador and Honduras, 245-246; Honduras, mediation in, 246; Honduras revolution and treaty, 248; Nicaragua revolution and treaty, 247-248; peace conference at Washington, 246-247; union, establishment of, 251-262; Washington conference of 1907, 249-251.
- Chile: area, 24, 212; minerals, 212; physical conditions, 212; population, 24, 212; trade, 212.
- Colombia: arbitration, its restoration, 284-289; area and location, 25; righteousness of Colombia's claims, 276-280; settlement with—in justice to the United States, 274-289; transportation, 210.

- Latin America: arbitration, 41-42; area, 31; civilization, a glance at, 21, 30-46; commerce, 20-21, 43-45; conquests, 9-11; "Corda Fratres" 325-326; cosmopolitan clubs, 324-325; discovery of America, 33-34, 183-184; education, 37-41, 307-320; geographic conditions, 11-12, 23, 32-33; inhabitants, 4-10; international relations, 321-327; nations, mind of Latin American, 299-306; political life, 14-18, 42-43; population, 23, 31; relations of United States with, 290-298; students in United States, 322-324; survey of, 24-26; tariff, 177; trade, 176-180, 300-302; transportation, 22; universities, 21, 34-35; 307-320.
- Mexico: causes of present situation, 64-81; democracy on trial, 95-103; Diaz, Porfirio, 74-77, 82-92, 105, 245; economic aspect, 51-55; Huerta, 92-106; Madero, 77-78, 88-91, 105-106; Mexican situation from Mexican point of view, 47-63, 82-94; political aspect, 55-63; population, 105-106; railroads, 49-51; situation as shaped by past events, 104-107; social aspect, 49-50.
- Monroe Doctrine: abandonment of, 126-150, 302-303; defense of, 143-145, 148-171; future of, 153-160; Germany and, 118; interpretation of, 154-160, 163-167; Latin American opinion of, 132-143; meaning of, 115-116, 127-132, 151-152; modern meaning of, 161-171; Monroe Doctrine from a South American view point, 121-125; necessity of, in the Caribbean region, 116-119; origin of, 108-111, 151, 161-163; present day phase of, 108-120; present need of, in South America, 112-114; 172-175; San Domingo and, 119.
- Pan America, 19-21, 122-125.
- Panama Canal: 19-21, 27, 116, 126-127, 155-156, 274-289; commerce, 27-28; cost, 189-190; effect, 216-234; effect of, upon west coast of South America, 213; exportation, 195-196, 226-231; "Free Port" and "Free City" 191-195; geographic condition, 220-224, 232; meaning, 27; optimism, 216-220; transportation, 222-234;
- Patagonia and Tierra Del Fuego, 328-341; agriculture 333, 335, 338, 340; area, 331, 335; climate, 331-334, 339; description of natives, 328-329, 339; dispute over boundary line, 330-331; education, 332; immigration, 335; irrigation, 331, 334; mining, 333-334, 337; population, 334-335, 340; transportation, 336, 337-338, 340-341.
- Peru: area, 24, 210; commerce, 211; intermountain region, 211; irrigation possibilities, 210-211; minerals, 211; population, 211-212; temperature, 211.
- San Domingo: administration of customs, 264-267; administrative difficulty and political agitation, 268-270; American intervention, 270-273; Dominican convention, and its lessons, 37, 273; readjustment, details of, 264.
- South America: climate, 183-184, 199; coal, lack of, 201-202; commercial condition, 181; economic facts and conclusions, 197-215; Geographic groups, 210-211, origin of people, 183-184; physical facts, 182, 198; population, 203-206, 214-215; tariff, 75; trade, 183-184; 206-209, 214; transportation conditions 183, 200-201.

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